Expanded military cooperation in the Western Hemisphere.

Introduction

Canada and the United States have been on an historic journey for over forth- eight years. For almost five decades, they have ensured the aerospace sovereignty of North America, and in May 2006, they expanded their efforts to maritime warning. Recognizing the broader global aspects of 21st Century threats, the two nations are also weighing possibilities for expanded membership in the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD). Our leaders have repeatedly underscored the importance of international cooperation for homeland security, and the primary focus has been the asymmetric threat. At the same time, the United States finds itself at war. This wartime condition has, and will continue to have a strong effect on the entire neighborhood.

In the spirit of a neighborhood watch, the nations of our hemisphere have a great opportunity to create a set of new relationships that build on the strengths and benefit from the challenges of earlier times. By changing the lenses we have looked through for generations, we can develop processes and procedures to reduce the inter-domain, interagency and inter-modal gaps that currently exist in our defenses.

There are a number of ways to address these new relationships. Whichever approach we take must acknowledge all members as equal partners. In that light, this paper will review the strategic environment, look at some assumptions, and offer alternatives regarding how Canada, the United States and other neighbors might work together to improve military cooperation in the defense of our neighborhood.

Strategic Environment

At the end of the Cold War, we witnessed dramatic changes in the geostrategic environment which shifted the focus of North American aerospace defense. The traditional Cold War threat has altered, both in terms of the nations or groups that might choose to challenge North American security and the weapons that could be employed. Strategic arms reduction treaties and other arms control initiatives hold the promise of deep cuts in strategic ballistic missile nuclear forces. However, large residual nuclear arsenals capable of striking North America will still exist after programmed reductions are made. Meanwhile, other nations are covertly attempting to acquire nuclear- capable ballistic missiles and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

The terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, represented another dramatic change in the geostrategic environment for North American security. The overall threat to the North American continent from the aerospace, space, land, sea, and cyber domains has greatly increased, and the proliferation of WMD and their delivery systems to state and non-state actors has emerged as a major security challenge. This evolution has introduced the threat of asymmetric activities that have the additional potential to affect the decision-making processes associated with the defense of North America. Additionally, the proliferation of cruise missile technology, unmanned aerial systems, and non-military air activity associated with drug trafficking and other illegal activities is of continuing concern.

Domestically, the overall volume of air traffic flowing daily to, from, and within our airspace will continue to expand and will dictate an even higher degree of coordination between our national airspace surveillance-and-control systems and their military components. The wide range of threats to our continent coming from the seas and major waterways, plus the issue of cyber security will also pose significant problems. Finally, our vast and open borders will require both a closer level of cooperation between land forces and facilitation of military-to-military defense support to civil authorities.

Organization

Today, there are three strategic headquarters (HQ) immediately concerned with the defense of North America:

* NORAD a bi-national Canadian and the United States (CANUS) command

* Canada Command (CANADA COM) a Canadian only command

* United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) a U.S. only command

Any expansion of military cooperation with other nations must be considered carefully to ensure a clear understanding of responsibilities among all concerned.

The requirement for greater military cooperation is not in question. However, the extent of military cooperation and the form within which this expanded cooperation could take place remains a decision for the diplomats. Notwithstanding the governments' responsibility for the decision, negotiators will seek military input on potential constructs. Therefore, it is time to assess the options and distribution of current and future functions as they relate to multinational military cooperation. From a military perspective, the options can be broadly categorized as one of two general models: either alliance or a coalition.

* Alliance Model. This is based on a command and control structure established to fulfill an assigned mission, agreed to by the participating nations and operating under nation-tonation authority. Similar to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), this model permits additional nations to join as equal partners, and much like the spokes of a wheel, the execution of the defense mission is commanded at a designated strategic HQ. Again, as with the NATO, this structure does not limit individual nations from establishing arrangements outside of the construct; and while the day-to-day maintenance of this model is demanding, its strength is in the on-going attention to interoperability and in the default response position of being a known quantity and commitment. Additionally, this default is packaged as an alliance response, consequently, political issues surrounding perceptions of one nation's forces being under command of another are greatly reduced. A command and control construct, which would build on the existing NORAD model, to include multiple domains and permit additional nations to join, is clearly along the lines of the alliance model.

* Coalition Model. This military-to-military model is based on existing national command and control constructs and assigned a defense mission in addition to existing unilateral responsibilities. Participants adhere to a common goal, but rather than a standing centralized command structure, they build upon consensus in procedures and methods. This would maximize national flexibility and would represent a relatively small increase in resources, infrastructure and staff effort over existing national requirements. However, there would be a potential risk that over time, the more frequent and pressing national interest activities could limit the dedication of staff effort and resources to the maintenance of interoperability. As with previous examples of international coalitions, without a single defined command organization, when a requirement for action surfaces, one nation typically must step up as the lead. While this permits a rapid and focused ramp up of capability by one nation, given the consensus nature of coalitions, it would likely require significant political and military staff effort by the lead nation to confirm the involvement and level of commitment of the other nation(s). The optics of having a lead nation could bring with it the potential perception of subordination of forces that may have a negative influence on participation due to sovereignty concerns. In the end, under a coalition model, the price of relatively unencumbered relationships in support of a common aim is a spike in staff activity to confirm government commitment in the relatively short lead time prior to a critical event or crisis. The organizational proposals discussed in this paper lie along the spectrum between the two models.

Assumptions

In examining options for increasing military cooperation for the defense of North America, a number of assumptions come into play:

* An attack on one country is an attack on the others

* Nations believe it is advisable to expand military-to-military cooperation

* Enhanced military cooperation will increase layered defenses of all nations

* Gaps exist today among the land, maritime, aerospace, space and cyber domains

* Reducing or minimizing the impact of seams along borders and between domains will improve the defense and security of all nations

* Increasing decision time will provide more time to respond to threats

* Nation-to-nation agreements are more effective than military-to-military agreements

* Current policies do not prevent expansion of military cooperation

* It is possible to leverage existing command and control for expanded missions

* Laws do not prevent multi-domain commands for homeland defense (HLD)

* Other nations' politicians' perceptions of cooperation with U.S. military forces will present a challenge to enhanced military cooperation

* Canadian military forces may provide a successful conduit for enhanced military cooperation with other nations

Analysis

These are key factors in describing and commenting on the organizational constructs presented in this paper:

* Unity of command and command and control

* Gaps and seams

* Responsiveness

* Ease of implementation

* Potential for multinational expansion

* Resources

* Diplomatic impact

* Intelligence and information sharing 

The diagram below represents where the potential organizations would fall on a notional continuum which ranges from a pure multi-lateral construct (coalition model), where the current multinational HQ (NORAD) functions and expanded domain roles would be assumed by national command HQs, to a single, multi-domain multinational HQ construct (alliance model).

[FIGURE 1 OMITTED]

Under this construct existing NORAD functions and any increased military cooperation would be executed through national commands. This would result in decentralized control and execution across all domains by the national HQs multilateral, compared to the centralized control and execution which would exist under a single multinational HQ construct.

As this construct augments the mission of existing strategic and operational level organizations, the unity of command across domains within each country remains strong. However, there is the potential for continued cross border, cross command seams due to the lack of a single command authority focused on the coordination of multinational strategy, procedures, plans, doctrine, and policies. An additional organization would likely be required to exercise oversight or coordination responsibility for these areas to avoid the risk that, with three (or more) commands, issues will remain locked in consensus building rather than move efficiently through a command decision process.

A sub-option, which could address the coordination requirement identified above, would be to have NORAD, as part of the transfer of its functions, transition into a multinational oversight and advisory group with a mandate developed from the earlier Bi-national Planning Group (BPG) (1) tasks. This organization could report to an external multinational political and military body such as the Permanent Joint Board on Defense (PJBD) (2). While likely not in the direct chain of command of any command, this advisory group would be responsive to all for the development and maintenance of strategy, policies, doctrine, operational plans, etc. In terms of structure, it could be built along the lines of a NORAD Joint Staff 5 (J5) (Plans) organization; and although not of a size that would warrant a full J-staff, augmentation by J2 (Intelligence), J6 (C3) and J7 (Training and Exercises) would be required to provide the necessary expertise to tackle issues of multinational information sharing, interoperability, training, and exercises.

While the national response by a participating nation is not hampered by this construct, and may in fact be improved by access to increased cross-domain multinational information and intelligence, timely and effective combined and joint response may be more difficult. Collective response procedures would need to be established to minimize the time required to stand up a multinational response to a threat, and it would likely be necessary to have subordinate operational commands predesignated with the standing task of assuming a Combined and Joint Task Force (CJTF) command role to avoid having to resort to last minute ad hoc response C2 arrangements. With respect to military advice to the multinational government decision-making body, there would be potential for blurring of multinational and national advice.

Transitioning NORAD functions to national commands would be a significant challenge. Notwithstanding the bureaucratic effort of splitting the sunk costs of the NORAD infrastructure, there would be the technical requirement of terminating existing feeds within the CANADA COM and USNORTHCOM infrastructure and then re-connecting them for a shared multinational coordinated picture. Response by NORAD regions should not change since these are layered on top of national operational organizations. The challenge would be in achieving in the national commands the same level of fidelity in the common operating picture that exists in NORAD. These procedures and level of functionality would of course have to be established in other domains as well.

This construct would allow for additional countries to participate. The difficulty would be with the ability of any future participating nation to interoperate with CANADA COM and USNORTHCOM at the strategic and operational levels. Because there would not be an existing HQ that future nations could join, it would be incumbent upon any joining nation to revamp or develop its national military structure to accommodate the information gathering and decision-making processes that exist at the time between the coalition commands. This could be an impediment, based on the level of modernization of potential participating nations.

Any possible resource savings associated with dissolving the NORAD command structure would likely be offset in increases in the multinational facilities to accommodate the transferred responsibilities. In terms of personnel, this may actually result in a slight increase because of likely duplication of some functions previously performed by NORAD on behalf of both countries. The requirement for exchange personnel in the commands should be considered a common consequence for all organizational constructs.

From a diplomatic perspective there is a risk that the resulting break-up of NORAD would over- shadow any message purporting that there is a commitment to expanded military cooperation. Despite assurances that NORAD functions would continue, NORAD, as an institution, currently represents CANUS cooperation on bi-national defense and, as such it would likely be very difficult to portray its being dissolved as a step towards improving those efforts.

Information and intelligence sharing are key components of improving both national and multinational response to potential threats. It would likely be the responsibility of each HQ to coordinate information and intelligence gathering from within their respective national intelligence and public security organizations for subsequent sharing. Addressing releasability issues may be more difficult under this construct because there would be no single voice advocating the need for improved info sharing as being key to mission accomplishment. The commands would have to establish technical means to incorporate and analyze information from their respective sources. In addition, pipelines would need to be established for the flow of information between the HQs. Equally important as the technical aspect is the requirement for exchange personnel in each nation's HQ to oversee, advise and assist in decision-making resulting from the intelligence and information being shared.

Multi-domain Warning and Surveillance Combined and Joint Task Force

In this instance the national commands would have the responsibility for NORAD response functions and any future increased military cooperation. This arrangement would result in decentralized, multilateral control and execution across all domains executed by the national HQs. NORAD would transition to a supporting command, an enabler for the others by providing multinational intelligence and information fusion executed through an enhancement of the NORAD and USNORTHCOM Command Center (N2C2), the eyes and ears of North American aerospace defense, and the follow-on to the Cheyenne Mountain Operations Center.

Because this construct augments the mission of existing strategic and operational level organizations, the unity of command across domains within each country remains strong. However, there is again the potential for continued cross border seams due to a lack of a single command authority focused on the coordination of multinational strategy, procedures, plans doctrine and policies. To address this, the combined and joint task force (CJTF) could also be tasked with multinational oversight and advisory responsibilities with a mandate developed along the lines of the old BPG tasks. As in the previous example, this organization would likely report to an external political and military body such as the PJBD on multinational issues of strategy, policies, doctrine, operational plans, etc. Given this political aspect of multinational responsibility as well as the operational missions of warning and surveillance, the command relationship would be complex. To support the multinational response commitment of the national commands, the CJTF would need to be in the direct chain of command of all commands, but on the other multinational matters the CJTF would only be responsive to them. As such it would probably merit consideration to have the CJTF assigned the status of a multinational command, albeit likely not on a par with the parent commands. Given that response would no longer be a function of the CJTF, there should be greater latitude for the commander to be a Canadian, U.S. or other officer.

While the national response by a participating nation is not hampered by this construct, and it may, again, be improved by access to increased cross-domain multinational information and intelligence, timely and effective combined and joint response might be more difficult. As before, collective response procedures would be necessary to minimize the time required to stand up a multinational response to a threat, and it would also be important to have subordinate operational commands pre- designated with the standing response task of assuming a CJTF command role to avoid having to resort to last minute ad hoc response C2 arrangements. As above, with respect to military advice to the multinational government decision-making body, there is the potential for a blurring of multinational and national advice.

This construct avoids the majority of difficulties associated with transitioning all of the NORAD functions to other commands because the majority of the sunk costs in infrastructure, procedures and the technical aspects of data fusion resident in the N2C2 would be retained and incorporated into other domain areas. The challenge would be achieving the same level of coordinated picture in these other domains that currently exists in the aerospace domain.

This construct would allow additional countries to participate. However, as stated earlier, the difficulty would be with the ability to interoperate and respond with CANADA COM and USNORTHCOM at the strategic and operational levels. Since there would not be a single stand-alone HQ that future nations could join or share in, it would be incumbent upon any joining nation to revamp or develop its national military structure to accommodate the information and decision- making processes that exist at the time between or among other members. Additionally, any future nation would have to be comfortable with the concept of a separate organization providing them their warning and surveillance picture. Similarly, there would need to be a high degree of confidence within the member commands and the CJTF that any future nation could provide the level of information and contribution that would ensure the expanded collective defense responsibility. These requirements could be an impediment based on the level of modernization and capabilities of a future potential participating nation.

In terms of structure, the CJTF could be built around the existing N2C2 operational and support organization, with augmented J3 (Operations) and J5 functionality, as well as incorporation of the existing J2 Fusion Center to address the additional resource implications of expansion into other domains. From a diplomatic perspective this construct could deflect to some degree the potential negative reaction to the perceived dissolution of NORAD. However, it is unlikely to be effective in portraying the result as anything less than a significant scaling back of NORAD.

From a conceptual perspective the crux of this construct is the information and intelligence architecture. While info sharing is the key component to improving both national and multinational response to potential threats it is unlikely that CANADA COM, USNORTHCOM or another command would abdicate the task and responsibility of coordinating information and intelligence gathering from within their respective national intelligence and public security organizations for subsequent sharing, as authorized. In a perfect world, this concept would have all sources, irrespective of nationality, providing data into the CJTF Fusion Center for analysis and subsequent display and correlation for use by the commands, relieving these organizations of the requirement of this fusion function. However, given security concerns regarding sources, which remain key to the Fusion Center's ability to establish a confidence level of information, as well as the likely desire to have national assessments to either confirm the multinational assessment or in support of unilateral action, it is likely that all commands would retain similar functionality to that envisioned for the CJTE While this is achievable, with USNORTHCOM likely continuing to use the existing NORAD and USNORTHCOM J2 Fusion Center, there may be issues with substantiating the value added of the CJTF function. It could be argued that the same common operating and intelligence picture could be achieved through exchange officers and improved sharing protocols between the respective operations and intelligence organizations in CANADA COM, USNORTHCOM and other nations' commands rather than routing through another player, the CJTF

Split Domain Responsibility

Under this construct there would be no change to the existing NORAD functions, and any increased military cooperation would be executed through CANADA COM, USNORTHCOM and other commands. This would result in centralized, multinational command and decentralized execution in the aerospace domain (aerospace warning and aerospace control) and multi and bi- national maritime warning by NORAD and decentralized multi-lateral warning and execution in other domains executed by the other commands.

This option would require a high level of coordination between the strategic commands, both to prevent exploitation of seams from a lack of unity of command across all domains and to ensure a common operational picture. The current high level of responsiveness in the aerospace domain is retained. Given that national structures in the other domains would be retained, individual national responsiveness would not be adversely affected. Once more, collective procedures would need to be established to minimize the time required to stand up a multinational response to any threat other than one uniquely in the aerospace domain, and it would likely be necessary to have subordinate operational commands pre-designated with the standing task of assuming a CJTF command role to avoid having to resort to last minute ad hoc response C2 arrangements. Additionally, there would be the potential for conflicting or at least uncoordinated military advice to the multinational government decision-making body as different views could be presented regarding multinational response based on the national or domain responsibilities of the strategic-level organizations.

This construct would expand upon existing or planned command domain mission areas in the nations' commands, to include a multinational responsibility, and does not change the NORAD mission substantively, it would likely be relatively easy to implement. However, with the strategic-level HQs all having responsibility for some aspect of multinational defense, there would again be a requirement to establish one of the HQs or a separate body as the lead organization for common multinational defense policies, plans, cross-domain coordination in operations, info-sharing and intelligence, etc. This construct would be a useful intermediate step should there be a desire in the future to reduce the number of strategic HQs or to combine domains by transitioning the existing NORAD functions to CANADA COM, USNORTHCOM and other commands.

There could be a level of difficulty in incorporating additional nations, as it would require them to interject into two different structural C2 models, one for the aerospace domain and multi and bi-national maritime warning, and another for the remaining domains, each with different operating methods. Additional resources should be relatively limited as there would be little or no infrastructure increase. There may be a small increase in personnel to address the requirement for exchange officers in the various strategic-level commands and potentially at the operational level by domain.

From a diplomatic perspective this would represent an increase in North American cooperation without appearing to sacrifice sovereignty and flexibility of action by national forces and yet retains the NORAD institution which enjoys various levels of public support. Notwithstanding the split of domain responsibility between the commands, there would be a requirement for similar if not the same level of intelligence and information support to assist in the effort to minimize potential cross domain vulnerability. CANADA COM, USNORTHCOM and other commands would likely retain responsibility for coordinating national defense and other agency inputs. Similarly, this data or the resultant assessments are vital to a multinational common understanding of the strategic and operational picture, and as a result, needs to be shared with NORAD for the execution of the aerospace domain and maritime warning missions between the other commands for the other domains. To this end, given the geographic collocation of NORAD and USNORTHCOM there are efficiencies in considering an expanded combined Intel Fusion Center which would include representation by all commands to effect and oversee efficient transmission of intelligence products. There would likely be additional requirements for national representation at the equivalent intelligence centers.

Separate Multinational Domain Commands

Under this construct, there would be no change to the existing NORAD HQ or functions, and any increased military cooperation would be addressed by domain-specific command organizations. In this construct, similar to the undertaking in the aerospace domain initiated forty-eight years ago with the stand-up of NORAD; a multinational strategic-level HQ would be established for warning and control in other domains. This would result in centralized, multinational command and decentralized execution within each domain.

This would provide for a strong unity of command within the domains but would not address the cross-domain seam issue. This construct would require a high level of coordination between the multinational strategic domain commands to prevent exploitation of seams due to the lack of unity of command across all domains and to ensure a common operational picture. Assuming that national operational structures across other domains would be retained, individual national responsiveness is not adversely affected. Collective response procedures would need to be established for each domain and across domains to minimize the time required to stand up a multinational response. Additionally, there is the potential for conflicting or at least uncoordinated military advice to the multinational government decision-making body as different views could be presented regarding multinational response based on the domain responsibilities of the strategic-level organizations.

This construct would be expensive to implement in terms of acquiring infrastructure and identifying numbers of suitable personnel to man additional HQs. It would provide a framework within which future participating nations could easily be inserted, it would likely represent a significant personnel commitment and challenge to achieve appropriate representation within each domain HQs. From a diplomatic perspective, while this could be portrayed as an increase in CANUS cooperation, it has the potential to be perceived as sacrificing sovereignty and flexibility of action by national forces and impinging on responsibilities of existing national strategic or operational level commands.

Notwithstanding the split of responsibility along strategic multinational domain lines there would be a requirement for similar if not the same level of intelligence and information support at each domain HQ to assist in the effort to minimize potential cross domain vulnerability. All commands would of course require this same level of information and intelligence, if not slightly more due to their responsibility for unilateral action and would likely retain responsibility for coordinating their respective national defense and other agency inputs. As such with the increase in number of users and contributors, the complexity and cost of establishing infrastructures and pipelines to handle and coordinate the necessary data would increase significantly as would the requirement for exchange personnel in each of the intelligence centers.

Multi-domain and Combined and Joint Interagency Task Force

This construct would see the stand up of an organization responsible for multinational defense and security across all domains with all national commands retaining responsibility for multi-lateral response. A sub-option could be developed wherein NORAD remains unchanged operating in parallel with the other commands for the combined and joint interagency task force (CJIATF). This would result in centralized, multinational command and decentralized execution across all domains.

There would be a high degree of unity of command as this provides for a single point-of-contact for all governments regarding multinational defense and security issues although there would likely be significant discussion as to whether or not it would or should be military commanded or civilian led. Additionally, this construct deals very effectively with inter-domain, inter-modal, cross-border gaps and seams. This approach helps increase effectiveness in gray areas of homeland defense and homeland security (HLS) initiatives. Should NORAD not be subsumed there would of course be an issue with a seam for the aerospace domain and bi-national maritime warning, as well as the potential for conflicting or at least uncoordinated advice to the multinational government decision- making body as different views could be presented regarding multinational response based on domain responsibilities.

Implementation would face significant challenges, as it would require the creation of a new organization, requiring manpower commitments from a variety of interagency organizations from both countries in order to function. Procedures, policies, doctrine and plans would likely be considerably more difficult to develop and implement due to differing operational cultures. Given the necessary intertwining of defense and security related organizations in the command aspect of this construct, the incorporation of additional nations may be hampered by real or perceived security concerns of the equivalent organizations in those countries.

Diplomatically, this approach would reflect a significant commitment to the protection of all nations. Assignment of forces would be problematic but again would likely require a system of tasking forces through dual-hatting existing operational command structures. Establishing an organization this large in terms of size and scope would require clear, well-defined conditions and limits of authority to act particularly in light of the blending of law enforcement and defense capabilities.

As opposed to earlier organizational concepts where national defense and interagency intelligence feeds would come into national HQ, this construct would likely have the feeds directly into its intelligence center, coordinated by and through the representative agency for subsequent analysis. While the strength of this structure lies in its ability to incorporate this wide spectrum of data it might also be its failing in that the wide attendant audience, and perceived vulnerability that it represents, may cause individual organizations to increase their releasability requirements such that usable information is denied to the organization.

Single Multinational and Multi-domain Command

This option would create an organization responsible for multinational defense and security, including multi-lateral response across all domains, providing centralized, multinational command and execution. Again, there would be a high degree of unity of command through a single point of contact for both governments regarding multinational defense and security issues. Additionally, this constructs effectively addresses inter-domain, inter-modal, cross-border gaps and seams. Implementation would not require the creation of a new organization, but would need manpower commitments from a variety of interagency organizations from both countries in order to function. Procedures, policies, doctrine and plans would also require dealing with different operational cultures.

Given the intertwining of defense and security related organizations under a military commander, the real or perceived security concerns caused by the incorporation of additional nations may be less difficult. Diplomatically, this approach would also reflect a significant commitment to the protection of all nations. Assignment of forces would be similar to that process used today. As opposed to earlier organizational concepts where national defense and interagency intelligence feeds would come into national HQ, this construct would likely have the feeds directly into its intelligence center, coordinated by and through the representative agency for subsequent analysis.

Conclusions

It appears there is political will in Canada and the United States to expand military cooperation to other nations to improve the defense of North America. The vision of how best to achieve this remains undetermined. There is a broad scope and variety of achievable options, some of which have been discussed in this paper; and while each could be effectively implemented, it remains for the militaries of our countries to ensure that their advice adheres to the common basic principles of unity of command, economy of resources and military effectiveness such that political expediencies do not rule the day during the diplomatic negotiations.

George P. "Rocky" Gaines

North American Aerospace Defense Command

(1.) At the request of the Minister of Foreign Affairs Canada and the United States Secretary of State, the BPG was created to address the future of Canada and United States cooperation in broadening bi-national arrangements for North American Security.

Specifically, the BPG was tasked to examine the following areas:

* Conduct reviews of all existing Canada and United States plans and military assistance protocols with a view toward improving North American land and maritime as well as potential new mechanisms for improving military support to civil agencies in time of major emergencies in both Canada and the United States.

* Prepare bi-national contingency plans to respond to threats, attacks, and other major emergencies in Canada or the United States, in accordance with the United States Joint Operation Planning and Execution System and the Canadian Forces Operational Planning Process.

* Maintain awareness of emerging situations through maritime surveillance activities. Share intelligence and operational information in accordance with national laws, policies, and directives under the auspices of intelligence arrangements between the Department of State and National Defense Headquarters. This shall include assessment of maritime threats, incidents, and emergencies to advise and/or warn both governments. ** BGP will focus its maritime assessments and warnings to those threats that could affect both the United States and Canada. ** BPG shall develop mechanisms and protocols to advise and/or warn both governments.

* Design and participate in exercises.

* Plan and participate in joint training programs.

* Validate plans prior to approval.

* Establish appropriate coordination mechanisms with relevant Canadian and United States federal agencies. [BPG interactions with United States civilian agencies shall be coordinated through the Office of the Secretary via the Joint Staff Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate (J-5). Interaction with Canadian civilian agencies shall be coordinated through the Deputy Chief of Defense Staff.]

(2.) The Permanent Joint Board on Defense was created by Canada and the United States in 1940. The PJBD is the senior advisory body on continental defense. It is composed of military and diplomatic representatives from both nations. The Board has examined virtually every important joint defense measure undertaken since the end of the Second World War, including construction of the Distant Early Warning Line of radars, the creation of the North American Air (later Aerospace) Defense command in 1958, and the binational operation of the underwater acoustic surveillance system and high-frequency direction-finding network.

Purpose and Function

The PJBD has served as a strategic-level military board charged with considering, in a broad sense, land, sea, air, and space issues, including personnel and materiel dimensions involved in the defense of the northern half of the Western Hemisphere. The scope of the PJBD's work also encompasses policy, operations financial, logistics, and other aspects of Canada and U.S. defense relations. Bilateral defense recommendations are forwarded to respective heads of the government or appropriate officials for consideration.

Importance to Defense and Security

In recent years, the Board has proven effective as an alternate channel of communication, one through which the resolution of difficut issues has been expedited. In particular, it has helped devise imaginative solutions to the types of problems encountered by both countries, such as cost-sharing in an era of declining budgets.

Meetings

PJBD meetings are normally held semi-annually with meeting locations alternating between Canada and the United States. The meetings are co-chaired by a Canadian and an American chairperson with much of the substantive work being carried out by senior military and civilian representatives of the respective military and political organizations of each country; including the United States' Departments of State, Canada's Department of National Defence and the Department of Foreign Affairs.

About the Author

George P. "Rocky" Gaines is the Principal Functional Analyst, NORAD Strategy and Concepts, in the NORAD Plans, Policy and Strategy Directorate. He graduated from the Air Force Academy with a B.S. in Economics in 1968. He served as a forward air controller in Vietnam, Panama, Germany, and the United States, and as an area specialist in Latin America. Working at the highest national and multinational levels, he was directly involved with the development of U.S. military policy in both Latin America and Central Europe. Among his other accomplishments, he helped create the plan for U.S. military representation in Latin American capitals. He also served on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization staff in Heidelberg, Germany, where he wrote NATO war plans and air tasking orders for Central Europe, and participated in exercises designed to evaluate the suitability of those plans. He retired as Deputy Commander for Operations, 27th Fighter Wing. He holds an M.A. in Latin American Affairs from the University of Arizona and is a graduate of Air War College.