Give peace a chance.

Byline: The Register Guard

It's time for Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert to tactfully but firmly tell his staunchest ally, President George Bush, to butt out of Israel's diplomatic affairs.

Olmert, at Bush's urging, is refusing to take Syrian President Bashar Assad up on his offer to renew peace negotiations without preconditions. Assad has even agreed to conduct talks that don't hinge on the disposition of the Golan Heights, which Israel captured from Syria in the 1967 Six-Day War.

"Talk to Syria," Assad urged Olmert in an interview in an Italian newspaper. "Even if you think it's a bluff you have nothing to lose."

Bush has his own reasons for refusing to negotiate with Syria. He is adamant about maintaining his hard line with Syria and Iran in the wake of the Iraq Study Group's strong call for the United States to include those two nations in a diplomatic initiative to resolve the crisis in Iraq. The U.S. president is not about to roll over for an embarrassing foreign policy rebuke at the hands of his father's former secretary of state, James Baker, co-chairman of the study group.

The United States has made it clear to Olmert that it would be "inappropriate" for Israel to engage Syria at a time when Bush is demanding that Syria cease all activities that support the continuing chaos in Iraq. Furthermore, Bush considers Syria and Iran essentially as equal partners in an effort to thwart U.S. objectives in Iraq. That linkage has crucial implications for Israel, which is counting on U.S. help in curtailing Iran's nuclear program.

As important as U.S. considerations are to Olmert, this is one instance in which American and Israeli interests do not align. History should inform Olmert's reconsideration of Assad's overture.

In 1973, Prime Minister Golda Meir rejected Egyptian President Anwar Sadat's offer to negotiate peace with Israel in exchange for captured territory in the Sinai. Then, as now, America's foreign policy objectives figured in Israel's decision. The Yom Kippur War became the catastrophic consequence of Meir's intransigence. Three thousand Israelis were killed, and Israel still ended up relinquishing the Sinai and ultimately signing a peace agreement with Egypt.

Make no mistake - the possibility of a war between Syria and Israel increases in direct proportion to the escalating conflict in the region. Outright rejection of Assad's unconditional offer to negotiate sends a clear signal to Damascus that Israel would rather risk combat than con- versation.

And for what? The support of a lame duck U.S. administration with plummeting approval ratings?

Israel and the United States must be agile enough diplomatically to take advantage of the timing of Assad's offer. The screwballs in Iran are holding a Holocaust denial conference and renewing calls for Israel to be "wiped off the map." Assad has moved in the opposite direction, clearly seeking to distance Damascus from Tehran.

Without much effort, it's possible to see a high-profile, U.S.-supported peace summit between Israel and Syria as the wedge that completely isolates Iran in the region. Simultaneously, doors open to press Syria for important cooperation in dealing with Lebanon, Hezbollah and Hamas. Even if no progress was made on issues relating to Iraq, the potential benefits of productive negotiations between Syria and Israel are too great to ignore.

There is nothing more important to Israel's national interest than peace with its neighbors - not even the blessings of the United States. Israel has peace agreements in place with Egypt and Jordan. The Golan Heights provide an important bargaining lever with Syria.

Peace with Syria, next to Iran the most hostile and troublesome of Israel's enemies, would change the security dynamics for Israel on multiple fronts.

It may be impossible to achieve. But if war is the only other option, Assad is right.

What does Israel have to lose?