Futuristic family of army vehicles losing momentum.

A looming defense budget crunch, a shift in military priorities and growing uneasiness about the state of technology are conspiring to disrupt the Army's largest ever procurement project, the Future Combat Systems.

The early signs that the Army began to seriously question the merits of FCS came more than a year ago, when Chief of Staff" Gen. Peter J. Schoomaker, warned that FCS would have to perform better than the Abrams tank. The FCS family of 18 vehicles, which are to be connected by a single command-and-control network, originally was intended to replace every combat platform the Army operates today.

The Army so far has committed $21 billion to the program, and expects to spend at least $100 billion more by the time all the pieces of FCS enter service in 2016.

Congress, for its part, recently began to sour on FCS after having stood behind it for the past three years. The House proposed cutting $400 million from the $3.4 billion FCS budget the Army requested for 2006. Earlier this year, the Armed Services Committee chastised the program in a lengthy report.

The committee says it is disappointed by rising costs and failures to deliver the promised technologies. Between fiscal years 2004 and 2009, the estimated cost of FCS rose from $19 billion to $30 billion. Other problems that HASC highlighted include "reliance on immature technology, over-dependence on contractors for program management and a lack of government systems engineering and cost analysis expertise."

"FCS has been hit from both sides at a four-way crossing," says Dan Goure, a defense analyst at the Lexington Institute. The war in Iraq, particularly, has cast a new light on high-tech weapons as a surefire means of beating the enemy. In non-traditional urban warfare, many observers contend, a system such as FCS could have limited value because it is based on the notion that light, speedy vehicles equipped with advanced sensors can replace heavy armor. With suicide bombs and buried roadside explosives killing U.S. troops in Iraq on a daily basis, Army leaders are questioning whether FCS can produce a "survivable" vehicle, Goure notes.

As a poster child for "network-centric" warfare, FCS epitomizes the military's over-reliance on technology. "Among the casualties of Iraq and Afghanistan is 'net-centric' warfare," says retired Army Maj. Gen. Robert Scales. This thinking also is gaining acceptance in the Marine Corps. "Technology can assist as an enabler, but this kind of war is always more art than science," says Lt. Gen. James N. Mattis, head of the Marine Corps Combat Development Command.

The committee report and comments by various lawmakers suggest that FCS budgets will become fat targets, he adds. "Congress will lop pieces off, slice and dice ... The view inside the Beltway is that FCS lacks a core."

The latest indication that the Army's confidence in FCS may be wavering is a decision to equip current tanks and armored personnel carriers with technologies that originally only were intended for new FCS vehicles. The Army describes this as a "spin-out" of FCS technology into the current force.

"Several technologies being developed for FCS will be adapted to current vehicles," says Richard McClelland, director of the Army Tank-Automotive and Armaments Command's research, development and engineering center.

An "active" protection system to counter rocket propelled grenades, for example, will be developed under the FCS program, but also will be installed on Abrams tanks, Stryker armored vehicles and Bradley personnel carriers.

Light ceramic armor plates now being designed for FCS will go to the legacy fleet as well. McClelland says. Another key component of FCS--a "common computer" used to process data and transmit information--also is being adapted for legacy vehicles. The 25th Infantry Division expects to operate a new vertical-takeoff unmanned aircraft that the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency now is developing for FCS.

The Army's emphasis on "spin-outs" is raising questions about the long-term political support for FCS. In its report, the Armed Services Committee criticizes the Army for failing to come up with a "single vision" of what it wants to be in the future. "It is not productive to have a vision of two future armies, one FCS-Army and the rest of the Army."

In this light, it would not be surprising if Congress began to progressively siphon more money from FCS to fund legacy programs, says Dean Lockwood, ground systems analyst at Forecast International, a market intelligence firm.

One of the biggest beneficiaries will be Stryker, which is a combat-proven system, a family of vehicles like FCS was designed to be, says Lockwood. "A huge fleet of newly designed FCS vehicles may never materialize."

If the "spin-outs" are successful, he adds, FCS could end up as a "hollow feeder program for new technologies."

One potentially devastating blow to FCS would be the substantial delay or even cancellation of the Joint Tactical Radio System, which often has been depicted as a linchpin technology that FCS needs for its high-speed wideband network. Lockwood predicts, however, that the Army could get by with commercial communications systems if JTRS didn't pan out.

But one congressional analyst who specializes in Army programs says JTRS could be a deal breaker. "I'm very concerned," he says. "Without JTRS, all you have is new vehicles."

Schoomaker, for his part, says he still has confidence in the program, although, he adds, "It's very clear that we have to refine FCS."

With FCS estimated to consume half of the Army's procurement dollars in the coming years, the service can expect sharper scrutiny and more pressure to show a return on this hefty investment.

Under the current schedule, the Army has until 2014 to field a fully equipped FCS brigade. The clock is ticking.