First Committee's disarmament debate: towards fewer weapons, more hope.

First Committee's disarmament debate: Towards fewer weapons, more hope

"In the matter of disarmament, we may be at a crossroads of crucial importance", Chairman Ali Alatas (Indonesia) told the First (Political and Security) Committee as it began its substantive work on 14 October.

Down one road, he said, lay the "threat of mutual annihilation . . . propelled by an unceasing accumulation and qualitative refinement of weapons of mass destruction, especially nuclear weapons". Down the other road lay a "ray of hope", marked by such recent achievements as the "small but perceptible progress" in the work of the Conference on Disarmament, the adoption by consensus of a Final Declaration by the Third Review Conference of States Parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the summit talks between United States President Ronald Reagan and USSR General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev.

The First Committee addressed 23 disarmament questions during meetings held in October and November. Despite expressions of concern over the continuing proliferation of nuclear and conventional weapons, and fears the nuclear arms race would extend to outer space, debate participants agreed that international disarmament efforts showed some encouraging trends. Cited in that regard were the new round of bilateral talks between the Soviet Union and the United States and the international conference on disarmament and development planned for 1986.

As in previous years, nuclear issues were the main focus of the Committee's agenda. But the 1985 debate also reflected increased interest in such questions as preventing an arms race in outer space and at sea, a chemical weapons ban, limiting the proliferation of conventional weapons, and reducing military spending.

Nuclear issues

Nuclear disarmament issues and proposals discussed by the First Committee related to the prevention of nuclear war, cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, a nuclear freeze and a comprehensive nuclear test ban.

Warsaw Treaty countries reported on initiatives "to eliminate the nuclear threat and bring about a positive reversal of the situation in Europe and throughout the world", adopted at their October 1985 summit meeting in Sofia, Bulgaria. A series of measures to be undertaken by both the United States and the USSR were proposed.

It was suggested that all work on developing and testing of space weapons, including anti-satellite systems, be suspended; that nuclear weapon stocks be frozen at existing levels; that development, testing and deployment of new types of weapons of mass destruction be suspended; and that deployment of medium-range missiles in Europe be halted. A separate agreement to halt deployment of nuclear arms in Europe and reduce existing arms could be implemented even before the United States and the Soviet Union had reached an agreement on issues relating to space and strategic weapons, many participants declared. Other proposals that received support included a call for a joint United States-USSR commitment not to deploy nuclear weapons on the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States and not to increase or renew stocks of nuclear weapons in countries where they were already deployed.

"The entire body of practical measures aimed at preventing war should be given the most serious consideration", said the USSR, calling on the United States and its allies "to abandon their obstructionist policy in this matter". It wanted negotiations on the subject to take place at the Conference on Disarmament.

China elaborated on a four-point proposal it had put forward in the Assembly's general debate to curb the arms race and avert nuclear war. The heart of the proposal was the conclusion of an international convention on non-first use of nuclear weapons by the nuclear States, particularly the United States and the Soviet Union, and on the non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear States or nuclear-free zones.

China called for the Soviet Union and the United States to stop testing and manufacturing nuclear weapons and to drastically reduce existing stockpiles, with corresponding measures to be taken thereafter by other nuclear countries. "However, we should not lose sight of the fact that the United States and the Soviet Union have already acquired nuclear arsenals, so huge that even if they could cut down their existing nuclear arsenals by 50 per cent, they would still have enough nuclear weapons to destroy the world several times over. Therefore . . . other efforts must also be taken to reduce the threat of nuclear war."

China also urged the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Warsaw Treaty States to agree on "drastic" conventional arms cuts; called on the United States and the Soviet Union to immediately stop the arms race in outer space, and for all countries with space capabilities to refrain from developing testing or deploying space weapons; urged an international agreement on the prohibition and destruction of space weapons; and called for conclusion of a chemical weapons convention, recommending that countries capable of producing chemical weapons pledge in the meantime not to test, produce, transfer, deploy or use them.

Western countries maintained their basic position that arms control and disarmament should be reached through negotiations aimed at concluding binding and verifiable agreements, aimed at substantial and balanced reductions at the lowest possible levels. A mutually agreed and verifiable nuclear weapons freeze must be accompanied by regional security initiatives, they said.

The United States reiterated its position that the way to arms limitation and disarmament was through strict adherence to the principles set out in the Charter for peaceful relations between States, and through full compliance with existing international agreements and restraints that promote peace and stability. Appropriate and effective verification measures for determining compliance with arms-control agreements remained essential.

"Today", said the United States, "only the gullible can believe that a State with scores of divisions, tens of thousands of tanks and artillery pieces, fleets of warships and submarines, thousands of missiles, aircraft, and nuclear weapons and a sky filled with satellites is too weak to provide information about its activities comparable to that which other States readily make available. The United States would not ask for more information of others than it provides itself. [But] the insistence on withholding information . . . remains a significant obstacle to successful arms limitations and disarmament agreements. Secrecy begets suspicion, suspicion begets fear and fear can beget conflict rather than cooperation."

"We are convinced", said the Netherlands on behalf of the European Community, Portugal and Spain, "that the main threat to international peace and security is not only the weapons that States possess but especially the way States behave towards each other. The process of disarmament cannot go very far unless accompanied by a reduction of fear, mistrust and misunderstanding."

Non-aligned countries continued to support proposals aimed at a qualitative and quantitative nuclear arms freeze, a nuclear-test ban and a treaty banning nuclear-weapon use in which all nuclear-weapon States would participate.

India said that simple prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons and outlawing their possession would not bring about their elimination. "However, by stripping those weapons of the prestige conferred on them and reiterating its condemnation of their use as a monstrous crime against humanity, the General Assembly will help in catalysing a process towards their elimination."

Test ban: Along with a nuclear-weapons freeze, a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty continued to be widely favoured among Committee members as a means to reduce the nuclear threat and halt the nuclear-arms race. The Conference on Disarmament was asked by the General Assembly to establish a subsidiary body to consider a nuclear test ban, but indicated in its report to the Assembly (A/40/27) that in 1985 it had again been unable to do so, as there was still no agreement on a mandate for such a body.

In the First Committee debate, nuclear-weapon States retained essentially the same positions as in the past on the test ban issue. The Western countries insisted that adequate verification measures must be worked out before a comprehensive test-ban treaty could be agreed on. "Meaningful arms control agreements that will endure cannot be negotiated on the basis of trust alone", argued Canada. A number of speakers put forward views on a proposed global seismological system for monitoring nuclear explosions.

The United States held to its position that although complete cessation of nuclear explosions was an important goal, the "central and most urgent arms control objective" was to radically reduce the number of nuclear weapons in the world. In the meantime, however, verifiable limits on nuclear testing could play a "useful, although more modest, role".

Socialist countries again pressed for immediate negotiations for a treaty banning all nuclear-weapon tests, with concurrent or subsequent consideration of the verification issue. Verification was not a problem when there was a genuine political will to conclude an agreement, they felt.

"The technical means already existing in the USSR and in the United States provide a necessary and quite adequate degree of assurance that a nuclear explosion, even of a fairly small yield, will be detected", said the Soviet Union.

Many countries, particularly socialist and non-aligned States, supported the Soviet Union's unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing, effective 6 August 1985, and its intention to extend the test ban beyond 1 January 1986 if the United States would take similar action.

Many Western countries, however, took the view expressed by the Federal Republic of Germany that a Unilateral moratorium failed "to make any contribution to the solution of nuclear questions that are at the centre of the debate today", including arms reduction and resolution of the verification issue.

Non-aligned countries continued to hold that a comprehensive test ban would be an integral part of halting the arms race and that pending conclusion of a comprehensive treaty, nuclear States should agree to an immediate moratorium on nuclear-weapons tests. Claims that effective verification must be worked out before a test ban could be agreed on were an excuse to continue further development of nuclear weapons, in the non-aligned view. "The means of verification that already exist are sufficient to guarantee the implementation of a comprehensive test ban", Mexico said.

There as broad support for test ban proposals put forward by the Heads of State or Government of Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico, Sweden and the United Republic of Tanzania. In the Delhi Declaration (A/40/114) adopted in January 1985, they called for an immediate halt to all nuclear weapons testing and urged conclusion of a test ban treaty at an early date. In October 1985, the six leaders proposed a 12-month moratorium on all nuclear tests.

Non-Proliferation Treaty: The issue of a comprehensive nuclear test ban also figureed prominently at the proceedings of the Third Review Conference of Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons--another topic of particular interest to participants in the First Committee's debate. The Conference met in Geneva in August-September 1985 to review operation of the Treaty 15 years after its entry into force.

The Treaty binds States parties possessing nuclear weapons not to transfer such weapons to others or to assist any non-nuclear-weapon State in manufacturing nucelar weapons, while non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty agree not to receive or manufacture such weapons. Of the 130 States parties to the Treaty, three are nuclear-weapon states--USSR, United Kingdom and United States. Two other nuclear-weapon States--China and France--have not joined.

There was widespread support in the First Committee for the Final Declaration adopted by consensus at the Review Conference. States parties solemly declared that the Treaty was essential to international peace and security, and pledged continued support for its objectives (see UN Chronicle 1985, No. 8).

While general support for the results of the Review Conference was expressed in the First Committee, there were misgivings among some non-nuclear-weapon States over what was perceived as teh "selective application" of essential elements of the Treaty. Cited in particular was article VI, concerning negotiations to end the nuclear arms race.

Observed Sweden "The Conference, with the notable exception of the United States and the United Kingdom, called on the nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty to resume trilateral negotiations in 1985 and on all the nuclear-weapon States to participate in the urgent negotiation and conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty as a matter of highest priority in the Conference on Disarmament."

Brazil reaffirmed its commitment to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and to the peaceful use of nuclear energy, but explained why it had not signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty. "The commitment to utilie nuclear energy exclusively for peaceful purposes cannot be assumed only by some, while others remain free to do as they wish . . . My Government cannot accept an agreement that aims at sanctioning discrimination and perpetuating imbalance among States."

United States-USSR talks: The resumption of bilateral talks in Geneva between the Soviet Union and United States was seen as an encouraging sign by debate participants.

In a joint declaration adopted in January 1985 the two countries agreed that the subject of negotiations would be questions relating to space weapons and nuclear weapons--both strategic and intermediate range--and that the objective would be to prepare effective agreements aimed at preventing the arms race in space and ending it on Earth, with the ultimate goal of "complete elimination of nuclear weapons everywhere."

The USSR briefed the First Committee on its new proposals, designed "to give impetus to the negotiations" with the United States. Those proposals included an agreement by both countries to a total ban on space strike weapons and a 50 per cent reduction in nuclear arms capable of reaching the other's territory.

To "facilitate an accord on an early mutual reduction of medium-range nuclear systems in Europe", the Soviet Union proposed concluding a separate agreement in the area, without linkage to the issues of space and strategic arms. Direct discussions on the subject aimed at a mutually acceptable solution should also be initiated with France and the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union said.

The United States said it had been "listening with attention" to the recent soviet proposals in Geneva, but it was too early to give a detailed response. "Their overall structure appears one-sided and clearly would not be an acceptable outcome of the negotiations. However, certain elements . . . appear to be positive and give h ope for a genuine process of give and take". The United States noted its own "far-reaching proposals" for achieving significant reductions--"down zero"--in the levels of intermediate-range nuclear forces "in a balanced and equitable way."

Western European countries expressed satisfaction that specific proposals were being discussed and hoped the result would be conclusion of one or more verifiable agreements. "These negotiations should have as their objective the bringing about of a balance at the lowest possible level of armaments", said the Netherlands on behalf of the European Community, Portugal and Spain.

"At a minimum", said New Zealand, the "negotiations must protect the agreements that have already been reached on the uses of outer space, notably the limited test ban treaty, the outer space treaty and the anti-ballistic missile treaty . . . At the same time progress on the immediate imperative of reducing nuclear weapons on Earth should not be held hostage of the achievements of new agreements on outer space."

Non-aligned States indicated it would be disappointing if the bilateral negotiations failed to achieve concrete results, or if, as Yugoslavia put it, "they ended in an agreement on a controlled arms race and controlled rivalry". Important as bilateral negotiations were, however, they must be a complement to, not substitute for multilateral negotiations in the context of the United Nations.

Many speakers took the view that the summit meeting in November between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev, although unlikely to produce any substantive agreements, could pave the way for more concrete results in the bilateral talks on nuclear and space arms.

Outer Space

Concern over the possible extention of the arms race, particularly the nuclear arms race, to outer space, led to the establishment earlier in 1985 of a new ad hoc committee in the Conference on Disarmament to examine the issue in light of existing agreements and new proposals. The First Committee's debate on prevention of an arms race in outer space centered on the United States Strategic Defense Initiative ("Star Wars" programme), which opponents claimed would "militarize" outer space, and a new proposal by the Soviet Union ("Star Peace" programme), which included a suggestion to establish a world space agency to promote international co-operation in peaceful space activities.

The USSR reiterated its position that the United States programme was not a research effort aimed at developing anti-ballistic defensive weapons as claimed but rather an effort to acquire first-strike capability. "They are speaking of some kind of 'security shield', while at the same time forging a space sword", said the Soviet Union. The United States' present course of action posed a threat to bilateral negotiations on offensive-weapons reductions, the USSR contended.

The United States told the Committee that the real issue was not in Strategic Defense Initiative but the "Appropriate use" of outer space. Assertions that United States activities would "militarize" space contituted "hyperbole", it said. Space had been used for military purposes for more than two decades, particularly by the Soviet Union. The Strategic Defense Initiative was a research effort to assess the possibility of defence against ballistic missiles. To say it was aimed at achieving first-strike capability or strategic superiority was "incredible", the United States said. "The proper forum ot address the questions of outer-space arms control multilaterally and without artificial linkage to peaceful co-operation is the Conference on Disarmament."

The Soviet Union's "Star Peace" proposals focus on international co-operation in the peaceful exploitation of outer space under conditions of its non-militarization. "Outer space, the common property of mankind, must be placed at the service not of war, but of peace and security and of the ecoomic and social progress of all peoples", the USSR maintained.

Their proposals call first for States to refrain from research, resting, production and deployment of space strike weapons, and to co-operate instead in space research "on an increasing scale". It would then be possible, according to the USSR, to work towards such long-range goals as industrializing outer space, merging space complexes with the terrestrial economies of States and operating orbital factories to produce goods under high-vacuum and weightless conditions.

International co-operation, as the USSR saw it, would include interplanetary research expeditions; experiments in such areas as biology, medicine, materials science, weather, communication stems and remote sensing; assistance in locating and rescuing victims of sea and air disasters; and development of such space technology as large orbital space stations and manned spacecraft.

The USSR also recommended establishment of a world space organization to organize and implement co-operation between States on peaceful outer space activities. Its functions would include ensuring all States equal access to the results of scientific and technical space studies and assisting developing countries in exploring outer space and using the results to hasten their economic and social development. Such an organization could be established "only when agreements effectively ensuring the non-militarization of space have been reached," the Soviet Union stated.

To consider all aspects of international co-operation in the peaceful exploitation of space, the Soviet Union proposed convening an international conference not later than 1987 with the participation of States with major space capabilities and other interested countries. There was widespread support for that proposal, particularly among First Committee members from socialist and developing countries.

Other matters

Chemical weapons: Chemical weapons also figured importantly in the debate. The desirability of concluding a convention banning such weapons, considered in depth by a subsidiary body of the Conference on Disarmament during 1985, received virtually unanimous support from First Committee members.

But there was a mixed response to the idea of regional chemical weapons bans, in particular a proposal by the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia to conclude an agreement with the Federal Republic of Germany establishing a chemical weapon-free-zone in Europe, where the largest stockpiles exist. Some speakers supported the move, expressing particular concern over plans by the Untied States to deploy binary chemical weapons on the continent. Opponents of the proposal argued that regional solutions would make verification difficult. Furthermore, the issue reached beyond Europe; use of chemical weapons had been reported recently in other regions.

"Next to nuclear weapons, chemical weapons are the most dangerous means of mass destruction, and it is a matter of utmost urgency to prohibit and completely eliminate them", stated General Secretary Erich Honecker of the German Democratic Republic and Prime Minister Lubomir Strougal of Czechoslovakia, in identical letters to the Federal Republic of Germany's Chancellor Helmut Kohl (A/C.1/40/2). They said the chemical weapon-free-zone would be a "way to arrive at the removal of the chemical weapon stocks existing in the region and to ensure that no new, extremely perilous types of such weapons, notably binary weapons, will be deployed on European soil".

Czechoslovakia told the First Committee that according to United States estimates, existing chemical weapons arsenals contained 150,000 tons of toxic chemicals and 3 million individual shells, 2 to 4 per cent of which was stockpiled in the Federal Republic of Germany. A regional chemical weapons ban would substantially reduce the risk of chemical war in Europe, it stated.

The German Democratic Republic said that regional agreements on the establishment of chemical-weapon-free zones "would be concrete steps towards confidence-building and towards a world-wide ban on these weapons."

However, the Federal Republic of Germany, in opposing the proposal, said that with regional agreements, "solution of the problem of verification would be even more difficult, and greater security could not be achieved . . ." There was "no practical alternative to negotiations on a world-wide ban on chemical weapons".

In identical replies to the letters from Czechoslovakia's Prime Minister and the German Democratic Republic's General Secretary, Helmut Kohl, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, stressed the view that all unresolved questions relating to the proscription of chemical weapons should be considered within the framework of multilateral negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament towards a comprehensive, world-wide chemical weapons ban (A/C.1/40/8). "By jointly working for a solution to this central problem", wrote Chancellor Kohl, "our Governments can make a valuable contribution to promoting the ongoing Geneva negotiations."

Several countries noted that in 1986, the Second Review Conference of States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological and Toxic Weapons and on Their Destruction would take place. Although "little attention" had been given to that Convention, Norway said, it was an important one. Not only did it represent a total ban on a class of weapons, it was also "one of the few conventions which have actually resulted in destruction of weapons". In addition, it provided the basis for ongoing negotiations on chemical weapons.

Naval arms race: "The nuclear-arms race at sea has been largely neglected in multilateral disarmament negotiations", according to Sweden, the initiator of a United Nations study on the subject submitted to the First Committee in 1985. "The time has come", Sweden said, "to address maritime confidence-building measures and naval disarmament."

Particularly important, it felt, were measures to ban long-range sea-based cruise missiles; remove tactical nuclear weapons from on board warships during routine patrol; respect coastal States' legitimate claim to "reasonable 'seaboard security'"; respect States' right not to have freedom of the seas infringed on by military activites; and modernize current laws of sea warfare.

Bulgaria said, "The continued naval arms race, the strengthened military presence in the seas and the oceans of the world, naval activities which directly endanger the security and independence of many countries, as well as maritime navigation and the exploitation of the resources of the world's oceans, strengthen our conviction that the time has come to initiate concrete, serious and fair negotiations with a view to concluding mutually acceptable agreements in this field."

The Secretary-General's report on the naval arms race study (A/40/535) concluded that there were two basic objectives for action to halt the arms race at sea: negotiation of effective nuclear disarmament measures, aimed at total elimination of nuclear weapons at sea, and investigation of ways in which naval experience and capabilities might contribute positively to improved ocean management policies.

Among the recommendations in the report are a freeze on manufacture of naval nuclear weapons and limitations on the numbers of such weapons as submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) and nuclear warheads, along with limitations on ballistic-missile submarines, and on naval ships and amphibious vessels of various types. Specific reductions and limitations are to be accompanied by restraints on qualitative and technological advancement, and implementation of confidence-building measures.

Conventional arms: The First Committee debate reflected increased concern about conventional arms build-up. Warsaw Treaty States reported on a proposal endorsed in Sofia recommending that the Soviet Union and the United States agree not to develop or manufacture new types of conventional arms with mass-destruction potential. In addition, they called for a freeze as of 1 January 1986 in both countries' armed forces, including those outside their national territories, and a mutual freeze on military budgets starting with the next fiscal year.

Concern over the conventional arms race was particularly strong among developing countries. "Third-world countries, especially the small and weak . . . face a more immediate and direct threat to their national security and survival from conventional conflicts than from a nuclear holocaust", contended Singapore.

Regional initiatives to limit arms trade must be encouraged, many States felt. "The need to control transfers of conventional weapons has never been more urgent", stated Trinidad and Tobago.

Explained Chad: "For us Africans, Asians and Latin Americans, conventional weapons constitute our foremost fear. Fear because we do not have enough of them, fear because our neighbour has too many, fear because wishign to have more we have to divert the major part of our meagre resources to acquire them, and fear because they cause social upheavals."

Others questioned the premise that, as Indonesia put it, "conventional armaments in the hands of third-world countries somehow pose a greater threat to peace and security than the nuclear and conventional weapons possessed by the great Powers". Opponents of that view said that progress towards disarmament could be achieved only through working within the fundamental framework and principles of the Final Document of the Assembly's first special session on disarmament.

Security assurances, confidence-building: The need for security assurances for the non-nuclear States and confidence-building measures for all countries have assumed increasing importance among the international community. In the Conference on Disarmament during 1985, there was no objection in principle to the idea of an international convention on security assurances; however, substantive negotiations on the subject have not begun.

Confidence-building among States and regional co-operation were among the key measures to promote international peace and security identified by a group of governmental experts in a study on concepts of security (A/40/553) prepared for the 1985 Assembly at Sweden's initiative.

"Security depends not only on limitation of arms, but is also a consequence of the state of political and economic relations among nations", the group observed. "Regional diplomacy could help minimize the temptation of parties to local disputes to appeal to Powers outside the region for political support and military assistance, and at the same time could reduce the risks of great Power involvement."

The study reviewed various security concepts and policies espoused by nations today--such as "balance of power", "deterrence" and "non-alignment"--as well as the major threats to international security and measures to promote international peace and security. The Assembly asked that the expert group deal in particular with "security policies which emphasize co-operative efforts and mutual understanding between States, with a view to developing proposals for policies aimed at preventing the arms race, building confidence in relations between States, enhancing the possibility of reaching agreements on arms limitation and disarmament, and promoting political and economic security".

The expert group reported that in reviewing various security concepts and assessing the elements necessary for global security, it shared common understanding on several points: that the use of military force for purposes other than self-defence is not a legitimate instrument for national policy; that security should be understood in "comprehensive terms"; that security is the concern of all nations; that the world's "diversities" should not constitute obstacles to international co-operation for peace and security; and that disarmament and arms limitation represent an important approach to international peace and security.

The report highlighted four areas for action to improve international security: renewed efforts in the field of disarmament to reduce the risk of war, particularly nuclear war; maintenance of the rule of law in international relations through strict observance of the Charter and effective application of the collective security concept; decolonization and elimination of apartheid; and

The USSR said it was ready to agree to a proposal put forth at Stockholm by neutral States and others on exchanging annual plans of military activities, in the hope that such an agreement would help "overcome suspicion and . . . make it more difficult to conduct secret preparation for war".

Confidence-building measures could be an important tool towards general disarmament, many Committee members acknowledged. "Based on the experience gained in 10 years on the European continent, we should consider extending the scope of application . . . to other areas", suggested Austria.

Regional Efforts

Moves to establish nuclear-free zones, nuclear-weapon-free zones and zones of peace in various parts of the world were endorsed by many Committee members. An expert group conducting a study of nuclear-weapon-free zones reported it had been unable to agree on a draft text to submit to the Committee (A/40/379), but a number of delegations commented on various regional non-nuclear efforts.

South Pacific: Many speakers expressed satisfaction at the conclusion of the South Pacific Nuclear-Free Treaty in August 1985, establishing a nuclear-free zone in that area. A main reason for the action, noted Fiji, was the "deep desire" of all South Pacific Forum members that no nuclear tests be conducted in the region.

Treaty signers hoped the nuclear-weapon States would become party to three draft protocols by which they would agree not to test nuclear explosives in the South PAcific, as well as not to use nucearl weapons against countries or territories in the zone.

Some countries welcomed China's positive attitude towards the zone and its decision to join the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), as wel as to particpate in work on a comprehensive test-ban treaty when it began in the Conference on Disarmament.

South Asia: For the past 11 years, South Asian countries, led by Pakistan, have with neighbouring States tried to establish a nuclear-weapon-free-zone. India, which exploded a nuclear device in 1974, has consistently opposed the move. Pakistan said the danger of nuclear proliferation in the area remained undiminished, and proposed bilateral agreements with India as well as creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone.

South-East Asia: Support was expressed for efforts by the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) to work out principles and modalities for a nuclear-weapon-free zone in their region. "But as in all nuclear issues and nuclear decision-making", observed Indonesia, "the establishment of those zones depends ultimately on the willingness of the nuclear Powers to take the necessary measures and make the necessary commitments to facilitate and promote their success."

The Lao People's Democratic Republic and Viet Nam noted that they had joined with Democratic Kampuchea in proposing ways to create a regional peace zone as soon as possible.

Africa: A number of countries called for action to ensure implementation of the denuclearization of Africa. Kenya noted that although Africa had declared itself a nuclear-weapon-free zone in 1964, it was apparent that South Africa had developed nuclear capability through assistance from certain countries. "The gravity of the implications . . . cannot be overemphasized", it said.

According to Angola, certain States members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Israel were attempting to undermine efforts to keep Africa a nuclear-free-zone. "Using as a pretext the 'vital interests of the West' and the 'constructive engagement' with Pretoria", said Angola, those countries had helped bring about a massive build-up of South Africa's military machinery and helped the apartheid State acquire its present nuclear-weapon capability. Such cooperation represented an "imminent danger" to international peace and security.

Latin America: The Latin American nuclear-weapon-free zone established 20 years ago by the Treaty of Tlateloloco was widely cited by Committee members as a good precedent for nuclear-weapon-free zones elsewhere. Brazil noted, however, that although the countries of the region had accepted a verification system designed to ensure compliance with their obligations towards one another, "unfortunately, no comparable system exits to verify compliance by the nuclear-weapon Powers".

Middle East: A number of countries recalled that the Assembly in 1984 (39/54) had urged countries of the region, pending the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone, to agree to place all their nuclear activities under IAEA safeguards. Yemen said "the Zionist entity is most secretive about its nuclear programme, thus adding to the prevailing tension and anxiety" in the region. Every possible pressure must be brought to bear to induce it to place its nuclear installations under IAEA safeguards, it added.

Israel, in reply, insisted that its consistent support of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in the Middl East was a "matter of record". Furthermore, it had reiterated its support for establishing a nuclear-free-zone in the Middle East and its willingness to initiate negotiations towards that end "without delay or preconditions".

Balkans: Socialist States in particular supported initiatives to create a non-nuclear corridor in the Balkans, between the countries belonging to the North Atlantic Treaty ORganization (NATO) and the Warsaw Treaty countries of Central Europe.

Nordic area: The question of establishing a nuclear-weapon-free-zone in the Nordic area was considered by the Committee again in 1985. Denmark supported discussions aimed at that goal, emphazing, however, that such a zone must be "guaranteed by the United States and the Soviet Union".

Many countries took the view that regional disarmament efforts, although not a substitute for general and complete disarmament, could be a significant step towards it. Others expressed reservations about a regional approach. It was not likely, said Algeria, to promote security and stability in such regions as the Middle East and southern Africa, "where aggressors have long benefited from the complicity of others in the construction of the most redoubtable arsenals . . ."

The Federal Republic of Germany said that although proposals for nuclear-weapon-free zones in Africa, the Middle East and South Asia fell within the concept as envisaged by the Final Document of the first special session on disarmament, proposed subregional zones--namely, the Nordic States and the Balkans--were "too limited in scope to reduce the danger of war or provide a dependable basis" for European security.

"Can a nuclear blast and its radioactive fall-out be stopped at the borders of a State or region?" asked India. Even the nuclear-weapon States seemed to realize that nuclear-weapon-free zones were "unrealistic in the context of the spiralling arms race", when they rejected proposals for such zunes involving their own territories or those of their allies, it said.

Indian Ocean 

Widespread support continued to be expressed for convening an international conference to consider ways of implementing the 1971 Declaration on the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace. Originally scheduled for 1981 in Colombo, Sri Lanka, the Conference was postponed when preparatory work for it could not be completed. In 1984, the Assembly asked the Ad Hoc Committee to complete preparatory work relating to the Conference so that it could be convened in the first half of 1986. A number of First Committee members reiterated support for that request.

Disarmament, development,

military budgets

Increasing concern over ways to free resources currently being spent on armaments for development goals was expressed in the First Committee, which also discussed the related issue of reducing military budgets.

"The relationship between disarmament and development has . . . assumed critical importance inthe world community", said India. "The astronomical sums being wasted by the most developed nations on military expenditures may have led to severe structural problems in their own economies which have in turn, through global interdependence, affected the economies of other developed nations and also developing countries."

Countries from all regions expressed support for the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development, to be held in Paris 15 July-2 Agust 1986. The Conference is to review all aspects of the relationship between disarmament and development and to examine the implications of the "level and magnitude of continuing military expenditures" for the world economy and international economic and social situation. It also will consider ways to release--through disarmament measures--additional resources for development, particularly in favour of developing countries.

"The Conference is going to be a major international political event of 1986", Preparatory Committee Chairman Muchkund Dubey (India) told the First Committee. "It will provide a historic opportunity to debate and reach conclusions at a high political level on one of the burning issues of our time, an issue which affects almost all aspects of contemporary life."

Austria called the decision to convene the Conference "one of the rare successes of our work this year". Because the issue was such a complex one, Austria said, the Conference should address not only disarmament and development in general but also the question of arms transfers and the effect on national economies of sudden cuts in military spending.

A number of speakers, particularly from Africa, referred to the Declaration and Programme of Action (A/40/761) adopted at the Ministerial Regional Conference on Security, Disarmament and Development in Lome, Togo, in August 1985. Lome Conference participants had stated that although Africa's military expenditures were relatively low compared with those of other regions, current security requirements imposed "extremely heavy burdens" on those countries to the detriment of their social and economic development.

The revenue spent on military hardware and personnel "is deperately needed to meet the fundamental human needs of a starving, illiterate, disease-ridden planet", Cameroon told the First Committee. "A shift from weapons towards peaceful spending would, in the long term, favourably enhance prospects for world peace and security."

The importance of curbing military spending was emphasized by a number of speakers. Nicaragua said that reducing the military budgets of the major Powers would reduce fiscal deficits and interest rates, "creating new sources of financing and alleviating the terrible problem of the foreign debt".

Romania, recalling that it had frozen its own military spending at 1982 levels, said there was "absolutely no doubt" that measures to freeze and reduce military budgets would have a beneficial effect on all aspects of international economic and social life. Romania called for a "constructive and flexible approach" that could iron out remaining points of disagreement and permit the Disarmament Commission to finalize in 1986 principles to govern States' actions in the frezzing and reducing of military budgets.

A Commission working group studying various proposals relative to that issue agreed in general that a gradual reduction of military budgets on a mutually agreed basis would help curb the arms race and increase the possibilities of reallocating military resources to economic and social development. They disagreed, however, on various issues relating to verification and data exchange.

Some members stressed that a balanced reduction must be based on the principles of transparency and comparability, which they said could be best achieved through regular availability of meaningful and reliable data. Agreed methods for measuring and comparing military expenditures were an essential requirement for substantive negotiations, those countries said.