Give it a chance.

No sooner did President Bill Clinton announce the imminent invasion of Haiti than he was attacked. No sooner did he call off the invasion than he was attacked. No sooner was the Carter-Powell-Nunn agreement with General Cedras made public than Clinton was attacked. The rules of engagement prohibited U.S. soldiers from stopping Haitian police atrocities; Clinton was criticized. The rules were modified, and the first U.S. casualty that results--as it must--will bring another round of protest.

U.S.-Haitian relations are a conundrum, a problem admitting of no satisfactory solution, as we may well see. Clinton's turn from invasion to negotiation to cooperative occupation was chalked up to his flip-flop style. But for a president so obviously reluctant to invade--as his September 15 press conference conveyed--the chance for last-minute negotiations was a chance not to be missed. That Cedras and company got a better deal then they deserved should not obscure the fact that neither American nor Haitian lives were lost as U.S. forces landed. That is no small achievement. Critics of the down-to-the-wire agreement argue that a military invasion would have swept the decks and created firmer ground on which to "restore" democracy. That's doubtful. If something like democracy is to take root in Haiti it is as likely to come with a peaceful arrival as a bloody one. It will be a long haul in either case.

And there are those who argue that the United States should not be in Haiti at all. They have a case. In part it rests on the president's failure to go to Congress as invasion plans took shape. A negotiated presence may be a welcome ex post facto excuse for this lapse, but it should not hide the constituional breach that has occurred. But the case of the anti-interventionists has other consequences as well. Were they ready to face the repercussions of a hands-off policy? Lift the international embargo. End support for the return of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide. Acknowledge that protesting the torture, the rapes, the murders, the assassinations, and the human rights violations would be nothing other than empty protests. Finally, live with the verdict that Haitians are irredeemably indentured to their class-bound economic and political system, under which the vast majority live in virtual slavery.

Certainly the most compelling justification for an invasion was to bring a halt to the mayhem perpetrated by Haiti's military. "An army of occupation" is how one Haitian described it to Larry Rohter of the New York Times (September 25, 1994). This assessment was obviously shared by the thousands of Haitians who turned out to welcome the "invading" forces, and who, at least for the moment, feel some semblance of security under the eyes and guns of U.S. soldiers.

Now that United States forces are there, expectations should be modest and clearly focused. The United States and its international allies cannot establish democracy in a country that has never had it, but their presence at least allows democratic processes to move forward. Aristide can be restored to office, along with legitimately elected members of the Parliament, many of whom are in hiding or exile. Aristide was a cautious economic leader when first in office and his return should bring aid, loans, and investments of the kind that will build infrastructure and allow a more equitable distribution of the island's resources. One development expert put the matter succinctly: "People here are not asking for anything extraordinary, only the things that you [Americans] have enjoyed since 1789, simple things: jobs, schools, lights, health care, water. For a peasant, a glass of clean water is a big thing."

The Haitian constitution provides for parliamentary elections at the end of this year and a presidential election early in 1996. Aristide cannot succeed himself and, in any case, has promised to turn power over to a duly elected successor. This gives him and the prodemocratic forces in Haiti approximately eighteen months to lay the foundation for democracy in Haiti. He must begin to make economic improvements sufficient to give hope to the poor and to solidify support for democratic institutions, while keeping the wealth of upper-class Haitians in the country. He must convince his followers that revenge will undermine democracy, while building a judicial system that insures that justice will be done. And despite the agreement with Mr. Carter, General Cedras and his fellow thugs should be inexorably pressed to leave the country.

Eighteen months is a very short time for Haiti and a very long time for Americans. Calls to bring home U.S. soldiers should be tempered by the real possibility that this time we might get it right and that this time the Haitians might achieve the democratic society for which they have long hungered. Their hopes and longings deserve our support.