Got I.D.?

Since Darwin's Black Box was published in 1996, many commentators have thoughtfully critiqued intelligent design. Not so John Derbyshire, whose recent article "But Is It Science?" (Feb. 14) is one long sneer. Aside from his claim that I.D. is hopelessly retro, Derbyshire's main complaint is that "I.D.-ers have been reluctant to submit their theories to peer review." Yet William Dembski's 1998 monograph The Design Inference was published by Cambridge University Press after thorough peer review. Several university presses were also interested in publishing my book, but I went with the Free Press, a trade publisher known for academic-quality books that challenge mainstream thinking. Before publication the Free Press sent my manuscript to be read by five scientists, none of whom questioned any of the scientific facts I cited to support the design argument and only one of whom recommended against publication.

Darwin's Black Box received more peer review than any of the several dozen papers I've published in technical journals. I've also responded to criticisms of intelligent design in peer-reviewed articles in philosophy-of-science journals. I had submitted the same articles to science journals but, like Mr. Derbyshire, they refused on principle to consider intelligent design.

Derbyshire quotes Kenneth Miller of Brown University, who wonders why I haven't presented my ideas to a meeting of the American Society for Biochemistry and Molecular Biology, as if I were afraid to do so. That's pretty disingenuous. Years ago Ken Miller and I wrote a joint letter to the ASBMB proposing a symposium on the topic of Darwinism/I.D. at one of their meetings. Besides an acknowledgment of the letter, we never received a response. I've presented seminars on intelligent design in front of any group that has invited me, including many university science departments.

The biochemistry upon which I.D. is based--none of it done by me--is solid. It is the logical structure of the design argument that raises truly intriguing questions, and the extra-scientific implications of the argument that raise hackles. For example, Mr. Derbyshire seems wedded to a conception of the Judeo-Christian God who is "remote from our comprehension"; he mistakenly thinks I.D. implies a "science-fiction God." But I.D. does nothing of the sort. At most I.D. is consistent with a God whose intelligent designs leave traces in the universe. It implies nothing about how remote or incomprehensible such a God may be.

Michael J. Behe

Lehigh University 

Bethlehem, Pa.