Force protection at the installation level.

Terrorists attack targets that are vulnerable, have a high psychological impact on a society, produce significant publicity, and demonstrate a government's inability to provide security. Both critical facilities and prominent individuals are potential terrorist targets Military facilities are a symbol of national power; a source of arms, ammunition and explosives; and a prestigious target that adds to the terrorist's reputation.

--CJCS Handbook 5260 (1)

We hear almost daily on every major news network stories about "force protection" (FP) and "Homeland Security" (HLS). To a few, these words may just be the latest buzzwords to hit the airwaves but to many more of us they are about protecting and securing our future while preserving our way of life. Those topics and several innovative programs represent a renewed and bolder approach to protecting our national interests at home and abroad.

These new programs and direct information-sharing between agencies are a direct result of the 11 September 2001 attacks on the United States. They are a critical element in our Global War on Terrorism and will continue to influence this nation and its people for many years to come. Gone are the days of thinking such events only happen in Third World countries, Europe, or the Middle East. We, the United States of America, the mightiest nation in the world, now fully understand just how vulnerable we are as a nation to terrorists. With terrorism at our door, intelligence-collecting, information-processing, and information-sharing among agencies continues to be some of our greatest tools to combat terrorism.

The events of September 11 have placed a far greater emphasis on FP and HLS. Furthermore, the manner in which we respond to emergencies and crisis management has changed significantly during the last year. Force protection is not a passive program, it is about being proactive, constantly alert, and aware of our surroundings. Our leaders have been dealing with FP and related issues for years. Only now some of the rules have changed and we are much more focused and vigilant. We have more closely balanced standards, procedures, and requirements to the overarching mission of the organization and the military installation. This article will focus on FP at the installation level.

Force protection is everyone's duty and applies across the entire command structure, from the newest private to our Commander in Chief. FP is a security program designed to protect soldiers, civilian employees, family members, facilities, and equipment in all locations and situations from threats which include terrorists, criminals, disaffected persons, hostile intelligence collectors, paramilitary forces, protesters, and saboteurs. To accomplish this goal, an organization must have an effective program that is proactive and prevents, deters, defends, and can respond to any threat or situation. Such a program is centralized and focused on a holistic management approach at the command, installation, and unit or activity level. This program identifies, consolidates, and synchronizes detailed FP requirements with a current risk assessment and prioritizes a distribution list of resources. Each organization must continuously monitor and validate its force protection program (FPP). In order to be effective, the FPP must advance at the same rate as major advancements in technology and intelligence collection.

Force Protection at the Installation Level

As stated above, FP applies across the entire organizational structure. Since 11 September 2001, the military Services have developed, written, revised, and published numerous manuals and regulations emphasizing the new procedures and changes required to protect our military installations. Some of the more critical requirements appear below:

* Appoint a force protection officer.

* Develop, implement, and maintain an overarching installation FPP that synchronizes the five existing security programs:

* Physical security.

* Information security.

* Protective services.

* Law enforcement.

* Antiterrorism.

* Establish a force protection committee (FPC). The FPC should have at a minimum representation from the following agencies, directorates, and sections: law enforcement, G3/S3 plans and training, G2/S2 security and intelligence, engineer, information management, logistics, medical, legal, safety, resource management, and public affairs.

* Conduct FPC meetings twice annually and incorporate the responsibilities of the physical security (PS) council required by AR 190-13, The Army Physical Security Program.

* Ensure FP requirements have a high budget priority and maintain a strict audit trail for FP funds.

* Ensure the aggressive management of FP in compliance with Department of Defense (DOD), Department of the Army (DA), and U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) plans, policies, and guidance. (Fort Huachuca is a TRADOC installation.)

* Conduct an annual FP exercise that includes a mass casualty (MASCAL) exercise.

* Incorporate FP special-interest inspection items in the Command Inspection Program. (Each installation develops its inspection items.)

* Publish and maintain an installation force protection plan. (2)

Force Protection Program

The installation or unit commanders do not develop the FPP alone. The installation commander develops and maintains the FPP with coordination and input from all agencies involved in the execution of the program. At the installation level, this should include all directorates, major organizations, and tenants. The program development must fully integrate non-DOD agencies at the local, state, and federal levels.

The goal of the FPP is to provide protection to the installation personnel, facilities, and critical assets, as well as to safeguard information. The development of high-risk personnel (HRP) and mission-essential vulnerable areas (MEVAs) lists meet this requirement. Updated annually, those lists should become part of the commander's critical information requirements (CCIRs).

The FPP must address units and individuals going outside the United States for deployments and mobilization operations. Since the absolute and continuous protection of all the personnel, structures, activities, and equipment under the commander's control is unrealistic, he and his staff must prioritize the resources and assets and clearly specify the required level of protection during various periods.

Furthermore, the program must look beyond the installation's physical boundaries. Monitoring and linking local government agencies and the plans and procedures are critical. The installation and local community rely on one another, and a sound working relationship between the two is essential for any plan to be successful.

A good example to illustrate this point would be the need to evacuate a portion of or the entire installation. Are plans in place with the community and have they practiced them? What are the egress routes? Where are the rallying points? Where are the shelters? Are they on or off the installation? Who are the community Red Cross and community emergency coordinators? This information exchange between the installation and the community is critical. Developing a sound working partnership means understanding that neither is able to sustain itself fully without the other. Installations and communities should exercise this partnership at least annually with the goal of sequentially and successively building upon each other's capabilities. The training value and knowledge gained through a combined exercise builds trust and teamwork and identifies each group's limitations and capabilities.

The Installation Battlespace

A military installation is comparable to a medium-size city with its countless service members, families, employees, and critical facilities. Like many cities where a mayor runs the community's day-to-day business, the military assigns an installation commander to manage these and the other complex installation operations. The installation commander is ultimately responsible for force protection and everything that does and does not happen on the installation; he accomplishes this through the garrison commander. Unit commanders on the installation are responsible for FP at their levels and within the scope of their commands. The installation commander clearly defines and assigns responsibilities to the installation operations center (IOC) and the post directorates, much the same way tactical commanders apply their forces on the tactical battlefield.

The critical element at this level is an intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) cell fully integrated into the IOC. The primary function of the ISR cell is to keep the commander apprised of the current situation and its impact on the installation. Compiling and analyzing data from numerous sources accomplishes this. This integration of the IOC and ISR cell enables the IOC to remain focused on the situation at hand and eliminates developing unnecessary courses of action (COAs).

Figure 1 provides a graphic illustration of converting a tactical battlespace to an installation battlespace. The installation boundary is the area of operation (AO). The AO consists of an inner, middle, and outer ring. The inner ring includes consists of the critical elements that must receive protection (e.g., high-risk targets [HRTs], MEVAs, and HRPs). The middle ring includes the remainder of the installation confines such as housing, ammunition storage areas, etc.

The outer ring does not have a finite boundary so the installation commander must define it as the area of influence (AI). The Al includes areas that the commander can directly influence through such activities as contacts with local government officials, law-enforcement agencies (LEAs), and emergency management agencies through public affairs command-information channels.

The area of interest (AOI), although not specifically addressed in an FPP is of concern to the installation commander. The AOI may include areas distant from the installation, in which events may occur indicating changes in the threat to the installation. It may also include contacts or information received from national and state LEAs, and intelligence or emergency-management agencies relating to the AI or AO of the installation. All of these are relevant to the installation commander and influence his decisionmaking process.

Once the commander has clearly defined the battlespace, the installation can maximize all five critical elements programs to protect the installation and it inhabitants

* Physical security.

* Information security.

* Protective services.

* Law enforcement.

* Antiterrorism.

All aspects of the battlespace are critical; the two outermost areas (AI and AOI) are the most critical to the commander and the ISR cell. Any advance warning and knowledge gained by the cell greatly enhances the commander's ability to select the best COA to allay the threat. Remember, one of the first goaJs in FP is to deter and mitigate the threat.

FP Training Plan

A training cycle is essential and must focus on the most probable means of attack and the "what if' scenarios. When it comes to the means of attack, the G2 and ISR cell are good places to start, just make sure that your CCIRs and priority intelligence requirements (PIRs) are up to date. A proven training mixture of weekly special-subject briefings, monthly "tabletop" exercises, with two or three full-scale exercises is a full load and works well during most of the year. This approach allows you to do the "walk, crawl, and run" steps with each exercise building on the previous one, and it works well regardless of an organization's size. Additionally, this approach allows all tenants to it develop their internal training objectives in conjunction with the installation mission, thus balancing the mission with the exercise. Also, when developing a training plan, go beyond just control of access; access control is a primary concern and the focal point for many installations; however, it is only the start.

Look at the major sources of utilities on the installation and how they individually affect it. View the installation and facilities from a terrorist's viewpoint. Where do I get the biggest bang for my efforts? Are gas lines, water-pumping stations, and major electrical plants easily assessible? Once identified, conduct a tabletop exercise with the IOC personnel and tenants involved. Assess the impact and resources needed to restore service. A possible training scenario could be eliminating a power substation near the commissary, or a MEVA for 24, 36, or 48 hours. What effect will it have on the installation, nearby units, soldiers, and residents? A primary player, the Directorate of Installation Support (DIS) understands the impact perhaps more than any other organization on the installation. However, other tenants need to be involved, such as the public affairs office (PAO) and should be included in the exercise.

Other scenarios to consider would be a notional bomb threat to a building, especially if it is a very large and prominent structure, or a simple fire drill in the same building. Does the building coordinator have rally points identified far enough away from the building? Is there an accountability procedure?

Exercise Apache Gold

Fort Huachuca recently conducted a postwide, one-day exercise with six major events consisting of--

* Force protection procedures.

* An airplane crash.

* A MASCAL event.

* Emergency evacuation plan (EEP).

* Emergency evacuation drill (EED).

* Hostage scenario.

* Seventy-five additional smaller events.

The Exercise, similar to one conducted at the beginning of the year with the Battle Command Training Program (BCTP), stressed the 00 and validated two new programs: the EEP and EED. These two programs are internal to Fort Huachuca. (Installations interested in these plans should E-mail or call the author.) The EEP is essentially the evacuation procedures used to relocate or evacuate family members on the installation from the threat area and, if necessary, evacuate them to a safe area off the installation, similar to noncombatant evacuation operations (NEOs) overseas. The EED is a list of procedures and local guidance to evacuate and account for all employees of a building. This is similar to a fire drill but contains additional information with a set timetable. The Exercise called for an EED to test the plan and procedures. Several directorates conducted their own internal drills in conjunction with the Exercise. The Exercise highlighted several pitfalls in our plan and the directorate's procedures; as a res ult, we have done more planning and revising to improve our plans and procedures.

The Exercise was a resounding success in part due to the planning and our ability to locate the "white cell" (controllers) a few doors down from the IOC. The controllers' cell, staffed by four individuals, injected the core scenario and other small events to the various participants inside the IOC. Figure 2 is an example of the chart used during the Exercise. It lists the units and tenants on the left side and across the top are time blocks broken down into 20-minute intervals. As in any exercise planning, the objectives started the planning process, which allowed the planners to develop the major events. Once they enter the major events into the chart, they added additional training objectives to the scenario to drive each directorate to conduct planning and problem-solving. This chart is a great tool and allows for crosswalking of each event, shows the time needed for completing each event, and helps identify problems before the exercise starts.

The chart cannot consider the unexpected as was the case when we had a real-world range fire divert our attention. The fire, small in comparison to the others in Arizona this year, consumed approximately 50 areas of range and diverted fire and LEA personnel to the scene. The impact was in dealing with the exercise and the fire simultaneously. One of our revised planning considerations was that if real-world events happen during the exercise, we would postpone the exercise as needed.

In using this planning matrix, the user would enter any major events such as a MASCAL or hostage scenario first, followed by additional events that cause other important members in the IOC to perform additional tasks. For example, during a MASCAL exercise, the planners could enter an additional inject for the Adjutant General (AG) to review service members' records for next-of-kin and insurance data or for the PAO to produce and post an official press release. This verifies not only the IOC procedures but also the internal AG and PAO procedures. In addition to using the planning matrix for planning the exercise and critical events, it is also a great tool to identify who should be doing what and when.

Lessons Learned

Fort Huachuca has taken great strides to improve upon every aspect of its FP program. The installation has conducted extensive planning, implemented construction projects, upgraded its IOC, increased training exercises, and invested in technological enhancements. Combined, they continue to increase our ability to prevent, deter, and improve our ability to respond to any threat or situation.

It has not been an easy road for the installation. However, the lessons learned during the previous year provide insight that could help other installations enhance their training and preparedness for the future.

Without exception, Fort Huachuca saw more than its share of unforeseeable events during 2002, starting with the Ryan fire. The Ryan fire, which started southwest of the installation, worked its way across the countryside to 1,800 acres on our installation. The result was a complete loss of power to the installation for nearly 24 hours, as both primary and alternate powerlines and poles burned to the ground. Talk about crisis management! We had a large uncontrollable fire spreading across the installation and were faced with the possibility of evacuating some, if not all, of the installation residents. There are far too many lessons learned to discuss them all, and the threat of fire might not be as prevalent at other installations as at Fort Huachuca. However, the loss of electrical power is a real possibility everywhere. Is your installation prepared to deal with the following if electrical power is lost?

* Directing traffic, as traffic and streetlights will not work.

* Emergency power capabilities in the operations center.

* Cold food-storage procedures (commissary and homes).

* Alarm systems in arms rooms and in sensitive compartmented information facilities (SCIFs).

* A postwide curfew for safety reasons.

* Communications capabilities (computer servers and telephones).

* The post cannot restore electric power until the area is safe and has obtained clearance from the controlling agency, whether that is the forestry service or some other state or local agency.

Another unexpected situation, a civilian brandishing a handgun, forced a limited evacuation of family members from their quarters and the immediate area. Issues of how and what do we do with the families during the cold night become immediately apparent. Fortunately, due to extensive training and scenario-driven exercises, the installation was able to bring the situation under control quickly and without implementing our emergency evacuation procedures.

These two examples are just the beginning of the endless variety of unexpected situations any installation could face. Twice within a year, Fort Huachuca had to respond quickly to developing dangerous situations.

Although, an FPP might not cover fires or other disasters, it provides a solid foundation that enables the installation to deal with the unexpected situations. This installation was able to adapt the existing plan to the situation at hand. The training conducted periodically throughout the year rein-forced the standards and procedures. Another positive lesson learned is that the real-world incidents allowed us to see our strengths and weaknesses and will help as we modify and improve our plan.

Conclusion

The installation is continuing to develop and update its IOC to handle such events. Additionally the ISR cell and FPP are making improvements daily with a combined team of experts. As the photographs of the IOC show, it is clear that force protection is a priority and a holistic management approach is in use on this installation. Technology enhancements will continue in the near future with the additions of a video matrix system, a reverse 911-telephone notification system, and additional digitized maps, which integrate the installation utilities and service schematics to the command center. Nevertheless, the core effort will be our training and planning events focused on present and most probable emergency events in the near future.

Endnotes

(1.) CJCS (Chairman, Joints Chiefs of Staff) Handbook 5260, Commander's Handbook for Anti-Terrorism Readiness (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 1 December 1996).

(2.) This list comes from two sources:

* Army Regulation 525-13, Military Operations, Antiterrorism (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 4 January 2002).

* TRADOC Regulation 525-13, Force Protection Program (FPP) (Fort Monroe, VA: Training and Doctrine Command, 12 December 1997).

The list emphasizes the major points that this article needs to address. Additionally, several of the items mentioned above have manuals devoted to their procedures such as physical security, information security, protective services, law enforcement, and antiterrorism. This is not a complete list, and you should review both references before developing your program.

David Koch is an Operations Officer in the Directorate of Installation Operations (G3), U.S. Army Intelligence Center at Fort Huachuca, Arizona. Readers may contact him via E-mail at [e-mail] and telephonically at [phone] or DSN 821-7471.