Forward observer battle drills -- the time is now.

Units continue to struggle to employ indirect fires effectively in support of search and attack operations at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), Fort Polk, Louisiana. These operations are characterized by short, violent encounters at extremely close range (100 to 200 meters) with little or no warning.

Infantry platoon leaders and forward observers (FOs) arrive at the JRTC unclear about how to help each integrate fires. This is generally the result of the their not training together under realistic conditions at home station.

In the friction and confusion of the engagement, the platoon leader forgets to request fires, is afraid to call for them or simply finds the process too difficult or slow to work through, given his focus on maneuvering his platoon in combat. In some cases, he may approve unsafe target locations because he has failed to account for time-distance factors, he lacks tactical patience or he doesn't know what a safe employment distance should be for a given indirect fire system. (The safe employment distance is based on the five requirements for accurate predicted fire, ordnance effects radii and probable errors in range and deflection.)

On the fire support side, young, inexperienced and typically under-ranked FOs often are not the fire support advisors and executors the Field Artillery expects them to be. In many cases, FOs are mentally and technically unprepared to coordinate and deliver safe, responsive and effective fires. Too often, FOs don't practice calling for and controlling fires at the speed or closeness to friendly forces that a JRTC (or combat) engagement demands. They are unfamiliar with indirect fire planning factors, unskilled at land navigation and maintaining situation awareness, poor at locating targets in wooded environments and have trouble organizing their thoughts under the pressure of simulated combat actions.

The result of poor integration of indirect fires is a rate of five Blue Force casualties to every one opposing force (OPFOR) casualty. Fewer than 10 percent of the casualties inflicted on the OPFOR are due to indirect fires.

The effective delivery of fires at these ranges and speeds requires significant dry- and live-fire practice at home station. This practice must be driven by a systematic approach to integrating fires and maneuver at the platoon and company levels.

Maneuver units use battle drills to train their personnel in tried and true tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) for reacting to contact. FM 7-8, The Infantry Platoon provides that doctrinal training foundation for all infantry personnel. The Field Artillery needs similar fire support battle drills for company and platoon fire support personnel.

Unfortunately, the artillery does not have such a doctrinal base that guides the immediate actions of the FO when his company makes contact with the enemy. So the JRTC Fire Support Division developed 12 fire support battle drills. (See Figure 1 for a list of the drills.) These drills were developed as outlined in FM 25-101, Battle-Focused Training.

FM 25-101 defines a battle drill as a "collective action rapidly executed without applying a deliberate decision-making process." FM 25-101 then states that "all soldiers and their leaders must know their immediate reaction to enemy contact as well as follow-up actions....drills are limited to situations requiring instantaneous response; therefore, soldiers must execute drills instinctively."

In Figure 1, the first eight drills complement battle drills from Chapter 4, "Battle Drills," of FM 7-8. These fire support drills are nested in the platoon actions and provide details for the FO and platoon leader.

Consider Fire Support Battle Drill #1 Platoon Attack that is based on the Platoon Attack battle drill from FM 7-8. In that drill, the employment of indirect fires is not mentioned until Step Three of four. More specifically, there are 13 sub-steps in that battle drill before it mentions indirect fires. The point is the FO should be conducting parallel, simultaneous activities with the platoon leader and both should arrive at sub-step 13 together, culminating in the FO's giving the command to fire on his FM radio. (See the Battle Drill #1 Platoon Attack in Figure 2.)

The FO links the gun line procedures of a firing unit with the battle drill steps being taken by the maneuver element. At the point when the platoon leader directs the FO to fire the mission, the FO should be able to fire instantly with the platoon leader's only having to wait for the round's time of flight.

Developing battle drills is only part of a solution to make indirect fires more effective in the close fight--training is the other. The battle drills provide a doctrinal template for training. FO battle drills are not a revolutionary concept, but they are not common within divisions, let alone standardized between divisions. Additionally and most importantly, they are not integrated into the supported maneuver unit's field manuals or local standing operating procedures (SOPs).

The JRTC Fire Support Division recommends these drills be embedded in Chapter 4 of FM 7-8, so maneuver leaders can access the drills easily and understand the nested integration of indirect fires into the maneuver drill. By codifying fire support battle drills in doctrine, we transmit the minimum Army-wide requirements to both the FO and infantry platoon leader and set the standard for home station evaluation/certification and for combat training center (CTC) mentors to support.

Figure 1: The 12 Fire Support Battle Drills. These battle drills are available on the Joint Readiness Training Center Fire Support Division's website at http://www.jrtc-polk.army.mil/OPS/Index.htm. Click on the fire support icon

1. Platoon Attack *

2. React to Contact *

3. Break Contact *

4. React to Ambush *

5. Knock Out a Bunker *

6. Enter Building/Clear a Room *

7. Enter/Clear a Trench *

8. Conduct Initial Breach of a Mined Wire Obstacle *

9. FO Occupation of an Assembly Area

10. FO Occupation of an Observation Post

11. Employment of Close Air Support

12. Precision Lightweight Global Positioning System Receiver (PLGR)

* Battle Drills designed to correspond with infantry battle drills on contact with the enemy.

Figure 2: Fire Support Battle Drill #1: Platoon Attack. (For this and the other 11 battle drills, go to the Joint Readiness Training Center Fire Support Division's website at http://www.jrtc-polk.army.mil/OPS/Index.htm. Click on the fire support icon.

Situation: Per FM 7-8, The Infantry Platoon, the platoon is moving as part of a larger force conducting a movement-to-contact or deliberate or hasty attack.

Assumptions: The platoon initiates the attack (otherwise, use FO Battle Drill #2 React to Contact Drill). This drill supports a movement-to-contact or deliberate or hasty attack.

Step 1: Platoon FO Plans Fires

The FO plans fires along the route of march in accordance with the platoon leader's guidance for fires.

A. In planning fires, the FO considers:

(1.) Current intelligence and reliability of the intelligence from higher command.

(2.) FO calls the company fire support element (FSE) to determine the following: assets available to fire for the FO, priority targets available to the platoon and an update of friendly unit actions around the platoon area of operations (this may help the FO understand how responsive the firing element will be to his call-for-fire).

(3) Development of a task and purpose for fires. Task and purpose should relate to the engagement of the anticipated size and type of enemy force the platoon expects to encounter. The FO ensures the platoon leader approves them.

(4) Integration of the higher headquarters fire plan. The FO must brief the plan to the platoon leader, and the platoon must rehearse it.

(5) Fire planning considerations for the offense. See Chapter 3, "Fire Support Planning for the Offense" of FM 6-20-50 Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Brigade Operations (Light).

(6) Communications plan and ranges. Before crossing the line of departure, the FO ensures he has good FM communications with the company FSE and mortars.

(7) Company mortar plan for support. The FO ensures the company mortars understand the route of march and have the target list to support the current mission. The FO must understand the mortar standard fire order for number of rounds in effect based on target description; he refers to the company or battalion fire support standing operating procedures (SOP).

(8) Target location error (TLE). In a deliberate attack, a larger TLE may have minimal impact on operations; whereas in a hasty attack, the FO may need to refine the target data or adjust fires before firing for effect.

B. The FO recommends to the platoon leader the development of specific fire support coordinating measures (FSCM) that facilitate rapid clearance and integration of fires into the contact. Additionally, the FO helps the platoon leader develop maneuver graphics. This coordination increases the FO's understanding of the maneuver plan and increases battle tracking/situational awareness.

Step 2: Actions on Contact

The FO's radio-telephone operator immediately sends a spot report and observer location to the company FSE.

Step 3: Provide Fire Support

A. The FO immediately initiates the precision lightweight global positioning system receiver (PLGR) battle drill (#12) to generate a fire mission: determine accurate target location, send initial call-for-fire in a "Do not load" status and conduct clearance of fires procedures with the platoon leader.

(1.) Depending on proximity of friendly forces to enemy troops, the FO may initiate the fire mission that enables maneuver to block, fix or isolate the enemy.

(2.) Upon confirmation with the platoon leader, the FO may employ creeping fires to achieve the desired effects on the enemy.

B. The RTO sends the mission to either the company FSE (centralized mode) or to the company/battalion mortars (decentralized mode) in an "At My Command" (AMO) status. According to FM 7-8, "The platoon leader does not wait for indirect fires before continuing with his actions." The FO increases the responsiveness of indirect fires by using AMC.

C. As the platoon P0 keeps the platoon leader informed of the firing unit status, the company fire support officer (FSO) simultaneously keeps the company commander informed of the actions of the platoon and what the FO and FSO are doing to support the company in contact.

D. As the platoon PO integrates fires into the platoon fight, the company FSO immediately plans and coordinates to integrate additional assets to support the company. Should the company commander decide to reinforce the platoon in contact, the FSO already has begun coordination to integrate additional assets. If the company commander determines the platoon does not need additional support, the company FSO can pass control of any additional indirect fire assets to another FO for his platoon to use.

E. The FO notifies the platoon leader when the mortars are laid and ready to support the mission and tells him the proposed location for the rounds to impact.

F. The FO and platoon leader continuously track the location of friendly forces.

G. The FO fires the mission under the direction of the platoon leader. He uses first rounds to either adjust or fire for effect. The FO and platoon leader assess the effectiveness of the mission to determine if the mission should be repeated.

H. While the fire mission is in progress, the FO sends refinement data to the company PSE to develop firing data for a higher caliber system. (The company FSE develops this mission on an alternate FM frequency while the FO continues to control the company mortars in the current fight.)

1. The RTO continuously updates the company PSE with friendly unit locations. The RT0 updates the P0 and platoon leader on all communications about battalion fire support assets on the company fire support net.

J. One Option--The FO may position himself with the platoon sergeant in the support-by-fire element. The platoon leadership must understand this option and rehearse it. The FO should position himself to best control the integration of indirect fires.

Step 4: Attack

During this phase, the platoon leader directs the movement of forces on the ground. The FO shifts indirect fires to help suppress or destroy the enemy, allowing maneuver to fix or isolate the enemy position, per FM 7-8 Platoon Battle Drill #1 Platoon Attack, Step 4, A. (3).

Step 5: Consolidate and Reorganize

A. The RTO sends a situation report (SITREP) to the PSE that includes battle damage assessment (BDA) and friendly locations.

B. The FO develops a fire plan to support the defense of the platoon in the consolidated location. The FO recommends a priority target or final protective fires (FPF) to the platoon leader and gains his approval. The P0 requests FPF from the company FSE. If the FPF is granted, the FO coordinates with the platoon leader for the best location of the FPF or priority target.

C. The FO adjusts these targets as soon as possible to ensure accuracy and responsiveness in anticipation of a possible enemy counterattack.

D. The FO transmits the defensive quick-fire plan to the company FSE and mortars. The FO rehearses all targets with the company mortars.

E. The FO walks the perimeter with the platoon leader and identifies squad members to serve as primary and alternate observers for each target and rehearses the call-for-fire with each observer. As the situation permits, the FO PLGRs-in each target in support of the platoon defense. The FO refines the target data and forwards it to the company PSE and mortars.

P. The FO identifies day and night triggers for each target to support the defense of the platoon position. The selected observers rehearse firing the triggers.

G. The FO begins developing a fire plan for the next mission (assuming the platoon will leave the consolidation and reorganization location in a relatively short time).

Major (Promotable) Daniel A. Pinnell is the Senior Brigade Fire Support Observer/Controller (O/C) for the Fire Support Division at the Joint Readiness Training Center(JRTC), Fort Polk, Louisiana. Also at the JRTC, he was the Senior FA Operations O/C. His other assignments include serving as the Brigade Fire Support Officer (FSO) and Battalion Executive Officer for 2d Battalion, 3d Field Artillery, both in the 1st Armored Division in Germany and Kosovo; Commander of a Tactical Psychological Operations (PSYOP) Company in the 9th PSYOP Battalion and Commander of an Operational Detachment of the 6th PSYOP Battalion (Airborne) in Central Africa, both part of the Special Operations Command at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. He also commanded a firing battery in the 2d Battalion, 8th Field Artillery, part of the 7th Infantry Division (Light), Fort Lewis, Washington.

Major Kelly W. Ivanoff was the Senior Task Force Fire Support O/C at the JRTC. Currently, he is attending the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. His previous assignments include serving as Commander of Headquarters and Headquarters Battery of the Division Artillery; Commander of B Battery, 3d Battalion, 6th Field Artillery; and Task Force FSO for 2d Battalion, 22d Infantry, all in the 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry) at Fort Drum, New York. He also was a Platoon Leader and Executive Officer for C Battery, 2d Battalion, 14th Field Artillery (Multiple-Launch Rocket System), 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized) in Germany.