Fires first in combat--train the way we fight. (The Update Point).

A great strength of the United States Army is that we are a learning, adaptive institution; this includes the Field Artillery. Through examination of the past, we consider how the experiences of others might apply to current and future requirements and operations. As in all historical experiences, we must carefully select the right lessons from recent operations, those that will have applicability on future battlefields in diverse environments against different adversaries.

As military professionals, we have become skilled in the after-action review (AAR) process, a critical self-examination of our performance, to determine the focus of future training and amend our tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs), as appropriate.

Training at the Combat Training Centers (CTCs). Our CTCs certainly have contributed greatly to the acceptance of the AAR and lessons-learned process, and the training experience of our CTCs has been invaluable in preparing soldiers and units for the rigors of combat. Experiential, immersive training in realistic simulated combat conditions best prepares soldiers and leaders to function under the stresses of high-intensity combat.

It is a precept of our Army that we should train as we intend to fight. Our current training systems enable this, in large part, and certainly have produced exceptionally well-trained soldiers and units. However, looking closely at the volumes of analysis and lessons learned from our training centers reveals that we, as an Army, do not truly train the way we intend to fight, particularly with respect to the employment of fires.

While FA units generally arrive at our CTCs at a high state of training, the synchronization of fires with maneuver has been reported repeatedly to be a training weakness, and joint fires are largely absent. Even when fires are effectively employed, the organizational construct of the training environment and the inability to fully replicate the effects of fires reduces the impact of indirect fires on the battle and increases the reliance on direct fire engagements to produce decisive outcomes.

Fires in Combat. Contrast our training with the experience that we, as an Army, have every time we enter combat: our reliance on indirect fires increases, and undeniably, there is a propensity to employ indirect fires wherever possible to achieve decision. The performance of those who plan and deliver indirect fires in combat is consistently praised, both for the competence of the soldiers and for the lethality that the indirect fire system brings to the combined arms force.

Certainly this is the case in the preliminary review of lessons emerging from Operation Iraqi Freedom where the Field Artillery made an enormous contribution to the success of the combined arms team and the joint fight. Field Artillery soldiers were well-trained; leaders were skilled in integrating fires and reacting to the changing situations of combat; our digital system provided a tremendous advantage in coordinating and expediting the application of fires; our delivery systems performed superbly; and the lethal effects produced by our munitions were exceptionally effective.

Maneuver commanders consistently moved their formations under the cover of supporting fires. Field Artillery fires were used extensively to prepare the battlefield and provide enabling effects. Fires were routinely exploited to maintain the tempo of the fight. Indirect fire solutions were clearly preferred to the tactical assault.

Commanders chose to fight first with indirect fires--those fires were synchronized, responsive and accurate.

So ... Why the Difference? Why the difference between what we generally observe in training and what we have witnessed consistently in historical combat and just witnessed again?

First, we must credit those soldiers and units who were responsible for this terrific demonstration of professional competence. Second we should cite the true level of integration that was achieved, including the integration of fires with maneuver as well as the integration and application of joint fires. Finally, when maneuver commanders faced a killing enemy in a live combat situation, they understood and applied our doctrine. They employed indirect fires to set the conditions for success and enable their maneuver forces. Those fires were effective, and the maneuver forces were successful.

We now are engaged in a detailed analysis of the lessons learned in Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom. In some instances, our experiences will indicate a need to modify doctrine or how we organize and equip the force.

A larger lesson for the Army to focus on will be on how to train: how to develop leaders to employ fires instinctively, how to ensure the effects of joint fires are integrated fully, and how to modify our CTCs to ensure the effects of indirect fires are replicated and rewarded.

When the Army fights, it fights with fires first to destroy enemy capabilities. We fight with fires first to enable maneuver and provide special purpose fires and effects. We fight with fires first in combat.

We need to train the way we fight.