First lethal FA fires in Afghanistan: lessons learned at Firebase Shkin.

On 25 April 2003, the two M119 105-mm howitzers of Team Gold at Firebase Shkin on the Afghani-Pakistani border fired the first lethal artillery rounds of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). Team Gold was part of C Battery, 3d Battalion, 319th Airborne Field Artillery Regiment (C/3-319 AFAR), 82d Airborne Division.

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On the morning of 25 April, elements of B Company, 3d Battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment (B/3-504 PIR) and the 1st Platoon of the 82d Military Police Company (1/82 MP) made contact with 25 to 30 enemy personnel during a routine patrol approximately eight kilometers from the firebase. Shouting his transmission over the clatter of small arms fire, Sergeant Konrad Reed, B Company's FA forward observer (FO), called for fire on a planned target and reported he had been "hit" by grenade fragmentation.

On the radio, the fire direction center (FDC) attempted to reach the infantry battalion executive officer (XO) who had the authority to clear high-explosive (HE) fires, but high-volume traffic prevented the FDC from contacting him. The C Battery XO then checked the target location against friendly unit locations on the map and, despite the target's being danger close to the FO's observation post (OP), determined it was safe to fire and commanded the FDC to send the data to the guns.

The FO and his company fire support officer (FSO), First Lieutenant Mike Dolan, who also was injured by the grenade, adjusted the rounds and used "creeping fires" during three subsequent volleys to bring the rounds within 100 meters of their position. The FSO then established the location of the final volley as a priority target.

Team Gold's 25 April fires resulted in one enemy killed in action (KIA) with signal intelligence (SIGINT) and human intelligence (HUMINT) sources later indicating more had died of wounds.

Although this first lethal FA engagement was brief and only two howitzers fired, we can learn from such small-unit operations in extremely harsh terrain. We first learned that M119 fires were responsive and accurate in combat operations in Afghanistan--often making them the fires of choice for immediate close support and blocking or suppressing the enemy. Also, a land force could face similar circumstances as the FA helps fight the War on Terrorism in other equally challenging locations around the globe.

3-319 AFAR M119s on Firebases. C/3-319 AFAR deployed in support of OEF III in January of 2003 and remained in Afghanistan until August 2003. It deployed with six howitzer sections, one FDC section and a battery headquarters and conducted split-battery operations during the entire deployment.

A portion of the battery, Team Black, consisted of four 105-mm howitzer sections; four FDC personnel, including the fire direction officer (FDO); and a majority of the battery headquarters, including the battery commander, first sergeant and chief of firing battery. Team Black, after being positioned in several locations, settled in July at Firebase Orgun-e along the Afghani-Pakistani border. (See the map on Page 12.)

The remainder of the battery, Team Gold, consisted of two howitzer sections; four FDC personnel, including the fire direction NCO (FDNCO); the gunnery sergeant; and the battery XO. Team Gold initially occupied a firebase at Bagram Airfield and then, in April, moved to Firebase Shkin, which is 40 kilometers south of Firebase Orgun-e, also on the Afghani-Pakistani border.

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Throughout the deployment, the battery's two elements operated great distances from each other, sometimes exceeding 400 miles. To communicate, the two teams had to depend on long-range devices, such as tactical satellite (TACSAT), Force XXI battle command brigade and below (FBC[B.sup.2]) and other devices.

When Team Gold occupied Firebase Shkin, it emplaced the two howitzers at the northern and southern corners of the firebase with the FDC/command post (CP) approximately 75 meters from the northernmost gun. To facilitate 24-hour operations, the team manned the howitzers at 33 percent and the FDC at 50 percent (one NCO and one soldier awake at each howitzer and in the FDC) during hours of limited threat and manned them 100 percent during hours of increased threat. The threat assessment was based on enemy patterns/trends and the firebase maneuver element's patrol schedule. Members of the howitzer sections not on duty slept in crew tents or improved shelters at the howitzer positions while FDC personnel slept in the FDC/CP (an improved mud-hut shelter), allowing the team to gain 100 percent manning quickly.

Team Gold operated a fully automated FDC using the handheld terminal unit (HTU) with battery computer system (BCS) software and maintained a manual back up. It fought a constant battle to meet some of the five requirements for accurate, predicted fire. Team Gold provided its own survey using the gun laying and positioning system (GLPS) and precision lightweight global positioning receiver (PLGR) and calibrated every powder lot.

With no meteorological section, the team employed a technique to use Air Force Met to improve firing data. (See the article "Afghanistan: Firing Artillery Accurately with Air Force Met Support" by First Lieutenant Joshua D. Mitchell, January-February 2003). With no Internet access to download the Met information, the team relied on resupply aircraft to deliver the information, and, at times, went seven to 14 days without receiving updated Met data. Because of this, the howitzers had to register often.

Unique to Firebase Shkin was the close working relationship the artillerymen maintained with their maneuver unit: two rifle platoons, one anti-tank (AT) platoon and two MP sections (later replaced by another AT platoon), as well as scout and long-range surveillance detachment (LRSD) elements.

The rifle company commander commanded the maneuver elements in the firebase, and the infantry battalion XO provided command and control ([C.sup.2]) for all firebase elements. The battery XO on Team Gold reported directly to the battalion XO and served as sort of a "fire support coordinator" (FSCOORD) for the firebase. The battery XO participated in planning and briefings for every mission, providing input on the battery's capabilities and limitations and maintaining situational awareness.

Lessons Learned 25 April. Team Gold learned several lessons firing on an elusive enemy in extremely rugged terrain during the engagement at Firebase Shkin.

Preplanned Targets and Hasty Fire Planning. A key lesson was the importance of establishing and using planned targets and conducting hasty fire planning. On the morning of 25 April, the FSO had conducted a quick mission analysis for the day's patrol and determined the existing targets were not adequate. The FSO then conducted hasty fire planning with the battery XO.

During the 25 April patrol, the FO directed the FDC to lay on the target planned by the FSO that morning. Within seconds, the FO gave the command to fire. Although the target was approximately 300 meters beyond and 200 meters left of where the FO wanted the fires (along the observer-target line), he knew that firing the planned target would increase the response time and block and suppress the enemy as friendly forces maneuvered.

Situational Awareness and Battle Tracking to Clear Fires. The 25 April contact also proved the importance of situational awareness and battle tracking in the FDC and the firing unit leader's involvement in the maneuver planning process.

After the engagement, the firebase developed standing operating procedures (SOP) to rapidly clear fires in support of troops in contact. Under this SOP, if troops made contact and the battalion XO was not immediately available on the net, the howitzers could execute fires as long as the senior maneuver leader on the ground cleared the fires and the battery XO performed a secondary check by plotting the target against friendly unit locations. For the battery XO to assume partial responsibility for clearing fires, he had to understand the maneuver plan and the FDC had to maintain situational awareness through detailed battle tracking. Using this SOP, Team Gold provided responsive, accurate fires in support of troops in contact eight times at Shkin.

Maneuver Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs). The maneuver element then developed new TTPs to capitalize on Team Gold's ability to provide timely, accurate fires. Before Team Gold arrived at Shkin, maneuver elements relied on close air support (CAS) to provide indirect fire support, often waiting long periods for aircraft to arrive on station. As a result of Team Gold's performance in its first engagement, maneuver leaders used the howitzers to provide close supporting and blocking fires during all subsequent engagements.

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Another important TTP developed by the maneuver unit after 25 April was employing howitzer fires as, what the maneuver battalion XO called, the "decisive effort." To keep enemy forces from massing in the area, the maneuver battalion XO began placing scout and LRSD teams out in OPs for 48 to 72 hours, directing them to call-for-fire before engaging the enemy with direct fire weapons. The battalion XO's intent was to use the scouts and LRSD elements to find the enemy and howitzer fire to either finish or fix him until the quick reaction force (QRF) arrived--indirect fire as the decisive effort.

The FDC planned targets to support scout and LRSD OP missions. Once the maneuver observers were in position, they refined the targets; developed a hasty fire plan, based on the surrounding terrain; and established a priority target. On four occasions, Team Gold fired priority targets for scout and LRSD teams who had eyes on the enemy, resulting in five enemy KIA.

Enemy forces operating in the vicinity of Shkin used hit-and-run tactics, expending large amounts of ammunition in a short time, and then concealed themselves in the rugged terrain to break contact. These tactics highlighted the need for situational awareness and responsive fires and made the quick-response SOP crucial for the success of operations.

Radar Acquisition Counterfire TTP. One of the greatest threats at Firebase Shkin was enemy attacks with 107-mm rockets. During an attack on 21 June, the Q-36 Firefinder on Shkin made the first radar acquisition of a 107-mm rocket.

For Q-36 acquisitions, the battalion XO used the acquisition decision matrix to clear fires. (See the figure.) This is a simple, graduated response matrix that clarifies the rules of engagement (ROE) and maneuver actions and works well when drilled.

When the radar received an acquisition, the FDC processed the fire mission and sent it to the howitzers as "Do Not Load." The battalion XO then either cleared or did not clear the mission.

On 21 June, the FDC processed the mission and had the guns laid on Do Not Load data within 45 seconds of receiving the point-of-origin (POO) data from the radar. Once the battalion XO cleared the fires, the guns fired an initial volley and one repeat volley. Maneuver elements sent to investigate the launch site found one unexpended rocket surrounded by shrapnel from the artillery rounds.

To expedite clearing fires in the future, the FDC could create graphical control measures to identify areas on the map that are cleared or not cleared in accordance with the decision matrix (i.e., unpopulated or populated areas). These control measures will allow the FDC to plot the POO on the map and, after confirming enemy fires by a second source, know immediately if counterfires are cleared. If the Q-36 receives an acquisition and the firebase receives incoming fire (the second source of confirmation in accordance with the decision matrix), the senior maneuver leader plots the POO on the map; if the POO plots inside one of the "pre-cleared" areas, counterfires can be initiated immediately.

At Firebase Shkin, we decentralized the clearance of fires drill as much as the situation allowed.

One of the most rewarding parts of operations at Firebase Shkin was Team Gold's constantly receiving positive feedback from its maneuver brethren. After each engagement, soldiers came to the FDC or the guns to thank them for the indirect fires. Team Gold's response--"That's our job."

RELATED ARTICLE: A/3-6 FA at Firebase Shkin in Afghanistan--NOW

From the rocky, desolate firebase where the Alpha Steel Battery Redlegs have positioned their guns, you can hit Pakistan with a rock. Instead, the 3d Battalion, 6th Field Artillery (3-6 FA) Centaurs of the 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry) choose to spend their time throwing cold steel "rain" at unfortunate enemies.

In the months since their arrival on the barren Afghani mountain range, the men of 3-6 FA have learned the call to duty can come at any time, and they don't always have time to dress for the occasion. Fire missions called in by their fire support team (FIST) brothers out walking with the 10th Mountain Infantry can come at all hours, and when the calls come, the missions are fired. A tedious day suddenly can be punctuated by another call-for-fire on the enemy.

The missions turn night to day as illumination rounds hang swinging in brilliant globes beneath lazy parachutes or fill the rocky hillsides with the rolling thunder of unforgiving barrages of jagged steel fragments. US infantry and artillery soldiers witness the power of the Centaur Redlegs on a daily basis.

The roaring recoil of the guns billows clouds of the tan talcum dust that covers everything on the firebase. The dust slowly settles when the mission is over, but the Redlegs don't just walk back to what they were doing when the call came. These days, they swagger.

The day-to-day successes have done little to change the fact that each man misses home and family. Everyone knows his job is important--that he could save US lives on each mission. At the same time, phone calls, letters and packages are pearls beyond price at Alpha Steel's redoubts. Each arriving mailbag is impatiently eyed as if it were Santa's own bag of toys.

The Centaurs have learned much from the past months, but most of all that the ability to answer the call any time, day or night, is what they've trained for. Whether the mission comes in at Shkin, Orgun-e or any of the remote firebases across the vast Afghani countryside, the Redlegs of 3-6 FA are ready. Each day brings challenges, and the Centaur Redlegs meet those challenges with honed skills and steady vigilance. And they know it.

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1LT Matthew A. Seibert

Reconnaissance-Survey Officer, 3-6 FA

10th Mtn Div Arty, Afghanistan

Captain James A. Sink was the Executive Officer of C Battery, 3d Battalion, 319th Airborne Field Artillery Regiment (C/3-319 AFAR), 82d Airborne Division, and deployed to Afghanistan for Operation Enduring Free-dom III, participating in the engagement at Firebase Shkin on 25 April 2003. Currently, he is the S1 of 3-319 AFAR at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Also with 3-319 AFAR, he was the Fire Support Officer for B Company, 1st Battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment, and Fire Direction Officer for A Battery. He is a graduate of the US Military Academy at West Point, Class of 2000.

By Captain James A. Sink