Future trends in precision arms development.

The changed nature of warfare due to lower operational densities in men and equipment and the switching from an area bombardment to selective bombardment of enemy targets has drawn special attention of experts to precision weapons. It is no mere chance that there have been many articles in the press devoted to one of the types of these weapons-artillery precision munitions. (1) Despite the divergent views contained in these articles, their authors as a rule agree in their appraisals of the Russian guided munitions (we are talking about the Krasnopol artillery shell) while some experts come up with harsh criticism. Specifically, V. Odintsov claims that "gambling on semiactive laser homing of the projectile" was "wrong" and the arming it with a high-explosive fragmentation instead of with a shaped-charge head was a mistake." (2) Are such rebukes justified and was this course of action in developing PM really a mistake?

Let us start considering these arguments from, as V. Odintsov put it, "a much simpler and physically obvious question" on whether it is possible "to inflict sure damage to armored vehicles without piercing their armor." It is noteworthy that considering this question V. Odintsov for some reason confines his arguments to tanks although it is a well--known fact that--while tanks are of course the most important armored targets-there is a long list of other armored vehicles. As analysis of force composition of the militaries of developed countries suggests, the number of various armored vehicles (IFV, APC, armored antitank and air defense weapon assets, armored command and weapon control vehicles, etc.) in combat and march formations of units is 2 to 2.5 times greater than the number of tanks. Therefore, it is hardly correct to appraise the efficiency of laser-homing projectiles with regard to tanks alone. As for the Krasnopol's damage and casualty effect with regard to such targets as IFV (APC), experiments sho w that the projectile pierces the armor and explodes inside the vehicle. Not only does this kill its crew but also deform its body beyond repair. Consequently, this projectile can effectively destroy vehicles that support tanks, deny tanks the infantry and direct fire support, knock out obstacle-clearing vehicles, and this solves practically half the task of repelling a tank assault.

The experience of firing practice shows that the extent of damage to a tank depends on whether its body remains intact or becomes damaged. Even if a projectile explodes outside the tank, the blast wave and fragments of the hull wound, kill or otherwise incapacitate its crew and disable or destroy the equipment.

Despite all the ironic remarks about "shaking" and disabling a tank without piercing its armor, experimental data show: it is first the projectile and then detonation products of the burster charge that deliver a powerful blow to the body of the target. This causes strong impact accelerations in its walls, assemblies and instruments (the personnel in this case is impacted by a "seismic" wave). Additional factors are the air shock wave generated by the tank's body and multiply reflected by it and high-intensity impulse noises that cause barotraumas to the ears and internal organs, as well as fragments of disintegrated equipment and the armor. At the same time, giving tanks stronger armored protection and providing them with dynamic protection have considerably degraded the effectiveness of traditional-type shaped-charge projectiles and necessitated a switch to a combined version. It has proven by now possible to implement this idea only in missiles for antitank guided missile systems. This is the reason why s ubcaliber projectiles are increasingly replacing shaped-charge rounds (the latter are being increasingly regarded abroad as second-rate munitions to be used against poorly armored targets).

The answer as to which extent these conclusions apply to modem foreign tanks with powerful armor plating and big weights is found in the results of test firings at M1Abrams tanks and other armored vehicles. (3) According to the results, high explosive fragmentation shells can be effective against tanks not only in direct hits but also in exploding in their proximity. They damage the tracks, suspension systems and other systems of tanks resulting in the loss of their maneuverability or firepower. It turned out that artillery fire is a formidable threat to the tank's high-tech fire control systems, especially to their optical instruments and highly vulnerable electronic, equipment. Direct hits on modem tanks will result in even greater impact from the fragments and products of detonation of high explosive fragmentation shells due to the bigger sizes of weapon sights heads equipped with infrared imaging systems. So, even such a tank as the U.S. Abrams cannot take direct hits by high explosive fragmentation shel ls. Moreover, these shells can be effective against tanks not only with high antiknock properties with regard to conventional shaped-charge shells but also with "anti-combined" properties. Not to be ignored is the possibility that fragmentation can damage the tank gun barrel beyond repair.

Consequently, the fitting of the Krasnopol projectile with a high explosive fragmentation warhead was not a mistake because this considerably broadened the projectile's capabilities and, according to foreign experts, it is a serious advantage because it can effectively engage a wide range of other small-sized fixed and mobile targets in addition to armored targets. (4)

Was it wrong to fit guided munitions with a semiactive homing head? Not during the period when they were being developed. First, the troops already had laser range-finders and the personnel had mastered them. Second, by that time our industry could commercially produce laser beam control instruments and receivers of reflected laser emission-the basis of laser homing heads. Furthermore, there was information about active efforts abroad to develop projectiles controlled on the basis of this principle. Therefore, there were both objective and subjective prerequisites, unlike in the case of munitions using homing heads of different types.

Nevertheless, it is hard to deny the numerous drawbacks of munitions with semiactive laser homing, and they have been described in sufficient detail in various articles. It would be appropriate here to stress that these projectiles are employed only against observed targets in good visibility (cloud cover of at least 300 meters and wind velocity of not greater than 15 meters per second, the absence of convection airstreams at noon and in the afternoon in hot-climate regions, as well as of dust, smoke and fog contaminants). According to calculations by NATO experts, the probability of employing these projectiles 2 to 3 kilometers away from the forward edge of the forward most friendly positions under the physical and geographical conditions of Europe is never above 20 percent, and 5 to 6 kilometers is never greater than a few percentage points. Consequently, the artillery systems firing precision munitions use only half of their capabilities.

The above drawbacks are inherent in all munitions using semiactive laser homing heads. Therefore, despite the considerable stockpiles of such munitions, they were used in the 1991 Gulf War only on some occasions (for example, they were employed on little more than 90 occasions by 7 AC U.S.A. (5)). Despite the high effectiveness of fire, the United States' attempts to sell the projectile to its NATO partners or start its manufacture in Europe failed.

Quite reasonable is the amazement of some authors caused by the limited use of munitions with semiactive laser homing heads in the Chechen conflict although this has an easy explanation. First, after foreign estimates, the cost of precision munitions is 15 or more times greater than that of conventional munitions. Second, a guided projectile is an item of high complexity: Arming consists in making several settings, which makes its employment difficult and may cause additional errors in combat activities. It is certainly not coincidental that several experienced experts were sent to Chechnya to speed up teaching the personnel how to use the Krasnopol. This confirms the fact that troops are liable to find it hard to learn how to employ such new weapons.

Semiactive laser homing projectiles also have their advantages. Numerous test firings and large-scale exercises showed that they are highly effective. More specifically, the Osen-88 exercises showed that Krasnopols scored almost the same number of hits at moving tanks as at stationary tanks. Semiactive laser homing projectiles can prove especially effective on mountainous terrain due to longer lines of sight that can be obtained from commanding heights. Furthermore, semiactive laser homing projectiles have an undisputed advantage over antitank guided missiles when firing at tanks over the same range because tank crews cannot see guns shooting from indirect-fire position and thus cannot maneuver to avoid being hit.

Protection of armored targets against semiactive laser homing weapons can rely on systems of active protection that include threat detection sensors, fire control systems and munitions capable of disabling antitank guided missiles, artillery and mortar shells. However, such systems are still being developed abroad as a rule and those developed in this country have not been tested in combat environment. Therefore, it seems to be a long time before the answer has been found to the question about which measures armored vehicle crews should take to avoid being hit.

Consequently, controlled munitions with laser homing have not exhausted their combat capabilities, and it would be a mistake to decide against their employment. It is advisable to develop such munitions for systems with small ranges and steep ballistic trajectories. This enables the full use of artillery systems' range and sharply (down to 3 seconds) reduce the time needed for target illumination and thus improve the munitions' capability to withstand active and passive enemy countermeasures. It would be wise to equip these munitions with combined (semiactive laser and infrared) homing heads. The laser channel will make it possible to utilize the high-precision characteristics of the munitions with semiactive laser homing heads in favorable visibility and weather conditions, first of all, against armored targets on operational sites and fortified positions where they cannot be successfully engaged by munitions with infrared seekers.

We should hardly consider as an altemative to guided munitions the socalled adjustable munitions, which have much inferior accuracy characteristics. Therefore it seems doubtful that developers should focus on munitions that require adjustment of fire which may take crews more than 1.5-2 minutes-the longest time they can stay in the same gun position under modem conditions. Their plain design, a relatively low cost, high reliability and safety cannot offset this drawback in adjustable munitions.

Thus, the creation of the Krasnopol was a worthy answer to the Copperhead. The development of the Krasnopol was a quantum leap in effectiveness of artillery fire from indirect-fire positions: Whereas in the past it took dozens or sometimes hundreds of rounds to hit a separate observed target, now it could be done with one or two homing projectiles.

However, it was found that the first generation of precision laser homing munitions had many drawbacks and the most vulnerable element in their homing loop was man. Man is prone to making mistakes in preparing munitions for firing (entry of numerous settings and doing various switchings), selection of settings or the illumination points, and man can after all lose the setter key. This was behind the main idea in developing second-generation precision munitions not only to take man out of the munition control loop but also to implement the fire-and-forget principle. Characteristics of the main foreign second-generation precision weapons are discussed in detail in many publications and we will dwell only on some of them.

Second generation precision projectiles abroad are usually put in a class of terminally guided warheads (TGW). Among them are homing mortar shells (the British 8hnm Merlin and the Swedish 120mm STRIX) and cluster weapons armed with self-targeting and homing warheads. They require no illumination of target from extraneous sources and can destroy armored targets right below them. Some of them (mortar shells and the German 155mm artillery shell SMArt) are already in service and being commercially produced with other models going through different stages of development. The latest self-targeting weapons (the German SMArt and the American SADARM) and homing weapons with multichannel target sensors and combined homing heads-a millimeter-band radar, infrared and sometimes acoustic homing heads. This is supposed to make them effective in conditions of bad weather, poor visibility and electronic countermeasures (ECM).

What really matters is that the effectiveness of new precision weapons is appraised in the West from the results of firing at real combat vehicles and structures specially built for the purpose. Remarkable in this regard were the test firings using the Krasnopol in France. To test its destructive power, they used three AMX tanks, a specially built concrete wall and a shelter. (6) They justly think in the West that the use of all manner of simulators is liable to yield wrong performance characteristics of weapons. Moreover, the United States plans to build "a tactical battlefield" to test precision weapons under conditions closely resembling those of actual battle.

In conditions of quite understandable financial constraints in recent years in Russia, they try to replace real targets will all manner of simulated targets, cut the time of tests and hold them in favorable conditions. Not infrequently, they appraise the effectiveness of weapons using calculating methods and the results obtained by their developers. Understandably, the cost of ammunition, vehicles and equipment used in tests has soared. The cost of mistake in testing weapons has equally increased. Tests have become a more complex procedure. Whereas in the past their key goal was to confirm their effective engagement characteristics, now it is necessary to also appraise under real conditions the correctness and reliability of functioning of the many systems of target detection, guidance, etc. Such appraisals also serve to formulate recommendations for the employment of weapons in conditions other than those during testing. Such appraisals can be objective only to the extent the conditions of testing match tho se of actual combat. Replacing testing with calculations we will at best obtain good results of calculations but formulate very doubtful recommendations that may cost lives of our men.

An equally important problem is standardization of weapons. Whereas standardization of elements of precision weapons in the West covers types of weapons and elements they consist of (they can be used not only in artillery munitions, missile warheads, air bombs and sea-based missiles), developers in this country used to try to design elements unique to well-nigh every weapon. This frittered away the research potential, duplicated efforts and drove up the price of R&D and manufacture. Such practices are still in evidence.

The development of second-generation precision weapons is an undoubted step forward in upgrading precision weapons because they no longer rely on target illumination. The exclusion of man from the weapon control loop makes the employment of these weapons much simpler. Now their employment is practically in no way different from the use of conventional weapons because they require no additional preparations on the firing position and make possible automated loading of artillery pieces. This substantially enhances the fire capabilities of artillery units and eliminates many limitations imposed by visibility and weather typical of laser-guided projectiles.

However, the chosen concept of creating second-generation precision weapons has a number of serious drawbacks. First, the elimination of man from the warhead control loop denies man the possibility to influence the selection of targets and the weapons cannot discriminate between targets. Such weapons are not sensitive to the importance of targets, they are not capable of picking out from the enemy tactical or march order targets to be engaged first (command vehicles, missile launchers, self-propelled guns, etc.) and they engage a tank or a tractor with equal effectiveness. Second, such precision weapons cannot be used against targets that do not have sufficient infrared or radar signanires (fortifications, infrastructure elements, etc.). Third, the fire-and-forget euphoria abated when it came to light that the creation of weapons based on this principle has far from having made easier control over the results of delivery of fire, * despite the fact that the cost of the homing head is nearly half the cost of t he entire weapon. Finally, the size of the field of view in homing heads (target sensors) of second-generation precision weapons is not in excess of 500 meters as a rule, which is a serious constraint in employing them against moving targets. Furthermore, this more often than not makes impossible for them. to make up for errors in selecting the firing settings owing to which engaged targets may happen to be outside the field of vision of homing heads (target sensors) and not to be locked on. But the widening of the field of vision in homing heads (target sensors) creates added difficulties: Since precision weapons are not used one by one but in a group, a situation can arise where all or some of the weapons in the group will head toward the same target.

In other words, it has become necessary to "coordinate the performance" of weapons in a group. At the present time the only missiles capable of this are the Russian antiship Iakhont missiles. They can perform in a group, exchange information in flight, structure combat formations without a human operator and select priority targets. This means that the most important feature in modern precision weapons is not accuracy but intelligence capability, which seriously complicates their electronic assets, or vetronics (VETRONIC is Vehicle radioelecTRONIC).

Many researchers in Russia stress, in connection with the need of making precision weapons' vetronics intelligent, that "precision weapons" is a vague term. It would be especially hard to classify the future generations of these weapons. It is clear at the moment that the terms "precision weapon" and "precision warhead" have become obsolete because many modem weapons no longer fit the description. Intelligent weapons, unlike precision weapons, are capable of performing functions reserved for man in the past, that is to say, intelligent weapons are taking the place of precision weapons. Some in the West even believe these weapons can use biological models. At the same time, there arises the question: Is it legitimate to transfer the prerogative of decision-making from man to robot with regard to concrete targets. This is especially important because such munitions can effectively engage both enemy and friendly armored targets alike. Arguably, they should be used only against targets at considerable distances f rom the friendly forces.

Vetronics incorporated into precision weapons is based on what current production processes can offer. For this reason precision weapons are now indicators of the research and development standards of some or other nation. In other words, their significance today is not unlike the significance of the role played by aircraft technology in the past.

The West was developing its second-generation precision weapons (155mm SMArt, BONUS and SADARM projectiles) to counter "armadas of Soviet tanks poised to attack the heart of Europe." Since operations involving massive employment of armored forces are unlikely, Western experts think these weapons can hardly be used in the future despite the huge sums spent in developing them. Although there is an alternative use for these weapons like counterbattery activities, for example, SMArt systems are in for a difficult future. This is confirmed by a sharp decline in their purchases and the orienting of the industry to the development and production of more up-to-date munitions.

The circumstances outlined above call for developing third-generation precision weapons controlled along their entire flight path using GPS data. The war in Yugoslavia showed that the United States leads the world in their development. The U.S. monopoly in GPS-positioned precision weapons offers it unique chances in the world arms markets. France, Britain, Sweden and Germany, however, have programs to develop 155mm artillery projectiles with this capability. Their objective is independently targeted projectiles with ranges of 80 kilometers and more. Their probable error range is between 15 and 20 meters.

There is also one more direction in developing third-generation precision weapons aimed at bringing man back into the weapon control loop. This effort is based on the use of fiber-optic cables or radio channels to transmit control commands to the weapons and getting information from them. The operators can fly, as it were, together with the weapons they control, which guarantees not only high probability of scoring hits on targets but also reduces the chances of hitting objects in their proximity and maximum safety for the friendly troops. Furthermore, this mode of controlling weapons enables the surveillance of areas they fly above.

The earlier idea was that RPVs would be sent in regions of reconnoitered targets to seek them out and destroy. The development of a lightweight radar with a synthetic aperture has greatly lengthened the list of tasks handled by such vehicles. The data it gathers about the targets and the radar image of the terrain processed by the onboard computer are transmitted to a ground-based station with a capability not only to control the vehicle's flight but also to use information from it as reconnaissance data.

This means that there is a tendency in developing RPVs in the West where it is possible to control their weapons throughout its flight and not just up to the moment the weapons are fired (launched). Nor is the West in a hurry to discard laser guided weapons because under certain circumstances they can be very effective. This must have been the reason for developing the American precision 120mm PGMM XM935 mortar shell intended to destroy concrete shelters and tanks with dynamic protection. The shell has a seeker with a laser and a passive infrared channels. This means the shell is going to combine the qualities of a controlled and homing weapon. It is believed that when in service, it will use its semiactive laser homing precision in favorable visibility and weather and its versatility in knocking out small-size light-armored and protected targets while the high mobility of mortars will make the new weapon indispensable for infantry.

The last 10 to 15 years were a period of fierce struggle for survival as regards the Russian defense industry, whereas development of weapons in the West has never stopped. As a result, the West has forged ahead, as M. Rastopshin writes, (7) we have seriously lagged behind and primarily in developing weapons based on the latest technologies. While the Krasnopol is a perfectly good weapon, artillery projectiles with semiactive homing are capable of engaging only observed targets which in effect dooms us to fighting close-range combats that continues to be the most bloody phase in combat operations. At the same time, we can still hear calls for imposing on the enemy modes of operation that can hamper the use of its technological advantages. Unfortunately, "the grammar of baffle, the language of guns" are different now and the times when inferior quality of weapons was made up for by their numbers or by "the madness of daring" are gone forever. One can hardly harbor any illusions on this score. The experience o f armed conflicts over recent decades suggests that new technologies can only be excelled by the latest technologies.

Analysis of progress in military art over the latter part of the 20th century points to the prevalence of "standoff' operations over "contact" operations, the hitting of targets from great distances over the hitting of targets from short distances. This is reflected in the leading weapon development concept of NATO countries--to kill while staying away from the kill zone. Long-range strikes come before close-range combat. All other factors being equal, the likely winner in it is someone who has better long-range reconnaissance assets, an edge in long-range weapons and assets that control them.

Consequently, the main efforts in developing precision weapons should be focused on weapons that follow the above trends. It is hardly wise to try to catch up with highly developed countries in developing second-generation precision weapons. It would be wiser to focus our intellectual potential on developing third-generation weapons to at once reach the most advanced stage in developing the latest types of weapons.

Development of precision weapons is a costly business. Western experience suggests that they are developed on the basis of cooperation between many nations. Even such a wealthy country as the United States is developing new weapons in cooperation with its NATO partners. We, too, should try to solve our problems in cooperation with foreign partners to meet our needs for latest weapons and successfully expand arms export.

* The question of guaranteed results of delivery of fire became especially urgent in connection with the participation of contingents of regular forces in counterterrorist and peacekeeping (UN mandated) operations where the presence in the weapon control loop of man alone guarantees the identification of the most essential elements of targets and the selection of aiming points that not only guarantee reliable engagement of targets but also made it possible to avoid collateral damage: civilian casualties, the destruction of nearby civilian and industrial structures.

NOTES:

(1.) Armeiskii sbornik, No. 1,2000, pp. 54-58; Tekhnika i vooruzhenie, No. 8, 1999, pp. 4-8; No. 1, 2000, pp. 54-58; No. 2, 2000, pp. 25-27; Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie, No. 43, 1999, p. 6; No. 10, 2000, p. 6.

(2.) Tekhnika i vooruzheniye, No. 2, 2000, pp. 25-27.

(3.) Armed Forces Journal International, No. 5, 1991, pp. 36, 40-41.

(4.) Soldat und Technik, No. 3, 1994, S. 132.

(5.) Field Artillery, No. 10, 1991, p. 23.

(6.) Jane's Defense Weekly, Vol. 34, No. 20, 2000, p. 29.

(7.) Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie, No. 10, 2000. p. 6.