Full compliance with resolutions asked; Security Council rejects 'in toto' Iraq's allegations.

The Security Council, while acknowledging there had been some positive steps, declared on 24 November that iraq had not complied fully and unconditionally with its obligations under Council resolutions relating to the Persian Gulf war and called on that country to take action immediately towards that end.

The Council issued a statement through its President, Andre Erdos of Hungary, at the conclusion of a series of meetings, held on 23 and 24 November, to review Iraq's compliance with resolution 687 (1991) and subsequent relevant texts.

Resolution 687, adopted on 3 April 1991, set detailed conditions for a formal cease-fire ending the hostilities resulting from Iraq's August 1991 invasion of Kuwait and provided conditions essential to the restoration of peace and security in the region. Prime among those conditions was total Iraqi compliance with UN decisions.

The Council regretted the lack of any indication in the statements by Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz on 23 and 24 November on how his Government intended to comply with Council resolutions. It also regretted and rejected "in toto" the "baseless threats, allegations and attacks" launched by Mr. Aziz against the Council the, special Commission on Iraqi disarmament, the international Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Iraq-Kuwait Boundary Demarcation Commission, and the Sanctions Committee established under resolution 661 (1990).

In a 23 November statement, the Council declared that Iraq had only selectively and partially complied with obligations placed upon it by the Council.

Among Iraq's shortcomings were: failure to participate in the work of the Boundary Demarcation Commission; refusal to withdraw police posts not in line with the UN Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM) principle that both sides should stay 1,000 metres from the boundary line: not meeting its liability for full costs of the disarmament process; and not completely disclosing all aspects of its programmes for weapons of mass destruction, including documentary evidence on Iraq's past production, suppliers and capacity to produce such weapons.

On the humanitarian aspects of the situation, the Council noted that the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) had received neither information on missing persons in Iraq nor permission to visit Iraqi prisons and detention centres. Very few of those people had been released since March and hundreds were believed to be still detained.

In addition, the Council remained deeply concerned at the "grave human rights abuses" which, despite provisions of resolution 688 (1991), Iraq continued to perpetrate against its population, in particular in its northern region, in southern Shi'a centres and the southern marshes.

Iraq also had not shown any willingness to resume discussions on implementing resolutions relating to the sale of its oil to provide for the basic needs of its citizens, the Council said.

Debate

In debate, Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Aziz said that no matter what Iraq did to fulfil its obligations, "the unjust sentence passed by the Council to starve the people of Iraq and deny them the right to life will remain in place, simply because this is the will of certain influential Governments in the Council". That same will continued to be behind the unjust manner in which Iraq had been treated, he said.

Iraq, in spite of the grave injustice inflicted upon it, had complied with resolution 687 despite that text's "arbitrarily iniquitous nature", he went on. The Council continued to adopt a "despotic posture" against Iraq and had pursued a method of continued harassment and pressure. It had placed "obstacles before the possibility for Iraq to use its frozen assets abroad" in order to meet Iraqis' humanitarian needs. The Sanctions Committee had persisted in its "shameful conduct, namely the prevention of Iraq from obtaining its needs".

Mr. Aziz asserted that the United States had imposed upon the Council the "grotesque and iniquitous" resolution 778 (1992), under which parts of Iraq's frozen assets abroad were being "robbed and used at will in an arbitrary fashion". The determination to keep the embargo against Iraq in place amounted to the "perpetration of the crime of genocide against the people of Iraq". The embargo's imposition had caused the deaths of thousands of children. It had led to the "bitterly cruel suffering" of the Iraqis. The Council should drastically review its arbitrary resolutions, he said.

Mr. Aziz added: "To focus on stripping Iraq of its national security capabilities and the means of protecting its people, and to impose iniquitous conditions, which violate its sovereignty and security under the guise of future monitoring, is to leave the situation in the region without any serious monitoring:"

Sir David Hannay of the United Kingdom said Iraq's reassertion of its claim to Kuwait called into question its commitment to resoluton 687. Iraq had still not complied with its obligations under resolution 707 (1991) to provide a full, final and complete declaration of its weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programmes. It had failed either to recognize or to accept its obligations under resolution 715 (1991), which, provides for long-term monitoring and verification by inspection.

Edward J. Perkins of the United States said Iraq's weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles must be permanently eliminated if the Gulf region was to enjoy peace and security. That goal required Iraq's cooperation in two areas--full and complete disclosure of its weapons programmes and long-term monitoring and verification. Iraq had left many gaps in its declarations to the Special Commission and to IAEA.

It had diverted food imports to the military and security forces "to allow Saddam Hussein to maintain his brutal dictatorship", he charged. The Council had sought every peaceful means to redress the suffering imposed by Baghdad on Iraqis. Without full and unconditional Iraqi compliance with all relevant resolutions, there was no reason to lift sanctions.

Herve Ladsous of France said sanctions could be lifted once Iraq had complied with Council resolutions. France was aware of the suffering of Iraq's civilian population and had consistently sought ways to make it possible to feed that population. The human rights situation in Iraq was extremely critical. Iraq must live in peace with its neighbours and its people. If it acceded to those two demands, it could bring about the lifting of sanctions.

Yuliy M. Vorontsov of the Russian Federation said there was no certainty as to the completeness and accuracy of the information presented by Iraq. Iraq had an essentially hostile attitude towards UN inspectors. It had confiscated the property of a number of foreign companies and organizations, in violation of resolution 687.

Kuwaiti information Minister Sheikh Saud Nasser Al-Sabah said Iraqi actions were part of a "systematic and deliberate exercise" aimed at keeping the region in a state of tension and instability. The Council should consider some procedure, under resolution 687, so that the Council might take "such further steps as may be required" to implement the resolution and to secure peace and security in the region.

Iraq on 22 December said (S/25012) it had repatriated all Kuwaitis and third country nationals present in its territory through ICRC and was ready to cooperate in identifying the missing persons.

Inspections

The fourteenth in a series of inspections of Iraq's ballistic missile capabilities took place from 16 to 30 October. Thirteen earlier inspections had been carried out between 30 June 1991 and 18 August 1992. The team, led by Nikita Smidovich of the Russian Federation, consisted of some 50 inspectors from 10 countries.

A UN official said on 4 November that the UN Special Commission on Iraqi disarmament considered this recent inspection a "touchstone" in its relations with Iraq. The team had received "mixed signals" from that country.

On the positive side, the inspection team had obtained "new and detailed information on certain operational aspects of the use of weapons of mass destruction during the period prior to the Special Commission's operations". Previously, Iraq had refused to supply such information, arguing that it was not relevant to the Commission.

On the negative side, there had been "fairly unpleasant things" said about the inspection teams and their intentions by President Hussein and high-ranking Iraqi officials. There were also problems with the treatment of the inspectors and refusal to provide data on equipment and material suppliers during the Persian Gulf war.

The Special Commission was set up under resolution 687 to verify Iraq's compliance with the Council's demand for "full, final and complete" disclosure of all its weapons programmes, including weapons of mass destruction. Commission Executive Chairman Rolf Ekeus told the press in New York on 27 October that the team, which the Commission considered to be the first real test of a promised change in Iraq's attitude, had reported some "interesting developments". Iraq appeared to be quite forthcoming in some important respects. The team had not found any hidden SCUD missiles, but to be sure, it needed to know, for example, whether fuel for SCUD missiles existed in Iraq.

The Commission was looking into the possibility of offering Iraq an incentive to comply with its obligations under resolution 687. Mr. Ekeus suggested that if Iraq were to be completely forthcoming about its weapons of mass destruction, the Council might be convinced to lift its restrictions on the sale of Iraqi oil.

A threat to inspectors?

On 15 October, the Security Council said that Mr. Ekeus had drawn its attention to "press reports of a high-level statement made in Iraq, which would constitute a threat to the security" of the inspectors. Council President Jean-Bernard Merimee of France said the body was concerned for the inspectors' safety and wanted Iraq's full cooperation with the team.

The fifteenth and sixteenth inspections of Iraq's nuclear capabilities took place from 8 to 18 November and from 5 to 8 December, respectively. Fourteen previous inspections had been carried out between 14 May 1991 and 7 September 1992.

The IAEA reported (S/24981 and S/25013) that the sampling of Iraq's waterways, begun during the fourteenth inspection, was concluded during the fifteenth mission. The objectives of the sampling were to detect undeclared nuclear facilities and to establish a baseline for future monitoring. More than 550 water and sediment samples had been collected.

An assessment of the conditions for removal of irradiated fuel, stored in pools and storage tanks at two locations, was carried out by experts, who estimated that the fuel removal operation, once begun, would take four to six months. The 100 tonnes of maraging steel declared by Iraq to have been procured for their centrifuge programme was destroyed, as was the R24 experimental electromagnetic isotope separator (EMIS) magnet system. Work to identify and catalogue key machine tools in various Iraqi State Engineering Establishments continued.

The uranium waste material recovered at Al Jezira and moved to Al Tuwaitha was weighed, sampled for verification and transferred to storage under IAEA seal. The re-verification of irradiated fuel at the IRT-5000 reactor and remedial actions to improve storage conditions for the irradiated fuel were completed. A number of additional nuclear material samples from previously verified material were taken to further evaluate Iraqi declarations regarding the processing of nuclear materials in the building 73 complex (Al Tuwaitha).

During the sixteenth inspection, no activity or documentation relevant to resolution 687 was uncovered. However, the team on arrival observed the removal of documents.

Future monitoring needed

Future inspections of Iraq's nuclear facilities and long-term monitoring of its activities were needed, IAEA Director General Hans Blix told the General Assembly on 21 October. Monitoring was still very important because Iraq's scientific and technical knowledge remained largely intact and its clandestine procurement network was still in place.

The Special Commission on 19 October reported (S/24661) that Iraq had not met conditions for the Commission's launching of its plan for ongoing monitoring of that country's weapons sites. There was "no movement" in Iraq's underlying position regarding compliance with Council resolutions. Iraq continuously sought to ensure that the implementation of the plan was proceeding "on the basis of its interpretation of its obligations, rather than on the basis of Security Council resolutions".

For the time being, the Commission remained constrained from going beyond preparatory work into full-scale monitoring and verification, until it was clear that Iraq would comply with such monitoring "on the Council's, not Iraq's, terms".

At its fourth plenary session in New York (28-30 October), the Commission discussed the destruction of Iraq' chemical weapons, ways to implement plans for ongoing monitoring and verification to ensure that Iraq did no reacquire proscribed weapons, and plans for the future control of imports into Iraq, in accordance with resolution 715 (1991).

Under Commission supervision, Iraq on 12 November began the large-scale destruction of its stocks of mustard agent, manufactured for chemical weapons. The Commission said the incinerator at Muthanna State Establishment operated at temperatures of 1,100 degrees centigrade to destroy chemical warfare agents and precursors. It had been built by Iraq and designed by a panel of international experts set up by the Commission. The incinerator could destroy, on average, 3 to 4 tonnes of agent a day. Destruction activities were expected to last about a year.

Meanwhile, at a second destruction plant at Muthanna, the neutralization of nerve agents through hydrolysis continued. As of 9 November, some 19 tonnes of nerve agent had been destroyed. Destruction of 122 millimetre rockets too dangerous to empty also continued. A total of 2,155 sarin-filled warheads had been destroyed at Muthanna, in addition to the 425 destroyed earlier at Khamisiyah.

On 17 December, Mr. Ekeus reported (S/24984) that the main areas requiring action before the Commission could report Iraq's substantial compliance were: Iraq's acceptance and implementation of all Commission privileges and immunities; unconditional acknowledgement by Iraq of its obligations under resolutions 707 and 715 (1991): Iraq's documentation of data in its declarations and provision to the Commission of a full picture of its foreign procurement networks and suppliers; full, final and complete disclosures required under resolutions 707 and 715; and plans for ongoing monitoring and verification to ensure that Iraq did not reacquire proscribed weapons.

UNIKOM

Boundary Commission

The Council on 9 October extended the mandate of UNIKOM for a further six-month period, until 31 March 1993. The Mission was established on 9 April 1991 to monitor the Iraq-Kuwait border. The Secretary-General reported (S/24615) that the situation in the demilitarized zone had been marked by a gradual heightening of tension in some areas. Although the trend had not so far become a cause for serious concern, it needed to be carefully monitored.

The Boundary Demarcation Commission held its seventh and eighth sessions (12-16 October, New York, and 14-16 December, Geneva), hearing reports on construction and emplacement of boundary pillars and markers.

Nicolas Valticos of Greece, a former International Court of Justice judge succeeded former Indonesian Foreign Minister Mochtar Kusuma-Atmadja as Chairman.

Security incidents

Stating he was "deeply concerned about recent security incidents" affecting World Food Programme (WFP) humanitarian relief convoys in northern Iraq, the Secretary-General decided on 21 December to assign UN guards to strengthen the protection of the convoys in that area. Since the relief operation began in mid-November, some 25 convoys with 410 trucks had brought more than 8,000 metric tonnes of much needed flour, seeds and fuel to the area.

WFP announced on 3 December that despite the bombing of six trucks in northern Iraq which destroyed 30 tonnes of flour, it would proceed with winter relief operations in all parts of the country. WFP said it was committed to feed 1.2 million people all over Iraq throughout the winter. On 16 December, unexploded time bombs were found in nine other trucks and eight more were blown up. There were no casualties.

On 22 October, the Memorandum of Understanding for humanitarian assistance in Iraq was signed in New York by UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Jan Eliasson and Iraqi Ambassador Nizar Hamdoon. The Memorandum was originally signed on 18 April 1991. It was extended in November 1991 and had expired on 30 June 1992.

According to the new Memorandum, which would remain in force until 31 March 1993, UN guards would continue to be assigned as needed in the three northern Governorates of Suleimaniya, Arbil and Dohouk. The number of guards would not exceed 300. Iraq would grant the UN field staff safe and unimpeded access to facilitate the programme's implementation and would facilitate the safe and rapid delivery of humanitarian assistance commodities throughout the country.

A UN official said the $217-million programme primarily called for the distribution of humanitarian assistance in the north during the winter; activity in the south would focus on food distribution and basic medical care.