Force protection for Baghdad International Airport.

This article is about 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized) Artillery (Div Arty) stability and support operations (SASO) at Baghdad International Airport from the end of major combat operations on 10 May 2003 until the Div Arty redeployed to Fort Stewart, Georgia, in August.

As we go to press, the level of conflict in Iraq has escalated into low-intensity conflict with units facing daily ambushes, infiltrations and deliberate attacks.

This article provides tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) for executing SASO in a more peaceful post-war, nation-building environment than exists in Iraq today.

Editor

After successfully attacking Saddam Hussein's regime, the 3d Div Arty transitioned immediately from high-intensity conflict to SASO. Consequently, FA units performed a variety of nontraditional missions. At the end of hostilities, the division headquarters tasked the Div Arty to plan and execute force protection for Baghdad International Airport. Soldiers in the Div Arty shifted their focus from destroying the enemy to protecting fellow soldiers.

The Area of Operations (AO). Baghdad International Airport, about 10 miles south of Baghdad, is Iraq's primary civilian hub for international flights. It has two runways. Passenger services continued up until three days before the beginning of hostilities in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). The city of Abu Gharyb (population of about 750,000) is located approximately one kilometer north of the airport.

Small farming villages flank the airfield to the west and south. East of the airport are a number of Special Republican Guards barracks and one of Saddam Hussein' s Presidential Palaces. Highway 10, which is a four-lane divided highway, leads directly from the airfield to downtown Baghdad and is the major avenue of approach for vehicle traffic entering and exiting the airport.

Task Organization. The Div Arty task organization for SASO consisted of Headquarters and Headquarters Battery (HHB), Div Arty; 1st Battalion, 39th Field Artillery (1-39 FA) multiple-launch rocket system (MLRS); and 1st Battalion, 3d Air Defense Artillery (1-3 AD). Due to the change in its tactical mission, the division no longer needed MLRS or air defense. Both 1-39 FA and 1-3 AD were in unique positions as the security force for Baghdad International Airport with the Div Arty headquarters as the command and control node.

Employing these battalions for SASO had advantages and disadvantages. While 1-39 FA had ample personnel to perform its mission, it lacked the high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs) and armored fighting vehicles to provide maximum protection at entry and exit control points (ECPs). Concurrently, 1-3 AD had an abundance of M6 Bradley Linebackers but lacked dismounted soldiers. To solve these problems, Div Arty cross-leveled personnel and vehicles to provide enough soldiers and armored vehicles at each ECP.

Before executing the force protection mission, the Div Arty established the Force Protection Operations Cell (FPOC) for Baghdad International Airport. The Div Arty mission was to command and control all airport force protection operations, coordinate with outside agencies for assistance and supplies, work in conjunction with the US Air Force security forces to secure the airport's two runways and interact with tenant units regarding force protection issues.

Also, the Div Arty found that a close working relationship with the airport's "Mayor's" Cell paid big dividends. The Mayor's Cell consisted of several Army and Air Force engineer units. Their tasks were to evaluate and rebuild the airport's infrastructure, restore utilities and coordinate space for units arriving at the airport.

The Div Arty began Baghdad International Airport force protection operations on 13 April by maiming the four ECPs and conducting roving patrols along the perimeter.

The Threat and Security Operations. Before the Div Arty assumed force protection responsibilities, the 1st Brigade Combat Team (BCT) with elements from the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) had been securing Baghdad International Airport. Both units reported little activity along the perimeter besides sporadic gunfire in the distance. At first, the biggest threats to the Div Arty's mission were people looking for Food and looters operating at night.

The Div Arty's initial task was to familiarize itself with what was left of the airport perimeter. A 14-foot wall bordering one of Saddam Hussein's Presidential Palaces flanked the eastern portion of the airport. Despite minor damage, the eastern wall was structurally sound.

The western portion of the airport was extremely porous and more difficult to secure. The wall along that portion did not fare well during the war and offered little protection, if any, to units that eventually would move into the area. The Div Arty executed a strongpoint defense in this area and constructed battle positions with interlocking fields of fire to protect the western perimeter.

One critical task in developing the perimeter was to identify the location of future ECPs. The Div Arty had to consider where most military traffic would enter and exit as well as which roads civilians and contractors would be permitted access to when they eventually returned to Baghdad International Airport. The Div Arty decided on four ECPs: two ECPs for military traffic and two for civilian/contractor traffic.

During the initial assessment of the AO, the Div Arty discovered many ammunition caches and areas strewn with unexploded ordnance (UXO). Due to the sheer numbers of caches and UXO in the airport, clearing these sites was secondary to developing the over all security of the airport.

As time passed, the Div Arty received more barrier material and, with the assistance of the military police (MPs) started to upgrade ECP defenses. Some of the upgrades included improving traffic serpentines, adding several portable lighting systems and constructing improved bunkers for soldiers manning the gates.

The first major test the Div Arty faced was the return of Iraqi civilians who lived in a village on the airport proper before the war. The civil affairs (CA) team operating in the zone informed the villagers the Army was prepared to let them return to their homes. This would not have been a problem if the CA team had notified the Div Arty. Instead, nearly 200 people arrived in buses and cars demanding they return to their homes.

At the same time, looters who had been coming onto the Baghdad International Airport grounds before the Div Arty assumed the force protection mission were attempting to exit in pick up trucks filled with appliances and electronics. The villagers began to scream Ali-Baba (thief in Arabic) and identified the individuals as criminals who did not live in the village. Altercations broke out, and the looters were apprehended and turned into the MP detention center.

After consulting the division headquarters and coordinating with the CA team, the families eventually were allowed back to their homes. One stipulation was they had to have an Iraqi Airways identification card (ID) or Saddam International Airport identification card to gain entry to Baghdad International Airport. The airline and airport IDs were a short-term fix until the Div Arty could establish a system to identify these individuals and help determine if they were still loyal to Saddam's regime and posed a threat to daily operations at the airport.

1-39 FA was tasked to oversee the village and, eventually, took a census of the village. The battalion developed new identification cards, renumbered the houses and established a vehicle registration system in the village.

1-39 FA's initiatives accomplished two things. Primarily, 1-39 FA quickly could identify villagers as they approached their ECP. Second, 1-39 FA gave the villagers a sense of belonging and a reason to work toward restoring normalcy in their daily lives.

Unfortunately, the airport villagers were not the Div Arty's only concern. Many "hot spots" sprang up as time went on.

One area was just outside of ECP1, which served as the main gate for Baghdad International Airport. Approximately one kilometer east of the ECP1 is an overpass that crosses over Highway 8 leading into the airport. The area was a gathering place for military-aged males. This congregation led us to believe the Iraqis were gathering intelligence and observing convoys moving on and off Baghdad International Airport.

Because they were not breaking any laws, the Div Arty did not detain them. Instead, the Div Arty developed a plan to run them off. The first step was to eliminate all brush and foliage for about 700 meters east of the ECP that bordered the highway. This improved observation and fields of fire lot the security forces manning the ECP.

The Div Arty also conducted "Thunder Runs" in conjunction with the quick reaction force (QRF). The QRF consisted of two M1A1 Abrams main battle tanks and two M2 Bradley fighting vehicles (BFVs). These vehicles belonged to the assault command post security force that was task organized to the Div Arty. On a Thunder Run, the QRF drove to the overpass, stopped, set up a hasty perimeter and waited until the crowds dispersed.

This show-of-force was extremely effective in dispersing crowds. Upon the arrival of US tanks and BFVs, many of the Iraqis would wave white flags in a sign of submission.

The QRF executed Thunder Runs several times within two to three hours and always achieved optimal results; the crowd dispersed and traffic flowed freely on and off the airport.

As the situation matured, the Div Arty worked closely with Air Force security forces to provide perimeter security while the Air Force was responsible for aircraft and runway security. The biggest challenge was direct communications between the two services. The Div Arty overcame this challenge by signing for a single-channel, handheld Motorola radio that enabled access to the base defense operations cell that served as the command and control node for Air Force security forces.

Another challenge was controlling the access of local construction vehicles and personnel onto the airport. These personnel were repairing the airport's two runways. But before establishing any type of agreement, the Air Force had nearly 100 trucks a day arriving at ECP4, which was responsible for vehicle inspection. Vehicle inspections became impossible due to the increasing heat and the number of trucks per day at the gate. In the end, the Army continued to man ECP4, which became a service entrance, while the Air Force searched and escorted the Iraqi construction vehicles on and off the airport.

The Div Arty would not have been as successful in its three protection mission without the assistance of the engineers and MPs. The engineer liaison officer (LNO), who was assigned to the Div Arty before the war, directed many projects, such as repairing holes in the perimeter wall, clearing brush and foliage, razing damaged and unsafe buildings, and clearing UXO.

The MPs proved invaluable in ECP construction and perimeter security. The 709th MP Battalion commander conducted a vulnerability threat assessment of the airport's perimeter and checkpoints. The assessment yielded a wealth of information and allowed the Div Arty to upgrade perimeter defenses and ECP security.

Major Challenges. While the mission was an overall success, the Div Arty faced three major challenges while serving as the Baghdad International Airport security force. The first was the lack of training on force protection procedures (vehicle and personnel searches) and the lack of force protection equipment (search wands and vehicle inspection mirrors). Force protection is inherent to major operations, but US Forces rarely train on it.

One recommendation to enhance the force protection posture of the Army while continuing to hone warfighting skills is to incorporate basic force protection tasks into quarterly common task training (CTT). Soldiers could train to set up a hasty checkpoint or roadblock during combat or peacekeeping operations.

Additionally, soldiers need the right equipment to perform these tasks. Search wands and detection mirrors should be added to the battalion's modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE). As OIF proved, tasks formerly considered jobs for the infantrymen and MPs are performed by soldiers in many military occupational specialties (MOS).

The second major hurdle was the lack of Class IV material, such as concertina wire and Hesco bastions used to build barriers. While some of this material was available at the division support area about 30 kilometers south of the airport, the quantity needed and capacity to haul it were severely lacking. Eventually, the Div Arty received a copious amount of barrier and construction material, but these materials needed to have been a priority for movement north to support securing many post conflict headquarters and troop concentration areas.

Finally, the most difficult challenge the Div Arty faced was working with the non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), later renamed the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). Many of these NGOs flew into Baghdad International Airport and met their relief convoys outside of the airport.

The Div Arty had to determine procedures to allow these people entrance to the airport. Despite photographing each person and documenting his/her passport, many of these relief workers came from countries (Sudan, Yemen and Syria) that have been accused of supporting terrorism. The Div Arty assumed that ORHA would take over this task, but this never happened.

ORHA was a challenge for the Div Arty in several ways. On more than one occasion, ORHA wanted to have local civilians return to the airport to begin cleaning and repairing airport facilities, but they had no plan for monitoring them. Ultimately, the task for securing them and their work areas fell on the Div Arty, which was already stretched to the breaking point. Better interagency cooperation and information flow would have resolved a number of the NGO problems we encountered.

In the end, the Div Arty adapted to its ever-changing environment and protected Baghdad International Airport, handing over a secure operating environment to the 1st Armored Division Artillery.

Operation Iraqi Freedom is one model of combat in the contemporary operating environment. The Army, and especially the artillery with our organizational skills and communications and haul equipment, will be part of SASO after major combat ceases. The Army needs to train for that and establish better communications with and procedures for working SASO with other services and organizations.

After all, when US/Coalition major combat operations cease, who else will be able to do it?

Captain Kevin J. Podmore is the 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized) Artillery Plans Officer and deployed to Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF); he also served as the Force Protection Officer during the initial civil-military phase of OIF. In his tour with the 1st Battalion, 7th Field Artillery, 1st Infantry Division (Mechanized) in Schweinfurt, Germany, he served as the Fire Support Officer for B Company, 1st Battalion, 18th Infantry; Battalion Adjutant; Battalion Ammunition Officer; and Paladin Platoon Leader. He is a graduate of the Combined Arms and Services Staff School (CA[S.sup.3]) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas