FA priorities after OIF.

Shortly after the conclusion of major combat operations (MCO) in Iraq, an initial Army report clearly described the tremendous impact the Field Artillery had during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF): "Artillery played a key and essential role. Every commander cited artillery as indispensable during the fight."

The Field Artillery--skilled leaders and heroic soldiers displaying exceptional professional competence equipped with a highly effective command and control system, operating precise target-locating capabilities and armed with lethal delivery systems--was "indispensable during the fight." In OIF, the FA was a fully integrated and effective element of the joint and combined arms team.

US Army FA units conducting MCO included one corps artillery, two division artilleries (Div Artys), three FA brigade headquarters (one of which had a nonstandard mission of sensitive site exploitation) and 11 FA battalions. The USMC was supported by a substantial Marine artillery complement, including five battalions and multiple separate batteries. Our allies from the United Kingdom added an additional 66 howitzers organized into three battalions Another US Army Div Arty, an FA brigade and 10 additional FA battalions, joined the force in support of stability and support operations (SASO) in Iraq and have done an absolutely magnificent job while conducting a full range of missions in a continuing hostile situation.

It has been suggested that this war was won with less artillery than was employed in Operation Desert Storm, and that is certainly true. It is also true that we won with fewer divisions, fewer tanks and fewer infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs). In fact, the ratio of US artillery pieces to US tanks and IFVs in OIF was the same as or higher than the ratio in Desert Storm.

On the other hand, we fought an Iraqi army that was very different than the force we fought in Desert Storm. It fought distributed throughout a much large battlespace and employed very different tactics, often in adverse weather conditions. A combination of fires capabilities that included joint fires integrated with the artillery's close supporting and long-range fires was very effective in dealing with this threat. The great artillerymen in OIF emerged victorious while fighting for a longer time with fewer resources over greater distances against a dangerous enemy who was less predictable.

Each of the US Army's cannons and launchers delivered fires at a higher rate and greater volume per system than their Desert Storm counterparts. The Army's 62 155-mm howitzers fired almost 14,500 rounds--the 54 Paladin fired 13,923 and the eight M198s fire, 516 rounds. The 62105-mm M119 howitzers fired 4,107 rounds. Our 73 multiple-launch rocket systems (MLRS) fired 857 rockets and 414 Army tactics missile system (ATACMS) missiles. Additionally, American Marine Artillerymen delivered 19,883 rounds. By all reports, the effects of artillery fires were devastating.

Field Artillery accomplishments have been documented in detailed after-action reports (AARs) submitted by the commanders of our maneuver and artillery formations at every echelon as we as in numerous lessons learned effort. These articles and reports are being reviewed in detail to address required warfighting capabilities and share the methodologies our Field Artillery warriors found successful in combat. Here are some of our most significant conclusions to date.

Doctrine. We must develop capabilities and procedures to support high tempo offensive operations over extended distances. Further, we must develop procedures to support Special Operation Forces (SOF) with fires an influence joint fires doctrine, including targeting, fire support coordination measures (FSCM) and kill box methodologies. We also must document the role of Field Artillery units in SASO.

Training. We must sustain realistic training systems, improve the availability of joint fires and the replication of fires in our Combat Training Centers (CTCs), train on the transitions from MCO to SASO, train all soldiers on the call-for-fire as an essential task, and train and certify Universal Observers who can apply all categories of joint fires.

Leaders. We must sustain the training programs that produced outstanding OIF leaders, nurture leaders who can adapt to the changing conditions of the contemporary operating environment (COE) and develop additional expertise in integrating joint fires and effects.

Organizations. We must improve the ability of cannon batteries to operate independently with nonstandard missions, properly man fires and effects cells (FECs), recognize the agility an FA brigade headquarters provides forces in combat, increase our target acquisition capabilities and fix combat service support (CSS) to FA units.

Materiel. We require long-range communications and an improved command and control vehicle. Our delivery systems require longer range with precision, and we need to improve our targeting capabilities, both mounted and dismounted. We also need to simplify and integrate our digital systems and improve our gun display units (GDUs) and lightweight fire direction systems. Further, we need to enhance our munitions capabilities, resolve the unexploded ordnance issue and improve soldier and system survivability.

Soldiers. We train soldiers to be warriors--soldiers first--and provide them all the training and equipment they require, regardless of specialty or component.

The magnificent Field Artillerymen who fought this war have done a remarkable job of documenting their stories, sharing their experiences and providing their professional insights on the tactics, techniques and procedures that worked for them in OIF. We accept the challenge of enhancing capabilities so the Field Artillery can continue to Create the Thunder?