Force protection in Korea: a 2d Infantry Division perspective.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the 2d Infantry Division, U.S. Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

The events of 11 September 2001, served as a wake-up call and a paradigm shift of drastic proportions for the United States of America and its military forces. For the first time since World War II, a foreign entity had successfully attacked the United States on its home soil. Force protection (FP), on both a practical and an ideological level, changed drastically.

Post-September 11 Activity

Across the globe, U.S. forces immediately took stock of their situations, identified local FP issues, and scrambled to correct those shortcomings they were able to influence. Immediately following the September 11 attacks, the Department of Defense elevated the force protection condition across the Korean Peninsula to the highest FPCON, "Delta."

While there was no evidence of a terrorist threat to U.S. service members in Korea, the FPCON remained elevated until a clearer picture emerged concerning the actual threat. During this period, the 2d Infantry Division (2 ID) had essentially "locked down" its various base camps, with no civilian employees allowed on post and only mission-essential U.S. personnel allowed off post. Before September 11, 2 ID had never elevated its FPCON to Delta, and the change presented a steep learning curve. While 2 ID had elevated its alert status during periods of heightened tension (e.g., when two U.S. officers were bludgeoned to death in a melee with North Korean border guards in the Joint Security Area on 18 August 1976), it had not elevated the FPCON (formerly called THREATCON) since this system of threat designation has been in use.

By its very nature, FPCON Delta dictates that all missions halt except for base security. This includes training, administrative functions, and all but the most critical maintenance issues. Because of this and security considerations, no unit can maintain FPCON Delta indefinitely.

After ten days at FPCON Delta, 2 ID reviewed the local threat and, in coordination with Eighth United States Army (EUSA) and U.S. Forces, Korea (USFK), decreased the FPCON to "Charlie" with some antiterrorism (AT) measures included for FPCON Delta. This essentially left 2 ID at "Charlie+"; even FPCON Charlie+ severely affected the missions and activities within 2 ID when compared to those at FPCON "Normal" before September 11. Due to the increased guard and security requirements, the Division still had to curtail its missions and training severely. Soldiers were still confined to base camps except for official business, and all movement between camps was limited to official U.S. Government transportation only, to include contracted buses and AAFES taxis. The Division placed all off-post clubs and shops off limits and personnel residing off-post with their families had to have a "buddy" accompany them when traveling to and from work.

Once the FPCON lowered to Charlie+, 2 ID did a scrub to determine which civilian employees working at the camps were "essential" and which were just "nice to have." Due to this scrub, 2 ID was able to determine what services provided by local nationals were truly vital and concluded that some of these services enjoyed by 2 ID personnel were simply not essential for day-to-day operations. This scrub resulted in the development of a matrix dictating exactly who would be allowed on post during any given FPCON.

Increased Need for Augmentation

Before September 11, the security of 2 ID camps was the sole purview of the military police (MPs). Even though the Korean Security Guards (KSG) augmented the MPs and they have the assistance of the Korean National Police (KNP) for exterior security issues, they did not have sufficient personnel to meet the security requirements levied upon them by the elevated FPCON. Because of this, soldiers throughout the Division received training in proper social procedures and began performing vehicle searches, searching individuals desiring entrance into camps, executing perimeter security patrols, and taking care of various other camp security issues. Soldiers also formed a quick reaction force (QRF) for each camp to act as first or immediate responders in the event of a serious incident. This became especially critical for those installations lacking on-post MP support. In some cases, depending upon the traffic congestion, the MPs may not be able to respond quickly to some of the satellite camps after they call; on th e best days, it may take as long as 30 to 40 minutes to travel 6 kilometers due to the heavy traffic.

In addition to the personnel strain placed on 2 ID due to FPCONs Charlie and Delta, the Division also expended a great deal of unprogrammed funding. The higher EPCON levels dictated the emplacement of barriers and other devices to restrict vehicle movement through and around the gates and critical buildings throughout the Division, necessitating construction or emplacement of additional barriers to meet these requirements. The September 11 attacks also pointed out the need for additional lighting, mirrors used for vehicle inspections, better intra-agency communications, closed-circuit television cameras, and numerous other items. Several construction and repair issues, such as fences and walls, received an elevation in priority and 2 ID accomplished them with a renewed sense of urgency.

While it would be difficult to imagine anything good coming from the attacks of September 11, they did force 2 ID to take a hard look at its security posture and identify some shortcomings that needed addressing. This close scrutiny prepared the Division for the events and challenges that it would face during the summer of 2002.

Protests Beginning in June 2002

As horrific and significant as the events of September 11 were, it may be argued that the string of events that began on 13 June 2002 has more directly affected FP for U.S. forces in Korea, specifically for those soldiers serving in the 2d Infantry Division. On that date, two young Korean school girls, Shim Mi-Son and Shin Hyo-Sun, were killed in a tragic accident when a U.S. Army tracked vehicle involved in convoy operations struck them from behind while they were walking along Highway 56 in Kyong-gi Province. This accident, and the subsequent investigation, sparked a firestorm of protests. The first of these protests took place on 20 June at Camp Red Cloud, the home of 2 ID headquarters.

Protests in the Republic of Korea (ROK) are allowed and, in some respects, encouraged as a method of expressing free speech in this relatively new democracy. Protesters must submit a request to hold a demonstration to the local police, and the demonstration permits often cover a period of several weeks. Demonstrations are not to be violent, and they must occur during daylight hours. The protest on 20 June was sanctioned and began peacefully. It was also quite small, with fewer than one hundred protesters, to include several relatives of the victims. While it started peacefully, it soon escalated and turned violent, resulting in a significant disruption of military operations and damage to U.S. Government property. Both the Korean Police and U.S. military personnel in charge of the main gate were completely unprepared and overwhelmed.

The protest that followed on 26 June was also violent, resulting in several injuries to U.S. personnel. Protesters, acting with military precision, distracted the riot police with a rush at the main gate of Camp Red Cloud while others surreptitiously cut a hole in the fence 30 meters north of the gate, thus gaining access to the installation. Security forces quickly apprehended those protesters who gained access to the installation. While waiting for a fire hose and concertina wire, U.S. personnel outfitted with riot-control gear fought with protesters and guarded the hole in the fence. Seeing their newly created entrance blocked, protesters assaulted the U.S. soldiers with a hail of kicks, rocks, bricks, and bottles. Intent on drawing blood, protest leaders instructed the rioters to throw rocks and bricks at the soldiers' feet and shins to make them lower their riot shields, exposing their heads. Their tactic was successful and several U.S. soldiers were struck in the head and face, injuring them.

Liaison with Korean LEAs is Crucial

One of the greatest FP assets available to U.S. forces is our relationship with these Korean law-enforcement agencies (LEAs). Because of this close relationship, liaison is constant, resulting in a superb flow of information. It is a rare event when a protest occurs without prior notification to U.S. forces. Liaison occurs within jaw-enforcement and military intelligence (Ml) channels, all owing the corroboration of information from more than one source. They analyze, evaluate, and quickly distribute this information to unit commands and unit AT officers (ATOs) to ensure soldiers are aware of any imminent protests or rallies.

In addition to the free exchange of information, this close relationship with the KNP has resulted in their assistance in dealing with violent protests. KNP riot police have been on hand to quell violent protests at several 2 ID installations, including Camps Red Cloud, Casey, Page, and Howze. Hundreds of KNP riot police in full armor met the protesters at Camp Red Cloud in June 2002. This KNP presence undoubtedly reduced the number of injuries to U.S. MPs and other soldiers.

After 2 ID and the KNP realized the size and severity of the protests, the KNP increased the riotpolice presence accordingly. When the protests turn violent, this large ratio is welcome and necessary. If the protesters manage to get past the riot police, a cadre of MPs and soldiers in riot gear and body armor meet them.

Protesters' Campaign to Increase Support

All of the protests held as a result of the June 2002 accident had one thing in common: regardless of whether the protest was peaceful or violent, the protesters ensured the presence of a video camera, whether private or from the news media. Through liaison contacts, 2 ID found out early that the protesters wanted to film a protester struck or mistreated by a U.S. soldier. They believed that such an event would help shore up their popular support with the South Korean people and move them closer to their ultimate goal: the removal of U.S. forces from the Korean Peninsula.

It is important to note that until this time, the dissident groups and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) organizing and leading the protests had little popular support. Almost everyone participating in the demonstrations were NGO group members or relatives and schoolmates of the deceased girls. What the dissidents and NGOs needed to do was move the protests from the realm of dissidents and NGOs to that of common citizens. They proceeded to conduct an extraordinarily well-conceived information operations campaign that eventually led to demonstrations by fifty thousand people in the streets of downtown Seoul.

Korea is the second-most 'wired' nation in the world, and protest groups use anti-U.S. websites extensively to post articles, photographs, and short "news" clips depicting what they see as "atrocities" perpetrated by U.S. military personnel. The protesters usually edit these video clips to show a decidedly anti-U.S. bias and designed to stir up their fellow protesters--not necessarily to show events in a factual light. Protest groups have proven that they are not above provoking or attacking U.S. personnel and filming the U.S. soldiers defending themselves. They then edit this video footage to make it appear as if the soldier was the instigator--ting like the quintessential "Ugly American."

For the most part, this tactic has not worked to the protesters' advantage as the majority of U.S. soldiers are circumspect while on the Korean economy and they rarely travel alone. USFK established an extensive training program for all its personnel that emphasizes the benefits of being good neighbors, a familiarization with Korean culture, and what to do in the unlikely event that they are attacked or provoked. Throughout all of the training and briefings, one theme remains constant: the U.S. soldier always retains the right of self-defense. While trainers and commanders remind soldiers of this fact, they also emphasize using the minimum level of force necessary and not letting the situation get out of hand.

While attacks are very rare, they have occurred, to include an altercation on the Seoul subway between protesters and three 2 ID soldiers that resulted in the abduction of one of the soldiers, and another attack against an EUSA officer outside Yongsan Garrison in Seoul that resulted in a knife wound. This last attack, however, may have been criminal in nature rather than protest-related.

Since the accident in June 2002, there have been nearly 350 demonstrations against U.S. forces in Korea, ranging in size from one or two peaceful individuals holding signs or candles (commonly referred to as one-man protests") to crowds numbering in the tens of thousands. Most of these protests have been peaceful, but almost one-fifth of them have been violent, resulting in injuries and damage from thrown rocks, bottles, bricks, and paint. In a handful of instances, the protesters have gone so far as to resort to surprise attacks using Molotov cocktails. In these cases, the intent appeared to be gaining attention through coverage rather than to cause any significant property damage.

In virtually all cases, information flowed freely between U.S. forces, South Korean police, and the intelligence agencies, resulting in minimal injuries and minimal property damage. We have also been able to use this communications flow to ensure the protesters understand our position on certain issues. At one point during the protests in the summer of 2002, organizers entertained the idea of ramming the main gates with vehicles at several 2 ID installations as a form of protest. These protest organizers were told, via liaison contacts, that such an attack was clearly "crossing the line" and would not be viewed as a method of protest; rather, 2 ID would view it as a blatant terrorist attack and security forces would respond accordingly. Thanks to the clear communications and liaison channels, we averted a potential tragedy and no one was hurt or killed.

Outlook

During January 2003, the pro-U.S. silent majority began holding pro-USFK rallies in Seoul, led mostly by Korean veterans' groups and religious organizations. This appears to be leading to a return of the normally warm relations between the South Korean people and U.S. forces in the Republic of Korea. Regardless, U.S. forces on the Korean Peninsula and in the 2d Infantry Division will continue the day-to-day business of training, soldiering, and working to ensure that those Koreans who protest our presence here enjoy the right to freedom of speech guaranteed by the Government of the Republic of Korea--a government we respect and support.

The author would like to thank Mr. Victor Lowe, Camp Red Cloud Garrison and Area I Anti-Terrorism Officer, and Chief Warrant Officer Two Randy Rogers, 2 ID G2 Force Protection Analyst, for their invaluable assistance in the preparation of this article.

Chief Warrant Officer Three Wayne Miller is a Counterintelligence Technician (351B) with more than 20 years' experience in the intelligence field. He is currently serving as the Counterintelligence Operations Officer and the Assistant Battalion Antiterrorism Officer for the 102d Military Intelligence Battalion at Camp Essayons, ROK, with the 2d Infantry Division. Readers may contact the author via E-mail at [e-mail].