Eyes of Artillery: The Origins of Modern US Army Aviation in World War II.

Edgar F. Raines, Jr., Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 2000, 372 Pages (GPO Stock No. 008-029-003562). $43.00.

Innovation is the razor's edge of war. In Normandy during the bloody fighting of the summer of 1944, one crucial battle of move and countermove between determined foes was to find and kill the German artillery. Although the Germans had few guns and little ammunition, they used their limited firepower with devastating effect.

When the American infantry assaulted, the troops found themselves crossing narrow, tree-lined sunken lanes and small fields bounded by thick borders of wood and brush. Slowed by mines, snipers and planned defenses, the attack formations made choice targets for a few well-placed volleys. Forward observers, who rarely could see beyond the next line of trees, were useless in the counterbattery fight. Sound-ranging platoons provided a means to go after enemy artillery, but coordinating fires by this method was time-consuming, cumbersome and reactive.

The Americans needed a better way. Their savior was the aerial observation post-the "eyes of artillery." In an important new book, Edgar F. Raines, a historian at the US Army Center of Military History, chronicles the evolution of aerial observation for artillery in one of the most successful, yet unheralded innovations of the interwar years.

In Raines' narrative, the hero of the story is Major General Robert M. Danford, the Chief of Artillery between January 1939 and December 1942, who tirelessly championed the case for building an organic Army aerial observation force. Artillery spotting by plane had been tried during World War I but proved wholly unsuccessful. Based on these lessons Army senior leaders dismissed the idea altogether. Leaders of the fledgling Air Corps were equally unenthusiastic. Chief of the Air Corps, Major General Henry H. Arnold (later commanding general of the Army Air Forces) rejected experimentation in aerial observation in favor of investing the service's energy and resources on strategic bombing.

The first chapters of Raines' book are a case study of the roles of leadership and bureaucratic infighting in determining the course of military innovation. Through luck , guile and persistence, Danford overcame Arnold's opposition. In December 1941, he obtained War Department approval for testing the air observation post.

Several factors contributed to the feasibility of Danford's initiative: the development of light, static-free radios; the fire direction center (FDC) that allowed commanders to quickly mass fires on a common point; and light, durable aircraft that could land and take-off on short unimproved fields. Once tests got underway, the feasibility of combat aerial observation was soon apparent. Tests and further experimentation proved sufficiently successful to lead to the incorporation of air observation post sections in all US divisional structures.

Military innovation requires trained soldiers and suitable methods as well as new technology and organizations. The middle chapters of Eyes of Artillery detail the challenges of training, air safety, supply and maintenance and the evolution of doctrine in the brief period between the first tests and the artillery observers debut in combat.

Not surprisingly after a whirlwind fielding process, initial efforts were marred with miscues. In November 1944, the first three L-4s were launched off the carrier Ranger the day after troops landed in North Africa as part of Operation Torch. Unfortunately, no one had added the plane's silhouette to the recognition book for anti-aircraft gunners. The cruiser Brooklyn opened fire on the strange craft. All three crash-landed.

Like many innovations untested by battle, artillery observation only reached its full potential when trained, fearless and innovative soldiers applied their intelligence and energy to the challenges of war. The remaining chapters survey the employment of Army aviation in each theater.

A final chapter on postwar developments and a thoughtful and insightful epilogue cap the book. Here lies the book's only shortfall; even an excellent survey cannot do justice to the still largely untold story of the incredible skill, bravery and inventiveness of the aerial observation sections.

Normandy was a case in point. Doctrine offered no blueprint on how to hunt enemy artillery in the thick tree-covered Normandy landscape. Observers discovered that on calm days they could pick out artillery by the lingering smoke around the firing positions. But German gunners soon learned to stop shooting when they detected spotter planes in the area. American pilots then became skilled at buzzing a suspected position; flying away, and then circling back to catch the enemy off-guard.

Aerial observers also started hunting for artillery at dusk and dawn when the flash of firing guns was easier to spot. Commanders learned to cross-cue aerial observers with other sensors. By the end of July, German battery commanders were fearful to fire more than a single volley before changing their positions.

While Raines cannot tell the whole story, his narrative is excellent--richly researched and documented, well-illustrated and superbly edited. This book is also timely. As today's artillerymen struggle with the challenges of innovation and transformation, the book gives a worthy example by which to measure their efforts.

I highly recommend Eyes of the Artillery as good history and for stimulating debate on the methods and goals of military innovation. It is available for public sale through the Government Printing Office (GPO) and can be requisitioned as CMH Pub 70-31 through the US Publishing Agency.