Fires for the IBCT: A Mobile Infantry-Centric Force. (Interview).

Commander of the 3d Initial Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) 2d Infantry Division, Fort Lewis, Washington

The Initial Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) is the first of the IBCTs being developed as part of the transformation of the Army into the Objective Force. The IBCT will deploy anywhere in the world within 96 hours, sustain operations for 180 days without relief and conduct stability and support operations (SASO) and small-scale contingency operations (SSC) against low- to mid-range threats that can employ conventional and asymmetrical capabilities. With augmentation, the brigade can fight at the higher end of the spectrum, a major theater war (MTW).

The brigade must operate in urban, complex and open areas. Its two core qualities are high mobility (strategic, operational and tactical) and its ability to achieve decisive action through dismounted infantry assaults. The IBCT is projected to be deployable in FY03. (See the organizational figure on Page 6.)

The IBCT's organic fire support assets are a 3x4 (12) M198 155-mm towed howitzer battalion in direct support (DS) with one Q-36 and one Q-37 radar; fire support teams (FISTs) embedded in the infantry battalions and the reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition (RSTA) squadron; a fires and effects coordination cell (FECC) as part of the brigade headquarters; four unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in the RSTA squadron; and 66 mortars. The mortars are 36 120-mm mortars (10 in each of the three infantry battalions--four in the headquarters and headquarters company mortar platoon and two in each of the three company mortar sections; and six in the RSTA--two in each of the reconnaissance troops); 12 81-mm mortars (four per infantry battalion in each mortar platoon) and 18 60-mm mortars (six per infantry battalion--two in each of the company mortar sections).

Q Given that your FA battalion's primary mission is counterfire, what is its role in shaping and close supporting fires? How do you mass and integrate mortars with Field Artillery?

A Because the IBCT is infantry-centric and vulnerable to indirect fire, the primary mission of 1-37 FA is counterfire. But the brigade is capable of operating across the spectrum of conflict, so the mission of our FA battalion depends on the scenario. If the brigade is conducting operations at the lower end of the spectrum--SASO or an SSC--then the mission is different than if the brigade is conducting operations at the higher end--an MTW. So, in fact, 1-37 FA must be prepared to do it all--counterfire and shaping, close and rear fires--like traditional DS FA battalions.

Now having said that, mortars are our primary close support weapons. The mortars, basically, are the battalion commanders' or the company commanders' assets. If we faced, say, a massive infantry assault, we could use the FECC [fires and effects coordination cell] to integrate and synchronize the effects of mortars from several different units and FA to mass against the central target. But massing mortars would be the exception. Because of the distances over which we must operate, massing mortars is just not practical in most situations.

Q What are those operational distances and what are your challenges?

A We must operate in a 40-by-40 to 50-by-50 kilometer box, as compared to the legacy brigade's 10-by-10 kilometer operating area. Our brigade will be spread out to conduct nonlinear, non-contiguous operations--it will be difficult to move mortars into position to mass--or even on occasion our howitzers, for that matter. If we need more close support firepower, we depend on GAS [close air support] or other joint fires.

The brigade was designed with additional [C.sup.4]ISR [command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance] assets to "see" a situation developing in advance before we come in contact with the enemy. With these [C.sup.4]ISR assets, we can see our units, the enemy and the terrain and can do a better job of predicting the firepower we'll need.

In our BCTP [Battle Command Training Program] Warfighter exercise [4 to 8 September], we had almost a 100-by-100 kilometer area of operations when we started the exercise with stability and support operations. That was a challenge--in terms of infantry operations and communications plus radar coverage.

When the brigade is spread out over a 100-by-100 kilometer box, you must operate in squad-sized elements to have an area presence. That's an old lesson, but that also means you have to leverage [C.sup.4]ISR down to the lowest level to be successful--you don't realize how important that is until it becomes a challenge. Our communications network was a challenge over such a large area. So operations at the squad level is easy to describe and hard to do.

Because we will have to fight in squads dispersed over large areas, often in complex or urban terrain, it is not practical to have forward observers only at the company level. Therefore, we have requested and the DA staff has approved forward observers at the platoon level. It will add 13F20s [Fire Support Specialists] to the brigade--their value-added is well worth it.

Another challenge was radar coverage. The brigade has one Q-36 and one Q-37 radar, but we need another Q-36. Our Firefinder radars are critical to counterfire and force protection.

Our area of operations was so large and nonlinear that we had to accept some risks by focusing the arcs of our limited radars on selected areas, based on information that indicated enemy forces in those area. By taking advantage of our organic ASAS [all-source analysis system] and reach-back intelligence capabilities, we had a better picture of the enemy and where he was operating. We leveraged our intelligence technology to adjust our radar coverage and assumed some risk in other areas.

It is along those same lines that we attempted proactive counterfire during our Warfighter--with some success

The need for a second Q-36 applies not just in a 100-by-l00 kilometer operational area, but also in a 40-by-40 kilometer area--particularly when we must fight gorilla forces simultaneously with conventional forces, as happened during our Warfighter. In one scenario, we had nearly a 360-degree environment for the enemy to attack us. With only two radars, we were limited in the direction the arcs could search; in addition we needed the Q-37 to look deep at the conventional forces being introduced into the theater.

Q: How did your UAVs contribute to the brigade's intelligence and targeting?

A: Our Hunter UAVs proved to be excellent information sources. They provided intelligence and targeting data, triggered GAS, adjusted indirect fires, reported battle damage-in short, served as reconnaissance elements and "forward observers."

In the Warfighter, our UAVs were highly effective in helping us transition into scenarios with increased threats. Our SASO scenario moved into a SSC sideline and then into an MTW when the enemy committed to a conventional attack against us while he still had his non-conventional forces in the area. We had to deal with three levels of military operations at the same time.

We got an early JSTARS [Joint surveillance and target attack radar system] indication that triggered us to retask a UAV to look in a specific area and found the enemy assembling his air assault forces--infantrymen and helicopters. At that time, they were out of our artillery range.

So our JTF [joint task force] headquarters redirected CAS on that target. We then tracked the force as it began to move with the AMDWS [air-missile defense warning system] and used our UAV to trigger our artillery and direct fires against the force when it landed within range. In that one engagement, we used UAVs to attack the enemy with CAS, then artillery and mortars plus direct fire from our maneuver forces. The enemy air assault battalion was completely unsuccessful.

The RSTA squadron commander employs the UAVs. The preferred method of employing the UAV is as part of the overall intelligence plan--determine a route to cover gaps in intelligence gathering and then deconflict its airspace in advance. Otherwise you have conflicts in airspace control between the Army and Air Force and our mortars and artillery.

Obviously, when a critical target presents itself--such as the air assault battalion--we can dynamically re-task a UAV to confirm the target and provide the grid coordinates to kill it. But such re-tasking is the exception.

Q How did you employ the FECC?

A We are "breaking new ground" with the FECC, a relatively new concept. One lesson we learned early on is the FECC's nonlethal effects cell needs to do some initial coordination to ensure nonlethal effects line up with lethal effects before we go into the targeting meeting. The FECC, in essence, needs two meetings for targeting. The preliminary meeting ensures the targets and objectives of nonlethal effects complement those of lethal effects and both meet the commander's guidance and intent. The actual targeting meeting synchronizes it all.

If you don't have the preliminary meeting, the focus of the target meeting is fragmented and the meeting takes too long and is less effective. We have to be focused and flexible enough to target the enemy effectively as we cross the spectrum of conflict from a SASO/SSC into an MTW--move from an emphasis on nonlethal (information operations, psychological operations, civil affairs, etc.) to lethal effects. We need to develop, revise and refine out FECC TTP [tactics, techniques and procedures] as we practice our operations.

During our Warfighter, I asked Lieutenant Colonel Skip [Henry S.] Larsen, the ECOORD [effects coordinator/FA battalion commander], to help me figure our how to kill mortars, which are fleeting targets. The enemy would fire a couple of mortar rounds and move out.

The result of our work was that when the radars acquired the firing mortar, the FECC communicated over a counterfire quick-fire net to send the nearest infantry unit in to detect the moving or repositioned mortar and kill it or locate it precisely enough for an artillery kill. This quick-fire net was especially effective in urban areas with the local populace all around the mortar position or in areas restricted to indirect fire due to the ROE [rules of engagement]. This "maneuver counterfire" proved very successful.

The key to synchronizing intelligence and targeting is the brigade TOC [tactical operation center]. During the Warfighter, the brigade TOC included the FA battalion TOC, FECC and RSTA TOC with the MI company. Coordination and synchronization are much easier when you are all together. But it also created a big TOC with a big signature.

We have an exercise planned at Yakima Training Center [Washington] in the near future in which we're going to split the components out and make the TOC signature very small. We will leverage technology to plan, synchronize and execute brigade operations from different locations by VTC [video teleconference] and the "white board" embedded in our [C.sup.4]ISR.

Q What were other challenges during the Warfighter?

A When we are operating at the lower end of the spectrum of conflict where we won't be augmented, we have to be very accurate and predictive in reporting our ammunition status and other CSS [combat service support] requirements. In a more traditional brigade, if you aren't accurate in your reporting, you have enough supply assets to push forward in sort of an emergency resupply mode. We don't have that capability embedded in the brigade. So we have to take advantage of our situational understanding provided by our [C.sup.4]ISR and predict our supply needs down to the lowest possible level.

When the level of conflict increases, we will have a CSS structure--the brigade is not designed to fight an MTW without augmentation. The military situation and how long the brigade expects to have to fight at that increased level of combat intensity determine the amount and types of augmentation from corps--not just CSS, but other assets as well. These include CASEVAC [casualty evacuation], access to helicopters and engineer and other assets.

One important lesson learned during the Warfighter is that when the brigade moves into a conventional fight and has to go into the defense, it needs augmentation of engineer assets from the JTF. Our [C.sup.4]ISR reach-back assets gave us early warning of an advancing conventional force so we could quickly dig in to blunt the enemy's attack. Our one engineer company with limited dig capability was a precious force protection asset.

We also were surprisingly successful in the battles against the non-conventional forces and terrorist in our area of operations. We had some casualties, but in most incidences, we were successful.

We certainly have more counterterrorism capabilities than traditional forces. Our [C.sup.4]ISR provides dossiers on known and suspected terrorists, their photos, information on the different cells out of which they operate, the enemy orders of battle--in fact, reach back to the national database on terrorists. Our RSTA recon troops provide HUMINT [human intelligence], which the MI company analyzes.

Q Please describe several scenarios representative of IBCT employment.

A First, the requirement to be able to deploy the IBCT in 96 hours was imposed by the Army to restrict the size of the brigade--not as a requirement in all circumstances. The actual deployment time line will be dictated by the situation, the availability of air transport assets and the ability of the "receiving end" to accommodate those aircraft--not necessarily in 96 hours.

Ideally, the brigade was designed to operate in the SASO or SSC environment because of the deployability and mobility of our infantry-centric force. We could go into Kosovo, Bosnia or back into Somalia.

We have infantry forces and snipers maximized to fight in urban and complex terrain. We specialize in clearing buildings and conducting dynamic breaches to open up an entry that the enemy isn't expecting. We spend about 50 percent of our training time on MOUT [military operations in urban terrain], about 30 percent on complex terrain and only 20 percent on the more traditional open, mechanized fight, such as at the NTC [National Training Center, Fort Irwin, California]. But with the augmentation of selected assets as the scenario dictates, the brigade can fight across the entire spectrum of conflict.

One scenario the IBCT is suited for is to come in behind a lead battalion, either from the 101st [Airborne Division (Air Assault)], 82d [Airborne Division], Rangers or Special Forces. The battalion would secure the airfield and its immediate perimeter, and the IBCT would flow in by air after them.

The brigade has the mobility to expand the operational area and has some "teeth" to protect and secure the airfield until heavy forces can start arriving. For example, we have 132 Javelin [antitank] launchers in our infantry squads and RSTA troops, an excellent weapon. We also have nine platoons of mobile gun systems [tank-like, light armored vehicles WITH 105-MM guns]. Of course, these are in addition to our FA battalion's 155-mm M198s; the battalion has the command and control capabilities to deploy along with the FECC as a complete entity or in firing battery sets.

These systems give us the firepower to follow an initial entry force into the theater to secure the environment for follow-on forces. We would ensure the enemy not only can't seize the airfield, but also can't influence subsequent operations on the airfield.

In another scenario, we could be employed effectively in Intrinsic Action type of deployments. The Army routinely rotates heavy forces back into Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, practicing deployments and training in exercise Intrinsic Action.

If the Iraqis begin to build up along the border, as they often do, then the brigade could fly out immediately to the area, push out and secure the borders as heavy brigade elements from, say, the 1st Cavalry or 3d Infantry Divisions fly in behind the brigade. The heavy elements then would draw equipment out of POMCUS [prepositioned materiel configured to unit sets], do some equipment testing and calibration and join us on the border.

As the combat intensity of a scenario increases, we can become the fifth maneuver brigade [including the aviation brigade] of a heavy division. In fact, we worked on just such a scenario with the 4th Infantry Division at FortHood [Texas].

That allows the division to use us as an economy-of-force element to secure an unprotected flank. If augmented, we could serve as a security force--operate similarly to, for example, the 3d Armored Cavalry as a covering force. But to fight out in front, we will have to have additional fire support and tank assets. Then the division would have a robust force out front with great information-gathering capabilities as well.

Q What message would you like to send Army and Marine Field Artilleryman stationed around the world?

A We ask our Field Artillery battalion do more than the traditional DS battalion, and it has done a superb job. 1-37 FA is leading the way in transformation. It was the first in the brigade to field its equipment...the first to deploy and re-deploy by air (and so the battalion is writing the brigade's deployment SOP)...and the first in the brigade to live fire. 1-37 FA is a critical force protection and firepower asset for the IBCT.

Colonel Steven L. Bailey commands the 3d Initial Brigade Combat Team (IBCT), 2d Infantry Division, Fort Lewis, Washington, the first of the IBCTs in the Army's Transformation initiative. In his previous assignment, he was the Senior Trainer for Armor Task Forces at the National Training Center, Fort Irwin, California. He commanded theist Battalion, 32d Armor, part of the 9th Infantry Division, Fort Lewis. In the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Stewart, Georgia, he was the S3 of the 3d Brigade and Executive Officer for 2d Battalion, 69th Armor. He commanded a tank company in the 1st Battalion, 33d Armor, part of the 2d Armored Division, Germany. He is a graduate of the Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.