Firepower in the third dimension--a joint and coalition future. (Interview).

Major General Jonathan B.A. Bailey, MBE, Noted Military Historian and Director of General Development and Doctrine for the British Army 

Q The expanded second edition of your book, Field Artillery and Firepower, is due out in September [United States Naval Institute, Newport, Rhode Island]. As discussed in your book, please briefly describe how the Field Artillery emerged as a combat power to be reckoned with in the 20th century.

A For millennia prior to 1914, battles were two-dimensional, linear encounters. The front line was where the action was--direct fire and quite short range. You only could engage targets that were in sight, whether it be with arrows, spears, rifles, muskets or field guns. So target acquisition was a matter of what you could see.

With the introduction of indirect fire, you suddenly could engage the enemy anywhere in his entire area of the battlefield. Warfare was still two dimensional, but engagements were far from being just encounters on a line; simultaneously, you could engage the enemy's command and control, communications, logistics and his reserve.

Interestingly, indirect fire started out as a tactical measure to protect the detachment or the gun from enemy fire. The main threat at that time was from the infantry because of the introduction of the high-velocity rifle conoidal bullet that allowed the infantry to match the range of the field gun. Consequently, guns employed in the open in the American Civil War, the Franco-Prussian War and the Russo-Japanese War frequently were blown away by infantry firepower--the rifle and the machine gun.

After the summer of 1914, guns began moving behind hills as a self-protection measure, a tactical expediency that transformed warfare. Suddenly, a gun could engage a target it couldn't see anywhere in the enemy's battlespace as long as it could identify where the target was and range it. Now you could fire ballistically through the third dimension to attack any target in the area of operations.

Some people imagine that even in the days of direct fire it was a three-dimensional battlefield--that gunners moved rounds from an artillery point through the third dimension to attack the enemy. Actually, direct fire with, say muzzle-loading cannons, was generally horizontal.

If the gunners elevated the gun tube slightly, it caused the cannonball trajectory to be above head height for the majority of its travel. Fired parallel to the ground at or below head height, the lethality of the cannonball was horrendous for its entire journey.

For the best effects, gunners ricocheted rounds off the ground into the enemy. For example, in an enfilade when taking an enemy from the flank, the cannonball could bounce and skip down a file of troops for maximum effect. Shells could be fired in a higher trajectory, but until 1870, they were not a very effective munition.

Indirect fire through the third dimension was a revolutionary change that only was fully revealed in the First World War--it can be argued that indirect fire constituted the birth of the modern style of warfare. Artillery became the major combat arm and probably played the dominant role in World War II, increasingly in concert with airpower.

Q What were the two major shortcomings of indirect fire after World War II that you discuss in your book? Are these shortcomings still present today?

A During the Cold War in Europe, the importance of artillery waned relative to the other arms. That was largely because it lacked the ability to acquire moving armored targets--the high-payoff mobile Soviet armor in depth--and engage those targets effectively, even if it could acquire them. Meanwhile in smaller wars, artillery firepower lacked utility because its effects often were excessive and high-payoff targets seemed elusive. The need for a more sophisticated application of fire became apparent.

Artillery could regain its utility only by acquiring the highest payoff targets and engaging them effectively with the appropriate degree of force in time and space--in other words, by employing a precision indirect fire system.

The future of the indirect fire system depends on target acquisition systems that are highly accurate over long distances and the speed and accuracy of communications that transmit the data to the people who can engage targets. Likewise, precision depends on the accuracy of the munitions, either through target designation or "fire and forget" technology, and the munitions' ability to create the desired effects on any target.

If we can improve these two major shortcomings in indirect firepower--target acquisition and munitions--the ability of future land systems to engage high-payoff targets throughout our battlespace effectively seems likely to be restored, having implications for warfare analogous to those of the introduction of indirect fire a century ago. Just as indirect fire changed warfare at the operational level, so the technical advances of target acquisition and munitions in the 21st century will have other and more important operational and strategic implications.

For example, about 100 years after the introduction of indirect fire, the science of precision means accuracy is no longer a function of range. Today you can fire a munition into the general area of the target and either by designating the target by ground or air means or using some form of terminal guidance in the munition itself, you can hit the target precisely--the range from the gun or the launcher doesn't matter.

Suddenly the techniques of precision give artillery opportunities that appeared to have diminished since 1945.

In addition, warfare itself will become more three dimensional. Many systems--munitions, unmanned aircraft, loitering objects--will operate in the third dimension, not just pass through it. As a natural progression, combat will occur increasingly in the third dimension and be inherently joint with artillery and airpower the big players.

Exploitation of the three-dimensional battlespace will bring new challenges.

Q You caution military leaders not to limit the word "precision" to mean only "accuracy at a point," such as in a precision munition. What does "precision" mean?

A Our terminology is in danger of being out-of-date and misleading--in fact, quite damaging. People are tempted to limit precision to accuracy at an exact point--our ability to hit a precise grid reference or the "first door on the north side of a munitions factory."

Precision is that and much more. Precision entails creating the desired effects at the exact time and place, and the place may or may not be a point--it might be an area. For example, the commander might want very precise effects on an enemy deployed in an area 500 meters by 500 meters--whether he wants to suppress, neutralize or destroy the enemy. The commander may want his area effects to be precise because churches, mosques, schools or hospitals surround the 500-by-500-meter area, and he doesn't want them damaged by the effects.

To achieve precision, the entire system must be precise. The commander must judge precisely what outcome he wants on what target and understand precisely what is going to happen to that target when and where the munition(s) hit the ground--x weight on this grid will have an xx effect.

Chucking a lot of inexpensive, relatively inaccurate munitions into a large area may be the best answer--but it should be the result of a careful decision.

Target acquisition must be precise; logistically, the right munitions must be at the right place and time; and the firing platform must fire the munition precisely followed by accurate battle damage assessment to determine if the desired effects were achieved.

Also, when we calculate precise "effects," we are in danger of using measurements that have served us well in the past but will not serve us well in the future.

In past attritional models of measuring effects, if you fired x number of rounds at an enemy tank company and destroyed 10 percent of the tanks, it was deemed that the crews of the other 90 percent were shaken up by the shock effect of the massive number of rounds dropped to achieve the 10 percent kills and were ineffective. With precision munitions taking out 10 percent of the tanks in an increased volume of battlespace, the other 90 percent might not even know the 10 percent have been hit. Therefore, the same percentage calculations would not result in neutralizing or suppressing the enemy.

The Field Artillery must develop more precision munitions, including area munitions that can precisely suppress and neutralize. Sometimes, dumb munitions will work--but they tend to be a logistical burden. There are other options, such as thermobaric weapons.

The Air Forces have been the first with precision munitions with the reach to take down operational and strategic targets, such as bridges and other infrastructure. And 70 years after the advent of indirect fire artillery, Air Forces too have become indirect fire systems with the introduction of standoff munitions. The Air Force went to standoff munitions to keep the aircraft safe when firing the munitions--the same reason the artillery moved behind the hill in 1914.

The Air Force also has developed unique close support capabilities without which ground forces would be in severe trouble. But the question is, are Air Force precision munitions the most cost-effective and efficient means to deliver fire in close combat (or at any range) compared to surface-to-surface fires (or even a Tomahawk from a submarine, for that matter)? With the Air Force' s unique strategic capabilities essential in interdiction, is it the best use of airpower to have it available on-call to engage "ten mortars over there"? At the moment, there are no surface-to-surface precision systems that can deliver many of the capabilities the Air Force brings to the battle.

The Artillery still has not brought in the precise systems that we've talked about for 20 years, although the technologies have been around for sometime. The programs have either been cancelled or delayed. Why? I think partly because it was assumed that the aircraft could do the job.

But what if you need to engage 500 targets in bad weather or within the next hour? The artillery's all-weather responsiveness in sensor-to-shooter links for close support or counterfire and its flexibility of effects simultaneously across the theater--10,000 rounds over here and smoke and illumination over there--often make surface-to-surface fires better than airpower.

When the FA has the reach (increased range and equipment mobility) and precise effects (more than just precision at a point), then we will make a considerably greater contribution to joint fires.

Q How do we integrate joint fires more effectively?

A The Battle of Cambrai in 1917 was the first time we had large formations of aircraft as part of the fire plan. Since then, Air Forces often have been reluctant to be part of the land scheme of maneuver.

For example in 1944, it was difficult to get Air Forces to divert resources from strategic operations against Germany to support the invasion of Normandy. They saw themselves as a strategic arm, not an arm of land forces. That's why Air Forces were formed as a separate service.

In recent operations, Air Forces have very successfully conducted both strategic operations and operations in support of the land forces.

But our future is going to become much more complicated. As we move into three-dimensional warfare where combat will be conducted throughout the volume of battlespace, it will become increasingly quaint to categorize capabilities in terms of land or air--the integration of the two will be seamless.

Other distinctions we've lived with for 100 years will become increasingly meaningless: direct and indirect fire, platform versus munition, and counterfire or air defense. For example, if you fire a missile from the ground and it flies over a target area and loiters for a couple of hours and then suddenly dispenses submunitions directly at a target it located below it, is that a direct or indirect attack?

The distinction between platforms and munitions is going to become rather meaningless. The cargo munition that dispenses a load of submunitions, is that a munition or a platform? Is Netfires a platform or munition?

What's the distinction between ground-based air defense and counterfire--two concepts people think they understand quite clearly? If your armored tank battalion is being attacked by a rocket that dispenses submunitions and you shoot down that rocket, have you conducted the last stage of a counterfire mission or an air defense mission?

Ground-based air defense will be everybody's business because of the scale of combat operations in the third dimension. Suppose a dozen enemy attack helicopters heading somewhere are 30 kilometers away and Field Artillery has precision. You will be able to acquire and track those helicopters, lob a round in their general direction and engage the aircraft with your submunitions.

In the past, we have tended to think about the third dimension in terms of airspace management, corridors and so on for manned fixed-wing aircraft. In the future, the third dimension is going to be very densely populated by mobile objects and very few of them will be manned--for example, there will be air-to-air combat between UAVs [unmanned aerial vehicles].

We will talk in terms of battlespace exploitation instead of airspace management. We'll have networks with situational awareness to make rapid decisions to knock out enemy targets, ensuring they aren't our own platforms or munitions.

It's going to be very complicated. Technology will give us the ability to exploit the three-dimensional battlespace, but first we have to understand the challenges of the future before we can solve them with technology.

Q Today is 1 May and, although major combat operations in Iraq are essentially over, the war is not over. As a military historian, please give us your initial analysis of the employment of fires in Operation Iraqi Freedom.

A In a superficial examination of the use of artillery in the Second Gulf War, one of the surprises is how absolutely traditional some aspects have been while dramatic progress has been made in other areas.

From the coalition artillery point of view, the war has been fought with quite old artillery equipment. If you take the equipment that has been deployed--MLRS [multiple-launch rocket system] ATACMS [Army tactical missile system], M109A6 Paladin, AS90 [British tracked 155-mm howitzer], your Marine's M198 155-mm towed howitzer, our M118 105-mm light gun, your M119--all but the AS90 took part in the First Gulf War. (Also, today's Paladin is very much more capable than the M109 of 1991.)

There have been some significant advances in joint target acquisition and intelligence systems in the past ten or so years--for example, we deployed our new and very effective advanced sound-ranging programme (ASP) in Iraq, which is a passive target acquisition system for mobile operations; and UAVs and new radars played an important role.

We employed much the same platforms and munitions in, basically, very traditional ways, i.e., close support, counterfire, deep operations and to provide smoke and illumination. Yet many aspects of Operation Iraqi Freedom were nonlinear, more nontraditional. Operations were conducted over a large area. There wasn't a secure rear area, and long lines of logistical support were not at right angles to the front. Artillery demonstrated mobility, and while traveling a vulnerable route over long distances, it was good to have a bit of armor on your weapons platforms.

It's quite clear the Artillery has been extremely busy in this Second Gulf War firing conventional munitions in support of maneuver and especially effective during sandstorms and in countering enemy mortars. I would be amazed if any maneuver commander would have foregone his artillery support in Iraq.

The credit goes to the Field Artillery that has performed magnificently with elderly equipment. It would appear that some who predicted the demise of the Field Artillery have done so prematurely.

And with the introduction of precision, the artillery will offer considerably more to the joint fight in the future.

Now in some areas of operations in Iraq, we have made dramatic progress. One of the triumphs of recent operations is the increasing integration of joint fires in support of maneuver--the way we meshed interdiction, CAS [close air support] and land-based fires. And many of those integrated fires came from maritime forces--from submarines, ships or carrier-based aircraft. So the good news is we have a culture that can learn from experiences.

From a coalition view, operations have been significantly more interoperable. We are better at technical and procedural interoperability and interoperability of the mind--the meshing of commanders' thinking during operations.

Q You participated in the British War in the Falklands against the Argentines and have written articles about it and the role of firepower in that war. What was the role of fires in the Falklands and what can we learn from that war?

A The War in the Falkland Islands was very unusual and primitive, even by 1982 standards. There were no roads--was no urban environment. There was almost no civilian population, and the weather was dreadful in semi-arctic conditions.

We did not have air superiority--very often the Argentine Air Force controlled the air. The British forces were at their logistical extremity.

There was no NBC [nuclear, biological, chemical] threat; there were only a couple of tracked armored vehicles on the islands, and we had no UAVs for air reconnaissance.

Most fighting took place at night without night-vision devices. There were some helicopters but not many because most of our Chinooks were sunk when our big container ship went down. Most of our soldiers were on foot, only occasionally lifted by helicopter, and it was extremely physically demanding.

From an artillery point of view, there were no computers because in those days our computers were fitted into vehicles that we couldn't drive because there were no roads. Computations were done by slide rule under ponchos in semi-arctic conditions.

There were no meteorological data--yet the Met errors in some wind conditions was up to 500 meters, and we were firing in close support of infantry maneuver at night. Survey was very difficult and based on information that was more than 100 years old.

We fired in close support of infantry attacking at night when we weren't sure where our own infantry was. We fired coordinated illumination to support infantry maneuver. We fired at flashes on hillsides when we didn't know the altitude of the target or the angle of sight to be applied in support of our troops who might be 50 or 100 meters away from the enemy we were engaging.

Fire missions were sometimes hundreds of rounds per gun, and the most common fire order given was "Continuous Fire." In the weather conditions, the guns often slid through the mud back several meters, even though they were held down with ground anchors made out of wire to try to keep them in position.

There were piles of ammunition all over the place. It was very hard to unbox ammunition and get rid of the refuse in the thick mud with water everywhere.

There was very little CAS, but naval gunfire was excellent. The ships sailed around the islands and shelled the Argentine rear areas at will. The naval gunfire was very accurate and very effective at harassing and demoralizing the Argentines throughout the night, shelling continuously. Naval gunfire observers on the shore, sometimes behind the Argentine lines, were essential.

It was extremely messy and difficult business, yet the British Field Artillery in the Falklands War, although significantly outgunned and outnumbered by the Argentine artillery, played an essential role in the decisive victory.

The Argentines had many more guns that were 155-mm compared to our 30 105-mm guns. Whenever possible, we sequenced concentrations of fire from all 30 guns in support of whichever of our infantry battalions was attacking at the time. The Argentines couldn't concentrate fires, often fired single guns and couldn't move their guns.

They often couldn't get the angle of sight right. So if you tucked your guns away in the right position, they had trouble getting rounds down into the gun positions--the rounds overshot or fell short of the positions.

The biggest lesson that came out of this war is that superior morale, training and leadership are the keys to winning a war when your army is outnumbered, some of its equipment is inferior and it must fight halfway around the world from home base in horrendous conditions. It was extremely risky and all kinds of things could have gone wrong--but they didn't.

We won due to good morale instilled by good leaders and the confidence good training brings.

Q What message would you like to send US Army and Marine Field Artillerymen stationed around the world?

A In recent operations in Iraq, indirect fires have been an indispensable element of ground operations.

However, in relative terms, the capabilities of the Field Artillery to engage the high-payoff targets in time and space has not kept up with technological developments or the capabilities of other services. We must make it our highest priority to bring on precision technologies so the Field Artillery can play its proper role in the joint systems of fires.

I congratulate you Gunners on the significant role you played in Operation Iraqi Freedom. Although I did not deploy to the Gulf, I can safely say for the British Army what a privilege it has been for our forces to work in partnership with yours.

Major General Jonathan B.A. Bailey, Member of the British Empire (MBE), is Director of the General Development and Doctrine for the British Army at Wiltshire, England. In his previous assignments, he was the Director of the Royal Artillery at Larkhill; Chief of Fire Coordination for the Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) in Germany; and Chief of the Joint Implementation Commission at the Headquarters of the Kosovo Force in 1999. In addition, he commanded the 40th Field Regiment in Germany and a battery in the 4th Field Regiment, Royal Artillery, in Germany. He also served as a Tactics Instructor and member of the Directing Staff at the Staff College in Camberley, from which he graduated, and as the Artillery Operations Officer for the 4th Armoured Division in Germany. Other highlights of his service include serving as an Operations Officer and Battery Commander during the Falklands land campaign in 1982 and commanding a Zipra Guerrilla Assembly Place in Rhodesia as part of the Commonwealth Cease-fire Monitoring Force in 1979. Major General Bailey holds a Bachelor of Arts in Medieval History and Philosophy from the University of Sussex. He has written a number of articles and books on artillery and military history.