GMLRS Unitary Battle Drill and the Ready First Combat Team.

1st Brigade Combat Team (1st BCT), 1st Armored Division, or the Ready First Combat Team, with the 2nd Battalion, 3rd Field Artillery (2-3 FA) in direct support (DS), deployed to Tal Afar in Western Ninewa Province in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) V The BCT then moved south to Ar Ramadi to relieve the 2nd Brigade, 28th Infantry Division (2-28 ID), Pennsylvania Army National Guard (PAARNG).

Because of the brigade's experience in Tal Afar, we were able to contrast the stark differences in the threat that can exist throughout the Iraqi theater of operations. These differences required us to employ new tactics and use new weapons, such as the M31 guided multiple-launch rocket system (GMLRS) unitary--a highly effective munition in the urban terrain of Ramadi.

The Threat and Terrain. While the brigade's area of operations (AO) spanned 180 kilometers north to south, the focus for fires was the provincial capital city of Ramadi. The daily threat to Coalition Forces included small arms fire, improvised rocket launchers and, of course, improvised explosive devices (IEDs).

The 40-square-kilometer city is made up of compact neighborhoods with winding streets and countless multistory buildings that provide the anti-Iraqi forces (AIF) cover and concealment. The area surrounding the city is significantly less populated but still has many homes among the farm land and palm tree groves. The Euphrates River and man-made Nassar canal compartmentalize the city but are not wide enough to seriously limit crossing.

Within the city, the enemy often synchronized attacks from multiple locations on Coalition Forces' patrols and fixed positions. AIF mortar and rocket teams fired from a variety of locations, both inside and outside urban areas.

Ramadi presented a significant increase in AIF activity and required the 1st BCT to employ more ground-fire support systems in addition to its DS battery. Such systems included 120-mm mortars, five lightweight countermortar radars (LCMRs), Firefinder radars and the hostile artillery locator.

Integrated with fixed-wing air support from the MultiNational Force-West (MNF-W), air-delivered munitions were employed on a regular basis to varying degrees of effects. Army aviation eventually was incorporated into the fire support and maneuver plans and provided mobile direct fires and a much-needed deterrent for enemy mortars.

No single asset proved to be the ultimate solution.

1st BCT's Introduction to GMLRS. A new capability available to 1st BCT upon arriving in Ramadi was the GMLRS unitary rocket. Providing general support (GS) fires in support of 2-28 ID, A/2-20 FA (MLRS) employed the M31 rocket. The M31 is a global positioning system (GPS)-guided rocket capable of delivering a 200-pound unitary warhead at ranges of 15 to 70 kilometers with extreme accuracy. The GMLRS unitary consistently outperformed its circular error probable (CEP) accuracy requirements during combat operations in Ramadi, making it an effective weapon in the dense urban terrain.

GMLRS unitary's high angle of fall and increased accuracy over conventional surface-to-surface munitions reduce the risk estimate distances (REDs) and collateral damage estimates (CDEs), making GMLRS unitary an extremely effective weapon in an urban environment. With most targets falling within 50 to 60 kilometers of the firing battery, Ramadi was in an ideal location to employ the munition.

What soon proved to be the "weapon of choice" in situations with troops in contact (TIC), GMLRS unitary required new procedures and the education of the maneuver task forces about this unfamiliar fire support weapon. The M31 was employed in MNF-W with limited use by the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR) during Operation Restoring Rights in Tal Afar and the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) in MultiNational Division-North (MND-N). The system was an unknown to the 1st BCT. We were fortunate to assume a system established by 2-28 ID and A/2-20 FA that allowed us to refine the process and end situations with TIC, usually with one rocket.

Target Selection and Fire Planning. Incorporating GMLRS unitary into the overall brigade plan and task force operations, as with any other fire support weapon, was important from the start. Including it in the attack guidance matrix (AGM) and understanding how to employ the munition ensured it did not get treated as a novelty but as a viable, timely solution for certain targets. Once trust in the weapon was established, maneuver commanders were as eager to employ it as any other system.

The desired effects--suppression, neutralization or destruction--must be considered for all indirect systems. GMLRS unitary is suited for precision targets making it ideal for TIC or the pre-planned destruction of a building or enemy weapon system. It is not suitable for counterfire or terrain denial fires, and its longer time-of-flight (TOF) for targets at greater distances makes it less desirable to engage fleeing targets.

For counterfire missions in the 1st BCT, speed was more important than pin-point accuracy, so we engaged counterfire targets with cannons or mortars. In terrain denial missions, the desired effects always could be achieved with less expensive high-explosive rounds.

Planning for GMLRS unitary from an observer or end-user standpoint is not much different than planning for fixed-wing or even cannon-delivered munitions. In selecting the M31, decision makers from the observer to the brigade commander must understand its effects on targets.

With its relatively low yield, the M31 can destroy certain parts of a building without reducing the entire structure. When fired using a time-delay fuze setting, GMLRS unitary has a one-meter penetration, allowing it to breach the roof of a building and detonate on the floors below without destroying the structure.

It can be fired in close proximity to troops with minimal chance of collateral damage to personnel or structures. The RED for GMLRS unitary is lower than the joint direct attack munition (JDAM) precision-guided munitions (PGMs): the guided bomb unit (GBU)-31 with a 2000-pound warhead, the GBU-32 with a 1,000-pound warhead and GBU-38 with a 500-pound warhead. Additionally, a mission can employ launchers against multiple targets to counter more than one threat.

All this is possible, however, only with precision target location.

GMLRS Unitary Battle Drill. As with any fire support weapon, the more preparation before employing it, the more effective the fire mission is. This does not mean all targets must be pre-planned, but it does mean processes should be rehearsed, and all nodes should be prepared to execute their tasks. If properly rehearsed and executed by a proficient sensor-to-shooter team, the process from request to "shot" can be executed within six minutes.

Despite the fact that GMLRS is a GS asset, regular, direct communications between the 1st BCT and the firing battery was essential. Both units must understand and constantly rehearse the battle drill.

When engaging targets with PGMs, accurate target location, to include altitude, is paramount. (When targeting buildings, the feature height or a three-dimensional target grid is critical.)

The target location error (TLE) is the key determinate of the risk to troops and collateral damage estimate. Minimizing the TLE is the difference between a target hit and a miss.

Because even minor inaccuracies can lead to tragic results, most grids are mensurated. (Mensuration determines the exact three-dimensional target location by applying mathematical algorithms to compare two images within the digital point position database, or DPPDB, of the same terrain iteratively until they match.)

For target mensuration, certain software must be employed for both planned and unplanned targets. Targeting specialists use systems based on the DPPDB, such as Dewdrop, Raindrop, and Rainstorm, to determine the most accurate target location. These assets are typically at the strategic level, however, and are not practical for use against time-sensitive targets (TSTs) or to support TIC.

In those situations, the precision strike suite-special operations forces (PSS-SOF) software provides data that is accurate enough to employ both Army and Air Force PGMs. See the articles "FOS with PSS Integrated--Nowhere for the Enemy to Hide" by Milton B. Smith in the September-October 2006 edition and "FA PGMs--Revolutionizing Fires for the Ground Force Commander" by Colonel Gary S. Kinne, et al. in the May-June 2006 edition.

We did not arrive in Ramadi with the required software or training, but we used the expertise of the Marine air/naval gunfire liaison company (AN-GLICO) forward air controllers (FACs) and Air Force joint terminal attack controller (JTAC) teams that operated with every maneuver task force. The JTACs provided on-the-scene targeting data using PSS-SOF.

Without this rapid method of providing a precise grid, verification of the target location would have increased the mission processing time significantly.

Once the observer sends the target grid, the battalion fire direction center (FDC) or brigade fires and effects coordination cell (FECC) transmits a digital call-for-fire (CFF) via the advanced FA tactical data system (AFATDS) to the firing battery FDC. Upon receipt of the fire mission, the battery FDC calculates and reports the TOF and its maximum ordinate (MO), which is the data required to initiate air clearances. The data also is transmitted to the requesting unit's AFATDS.

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The firing battery requires a total processing time of three to four minutes from the time the CFF is sent until the report of "Ready" by the launcher. Upon the command to "Fire," the launcher takes an additional 12 seconds to update the rocket's GPS before firing.

A mensurated (or PSS-SOF) grid is not required to initiate the GMLRS unitary CFF. If target mensuration is not available immediately, the observer can initiate a GMLRS unitary request with an approximate target location.

Once the mission is sent to the firing unit, the requestor can send refinements to the target grid without generating a new mission, provided those changes are within 100 mils of the original target laterally along the gun-target line. If already laid on an approximate grid, the launcher only will take an additional 25 seconds to relay on the new target grid, once the PGM receives the update. This is particularly useful in responding to TIC situations or engaging targets of opportunity--allowing the maneuver commander the flexibility to respond rapidly to changes in the tactical situation.

Initiating the CFF immediately provides the firing battery the data required to compute the MO and TOF. This allows the requesting unit to begin the air clearance process earlier, conducting it concurrent with the target's mensuration (or PSS-SOF calculation) and the launcher laying process.

Another technique to speed air clearance is to coordinate with the GMLRS unitary firing battery to predetermine the approximate TOF and MO data for set ranges. This information can be used to create a "cheat sheet" for the requesting unit to determine the range-to-target and begin air clearances based on the predetermined data. This technique can save valuable time, especially given the missile's long flight path and high altitude that, typically, requires clearance at higher echelons.

Once the airspace is cleared, the command to "Fire" is sent digitally via AFATDS to the firing battery.

Because these missions are never conducted in a "vacuum," requesting units must retain flexibility within their battle drill and rehearse for possible eventualities. FDCs and fire support elements (FSEs) must be able to react to changes and not sacrifice the firing capabilities of other systems while conducting GMLRS unitary missions. The ability to conduct counterfire and engage other targets with cannon, mortar, aviation or GMLRS unitary assets simultaneously is extremely important.

Guidance criteria can be set within AFATDS to facilitate simultaneous missions. However, there is no substitute for training.

Conclusion. This article is by no means an attempt to write doctrine or dictate procedure. The intent is to share the lessons we learned during our deployment and introduce FA professionals who may be unfamiliar with GMLRS unitary to this highly effective PGM.

GMLRS unitary proved its worth to the 1st BCT in Ramadi and will be an asset in other theaters. It should be included or, at least, considered in fire support plans.

During the year of our deployment, the I Marine Expeditionary Force (IMEF) oversaw the fight in MNF-W's AO. IMEF documented that 80 percent of the air munitions had effects on target as opposed to 98 percent of all GMLRS unitary fires--the highest of any fire support system in the AO.

The role of Artillery in the Army has changed drastically in the last 10 years and continues to change. By the time of this article's publication, the 155-mm Excalibur unitary may be in use in the Iraqi theater of operations. Employed along side GMLRS unitary, DS PGM cannon fires will complement any maneuver fire plan.

When much of the fighting takes place in populated, urban areas against an enemy who blends in with friendly locals, traditional artillery rounds are less applicable. Adapting to new technology and learning to implement it in support of the maneuver commander is absolutely necessary.

As fire supporters, we must learn to integrate new technology and not lose sight of the basics. Artillerymen must expand, not shift, their skills. The five requirements for accurate predicted fire, sound targeting and professional tactical and technical fire direction must be maintained and applied to every traditional and PGM fire mission.

As long as lethal operations continue in Iraq, commanders will require lethal fires. It is up to the Artillerymen to ensure these fires are timely and accurate and provide the desired effects. They now have the option of GMLRS unitary in urban operations.

Captain Andrew D. Lantz is the Fire Direction Officer (FDO) for 2nd Battalion, 3rd Field Artillery (2-3 FA), 1st Brigade, 1st Armored Division, in Giessen, Germany, currently deployed in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) 05-07. He also has served as a Battery FDO, Battalion Ammunition Officer and Service Battery Executive Officer in 2-3 FA. Captain Lantz has a BA in History from Purdue University at West Lafayette, Indiana.

Major Paul C. Weyrauch is the S3 for 2-3 FA. In his previous assignment he was the Fire Support Officer (FSO) for 1st Brigade, 1st Armored Division during OIF 05-07. His other assignments include Squadron FSO of 1-7 Cav; Commander of B/3-82 FA; and Assistant S3 for 3-82 FA, all in the 1st Cavalry Division at Fort Hood, Texas. He holds an MA in Campaign Planning and Strategy from the Joint Advanced Warfighting School at the Joint Forces Staff College at Norfolk, Virginia.

By Captain Andrew D. Lantz and Major Paul C. Weyrauch