Flexibility and bold innovation for multiple missions in Iraq: 2-15 FAR beyond combat.

The battalion headquarters of 2d Battalion, 15th Field Artillery Regiment (2-15 FAR) from the 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry). Fort Drum, New York, deployed to Iraq in March 2003 with its Q-36 Firefinder radar and the battalion's combat observation lasing team (COLT). The headquarters coordinated, integrated and synchronized lethal fires for the 173d Airborne Brigade in support of the brigade's campaign on the Northern Front in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF).

Although the battalion headquarters performed typical FA tasks, the most significant impact 2-15 FAR had in OIF fell outside the traditional Redleg spectrum of missions. 2-15 FAR accomplished tasks that included conducting dismounted presence patrols; securing oil facilities; establishing and overseeing a detention facility; guarding a major bank; conducting command, control and communications ([C.sup.3]) for a 150-by-100-kilometer maneuver area of operations (AO); and establishing the a provincial government for the city of Kirkuk that governs 800,000 Iraqis.

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The leaders and Soldiers of the 2-15 FAR headquarters tackled these varied and unique challenges by relying on improvisation, flexibility and lessons learned from past training experiences, such as rotations at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), Fort Polk, Louisiana, and a recent division Warfighter exercise. Soldiers, NCOs and officers performed duties for which they had not been trained at home station, often accomplishing them without the authorized equipment and personnel.

Task Organizing and Deploying. The 173d Airborne Brigade stood-up as a brigade in June 2000. It was formed around the former Southern European Task Force (SETAF) Airborne Battalion Combat Team (ABCT). The brigade has one organic artillery battery: D Battery, 319th Airborne FAR (D 319 AFAR). To accomplish its OIF requirements, the 173d Airborne Brigade requested a force FA headquarters (2-15 FAR), a Q-36 radar and an additional firing battery. 2-15 FAR also decided to deploy its COLT to augment the brigade's observation capability.

2-15 FAR received its warning order to deploy during the 10th Mountain Division's Warfighter exercise in early March 2003. The battalion commander sent the brigade fire support officer (FSO) to the 173d Brigade in Vicenza, Italy, to integrate the FA battalion into planning for movement and help formulate the brigade's fire support plan. The battalion continued to participate in the division's Warfighter exercise while the tactical operations center (TOC) (minus), Q-36, COLT and firing battery prepared to deploy.

The battalion headquarters package departed Fort Drum on 23 March and completed movement to Aviano Air Force Base, Italy, on 25 March. During the next two days, the battalion head-quarters integrated into the final stages of the brigade's air movement and tactical plan.

The members of the battalion worked with their brigade counterparts to quickly adapt to the new unit's standing operating procedures (SOP) and develop relationships with key leaders. 2-15 FAR also exchanged SOPs and conducted rehearsals with D Battery.

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As the load plans for the airborne assault into northern Iraq were being finalized, aircraft restrictions forced the brigade to reprioritize its equipment for transport into theater. The reprioritization caused a significant decrease in the number of vehicles and personnel that 2-15 FAR could bring into country. As a result, only the vehicles absolutely necessary to provide command and control ([C.sup.2]) were air landed into theater. The battalion's combat service support (CSS) assets remained in Italy to redeploy to Fort Drum. The 105-mm battery made it to Germany, prepared to deploy to Iraq, but later was redeployed to Fort Drum.

Inserting by Air into Iraq. The 173d Brigade conducted its airborne insertion into Bashur Airfield in northeastern Iraq on 26 March. On 27 March, headquarters, headquarters and services battery (HHS) (minus) and 2-15 FAR deployed forward on C-17s with 41 personnel for the TOC, a Q-36 radar section and COLT platoon with a total of eight vehicles, one ISU90 storage container and two pallets of equipment and medical supplies.

The 173d Brigade's mission was to secure the Bashur Airfield, build combat power and prepare the airfield for use as a logistics hub in the Northern Front. The brigade jumped onto the airfield and secured it with the help of the Joint Special Operations Task Force-North (JSOTF-N) along with soldiers from the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP). The KDP fighters, known by US forces as the Peshmerga (those who face death), are a Kurdish resistance group in northern Iraq.

Under light rain and in darkness, the 2-15 FAR headquarters air landed at Bashur Airfield. The Q-36 occupied a position near the airfield and began observing. The TOC established operations in a former Iraqi Army fort that once was used as a prison. Due to the lack of organic vehicles' being flown in, 2-15 FAR's leaders arranged to transport the TOC personnel and equipment on borrowed Peshmerga trucks for the 20-mile trip through mountainous terrain. The 2-15 FAR TOC quickly learned the necessity of working with local forces and using the talents of contracted linguists to interpret and coordinate activities. The Peshmerga also helped provide security for the TOC as it set-up and immediately began the military decision-making process (MDMP) for upcoming missions.

The six howitzers of D/319 AFAR arrived in Iraq on 28 March and quickly established a firing capability near the airfield, soon integrating the Q-36 into its battery perimeter. The battalion fire direction center (FDC) incorporated D Battery and the Q-36 in fire mission and counterfire acquisition rehearsals.

The FDC established SOPs with its non-habitual subordinate battery and worked through the challenges posed by the advanced FA tactical data system (AFATDS)-equipped battalion FDC communicating with the non-AFATDS, battery computer system (BCS)-equipped firing battery. Needing to meet the five requirements for accurate, predicted fire, the TOC provided [C.sup.2] for a live-fire exercise for D/319 AFAR to calibrate its howitzers. Based on procedures outlined in a January-February 2003 article, the TOC applied Air Force meteorological data from the secure Internet protocol net (SIPRNET). (The article was "Afghanistan: Firing Artillery Accurately with Air Force Met Support," by First Lieutenant Joshua D. Mitchell.)

Fighting in Iraq. The training soon paid off when D Battery and 2-15 FAR TOC elements conducted two, two-gun raids near enemy lines with 60 confirmed kills and two bunker complexes destroyed in support of US Special Forces operations.

To conduct the raids, maintain security operations near Bashur Airfield and conduct the MDMP for future operations, 2-15 FAR TOC personnel contributed to the brigade's efforts. The TOC provided an officer to act as D Battery's executive officer (XO) for the artillery raid element, one NCO for the brigade's tactical command post (TAC) to facilitate coordination for air support and surface fires as part of the brigade fire support element (FSE) and a 131A warrant officer in the brigade TOC FSE to help in operations and planning. In addition, 2-15 AR's brigade FSO acted as the FA battalion S3 and supervised the battalion's MDMP and production of the FA support plan (FASP). 2-15 FAR developed the fire support plan for the brigade's seizure of the city of Kirkuk.

On 9 April, the 173d Brigade attacked to seize Kirkuk. The 2-15 FAR battalion TAC, Q-36 radar and four guns from D Battery moved 120 kilometers south to Kirkuk. The TAC reached the outskirts of Kirkuk and linked up with the remaining two guns and FDC from D Battery.

The artillery elements moved forward immediately behind the lead infantry battalion to provide close supporting fires. Enemy resistance was light as the Peshmerga and US Special Forces had conducted an attack earlier in the day that had diminished the enemy threat. The battalion and brigade TACs occupied a position at an Iraqi military helicopter airfield base outside Kirkuk, and D Battery established a firing capability and integrated the Q-36 into its firing position.

On 10 April, the brigade and battalion TACs moved to an Iraqi air force base directly west of Kirkuk. There they established permanent [C.sup.2] centers for the brigade and city. The Q-36 and D Battery occupied a position within the perimeter of the airbase and were prepared to provide indirect fire support. The remainder of the 2-15 FAR TOC arrived early the next morning, once again on borrowed Peshmerga cargo trucks.

High-intensity combat operations were over for the 173d Airborne Brigade and stability or support operations (SOSO) began with a series of nontraditional missions.

Securing Iraqi Oil Facilities. To protect Iraq's vital infrastructure, the brigade tasked 2-15 FAR to secure the key oil processing plant in northern Iraq. Kirkuk's oil fields produce 40 percent of Iraq's oil and six percent of the world's oil. D Battery secured the oil stabilization plant five kilometers northwest of Kirkuk while maintaining two guns in position ready-to-fire.

2-15 FAR also was responsible for an AO that included the oil stabilization plant, oil storage facilities and industrial equipment storage sites. To facilitate the security of the oil stabilization site and prevent looting and espionage to oil production structures, Soldiers from the 2-15 FAR TOC conducted many presence patrols at those sites and in surrounding villages. These patrols were conducted by FA officers and NCOs and Soldiers from Military Occupational Specialties (MOS) 13D Field Artillery Tactical Data Systems Specialist, 13B Cannon Crewmember, 96B Intelligence Analyst and 31U Signal Support System Specialist.

Instrumental to the success of these presence patrols was their training, focused on battle drills and rehearsals. The training was on mounted and dismounted patrolling techniques, reacting to ambushes, apprehension of looters and evacuating casualties. Leaders also had to integrate their linguists into training and operations.

2-15 FAR's TOC Soldiers never had been exposed to this type of training but were eager and quick to learn. These Soldiers were placed in the Iraqi population to provide security and build trust with the locals. One patrol with eight personnel and three vehicles captured 36 looters, some armed with AK-47s, who were stealing oil production equipment. Another patrol captured a 60-mm mortar that had fired at the air base.

Running a Detention Center. During this period, a new detainee collection point needed to be established. Presence patrols conducted by brigade maneuver units throughout the AO were detaining large numbers of looters and anti-Coalition personnel. Local jails in the city were not yet established, and the existing collection point was overflowing.

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The brigade assigned 2-15 FAR the task of establishing a brigade detention facility. The battalion determined the location and developed the plan for its construction and security. "Camp Bayonet Collection Point" was soon established.

A mortar platoon initially provided security for the facility while 2-15 FAR provided the hearing officers and the magistrate. Two FA captains, one FA lieutenant and the radar warrant officer became responsible for hearing cases and dispensing justice to detainees who soon numbered in the thousands. The hearing officers provided recommendations to 2-15 FAR's S3, who was the magistrate.

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Artillerymen were asked to perform duties primarily associated with judges and military policemen. These officers and Soldiers relied on common sense and practical judgment to accomplish these tasks for which they had never trained.

Due to mission requirements and Department of the Army needs, 10 personnel of the original 41 with 2-15 AFAR, the Q-36 and COLT returned to Fort Drum. 2-15 FAR (-) was led by the battalion S3, and a sergeant first class (promotable) became the senior NCO.

The young officers and NCOs throughout the TOC stepped up to the increased responsibilities. The assistant S3 became the operations officer and the senior NCOs became the S1 and S4. Others filled unfamiliar roles, such as a 13D sergeant's becoming the night TOC battle captain.

D Battery successfully maintained security of the oil stabilization plant and, when relieved of those duties by a local police force, D Battery became the force that secured and ran the brigade's detention facility. The 2-15 FAR TOC and D Battery provided the security and maintained all hearing and magisterial duties for the brigade's detention facility that processed more than 2,000 detainees and, at times, held up to 380 personnel. 2-15 FAR with D Battery also was responsible for transporting the more dangerous detainees to the 4th Infantry Division's facility in Tikrit.

Artillery soldiers applied hard work, ingenuity and attention to detail while operating a facility that was recognized as the best in the 4th Infantry Division.

Securing the Bank of Kirkuk. 2-15 FAR also was assigned to provide security for the Bank of Kirkuk. D Battery and the 2-15 FAR TOC shared responsibilities for guarding the bank. The security force guarded 32 million dollars in payroll funds and ensured the bank could operate and pay state employees, such as teachers.

An example of one of the challenges encountered was controlling a riot of hundreds of impatient Iraqis awaiting payment. Another was dealing with illegal moneychangers. Money exchangers who worked outside the bank were providing counterfeit Iraqi currency and false exchange rates to locals who were exchanging their American dollars for Iraqi dinar. In one instance, a 31U NCO and 13R Field Artillery Firefinder Radar Operator Soldier detained three of these con men by chasing them in a civilian taxi and subduing them. The bank detail lasted for four and one-half weeks.

Establishing the Government of Kirkuk. The 173d Brigade then re-allocated its battlespace and conducted an MDMP that, once again, changed 2-15 FAR tasks. 2-15 FAR was to form the nucleus of Task Force (TF) Government with the mission of establishing the government of Kirkuk and its province.

Kirkuk has a population of 800,000, and its governate has more than 1.2 million people. The city also is an ethnically charged area with Arabs, Turkomen, Kurds and Assyrians all competing for scarce resources and all trying to recover from the racist policies of the former regime. TF Government had to be ethnically and politically sensitive to all groups to maintain a stable environment in what could become a very explosive area.

2-15 FAR became responsible for creating the processes and policies for "DeBa'athification," government design, resettlement of internally displaced personnel, government budget and salaries, and daily governmental operations with the governor and city council. The brigade's Staff Judge Advocate was assigned to TF Government to establish the judicial system.

Simultaneously, 2-15 FAR had [C.sup.2] of an AO 150 by 100 kilometers that included six towns and more than 50 villages.

Forces task organized to 2-15 FAR for TF Government included an infantry rifle company, a long-range surveillance detachment (LRSD), a tank company detached from the 4th Division and D Battery. The 2-15 FAR headquar-ters provided command, operational guidance, intelligence and logistical support to these units. This wide array of units continued to accomplish the tasks already started in Kirkuk, stood up small town governments and developed civil works projects to improve quality of life.

The main focus in these towns was to stand up the local government, fix the infrastructure, provide basic services, and demonstrate to the Iraqis that the Coalition was there to help them. Many of these projects revolved around modernizing police forces, improving government buildings, constructing parks and repairing sanitation and water systems.

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2-15 FAR task organized with the battalion S2, an FA lieutenant, in charge of the De-Ba'athification process. The battalion fire direction officer (FDO), another lieutenant, was put in charge of the government design process. The assistant S3, a captain, was tasked to establish the government's budget and salary system. The LRSD XO, an infantry lieutenant, was in charge of the politically sensitive resettlement process. 2-15 FAR's S3, the only field grade officer, assumed responsibilities as the TF Government XO, synchronizing the daily activities of the Kirkuk government and becoming a mentor to the chairmen of the city council. Also, the battalion's fire direction NCO took charge of processing civil works projects throughout the TF Government AO, handling more than 1.4 million dollars in project funds.

2-15 FAR maintained the equivalent of two command posts, one in the Kirkuk government building and the traditional command post in the TOC. The battalion faced the challenge of not only performing the traditional [C.sup.2] duties of a battalion TOC, but also surging manpower and resources daily in the Kirkuk government building, as necessary, to accomplish the tough tasks of building the government and making it function. The former battalion assistant S3 performed the duties of the S3, maintained a presence in the TOC and synchronized the efforts of the battalion's four maneuver elements within the brigade.

The TOC also had to overcome the challenges of commanding and controlling elements in a large battlespace. The battalion's signal officer obtained enough tactical satellite (TACSAT) radios and satellite phones for the battalion TOC to maintain digital and voice communications using the TACSAT's data burst capability and voice nets. The TOC also used the brigade's retrans as an alternate communications means to distant stations.

With training, units were able to send reports and updates digitally with follow up on satellite phone. The battalion TOC could respond quickly to hostile contacts and other potentially dangerous situations for units 70 kilometers away.

Each of the areas of emphasis for TF Government had unique challenges. The FA captain in charge of budgets and salaries was responsible for dispensing more than five million dollars in the 2003 budget and paying the salaries of more than 40,000 government employees. He also submitted budgets for the 2004 fiscal year. He used email to contact similar-sized cities in the United States and used examples of these American city budgets to establish Kirkuk's budget while also adhering to the Coalition Provisional Authority's (CPA's) requirements.

The Government Design Cell was responsible for everything from government structure to the buildings the government would occupy. Led by the battalion's FDO and communications NCO, the Government Design Cell completed estimates on the government buildings in Kirkuk. This allowed nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to renovate these buildings at a later date.

The team also organized and opened the Kirkuk Employment Office. The purpose of the employment office is to find jobs for the many unemployed people of Kirkuk. The battalion FDO completed the estimates, helped hire personnel to man the employment office, coordinated with international organizations to provide funding and ensured the personnel had the equipment they needed to run the office. As of 30 September, the employment office had found jobs for more than 1,500 personnel.

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The De-Ba'athification Department was to eliminate the influence that Saddam Hussein's formerruling Ba'ath Party had on the government in Kirkuk. The battalion S2 established a system for screening the 40,000 government employees in the Kirkuk province. The battalion S2 used not only guidance from the CPA, but also familiarized himself with the de-Nazification process the Allies undertook after World War II.

He hired and trained an Iraqi staff to carry out the process. His NCOIC helped by acquiring the staff's equipment. Currently the De-Ba'ath program in Kirkuk has screened more than 4,500 government employees and operates with minimum Coalition oversight.

TF Government also established the initial processes for the contentious issue of resettlement. The LRSD XO took charge of this area, and eventually, D Battery's XO took over this task. With little guidance from CPA and without help from international organizations, the resettlement office, with D Battery's XO spearheading the effort, mediated terms between Kurds, Arabs and Turkomen groups who were in conflict over land and housing. These agreements have averted bloodshed in this ethnically charged area of Kirkuk.

As part of the brigade's TF Government, 2-15 FAR has not only established the processes and systems to get the government of Kirkuk and its surrounding towns operating, but it also hired local Iraqi staffs and trained them to accomplish the same tasks in the areas of budgeting and city planning. 2-15 FAR began the process of returning local control to trained Iraqis.

Flexibility and bold innovation have been the cornerstones of success for the Soldiers, NCOs and officers of 2-15 FAR and D Battery. They employed ingenious methods to accomplish a variety of standard and nonstandard missions with less than 60 percent of their personnel and 40 percent of their equipment.

2-15 FAR and D/319 AFAR, like other units in Iraq, have performed combat operations, civil affairs operations, and functions usually associated with NGOs. Leaders of 2-15 FAR and D Battery quickly adapted new methods to accomplish their unique tasks, conducted research and refused to take "That is outside of my MOS" as a reason for not accomplishing missions.

Training that places units in unexpected conditions, that requires quick problem-solving and that rewards innovative leadership will prepare our units for future missions, such as those accomplished by 2-15 FAR and D/319 AFAR after OIF.

By Major Jeffrey T. O'Neal and First Lieutenants Aaron P. Heberlein and Jonathan H. Bork

Major Jeffrey T. O'Neal became the S3 of 2d Battalion, 15th Field Artillery Regiment (2-15 FAR), 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry), when the battalion landed in Iraq in March 2003 for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). He assumed the duties of the Commander of 2-15 FAR in Iraq in May 2003. Before deploying in OIF, he was the Fire Support Officer (FSO) for 2d Brigade, 10th Division. 2-15 FAR is due to deploy back to Fort Drum, New York, this spring.

First Lieutenant Aaron P. Heberlein is deployed to Iraq with 2-15 FAR and has been the battalion's Signal Officer for 18 months. He also serves as the Battalion Historian and Public Affairs Officer.

First Lieutenant Jonathan H. Bork is deployed to Iraq and has been 2-15 FAR's S2 for seven months. He also served in the battalion as a Company FSO, Battery Fire Direction Officer and Battery Executive Officer.