Field Artillery.

Relevant, Trained and Ready...Two Years Later

On the eve of my departure as your Chief of Field Artillery and Commandant of the Field Artillery School, I want to refer to my first "From the Firebase" column in the September-October 1999 edition and put the last two years into perspective. As I wrote my first column, "Field Artillery: Relevant, Trained and Ready," the branch had been questioned about responsiveness and effectiveness in close support for a decade or more, just as we are today.

As I assumed command of Fort Sill, the Chief of Infantry published an article in the same edition of the magazine in which my first column appeared, which he titled "Is the Field Artillery Walking Away from the Close Fight?" Categorically, I answered, "No!" and stated my rationale.

This past April, a similar article appeared in ARMY, titled "Classical Fire Support vs. Parallel Fires." It criticized our branch and Field Artillerymen for failing to support maneuver commanders with responsive and effective close supporting fires. During the time between these two defining articles, this close support issue continued to resonate within my major command--US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC).

We, the branch, as well as the Army as a whole do have a problem providing responsive and accurate close supporting fires. From the perspective of some, this issue lies squarely at the base of Blockhouse Signal Mountain and is solely a Field Artillery problem. However, after studying the issue extensively for the past 12 years--beginning in 1988 as a direct support (DS) FA battalion commander; in 1991 as the Senior Fire Support Trainer at the National Training Center (NTC), Fort Irwin, California; in 1992 as an FA brigade commander; in 1994 as Director of Combat Developments in the FA School; in 1997 as Assistant Commandant of the FA School; and finally, during the past two years, as Commandant of the school--my read is the problem is far more complex and involves much more than just the Field Artillery. This is a fire support issue shared across the Army with Field Artillerymen, maneuver commanders, Combat Training Centers (CTCs) and those on the Army staff responsible for resourcing the Army. There is no on e culprit. However, the Field Artillery, alone, cannot fix the problem.

I have invested a lot of time at the NTC and Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), Fort Polk, Louisiana, since becoming Commandant--I suspect more than any Field Artillery School Commandant. While there, I have seen some well-trained FA units, providing responsive, accurate fire support to their maneuver brigades. Unfortunately, those "bright spots" were not the rule. The Army's CTC trends also confirm this. And just as I did in my first column two years ago, unfortunately I can state we are growing generations of maneuver commanders who do not appreciate the value fire support brings to the fight.

Successful solutions will have to be implemented by the Field Artillery, maneuver commanders and Army-level force developers. The Field Artillery accepts the challenge of working "our lane" aggressively, but there is much work to go around in other venues as well.

Although some of the solutions include changes that must be incorporated into operations at our CTCs, in no way are my comments intended as criticism of the CTCs. Our CTCs have been and remain the "crown jewels" of the Army's training strategy. But over the years, many have come to realize that our CTCs have shortcomings in how fires are replicated.

Understanding DS. Our performance at the CTCs during the past two decades has caused many to look for explanations as to why close support is not what it was in World War II, Korea or Vietnam. The April ARMY article blames doctrine. The article suggests we shifted our doctrine to "parallel" fires where the FA plans and executes fires parallel to maneuver and the two never intersect. It further says that the advent of parallel fires "banished" maneuver leaders from planning and controlling their supporting artillery. The article implies the need to return to "classical fire support."

The fact is that fire support doctrine for DS artillery has been consistent for three decades. That doctrine is neither Parallel nor Classical.

One challenge in defining the problem is for everyone to understand DS and its relationship to close support. Some believe DS is synonymous with close support. In fact, close supporting fires are only part of the DS mission.

The four support relationships (standard tactical missions) of DS, general support (GS), reinforcing (R) and GSR as defined in FM 6-20, our capstone fire support doctrine, have not changed. The focus of DS is and always has been to provide responsive, accurate fires for the supported maneuver unit--normally, a maneuver brigade. This means the DS battalion provides the fires the brigade commander directs it to provide in close consult with his fire support coordinator (FSCOORD). However, DS also includes brigade shaping (interdiction) fires and counterfire. All are critical fire support tasks for the maneuver brigade and sometimes generate competition for priority of limited fire support assets. These critical tasks must be integrated and balanced in accordance with the maneuver brigade commander's mission, intent and scheme of fires.

Probably the most significant issue in determining if today's direct support is correctly focused is the expectation for immediately responsive fires at the maneuver battalion task force and subordinate companies. These echelons expect responsive planned and unplanned fires at their levels--as well they should.

However, this expectation must consider mortars first and move on to DS FA. Army doctrine has always emphasized mortars as a major contributor to fires at the maneuver battalion and company levels. This is why mortars exist and are organic to maneuver. NTC observations note the continuing problems of integrating mortars into the fight--adding to our close support challenges.

Adequate fire support doesn't mean the DS unit engages every target. Expecting the DS artillery battalion to be the sole provider of close support never has been fire support doctrine. Close supporting fires also must incorporate Army aviation and joint assets.

Maneuver expectations at the brigade level may be somewhat different than those at the battalion or company levels. DS artillery first must meet the expectations of the supported commander--the brigade commander. The brigade commander is not "banished" unless he chooses to be. There's no question that some brigade commanders are more involved in the direction of their fire support than others. But it's also a fact that when a brigade commander is involved in directing the synchronization of maneuver and fires, his fires tend to be more effective, both shaping and close support.

Causes of the Problem. As NTC observations indicate, there are two major aspects of the problem--responsiveness and effectiveness. These challenges also surface at the other maneuver CTCs. However, "lightfighters" tend to focus their fire support better at home station through combined arms live-fire exercises and, generally, do better at the JRTC. Therefore, I use the NTC as my example.

FA Challenges. The latest "Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) Bulletin" for the NTC (May 2001) states that close fires lack "responsiveness" and "focus and mass of fires in execution," a typical observation of fire support performance at the NTC for at least the past decade. Two significant reasons for these challenges exist: the delivery system is too old and our observed target engagement system needs improvements. First, our delivery systems are old and unresponsive. Our medium and light towed systems are worn out, and our medium self-propelled howitzer is perched on a 40-year-old chassis. Only one is capable of supporting offensive operations--the Ml 19 towed 105-mm howitzer, but it is mechanically unreliable, Paladin and the M198 towed 155mm are cumbersome, labor-intensive and unable to support fast-moving, offensive-oriented maneuver operations.

Second, accurately locating targets, positioning observers in the correct location to observe and adjust fires, maintaining functional long-range communications (digital and voice), and creating a flexible digital fire support architecture are among the major challenges of our observed target engagement system.

These are not NTC challenges, they are FA branch challenges. The Field Artillery School has "stepped up to the plate" and is formulating solutions.

The new and improved joint, lightweight 155-mm howitzer (LW 155) will replace the M198, beginning in FY06. Although experiencing some developmental issues, this howitzer is designed to complement fast-moving operations in urban and complex terrain. We know the Ml 19 must be replaced by 2014. Our plan is to replace it with a more agile system that has greater range and accuracy. However, some transformation challenges must be resolved before we can select the new system.

Crusader is replacing Paladin. With its range, rate-of-fire and survivability, Crusader will complement our counteroffensive force's offensive capabilities and support small-scaled contingencies and security support operations.

At the NTC, we tend to fire targets as directed by maneuver leaders, which is what the April article says happens in Classical fire support. We tend to "shoot-this-now" based on spot reports, intelligence fusion and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) without a target location sufficient for engagement or an observer in place to see the mission through to completion. Without an observer(s) or another sensor that can see the target to assess the effectiveness of the initial volley and adjust the fires or reattack as necessary, the result is highly predictable: ineffective fires. The shoot-this-now mindset calls for a combined arms solution.

The complete cycle of a target engagement that was routinely executed during Vietnam is no longer the norm at the NTC or in home-station combined arms training. Even with observers in the right place, they rarely adjust the FA or mortars. At least to some extent, this is due to simulations that have given the force a false sense of what it takes to engage a target effectively. Unfortunately in simulations, we simply firefor-effect against an icon and get good results. It doesn't work that way at the NTC or in combat.

Being able to engage an enemy formation in conjunction with maneuver requires a responsive fire support system. Probably the most demanding requirement is for the FA to engage an enemy armored formation moving in open terrain. These formations often move two miles in 10 minutes at the NTC. To be most effective with our area munitions, we must have the discipline to track the enemy to a well-planned engagement area. This usually is in canalized terrain or in conjunction with obstacles. Further, we must have an observer or other sensor in place that can track the enemy and access delivery systems with the responsiveness to engage the moving formation at the right time.

Under these conditions, radio or digital relays exacerbate the challenge, often causing the fire direction center (FDC) to be unsure of which observer initiated the fire mission. The responses "Shot" and "Splash" are often missing, so no observer adjusts fires on those targets.

Other Challenges. Given its vast expanse for live, force-on-force maneuver, the NTC is the most dynamic environment our heavy units encounter, short of actual combat. It was precisely this environment that was a major factor in training combined arms units for our resounding victory in Operation Desert Storm.

This dynamic training environment demands much from our DS units. At the NTC, the DS unit must juggle the competing demands for brigade shaping fires, counterfire against mortars and regimental artillery groups, and close supporting fires. (Although these types of fires seldom occur in that sequence, we approach it that way.) When the requirements for special missions are necessary--such as family of scatterable mines (FASCAM), smoke and suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD)--and combined with the inevitable short supply of time, too often there are not enough assets to fire the missions. Even with a reinforcing battalion, the FA at the NTC faces a major challenge.

The battlespace of today's Force XXI heavy maneuver brigade has expanded to a size comparable to the battlespace of a division or even a corps in the past. It must be capable of fighting in a distributed, non-linear battlespace. During the last 15 years, maneuver brigade commanders, with assistance from their FSCOORDs, have tried to expand to dominate this larger battlespace.

The addition of enhanced reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition (RSTA) assets, such as combat observation lasing teams (COLTs), scouts and UAVs, have given the brigade an unprecedented ability to find the enemy at depth. Brigade commanders demand their FSCOORDs engage enemy formations as deep as possible to eliminate or minimize the necessity for a close fight and, if unsuccessful, to shape the close fight for their subordinate battalions.

Subsequently, the brigade transfers priority-of-fires to a task force. NTC trends have indicated that the battle hand-over between the brigade deep and close fights is seldom smooth and sometimes causes competition for fires between tactical depths and close combat.

Downsizing our cannon battalions has exacerbated the problem. With the 1996 decision to reduce howitzer battalions from 24 to 18 guns (a 25 percent reduction), the Army accepted what it thought was short-term risk. The plan to mitigate this risk was the fielding of the critical delivery systems of Crusader and the enhanced multiple-launch rocket system (MLRS) M270A1 launcher and the precision munitions enablers of sense and destroy armor (SADARM) and the MLRS smart tactical rocket (MSTAR). Since that time, Crusader fielding has shifted from FY05 to FY08 with fewer battalions receiving the system than originally planned. (Only the Counterattack Corps and supporting FA brigades will field Crusader.) And funding for SADARM and MSTAR was terminated.

Without the continued development of smart munitions, ourDS units will be limited to executing missions largely with area munitions for the foreseeable future. These munitions require an accurate target location and rely on volume for lethality. Firing an appropriate volume of area munitions usually comes at the expense of firing other missions.

Solutions. The problem is complex with no quick or easy set of solutions. The solutions cross the domains of doctrine, training, leader development, material and organizations and must be implemented overtime. However, work is ongoing today that will serve as a catalyst for change. Training. Realistic training at home station may be one of the most effective ways to better provide responsive, effective fires. Given today's dynamic world situation and the many venues to which the US Army is committed, homestation training is not the priority it was 12 years ago before downsizing. All leaders (section chiefs to battalion commanders) must learn how to train at home station better.

The battalion command sergeant major (CSM) must ask himself a series of questions: "Is my home-station Sergeant's Time training synchronized with our upcoming NTC (or JRTC) rotation? Do the soldier individual and section crew tasks complement the battery and battalion commanders' collective training plan leading up to our CTC rotation? Are we going 'through the motions' of FA training by erecting the OE254 antenna, donning the protective mask or practicing other skills not associated with providing responsive, effective fires?"

The battery commander must ask, "Do I and my platoon leaders use a stopwatch to time all gunnery tasks that have a time standard?" If we are to solve responsiveness issues our battery, platoon and section leaders must use their stopwatches to train to standard.

Here are a few tips endorsed by our NTC fire support trainers to help Field Artillerymen train their units better.

* Training Observers. Fire support teams (FISTs) and forward observers (FOs) are our most neglected soldiers. Commanders must place special emphasis on the equipment, training, evaluation and certification of observers.

Our FOs need training in the tactical employment, maneuver, use of technology and "boresight" of the ground! vehicular laser locator designator (GVLLD), Hellfire ground support simulator (HGSS) and mini eye-safe laser infrared observation set (MELIOS) to ensure they can deliver the eightdigit grid we need for accuracy. Our observers need the personal attention of the battalion CSMs and ourFSCOORDs. Battalions need to train at home station to execute a fire plan/scheme of fires instead of just training on a list of missions.

* Unobserved Fires. Remarkably, about 75 percent of our close fire missions at the NTC are unobserved. Most of these are spot report shoot this-now fire missions-shooting the grid of a maneuver spot report without anyone to adjust the fires, end the mission or assess the battle damage. This must stop. If the target is important enough to shoot, it is important enough for the originator to become an FO-we should not shoot unobserved fires in this age of sensor availability. When someone says, "Shoot this now!" ESCOORDs and fire support officers (FSOs) must respond, "Get an observer to initiate fires on that target."

* Responsiveness. We need true sensor-to-shooter linkages to make our fires more responsive. We must streamline the digital architecture for the observer to communicate directly with the shooter, not communicate via a series of fire support elements (FSEs).

* Paladin Operations. Until Crusader is fielded, commanders must train Paladin battalions, batteries and platoons to fight their mobile artillery platforms. Paladin units are employing too many set-piece tactics without a sense of urgency. For example, Paladin occupations are too slow and deliberate--primarily due to fire direction centers (FDCs) and dry-fire verification requirements.

Organizing for Combat. We must have the flexibility to organize for combat at the CTCs as we will in actual combat. In 1994-1995, the Army Science Board proposed and the Army approved changes to the allocation rules that placed two FA brigades (six battalions: two cannon and four MLRS) in support of each committed division. This allocation significantly increased the firepower available to both the divisions and their maneuver brigades.

In combat operations, a DS FA battalion in a brigade supporting effort may have more than one FA battalion reinforcing its fires. The reinforcing battalions could be both cannon and rocket. Such organization for combat would help to alleviate the competition for close supporting fires, shaping fires and counterfire by increasing the number of delivery units, volume and range.

The figure shows an organization for combat of a notional committed "52d Infantry Division (Mechanized)." The main effort and supporting brigades have more fire support assets while the division retains three battalions of MLRS (1-52 FA, 2-30 FA and 3-30 FA) and has a "string" on another battalion (3-31 FA) for executing the division's counterfire and deep fires, the latter also prosecuted by the division's Army aviation.

The April ARMY article suggested that "...division-supporting fires...is desynchronizing...because the brigade has lost fire support." This is incorrect. FA battalions with a DS mission are, for all practical purposes, organic to the maneuver brigades at the NTC--the brigade combat teams (BCTs). Those who argue that FA battalions should be organic to their maneuver brigades to enhance their responsiveness should look again at how we fight at the NTC. The DS relationship between the FA battalion and the brigade allows the division to retain flexibility of fires without impeding its level of support.

Competition for fire support assets at the division level is not the issue--competing tasks and the synchronization of fires and maneuver at the brigade level are. If we organize at the NTC as we would in combat, there would be enough assets to routinely mass fires for the division without taking assets away from the maneuver brigades. And, as we probably will in combat, we should consider having the division's Force FA Headquarters "handle" the counterfire fight at the CTCs, except for mortars.

Better Digital Fires. The April article correctly states that our digital fire support architecture blocks the maneuver commander's ability to know what's going on with his fires. Operating digitally doesn't provide the same level of understanding as existed with voice nets. We need digital capabilities that let the entire combined arms team have visibility over where fires are being focused at any time in the fight. But FA units must not return to the voice era to do this, although many have.

The advanced FA tactical data system's (AFATDS') new "client" software will begin to restore that visibility digitally. When maneuver battalion task forces can see where indirect fires are being focused and the types of targets being engaged, they can help fire supporters shift the focus. With such real-time knowledge of the big picture, maneuver subordinates may conclude that shaping fires in support of the brigade or counterfire is the most important task at that point in the fight.

As part of the digital solutions, we need a more streamlined and flexible digital fire support architecture. Today that architecture is too oriented on process and hierarchy. We are working to streamline the architecture to reduce the nodes (intervention points) between the sensor and the shooter while simply informing others. We need to be able to "stream" target location data directly to the howitzers for firing data updates as the enemy moves to the engagement area.

We also need to reduce the time needed to clear fires. Better "situational understanding" of fires and a more streamlined and flexible architecture will help us shift fires at the right time and with the right delivery assets--not all of which are artillery.

Better Target Location. We must improve our accuracy in locating targets. We must field an accurate and portable target-locating device soonest. Unfortunately, the Bradley FIST vehicle with an enhanced target location capability is fielding at a very slow rate--another resource issue. We are looking at commercial off-the-shelf alternatives for a partial solution, pending fielding of the lightweight laser designator rangefinder (LLDR) and, in later years, the enhanced accuracy gimbal laser-mission equipment package (EAGL-MEP) for the interim armored vehicle (IAV).

In conjunction with these efforts, we need an observation device by which the observer can "drag" a target icon to its new location and automatically update the fire plan as he tracks the enemy formation. These updates would be routed automatically to the howitzers so they rapidly could recompute the firing data to accurately engage the moving formation. Tankers use similar technology to engage targets today--why can't the FA?

Effects Replication. We are working closely with TRADOC and the CTCs to better portray FA effects. The Army must move to correct long-standing issues in effects replication at the CTCs. For example, we know it doesn't take 54 rounds of 155-mm to kill a tank.

No matter how many solutions we implement, we won't be able to change the perception that fires don't make a difference in the close fight if we continue to use unrealistic measures of fire support effectivenness at our CTCs. The three categories of fire support measured at our CTCs--effective, suppressive and ineffective--do not portray fire support's full impact on the fight.

The CTCs must replicate the effects of suppressive fires better--not just "killing" fires. Suppression and firepower or maneuver kills can have the same effects as castastrophic kills.

Maneuver Brigade Priorities. The brigade commander is responsible for fires throughout his battlespace, not just the close fight. He sets the priorities for the DS unit accordingly--which may not always include a shift in sequence from brigade deep to close. His approval of his essential fire support tasks (EFSTs) sets this prioritization in motion and is the basis for his scheme of fires. The fidelity, executability and linkages of these EFSTs to the mission and the maneuver brigade commander's intent have much to do with knowing when to shift between shaping fires, close supporting fires and counterfire.

We must have combined arms solutions for attacking targets that accomplish the EFSTs at different levels. Today, the high pay-off target list (HPTL) approved by the brigade commander doesn't always accomplish the EFSTs of his subordinate units. Maneuver commanders' defining EFSTs that mortars can execute will help. Adding artillery by realistically organizing for combat will be key.

Enhanced Simulations. One of the most difficult (and effective) solutions to make fires more responsive and effective is to replicate and practice overcoming the challenges associated with providing indirect fires integrated with maneuver at home station. Because of resource limitations, much of our combined arms training must be conducted in simulations--and, given the state of simulations, we have a long way to go.

Enhanced simulations would allow units to identify issues, develop procedures and train at home station to prepare for the "graduate level" CTC rotations. For example, enhancing the close combat tactical trainer (CCTT) to more fully replicate all fire support systems would help us work through target engagement and attack challenges and allow fire support and maneuver leaders to understand the consequences of target location errors (TLEs) and unobserved fires. Since its fielding, CCTT has not yielded this level of realism. This is another aspect of the close support problem that calls for Army force developers and priority setters to invest in helping to fix the responsive and effective fires issues.

Doctrine--Decentralizing. We may need to shift to decentralized fires down to the maneuver battalion to attain more responsive close support. Organizing for combat with more artillery will facilitate this decentralization. Crusader could make this shift very profound, given the number of missions it can handle with its rate-of-fire, range, accuracy and mobility.

In the near term, perhaps a battalion or battery(s) of Paladins sometimes should be placed DS to a maneuver task force, as the situation dictates, or attached for a limited period of time. The relationship established shouldn't matter as much as the outcome.

We need to become more agile in establishing command or support relationships at different tactical levels. Optimum support for a maneuver brigade at the NTC may be an MLRS battalion firing most of the brigade's shaping fires while two Paladin battalions fire close supporting fires and counterfire for the battalion task forces; for a brigade in the supporting role, this is a realistic FA organization for combat. The fires of a portion or all of these units could be massed, close or deep, as required, given that the systems and munitions to achieve the desired effects are available.

Long-Term Consequences. The problems associated with close supporting fires have created the perception that we are less concerned with supporting maneuver in the close fight. Just because we may not always get it right doesn't mean we aren't concerned about close support. If distributed operations become dominant in the future, this perception may become more widespread. Reverting back to the old days when close support was all a DS unit did will not solve the problems--in fact, would only create new problems.

The responsiveness and effectiveness of firepower that characterized combat operations in World War II, Korea and Vietnam must be routinely visible at the CTCs. We must implement the solutions outlined in this article and regenerate combined arms commanders' faith in fires--Armor, Infantry, Aviation and, yes, Field Artillery too. We also must show future generations of combined arms commanders that firepower can be applied with great timeliness and close synchronization of maneuver and fires. We must get to the state where we routinely accomplish this in all training environments.

The FA has not walked away from close support. We understand our many challenges and accept them. But we also need the commitment of the entire combined arms team and the Army to make effective, responsive close supporting fires happen.

Major General Toney Stricklin has been the Chief of Field Artillery and Commanding General of Fort Sill, Oklahoma, since August 1999. He will give up command on 24 August 2001 to Major General Michael D. Maples, who is currently Director of Operations, Readiness and Mobilization in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans at the Pentagon. After 32 years of service, Major General Stricklin is retiring from the Army.

Editor's Note: This article was taken, in part, from the article "Making Close Supporting Fires Happen" by Major General Stricklin and Colonel (Retired) Sammy L. Coffman that is being published in the ARMY August edition; the ARMY article will appear in print several weeks before this edition of Field Artillery.