Experience of the Great Patriotic War and current national defense problems.

Dear war veterans,

Dear comrades,

The 60th anniversary of the Victory over Nazi Germany in the Great Patriotic War and in World War II as a whole is drawing near. Our country in cooperation with the states of the anti-Hitler coalition and other countries is preparing to celebrate this great occasion in a fitting manner. Russian President Vladimir Putin, chairman of the Victory Day Organizing Committee, has approved an extensive plan of activities for celebrating Victory Day in the capital and in all the regions of the country.

The most important of these is the Victory Day parade in Red Square in Moscow on 9 May, which is to be attended by the leaders and delegations of more than 60 states.

The main participants in all the festivities will be front-line soldiers and other war veterans, including those from CIS countries, to whose heroic feats and achievements we bow our heads respectfully.

A major event in this context is today's military-science conference dedicated to the 60th anniversary of the Victory in the Great Patriotic War. We have agreed to give it a businesslike scientific and practical character. We have to analyze the lessons of the war in greater depth and, building on that invaluable experience, to draw scientifically valid conclusions for ensuring the country's reliable defense in current conditions.

I hope we shall be able to discuss in a constructive spirit the key problems arising in this field. All your opinions and proposals will be thoroughly studied and duly implemented.

Anticipating the work of the conference, I would first of all like to draw your attention to the questions that are particularly important for the development, training and combat use of the Armed Forces in future wars, conflicts and antiterrorist operations. The positions of Russian President Vladimir Putin, Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Russia, and the views of the Defense Ministry were set forth by us on 2 October 2003, and also at a closing conference of senior officials and command personnel at the end of 2004.

At a military-science conference in January 2004, we discussed the ways of further improving the military command and control system. Much of what we discussed at that time is already being implemented. But this does not mean that there is nothing left for us to think about or to discuss.

The above-mentioned document* elucidates the main lines of military organizational development, but it is important not only to proclaim the tasks we have to accomplish, but also to determine the ways and methods of addressing them. Besides, in the globalization era the military-political situation has been developing so rapidly and dynamically that we have to keep adjusting our "compass" and specifying our views and the decisions we have already made.

On the whole, prediction of the development of the geopolitical situation, potential threats and methods of warfare calls for wide-ranging creative work and for a combination of combat experience with modern methods of operation modeling and analysis. We appreciate the work carried out in this area by the collective of the Academy of Military Sciences and hope that all veterans of war and military science will actively assist us in our efforts to find expeditious and scientifically valid solutions to urgent problems of military science.

What are these problems at the present stage, what lessons should we learn from the experience of past wars, and what are the key reference points to be set for the future?

First, it is clear to all that we have to prepare not for past wars, but for that which awaits the Armed Forces in the future.

But, as the record of 20th-century wars shows, few have managed to do this in full measure. The Great Patriotic War, especially its initial period, was no exception. In view of this, one should give thought to why that was so and what were the factors and causes that proved to be impossible to predict. Evidently, it is better to make a mistake in one's forecasts than to reconcile oneself to the thought that the future of military science cannot be predicted. In spite of past mistakes, this work should be continued. In this process we should not forget that there has never in history been a war totally canceling the military art of the past: some rational elements have always been retained. At the same time, each new war has sown the seeds of a new military art. For future use, we should not simply be guided by past experience that lies on the surface, but should try to identify the deep-seated and often hidden trends that determine the ways of development of military art and science.

But this requires an objective and critical analysis and study of the operations and battles of past wars.

A priority task here is to study and generalize the experience of local wars and antiterrorist operations in Afghanistan, Chechnya, Yugoslavia, Iraq, etc. A special effort should be made to identify their general patterns, the main trends in the development of the character of armed struggle, which will facilitate valid forecasting and effective military planning. A point I want to make in this context is that an objective and critical study of history does not mean that we have to run down past experience in general. Such a one-sided approach is of little help. After all, in order to arrive at the truth we must understand not only the causes of our failures in 1941 and in the summer of 1942, but also the factors that ensured the success of subsequent operations and brought us to victory. They should also be added to the arsenal of the military art of the future.

As you know, many different things happened during the war, but none of its negative aspects can nullify or even detract in any way from the great feat of our people and their Armed Forces for the sake of saving the country. Our heroic past should help to educate the personnel of today's army and navy in a spirit of patriotism and loyalty to one's military duty. All senior officials and commanders, both in the Central Staff of the Defense Ministry and in army and navy units, should take into account the specific conditions in which we are now obliged to conduct educational work among military personnel. Whereas in the past our state educational agencies and all the mass media oriented the country's servicemen only in one direction--toward irreproachable service for the benefit of the Motherland--today these questions are not only given different interpretations, but things sometimes get to the point of vilification of our entire past, including the history of the Great Patriotic War, to the point of outright calls for draft evasion. In these conditions, work among personnel should be more convincing and well-argued. Command staff with the participation of our veterans should be able to resist negative social phenomena in the field of defense. In this connection, it is necessary to step up the activities of the military press and the new television channel Zvezda (Star), and to make more frequent appearances in different mass media.

Second, in the conditions of an uncertain military-political situation with its diverse threats and defense problems, it is necessary to ensure the readiness of the Armed Forces for the performance of combat missions in military conflicts of different scale and in antiterrorist operations. In this context, I would like to emphasize once again that the greatest threat confronting us today is international terrorism. And in the solution of these problems the role of the strategic echelon of military command and control is by no means reduced but, on the contrary, is increased still further, because the key decisions to act in operations of this kind are made by the higher military-political leadership, whereas the function of organizing their implementation and coordinating activities is vested in the Defense Ministry. In view of this, a serious process is underway to reorganize the central military agencies in order to enhance their efficiency in strategic decision-making and raise the quality of control of troops and naval forces to a new level.

It is also necessary to specify the functions and some new aspects of the relations of the Defense Ministry's Central Staff and the General Staff with the armed services and branches of the services and the high commands on strategic directions. We would appreciate your advice on these matters as well in order to find the best solutions with due regard for the new requirements.

Third, active efforts are being made in the Armed Forces to implement the Federal Program for a Transition to Manning Permanent Readiness Formations and Units with Military Personnel Serving under Contract. After that (from 2008 on) we will be prepared to reduce the term of compulsory military service to one year. But for these important measures we should prepare in advance, in order to organize pre-conscription military training of young people and to increase the number of conscripts. The conscription system will also inevitably be retained for times of war, with appropriate changes in mobilization processes. In these matters, the experience of members of the Academy of Military Sciences, which has been deeply involved in research of this kind, and the experience of war veterans would be particularly valuable.

At present, the Defense Ministry has fully renounced the practice of sending conscripted military personnel to serve in Chechnya. This enhances the efficiency of the performance of combat missions and helps to reduce combat losses.

You know about our losses during the Great Patriotic War (irrecoverable military losses totaled 8.6 million persons). In the mass media, these losses are often greatly exaggerated and distorted without justification. However that may be, the pain caused by the losses at the fronts, just as the loss of 18 million civilians who died as a result of Nazi atrocities, is still alive among the people. And one of the lessons of the war is that instead of abstract discussions and incantations about losses we should continue to take concrete organizational measures helping to minimize the casualty rate, to foster among officers a high sense of responsibility for the lives of their subordinates and teach them to thoroughly prepare and effectively conduct combat operations.

Fourth, as regards operational and combat training of command and control agencies and troops, during the Great Patriotic War our commanders-in-chief and front-line commanders set us a great example by engaging in constant and intensive combat training even in armies in the field fighting at the front throughout the entire war. Special attention should be paid to concrete training of units and subunits for the performance of future combat missions. Unfortunately, I must admit that such concrete training of units for combat action in areas of armed conflict, and also during antiterrorist operations has not yet become standard practice in our troops today. This is another task we have to address.

Based on the results of Armed Forces training in 2004, the experience gained during the Mobilnost (Mobility) exercises is most instructive and deserves further implementation. During these exercises, the training of higher command and control agencies was naturally integrated with practical performance by military units of combat missions assigned to them. The importance of such exercises is that we were able in practice to make a realistic assessment of our ability to carry out an intertheater regrouping of forces as an element of strategic maneuver. Given the limited resources allocated for combat training, such an approach to combining the performance of different-level missions should be practiced on a wider scale in all the services of the Armed Forces in the future as well.

Fifth, as regards combat capability and combat readiness of troops, the events of 1941 clearly showed that the combat capability (manning, equipment and material status) of Soviet troops was much higher than their combat readiness, that is, their readiness to join battle without delay and start performing their assigned combat missions. This is a lesson for our day as well. It is not enough to reorganize our units and formations with due regard for the new requirements. What we need is painstaking daily work aimed at maintaining the combat readiness and combat potential of units and formations. We can no longer tolerate the fact that our general-purpose forces can bring themselves to a state of combat readiness only given prior implementation (before mobilization is announced) of a set of measures designed to enhance their combat and mobilization readiness. After all, in 1941 we pinned our hopes on that, and you know the result. That is why we should draw appropriate conclusions.

For the combat capability of troops, adequate numbers of experienced and well-trained officers are of crucial importance. Some historians and writers have written a great deal about the fact that on all wartime operations maps there were many more red arrows than blue and that two or three Soviet divisions often fought against a single German division. Sure enough, Soviet divisions were numerically smaller than the divisions of Nazi German troops, although in the second half of the war German divisions also became much smaller than at the beginning of the war, both in terms of actual and authorized strength (10-12 thousand instead of 16-18 thousand). The smaller size of our divisions compared to those of the enemy had its shortcomings, but our organizational structure had its advantages as well. By retaining a core of battle-hardened officers in the division, regiment and battalion echelons, we were enabled to replace the losses suffered by military units within a shorter period, to share battle experience and to ensure unit teamwork in action.

Today we would do well to take a closer look at this experience in the sense that given today's high turnover of officer personnel we should do our utmost to retain a hard core of experienced officers in the battalion, regiment and division echelons. Such a core will ensure quicker integration of other officers called up from the reserve and better teamwork in units and formations.

In addition, we should not be in a hurry to move officers from units and subunits to higher headquarters and institutions: it is better to have a temporary officer shortage at these headquarters. Other measures should also be taken to stabilize the officer corps in the units and subunits.

Finally, there are certain social issues that have a significant effect on the morale of military personnel and, as we know, are a major worry for retired veterans of the Armed Forces. We spoke about this at the closing conference of command and control personnel of the Armed Forces, but most of you were not present at that conference. That is why I must admit once again that the social well-being of most servicemen and members of their families leaves much to be desired. This is due, first of all, to the entire set of problems connected with the size of cash allowances, provision of housing and medical services.

About 90 thousand servicemen are not provided with permanent housing, and about 45.5 thousand, with military (service) housing. Naturally, we cannot tolerate such a state of affairs, and concrete steps are being taken to improve the situation.

The Federal Law on a Savings Mortgage System for Housing Servicemen adopted this year has introduced a totally new mechanism for providing servicemen with housing, whose main advantage is that it is simultaneously designed to encourage servicemen to remain within the ranks of the Armed Forces. Naturally, it will take several years for the new system to produce tangible results, but housing queues will nevertheless stop growing. At the same time, servicemen will continue to be provided with housing certificates and newly built military quarters.

A few words about cash allowances.

As you know, on 8 February 2005, the President of Russia made a decision on a significant increase in officers' pay. Pensions are to be raised as well.

Now that the President has issued a decree on improving remuneration for persons filling government positions in territorial executive bodies, we think it necessary to draft a normative legal act providing for a similar increase in the cash allowances of military personnel serving under contract in the tactical echelon.

On 1 January 2005, the monthly bonus for the difficulty, intensity and special regime of military service was raised in order to compensate for the financial expenses associated with the monetization of a number of benefits in kind.

We realize that there is a limit to the state's economic possibilities, but hope that the Government will find the required funds in order to remedy the situation.

I would like to draw your attention to the fact that it is not only social status, however important, which determines the prestige of military service. A significant role here is also played by the image of the Armed Forces. It is quite obvious that this image, as created by public opinion, in large part determines the attitude of our fellow-citizens to current events in the army and the navy. And an objective assessment by society of military labor in defense of the Fatherland, for its part, enhances the significance of this profession and enables servicemen to take deserved pride in being part of the Armed Forces. I would like to urge you to do your utmost toward this end.

In speaking of the prospects for the development of the Armed Forces, I would like to emphasize that 2005 for us is the year of completion of the five-year plan of military organizational development. In view of that, work is already underway to elaborate conceptual long-term planning documents, such as the Concept for the Development of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation for the Period Until 2021, the Scheme for the Development of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation for the Period Until 2016, the State Armament Program for the Period Until 2015, and the Federal State Program for Operational Organization of the Territory of the Russian Federation for National Defense Purposes for the Period Until 2025.

According to these documents, the main lines of force development will be as follows:

First. Maintenance of strategic deterrent forces capable of causing retaliatory damage on a scale that would call into question the achievement of the goal of a potential aggression against our country. This is to be done by ensuring balanced development and maintenance on a sufficient level of fighting strength, primarily strategic nuclear forces and space-and-missile defense forces, and also by enhancing material status, stable operation of control systems and allround logistic support. Special attention is devoted to Russia's compliance with contractual obligations.

Second. Qualitative enhancement of the capability of the Armed Forces to a level that would guarantee Russia's ability to counter existing and potential military threats. This will have to be done in the conditions of tight resource and economic constraints by creating self-sufficient groupings of forces on potentially dangerous strategic directions designed to neutralize and localize armed conflicts.

Third. Further improvement of the legal framework for the activities of the Armed Forces, including changes in the provisions on military command and control agencies in accordance with the newly established structure of the Defense Ministry.

Fourth. Creation of a scientific, technological and production basis that would ensure the independence of the Russian Federation in the development and production of strategically important types of weapons and military equipment. Further planned and consistent equipment of troops and forces with advanced AME models.

Fifth. Projection of lines for the development of the defense infrastructure and a basic regulatory framework for the activities of the Armed Forces in this area under market relations. Considering the importance of this problem, the Federal Program for Operational Organization of RF Territory, which is to come up for approval in 2005, should be granted the status of a target program.

Sixth. Continued implementation of social measures designed to enhance the status and prestige of military service.

Such are the main lines of development of the army and the navy, whose consistent implementation with proper financing will make it possible to create truly high-quality Armed Forces in the Russian Federation. Ultimately, they should become rational in terms of structure, composition and numerical strength, should be manned with highly professional personnel, and should be in possession of the latest arms and military equipment models.

In conclusion, I would like to repeat my wish that war and Armed Forces veterans should continue to take an active part in molding the defense consciousness of society in accordance with current conditions, and that contacts with veterans of military science and members of the Academy of Military Sciences should be constantly maintained not only within the framework of the Defense Ministry's Central Staff, but also in the armed services, troops and fleets.

NOTE:

1. Voennaia mysl', No. 4, 2005, pp. 78-79.

Col. Gen. A.V. BELOUSOV

First Deputy RF Minister of Defense

* "Aktual'nye zadachi razvitia Vooruzhonnykh sil Rosiiskoi Federatsii," Krasnaia zvezda, 11 October 2003.

On 15 March 2005, a military-science Conference on the Lessons and Conclusions of the Great Patriotic War and the Prospects for the Development of Modern Military Science and Military Art was held at the RF Defense Ministry in Moscow. (1) The conference was attended by senior officials of the Defense Ministry, the General Staff and military academies, by representatives of Russian military science, government and research organizations and central mass media, and by military command personnel and leading researchers of a number of CIS states.

Today we are beginning to publish abstracts of speeches made at the conference. In this issue, we would like to bring to your attention abstracts of speeches by A.V. Belousov, First Deputy RF Minister of Defense; M.A. Gareev, Academy of Military Sciences President; General of the Army A.M. Moskovskiy, Weapons Chief of the RF Armed Forces and Deputy Defense Minister of the Russian Federation; General of the Army V.I. Isakov, Chief of the Rear Services of the RF Armed Forces and Deputy Defense Minister of the Russian Federation; and Admiral of the Fleet V.I. Kuroyedov, Commander-in-Chief of the RF Navy.