From Emerson to King: Democracy, Race, and the Politics of Protest.

Anita Haya Patterson. New York: Oxford UP, 1997. 257 pp. $49.95.

Reviewed by

Len Gougeon University of Scranton 

The stated objectives of this dissertation-based study are to "show that . . . Emerson's writings exhibit a consistent pattern of contradiction that is fundamental to his critical reassessment of democratic values" and that this political critique is "expressed precisely by means of Emerson's recourse to racialist language and values." Furthermore, Patterson argues that this "pattern of contradiction" is defined by Emerson as a "double-consciousness"; that is, an American identity conceived in terms which are at once liberal and racialist. The Emersonian work which gets most of the attention here is the 1841 essay "Self-Reliance." In this famous piece Emerson argues for the ultimate self-reliance of the individual who, by accessing the Divinity which exists in all of us, stands above the "joint-stock company" of restrictive society. Individual identity is thus established by nature rather than by contract or consent to social relationships (as John Locke would have it). The problem here, for Patterson, is that this transcendent self is conceived by Emerson in largely racialist terms. She points to his image of Columbus taking possession of the New World (in Representative Men [1850]), greeted by savages on the beach. Emerson sees this as a dramatic historical moment, the beginning of America, and, ultimately, of American democracy and freedom. For the "savages," however, it means the end of life as they know it, something which Emerson tacitly accepts. Patterson uses this example as evidence of "what is most and least democratic about [Emerson's] political thought." Another problem which Patterson sees in Emerson's notion of the self-reliant, transcendent self who stands apart from society is that such a position "ultimately dismantles any real possibilities for visible public protest" because reform begins and ends with self-reliance.

Despite these limitations, however, Patterson argues in her last two chapters (most of this book is about Emerson) that Emerson's emphasis on the individual and his political critique of social restrictions, as well as his concept of the "double-consciousness," are "not only foundational to the development of American pragmatism and [W. E. B.] Du Bois's sociology but . . . also contributed to the political thought of twentieth-century African-American philosophers such as Martin Luther King[,] Jr.[,] and Cornel West." Patterson notes specifically that Du Bois "deployed Emerson's simultaneous invocation of rights and race for the purposes of conceptualizing black American identity" and that "Emerson's writings represent a considerable resource for the development of Du Bois's political philosophy." Similarly, the significance of Emerson's contribution to "the revitalization of American political culture and the expression of political thought both during and after the civil rights movement" is made apparent in the fact that "Martin Luther King[,] Jr.[,] repeatedly and explicitly referred to Emerson in his speeches, lectures, and sermons." The particular influence here is Emerson's concept of self-reliance, for "King unequivocally promotes political action by deploying Emerson's famous mandate for nonconformity to communicate King's own vision of the social crisis brought about by the deadening conformity of racism." Such activism, however, is seen as a contrast to Emerson's own self-reliant passivism.

Lastly, Cornel West finds in Emerson "a pragmatic reconception of philosophy as social and cultural criticism." However, this philosophical activism presumably goes beyond Emerson's own practice, and West observes that "Emerson is not a social revolutionary" because of his insistence on the primacy of personal integrity and his "deep distrust of the masses" as well as his "profound disenchantment with the dirty affairs of politics."

The major problem with Patterson's thought-provoking study is that it fails to take into account those very works of Emerson which explicitly address the issues in question here, namely, his antislavery writings. It is well known that Emerson spoke and wrote about slavery a great deal (see, for example, Ernerson's Antislavery Writings [Yale UP, 1995]), but in this study of "Democracy, Race, and the Politics of Protest" Patterson, inexplicably, has virtually nothing to say about these provocative pieces, even though they are highly relevant to her thesis. In fact, much of this evidence tends to contradict that thesis, or to make Emerson's "double-consciousness" an exercise in paradox which is even greater than Patterson suggests. A few examples are telling. Regarding Emerson's presumed aloofness from public affairs, and the political irrelevance of his self-reliant thinking, the record of his speeches and other activities shows that he was very active in the antislavery cause from 1844 to the Civil War. Regarding his view of the proper role of government in a democratic society, this advocate of self-reliance states in his first significant antislavery address, "Emancipation of the Negroes in the British West Indies" (1844), that "government exists to defend the weak and the poor and the injured party," and he declaims specifically against the Senators and Representatives from Massachusetts who "sit dumb at their desks and see their constituents captured and sold." These constituents are the "poor black men of obscure employment . . . in [Massachusetts'] ships" who have been arrested under the "slave-laws of the states of South Carolina, Georgia, and Louisiana."

Regarding the issue of racism, it is true that Emerson occasionally employs racialist language, as did most of his contemporaries. It is important to note, however, that throughout his public career as a social reformer Emerson consistently condemned racism in the strongest possible terms. In his second address on the "Anniversary of West Indian Emancipation" (1845) he specifically notes that the primary obstacle to emancipation is "the objection of an inferiority of race" which is summed up in the word Niggers. "They who say it," says Emerson, ". . . think it is the voice of nature and fate pronouncing against the Abolitionist and the Philanthropist." But Emerson rejects such a "fatal allegation," because "the sentiment of right, which is the principle of civilization and the reason of reason, fights against this damnable atheism." God does not create inequality.

Regarding Emerson's presumed distrust of politics and political activism, it should be noted that he was, in fact, among the most politically active of the New England literati. He spoke frequently on public issues, signed petitions of protest to both state and federal legislatures, voted regularly and urged others to do the same. In the spring of 1851 he actually became a stump orator for John Gorham Palfrey, who was seeking election to Congress on the Free Soil ticket. Emerson traveled extensively throughout his Middlesex District, delivering his vitriolic "Fugitive Slave Law Address," which attacked Daniel Webster for his perfidy in supporting this heinous act. Such actions could hardly be characterized as irrelevant, non-political, or aloof.

The information presented above, and a great deal more, has been available for some time as scholarship on Emerson's views of race, politics, and reform continues to evolve apace. Patterson's study, which is important to this discussion, would have been much more complete and telling if at least some of these matters were taken into account.