Exotic allies: the Dutch-Chilean encounter and the (failed) conquest of America.

A curious vignette decorates the title page of a Dutch pamphlet produced circa 1600 [ILLUSTRATION FOR FIGURE 1 OMITTED]. Published in the final years of the Dutch Revolt and within the context of the virulently anti-Habsburg mood that pervaded the Netherlands, the Spanish and Aragonese Mirror depicts, in both word and image, what the subtitle calls the "unparalleled tyranny . . . of Spain."(1) In the upper corners of the page, two small windows look out onto scenes of Spanish "abominations" committed recently in the Netherlands and neighboring Westphalia. On the right, a halberdier stands gloating over the corpse of a slain Protestant prince; and on the left, an enemy soldier roasts two victims of a desolate Brabant village. Between these scenes is the "mirror" itself, which shows the dark reflection of a mustachioed soldier plunging his sword, in a single thrust, through the bosom of a mother and child. Grisly and gratuitous though they may seem, these were in fact unexceptional portraits of violence by the standards of early modern European propaganda - typical topoi of "tyranny." Below the mirror, however, and at the center of the print is a decidedly unusual depiction of an extraordinary gathering: a group of onlookers assembles to bear witness to the misdeeds of Spain - to draw the reader's attention, as it were, to the narrative themes of the pamphlet. At the center of this crowd stand two slender men whose accusatory fingers extend higher - more pointedly - than all others. Both turn their graceful, Mannerist figures slightly away from the viewer's gaze; for both men, aside from their feather headdress, pose utterly naked. This, by contemporary standards, was exceptional.

Two clues help to resolve this seeming breech of decorum. First, there is a brief caption beneath the vignette that announces, in doggerel verse, the image's didactic theme: "By the Spanish tyranny, in this space displayed, / All the world's nations are rightly dismayed."(2) The gathering, then, is international; and closer inspection reveals an eclectic array of characters and costumes: European ruffs, doublets, and breeches; an extravagant caftan and turban meant to indicate Ottoman, Persian, or otherwise Asian dress; a soft-trimmed hat atop the dusky head of what presumably counts as an African.(3) Within this gallery of continents, the feathered headgear of the two central figures makes iconographic reference to their American origins. The wearers are Indians. Second, note the figure positioned nearest to the Indians (standing just to their right) who watches carefully over them and would appear, by his sweeping gesture, to assume an almost proprietary interest in their welfare. His dashing cloak and the dagger in his belt imply a military background. More telling is the broad-rimmed hat onto which he has affixed a crescent-shaped badge - the mark of the Dutch Geuzen (Gueux or Beggars), the shock troops of the rebel army and vanguard of the patriotic party.(4) The American natives stand closely attached to the rebels and - one might infer - closely allied to the Dutch cause. They have come to join forces against Spain.

I

As the seventeenth century got underway, Beggars chaperoned Indians to protest tyrannies of Spain - this, at least, in the remarkably expansive, wonderfully inclusive imagination of the Dutch. The Spanish and Aragonese Mirror, together with scores of thematically similar works published in the Netherlands, demonstrates vividly the manner in which the Dutch assimilated the New World: creatively, compellingly, and often quite centrally. It also suggests a pattern of Dutch reception that differs markedly from the rest of Europe - or, rather, a pattern of cultural geography in the Netherlands that challenges the widely-held conviction of European indifference to America. The notion of the New World's "blunted" or "uncertain" impact on the Old - a thesis voiced first (and most provocatively) by John Elliott and echoed in most subsequent scholarship(5) - makes little sense in the context of the Netherlands, which had, by the late sixteenth century, warmly embraced America. The New World featured prominently in a variety of Dutch media and turned up ubiquitously in a collage of Dutch contexts. It was not only maps, atlases, and travel narratives published in the Low Countries (by this time the center of European geography) that showcased America, but also humanist histories and moralizing poetry, popular prints and - above all - political pamphlets. References to America turned up in social satires and theological debates and peppered a range of polemical exchanges. Rather than evincing "little interest or concern for the new worlds overseas," as Michael Ryan has suggested for Renaissance Europe more broadly, the Dutch incorporated the New World into their public discourse such that, by 1600, Indians had landed, literally, on the front page.(6)

The Dutch image of America, to be sure, fit into a local context of Dutch politics and geography. In an age of provincial protest, civil war, and patriotic revolt, the geopolitical horizons of the Netherlands stretched distinctly to America, where the image of "innocent" Indians and "savage" Spaniards resonated with special relevance. If early modern Habsburg ambition spanned both hemispheres, so too did the imaginative Dutch campaigns to resist it. The Dutch raised the specter of "Spanish tyranny in America" in order to galvanize opposition to the Habsburg regime in Brussels. Over the course of the bitter Dutch Revolt - from the late sixteenth through the early seventeenth century - the rebels made repeated reference in print to "cruelties" in the New World, the "destruction of the Indies," and the tragedy of the Conquista - only to relate all this to events unfolding in the Netherlands. The violent conquest of the Andes no less than Antwerp revealed the "true character of the Spanish race," according to polemicists. The shared experience of "Americans" and Netherlanders, both having suffered first-hand the yoke of Habsburg oppression, linked the two "nations" in a brotherhood of anti-Hispanism. The Indians, by such Dutch estimations, made for natural allies in the struggle against Habsburg "universal monarchy."

Imaginative as such geographic projections might seem, they should not imply a Dutch failure to comprehend what Elliott has called "the American reality." On the one hand, the Netherland's notion of the New World was no less imaginative than its perception of Spain - or, for that matter, of England, France, or Italy. Geography in the Renaissance entailed precisely such acts of deliberate "fashioning," whether portraying the Old World or the New.(7) On the other hand, Dutch projections of "America," whatever their rhetorical foundations, appeared perfectly "real" - believable, sensible, attainable - in the eyes of contemporaries. The vision of docile and cooperative Indians harboring pro-Dutch sympathies spoke compellingly to governors and colonialists no less than to geographers and polemicists. The Dutch New World had much to offer.

So compelling, in fact, did the New World appear that, by the early decades of the seventeenth century, the Dutch Republic showed itself willing to put its money where its rhetorical mouth was, so to speak, by investing substantial funds and effort into forging an "alliance" with its American "brethren." As the Revolt entered its final stage (the Twelve Years' Truce, signed in 1609, granted the breakaway Republic de facto independence from Philip III) and as the Dutch gained momentum in their war against Spain, talk of an American alliance shifted from rhetorical claims to more plainly ambitious programs: highly speculative and unusually confident colonial ventures derived from the presumptive geography of the rebels. The polemicists' projection of a Dutch-Indian confederation now translated into the pursuit of an actual contract with the natives of America. Promoters of an American commercial initiative promised an "alliance and friendship" from the Indians upon the Dutch arrival.(8) The Dutch West Indian Company (WIC), chartered upon the expiration of the Truce in 1621, received directives "to make contracts, agreements, and alliances with the princes and natives of the lands" whom they would expressly "liberate."(9) And if the WIC developed ultimately into a privateering operation, this should not detract from its original aspirations - and sincere attempts, it will be argued - to "save" the Indians and unite with them to challenge the hegemony of Spain. From the rhetoric of the rebels, in this way, derived the efforts of the Republic to pursue a remarkable New World agenda. Patriotic ideology evolved into Republican geography, encouraging genuine, not to mention costly, attempts to "ally" with America.

This essay explores one of the more remarkable chapters in the Republic's American enterprise, the Chilean diplomacy of the early seventeenth century. On three separate occasions between the 1620s and 1640s, embassies from the United Provinces sought to enlist natives of South America for a clearly articulated "brotherhood," or alliance, against Spain. The "Chileans," as the Dutch most often referred to those native peoples whom they solicited, were invited to unite with the new Republic and participate jointly in the "reconquest" of America. With their Netherlandish partners, the Amerindians were meant to free themselves from the tyranny of Spain and then liberate their hemisphere from Habsburg control. This imagined alliance never materialized, of course, and the proposed Reconquista never remotely took place - though not for lack of Dutch trying. All three of the initiatives received the blessings of the highest authorities in the Netherlands; and all drew energetic support from Dutch printers, publicists, and pamphleteers. Indeed, for years to come, the Chilean overtures captured the imagination of Dutch poets and epicists, whose paeans belied the unfulfilled promise of America.

Successful or not, Dutch projections of, and ultimate efforts in, the farthest reaches of South America demonstrate a profound interest in American novelties and the powerful role of "American" ideology in the Republic. The imaginative energy expended by the Netherlands to assimilate new worlds into the mental geographies of the Old, moreover, challenges the paradigm of European indifference to America, suggesting rather that the New World would have been variously perceived, at different moments and for diverse purposes, in Renaissance Europe.(10)

II

The metaphor of "America" first gained prominence within Dutch discourse during the revolt against Spain (1568-1648), when it played a conspicuous role in the ferocious war of words waged by the rebel party.(11) Already in their earliest political protests of the late 1560s, the rebels sought to compare their own experience of "tyranny" with events in the New World. Spain's tenure in America had proven disastrous, it was argued, and now much the same pattern of government could be expected from Philip II's centralizing regime in the Low Countries. "The Spanish seek nothing but to abuse our Fatherland as they have done in the New Indies," asserted a prominent group of nobles in 1568, in defiance of the government in Brussels.(12) "America," within this context, represented an ominous and foreboding future that awaited the Netherlands should the tyranny of Spain go unchallenged. The Habsburg "conquest" of the Low Countries, as the polemicists construed it, threatened to bring the same miserable consequences to the Netherlands as the conquistadors had delivered to America. "In the newly discovered lands . . . they have murdered practically all of the natives," wrote a pamphleteer in 1574. "Whosoever wishes to see an example of their tyranny, and to know fully how they would reign," it was suggested, could observe the pitiful plight of the New World.(13)

Dutch protests rose ever more shrilly as the Revolt progressed, such that, by the late 1570s, "the example of the Indies" began to recur with remarkable regularity in rebel propaganda. It was in the Apologie of Prince Willem of Orange, though, published in early 1581 and at least sixteen more times before the end of the century, that the topos became fully codified and definitively registered in the vocabulary of the patriotic party. In the course of this lengthy and often acerbic work, the ranking Dutch nobleman alluded to America frequently and imaginatively to convey what he called "the natural disposition of the Spaniards." In the New World, servants of the Spanish Crown "commanded absolutely [and] yielded to evident proof, of their perverse, natural disposition, and tyrannous affection and will." The Indies indicated patterns of Spanish government of which the Dutch should take note. Spain's aim of "depriving you altogether of your ancient privileges and liberties that they may dispose of you, your wives, and your children," Willem contended, was evident from the way "his officers have done to the poor Indians." The fate of the Indies portended a miserable destiny for the Netherlands; it served Willem as a sort of (failed) litmus test of Spain's ability to govern its colonies. "I have seen (my Lords) their doings," recalled Willem of his experience as the king's stadhouder,

I have heard their words, I have been a witness of their advise, by which they adjudged all you to death, making no more account of you, than of beasts, [as] if they had had power to have murdered you, as they do in the Indies, where they have miserably put to death, more than twenty millions of people, and have made desolate and waste, thirty times as much land in quantity and greatness, as the low country is, with such horrible excesses and riots, that all the barbarousnesses, cruelties, and tyrannies, which have ever been committed, are but in sport, in respect of that, which has fallen out upon the poor Indians.(14)

The definitive political testament of Willem - his last, it would turn out, as the prince soon after fell victim to an assassin's bullet - forcefully expresses the willful Dutch belief in what might be called "the American analogy." America presented a pattern of history, a code of Spanish behavior, that appeared closely to parallel events in the Netherlands. The lessons of the New World provided a cautionary tale that convinced the prince that it would be good "to cause (if we could) the Spaniards to depart out of the country."(15) (Months later, the States General would come to much the same conclusion in their official abjuration of Philip II, the Plakkaat van Verlatinge, which accused the Spanish monarch of seeking "to abolish all the privileges of the country and have it tyrannically governed by Spaniards like the Indies."(16)) The experience of America, in this way, played a distinctive role in the prince's assessment of the Netherlands' political fortunes. It also seemed to evoke, to judge from the Willem's stirring recollections, a special sympathy for the "poor Indians," who had suffered quantitatively ("more than twenty millions of people" occupying "thirty times as much land") and qualitatively ("such horrible excesses and riots, that all the barbarousnesses, cruelties, and tyrannies, which have ever been committed, are but in sport") to a greater degree than even the Dutch.(17) Finally, such analogies implied still closer associations; for by Willem's estimation, the "Americans" - and the Dutch routinely lumped all the natives together - shared a unique affinity with the Dutch, both "nations" having endured the savagery of Habsburg government.

To readers in the war-ravaged Netherlands, the prince's allusions to desolation and waste, to violated liberties and freedoms, suggested a sort of brotherhood of suffering that linked the Dutch with the Indians. Later chronicles of the Dutch Revolt, published in the early decades of the seventeenth century, made this point more explicitly by juxtaposing histories of the Netherlands with histories of the New World and presenting the two as mutually reflecting "mirrors" of Spanish tyranny. Like Orange's Apologie, the best-selling Spiegel der Spaensche tyrannye gheschiet in Nederland/West Indien (Mirror of Spanish Tyrannies Committed in the Netherlands/West Indies) presumed the existence of a special bond between fellow-suffering Netherlanders and Americans. It elucidated (in grisly detail) injustices jointly suffered, suggesting that miseries past somehow affiliated the young Republic and the New World.(18)

Hopeful colonialists took note. For those who contemplated overseas expansion, and especially for the chief proponent of the Dutch West India Company, Willem Usselincx, this presumed "special relationship" between the Netherlands and the Indies appeared the natural point of departure on the road to America. In a series of pamphlets published on the eve of the Twelve Years' Truce (1609-1621), Usselincx and a circle of like-minded polemicists made a strenuous case for a New World venture, predicating their arguments on expectations of an Indian alliance. These writers also alluded, of course, to the religious and economic advantages of colonization - the same cry of "God and Gold" issued by Spain over the previous century. Yet they integrated into these traditional appeals the novel assertion that political and moral factors favored the Dutch in America. "The pitiless slaughter of over twenty million innocent Indians who did [Spain] no harm," quoted Usselincx directly from the rebel's propaganda, "[demanded] God's righteous judgment." Fellow-suffering Netherlanders, he was quick to add, represented the obvious choice to carry out such holy vengeance. A Dutch West India Company, in this light, loomed less as an opportunity than an obligation, born of the pledges of fidelity made by the rebels to their American brothers-in-arms. "Our friends and our allies will lose all faith in us, if they see that we, but for the sake of a specious title [the Twelve Years' Truce] abandon our own inhabitants and the allied Indians who have been so faithful and done us such good service." The Dutch could iii afford to forsake their American allies; for "the Indians would be cruelly exterminated by the [king of Spain] and become our arch-enemies, since we will have handed them over (our alliance with them notwithstanding) to the butcher's block." The damage caused by inaction, concluded Usselincx, would be "irreparable." It would dishonor the Dutch and it would disoblige the Indians.(19)

The foundation of a Dutch West India Company became for Usselincx and his supporters a moral mission, a drive to "save" the native Americans and forge with them the anti-Spanish alliance they so desperately sought. Whereas Orange had juxtaposed the past anguish of the Dutch and Indians, proponents of the WIC now projected a shared future for the both - a natural and "easy" alliance in the New World. Behind all this rhetoric, to be sure, one detects a more basic desire for those mainstays of early modern colonialism, conquest and commerce. Yet Dutch "conquest" was now aimed at Spain - America would be "liberated" - and, even in the case of commerce, Usselincx and his fellow colonialists took care to couch their mercantile concerns in the loftier language of "duty" and patriotic imperative. Spanish tyranny in the New World had deprived the Indians of their right to free trade, Usselincx contended, since the Habsburgs monopolized the flow of goods to the West. The Dutch could offer the Americans a better deal, "because we can price all manner of manufactured goods, cent for cent, better than the Spanish." The Indians would prefer Dutch merchandise and Dutch prices, he asserted in perfect earnestness, and they would therefore seek out Dutch ships in the region. It was incumbent upon the Republic to meet the natives' demand and ensure that their cries not go unanswered. A newly created Dutch West India Company, Usselincx seemed convinced, would liberate the Americas economically no less than politically, and promise all manner of freedom for the "innocent" Indian.(20)

For a variety of reasons, Usselincx's initial pitch for a Dutch-American venture fell on deaf ears. The Twelve Years' Truce, signed in 1609, officially precluded any activity on the part of the Republic in the West Indies, and this effectively silenced all discussion of Spanish "tyranny" abroad. By the time the Truce expired in 1621, moreover, Usselincx's star had faded among the Republic's ruling class. The tireless promoter of overseas trade had himself declared bankruptcy following the collapse of various dubious investment schemes; and his own efforts to raise the necessary cash for an overseas voyage failed to excite much enthusiasm. Despite his ceaseless lobbying in these years, the ultimate charter granted to the WIC in 1621 bore little resemblance to that imagined by Usselincx and his allies. The emphasis had shifted to hard-nosed commercial matters, and optimistic talk of "alliances" with the natives now took a back seat to plain-speaking promotion of war against Spain and quick profits from privateering.(21)

Nonetheless, whatever the strategy of the WIC, half a century of rhetoric had not been without its effect. As the Republic embarked on its first major public expeditions to the New World, the perception of the Indian-as-ally still retained considerable currency within the Dutch imagination. The poetics of America - the portrait of the New World, first promoted by the rebels, as a landscape of rapacious Spanish tyrants preying upon guileless American innocents - still resonated within the politics of the Republic. There lingered in the minds of magistrates no less than publicists, apparently, the hopeful belief in the natural affinity of the Netherlands and America, in the brotherhood of "innocence" between two nations united by their antipathy to Spain. Despite the more mercenary direction now taken by the WIC, there persisted within other circles the more idealistic notion that the Indians patiently awaited their "liberators" from the north, and that a Dutch-American alliance would swiftly undo a century of Habsburg hegemony. This would have remarkable ramifications. For, as the Dutch returned to arms against Spain, they acted on their beliefs regarding America: on their perceived responsibilities to the natives and on their anticipated assistance from the natives. The three extraordinary "Chilean" initiatives of the seventeenth century demonstrate the resilience of the rebels' image of "innocence" abroad by illustrating the genuine faith of the Dutch in a New World ally. Two of these count among the very first official, public investments in America - "official" and "public" since they originated with the States General and the stadhouder rather than the WIC. The third initiative came from the WIC and somewhat later than the other two, yet it shares with the earlier efforts all the trappings of a public undertaking. Like the other two, it yielded only disappointment for its backers and well illustrates the inevitable tensions that arose when Dutch rhetoric of the New World encountered the hard realities of Spanish America.

III

The first major Dutch offensive against Spain's western empire set sail from Holland on 29 April 1623. An awesome assemblage of eleven heavy warships outfitted with nearly three hundred guns and staffed by over sixteen hundred men, the Nassau Fleet made a princely impression, as befitted its principal patron, Prince Maurits of Nassau.(22) Preparations for the voyage had begun at least six years prior, when Maurits threw his support behind a proposed assault on Spanish shipping in America. The prince drew inspiration from the voyage of Joris van Spilbergen (1614-1617), which had exposed the weakness of Spanish defenses off the coasts of Chile and Peru.(23) The Nassau Fleet, as Maurits conceived it, would confound the king within his own backyard and, at the same time, "divert the war from the Netherlands."(24) Planning remained necessarily provisional while the Truce remained in effect, yet already by 1619, the States General pledged five ships in anticipation. By 1622, the States upped their offer to six (including the navy's two heaviest vessels, the Amsterdam and the Delft); and by the following April, the prince inspected, with great pomp and parade, the fully outfitted fleet.(25)

"The greatest force ever sent to the South Seas" (as one historian called it) pushed off from Texel with grand aspirations.(26) The optimistic reports of Spilbergen excited Maurits as much as his allies in the States General, who envisioned in the enterprise the beginning of the end of the Habsburg empire. First, the Nassau Fleet would effect a quick end to the war. A Dutch armada in the Pacific would strangle the silver convoy in America, thus crippling the royal treasury in Spain and weakening the enemy siege in the Netherlands. The fleet would "reduce the Spaniard to his ancient poverty," as a contemporary account put it, and "deprive him of that with which he has hitherto fought his war in Christendom."(27) Second, the fleet would topple the Habsburg empire without Christendom - namely, in America - and here Dutch ambitions soared their highest. For its backers expected the Nassau Fleet to ignite nothing short of a full-scale revolt in the Americas, an alteratie in which a Dutch-Indian alliance would oust the Spanish decisively from the New World. The prince adopted this strategy in absolute earnestness and with great expectations. From the start, he and the other organizers assumed that they might swiftly "resume communication begun by Spilbergen" and "solidify" the alliance airily broached with the natives (varyingly called "Chileans," "Peruvians," or simply "Indians").(28) Toward this end, the fleet would convey official "letters of alliance" ("brieven van alliantie") addressed from the States General to the Indians. According to the explicit "Instructions" of the prince, these letters were to be distributed "all over the West Indies, as deemed necessary," and were to be followed up "with promises of freedoms, offices, dignities, land [encomienden], and other benevolences and advantages." How, precisely, the Dutch might grant "freedoms" or whose land, exactly, they would parcel out to whom the "Instructions" fail to clarify. They propose, rather, a rhetorical strategy devised to convince the natives "to rise up against the king of Spain." One can only imagine the outlines of the Dutch oration or the contents of the "letter of alliance" - of which, unhappily, no known copy survives. A Spanish report compiled from the testimony of two deserters from the Dutch fleet, though, confirms the presence on board of chests filled with "letters of liberation" ("cartas de livertad"), apparently left undelivered.(29)

Prince Maurits would not witness the return of his fleet (he died on 23 April 1625), though this was just as well. The expedition failed miserably, from inauspicious start to inglorious finish. Within twenty four hours of departure, a leak developed in the hull of the two-hundred last Eagle, which forced the fleet to anchor off the Isle of Wight and thus forfeit any element of speed or stealth. By mid-October off the Cabo Lopez Gonsalvo (Gabon, West Africa), the fleet suffered another round of setbacks, first from contrary winds and then from a deranged barber-surgeon. The surgeon proved the more dangerous, murdering seven men by poison before he could be sedated, tried, and executed.(30) Further delays rounding Cape Horn prevented the Dutch from overtaking the Spanish silver-fleet as it departed Arica (Chile). The Dutch headed straight for Callao (Peru) in pursuit, yet, as luck would have it, missed the "exceptionally rich" silver-fleet by five days. Disappointed, the fleet's council decided to remain off Callao and blockade the waters around Lima. This lasted from early May until late August of 1624, during which time the fleet's admiral, Jacques l'Hermite, succumbed to illness. The Dutch managed to destroy over thirty enemy ships yet took hardly anything of value. They then moved on to Acapulco, where they lingered for a few weeks, hoping to intercept the king's galleons sailing from Manila - yet again to no avail. Dwindling supplies and a hostile coast forced a retreat, and the fleet turned west to cross the Pacific before the end of the year. After brief service in the East Indies (under the command of the VOC, or Dutch East India Company), a skeletal fleet returned to the fatherland in the summer of 1626, with rather little to show for its efforts.

As went the military and economic course of the expedition, so went the political and diplomatic as well. The anticipated alliance with the natives never quite materialized, and the revolt of the Americas never transpired. Hope, nonetheless, remained unusually high. Published accounts of the voyage emphasized the steady stream of opportunities only barely missed, owing either to the fleet's misfortunes or other "unavoidable" circumstances. Off the coast of Chile, according to the most complete journal of the expedition, the bedridden Admiral l'Hermite expressed his sorrow that time prevented him from landing and liberating the natives. Earlier Dutch explorers had observed "the great affection" exhibited by the natives and their evident desire for Dutch assistance. L'Hermite regretted that duty pressed him on, "since he had greater hope that we might accomplish something good there [Chile], where the natives were stalwart enemies of Spain, than in our upcoming destination." When the fleet reached its target of Callao, enthusiasms turned to the natives of Peru, who, on good authority, "would not hesitate to rise up against their masters." "In these lands," noted the narrator of the same journal, "we also expected to make use of the good services of certain Indians who visited us the day before yesterday in their small barque. They displayed great zeal to help us and assured us of the assistance of the Indians and of the revolt of the Negroes, should we secure a beachhead." Once again, though, circumstances intervened. Forewarned of the Dutch arrival at Lima, the Spanish viceroy employed two additional companies of troops to prevent an enemy landing and formed a regiment of black mercenaries (gegagieerde Negros) to keep the indigenous and African populations in check. By the autumn, the Dutch gave up waiting and moved north to the waters off Mexico, near the port of Acapulco. It is more than slightly ironic that the Dutch suffered at this point the costly desertion of a native American gunner "who had served us faithfully in all of our missions." The fleet's vice admiral followed this supposedly dependable "Indiaen" into a carefully laid Spanish ambush, which took the lives of six men. The printed accounts passed over this event in embarrassed silence.(31)

Indeed, whatever the reversals in America, the narration of events published back in Europe left the impression that the Nassau Fleet had scored a resounding success. Spain had suffered irreparable damage - so it was alleged - and the natives had moved one step closer to their Dutch-assisted revolt. The praise could be elaborate:

An eleven-keeled fleet was outfitted in Holland, Which sailed to the South Sea and Peruvian shore, Led by L'Hermite, 'gainst the Spanish and Moors, It bullied by water, by fire, and sword.(32)

A certain amount of poetic license might have construed as "bullying" the pestering of Spanish sea-lanes by the sickly l'Hermite. Only willful fantasy, though - or propaganda - could have touted the voyage as a run of "notable successes," as did the Waerachtigh verhael van her succes van het vlote onder den Admirael Iaques L'Hermite (True Relation of the Success of the Fleet under the Command of Admiral Jacques l'Hermite).(33) This pamphlet appeared already in 1625, based on early reports sent back before the fleet had abandoned the coast of Peru. It formed the basis, nonetheless, for much of the public-relations campaign that followed. A French pamphlet of the same year described La furieuse defaite des Espagnols, et la sanglante bataille donnee au Perou; and the English editor Samuel Purchas announced nothing less than the fall of Spanish Peru:

There is also Newes of great preparations in Spaine to recover this losse, as also, of another famous Act of the Hollanders commanded by L'Hermit, which are said to have taken Lirma the chiefe Citie in Peru, and other places on the Peruan Coast: the old Enemy of the Spaniard, viz. the people of Chili being joyned with the Dutch. If this bee true, it is likely to prove a Costly warre to the Spaniard, and Honourable to the Dutch.(34)

The complete journal of the voyage came out in 1626 and in five subsequent editions by the middle of the century. In only slightly less sensational terms, it kept alive the image of the imminent Dutch ascendancy in the New World and the all but certain union of the triumphant Republic with its American allies.(35)

IV

Shortly after the return of the Nassau Fleet, the States General lent its support to a second American initiative, predicated, like the first, on the presumed affinity between the Dutch and the Indians. In 1627, the Flemish-born merchant and self-styled evangelist, Joan Aventroot, wrote an epistle to the natives of Peru urging them to rise up against the king of Spain. Addressing himself to his "Peruvian brethren" (living, as he supposed, in Buenos Aires), Aventroot detailed the manifold tyrannies and heresies of the Habsburg regime, hoping to incite his readers to armed revolt. He further advised the Peruvians to avail themselves of the assistance of the Dutch Republic, sworn enemies of Spain; and it was perhaps for this reason that the States General first took notice of, and eventually saw fit to sponsor, Aventroot's project. At the States' expense, eight thousand copies of Aventroot's epistle were printed, together with the Heidelberg catechism. The magistrates also commissioned Aventroot to draft an official "Alliance" between their High Mightinesses and the "Serene Lords of Peru" that would explain (ostensibly to both parties) the practical and spiritual advantages of a Dutch-American union. Finally, the States published a Dutch edition of the "Alliance" and the Epistola a los Peruleras - written by Aventroot originally in Spanish, which he assumed would be the lingua franca of the two nations - which was introduced by an extensive dedicatory letter from the author, dated June 1630.(36)

The similarities between Aventroot's program and that envisioned by the organizers of the Nassau Fleet - each soliciting the friendship of the "Peruvians," each including a letter of alliance, each receiving the blessings of the States - are hardly accidental. Aventroot initially approached the Dutch governors while the Twelve Years' Truce was still in effect, and he later had a hand in devising the "Instructions" for the Nassau Fleet. A flamboyantly zealous warrior for the reformed faith, Aventroot began to attract notice in the early 1610s when he penned a series of remarkable letters to Philip III directing the Most Catholic King to switch over to Protestantism and convert his entire empire in the process. The published version of this letter-campaign already mentioned the plight of the Peruvians - "poor souls" drudging in the mines of America - and urgently petitioned the king to improve both the bodily and spiritual condition of his American subjects.(37) By now living in Amsterdam, Aventroot published Dutch (1613) and Latin (1615) translations of his epistle with a dedication to the States General, whose favor he hoped to win. Apparently, he succeeded; for when the States needed assistance devising a plan to convert those Peruvian natives l'Hermite would encounter, they turned to Aventroot for advice. The "Instruction" of 1623 directed the fleet's admiral to "pay particular attention to the instructions of Jan Aventroot": a reference to a separate set of directives from the hand of Aventroot, which counseled on proselytizing the natives. With retrospective wisdom, Aventroot would judge these earlier (1623) attempts premature. The Nassau Fleet "had been embraced by the fleshy arm" of profanity, he wrote to the States General a number of years later. It had sailed without its evangelical orders - "the Christian Catechism of the Reformed Church" - and plainly before its time.(38)

By 1628, though, that time had arrived - precisely arrived, according to the apocalyptic visions and prognostications that Aventroot reported to the States General in support of a second American mission. The writing on the wall, as Aventroot read it, presaged a cataclysmic uprising in America: a political revolt and religious reformation, ignited by the Peruvians and fueled by the soldiers of the Dutch Reformed Church. Three times over the course of 1622, "signs and wonders" appeared to Aventroot that foretold an imminent Dutch-American alliance against Spain. Three times Aventroot brought these supernatural sightings to the attention of the magistrates before he convinced them, finally, of their portent. Only after the departure of the Nassau Fleet, however, did he realize that he had misread his own, earlier visions. Complex numerological calculations clarified his mistakes and demonstrated that l'Hermite had departed a few years too early - a few years before the end of the third generation of conquistadors, the third reign of Spanish Habsburgs (Charles V, Philip II, and Philip III), and the third cycle of tyrannies, all of which somehow terminated in the annus miribalis of 1628. By this year, predicted Aventroot in his epistle of 1627, the whore of Babylon would fall, bringing down her deceitful minions in Rome (the pope) and Spain (the king). Aventroot called on his Peruvian brethren to destroy all vestiges of papacy in America, to purify, as the Maccabees had, the idols from their temples. "You are obligated to revolt," he informed them. At the same time, he appealed to the Dutch magistrates to introduce the Indians to the Reformed Church, "which must be defended not only in your own lands, but must also be planted in other lands to the best of your ability, and especially in the new lands of the West Indies."(39)

The dedicatory letter to the States General and the epistle to the Peruvians both operated on the level of such religious signs and sensibilities. The Alliance itself, however, proposed a partnership on the more material bases of free labor, economic liberty, and commercial opportunity. Aventroot, who knew something of the Peruvian silver production from his experience as a merchant of precious metals, deplored the harsh conditions of the Potosi mines. To feed his "insatiable greed," the Spanish king tyrannized the Peruvians' bodies no less than their souls, sending the natives ever deeper into the earth to mine its treasures. "And as he tyrannized the Indians' bodies, so too he tyrannized their goods," added Aventroot. By this he meant not merely the Spaniards' seizure of Indian lands and exploitation of their silver mines, but also the low wages they paid, the high taxes they demanded, and the burdensome tolls they collected - fiscal abuses, in other words, that would make more sense to a Dutch readership than a Peruvian one. "And finally," noted Aventroot turning to a sin "completely unheard of," the king of Spain suffocated trade: "On top of all these intolerable impositions, [he] burdens commerce with high prices," railed Aventroot in the same moral-economic tone that Usselincx had struck twenty years earlier. "The conscience of the King of Spain" he observed, "is verily steeped in avarice. . . . [He] does not allow that you [Indians] might traffic with other lands and enjoy the ready purchase of goods as do other nations; but that you, like slaves, must receive only that which is offered from the closed hand of Spain."(40)

The Alliance proposed by Aventroot and published by the States General would rectify all that. "Because God has freed these United Provinces from the tyranny of the king of Spain," began the document's final, rather contractual-sounding paragraph, "their High Mightinesses are duty bound . . . to carry out this righteous sentence." For their part, the Lords of Peru would agree to renounce the king of Spain and to appoint a native king in his stead, "one who will, first and foremost, cleanse the Churches of the forbidden idols, by which the Pope has dishonored the Lord." By the terms of the Alliance, the Dutch would then provide whatever support - moral, military, commercial - they could. "And to this king of yours," Aventroot informed the Peruvians,

their High Mightinesses, Lords of the States, pledge their assistance, and grant by this Alliance their sworn word, to assist him to the best of their abilities, by water and land, until God shall have granted you your Christian freedoms. And likewise shall they promise you eternal relations of trade, offering you, from both the East Indies and these Provinces, basic products of better quality and lower price than those you now purchase from Spain.(41)

Military succor, Christian freedom, competitive pricing: the terms of the Alliance favored the Peruvians indeed, and there would have been little reason to suspect a rejection of the States' offer - had it ever arrived. As in the case of the Nassau Fleet's "letters of alliance," though, the Dutch proposition more than likely never reached its intended destination: there is no evidence of a voyage or shipment of documents from the Netherlands to South America around this time. And if Aventroot's Epistola a los Peruleras did make the journey to America, it would not appear to have elicited the desired result. No large-scale revolt ever took place in or about the year 1628; the "lords of Peru" remained under Spanish control well through that and the following generations. The States, nonetheless, pinned great hopes on the project, lent their full cooperation, and underwrote the unusually large printing of eight thousand copies of Aventroot's Alliance. The costs must well have seemed worth it.

V

A number of years would pass before the Dutch undertook another mission of friendship to the New World. The third, and in many ways most decisive, attempt to forge a formal alliance with the Americans proved to be the most ambitious, however; and it produced results at once more encouraging and more disappointing than the previous two. It began in early 1643, when the veteran commander, Hendrick Brouwer, led a fleet of five ships and several hundred men into the Pacific to solicit, once again, a treaty of cooperation from the local Indians, in this case the "Chileans." Between the voyage of the Nassau Fleet and that of Brouwer, few Dutch ships had ventured near the south-western corner of South America. After launching its first naval operation in 1624, the WIC had concentrated its efforts on the Atlantic coasts of America and Africa and steered clear of all attempts to engage Chile and Peru. Yet Brouwer came to the Company from the ranks of the VOC, for whom he had served as a bewindhebber (director) in Amsterdam and as a governor-general in Batavia (Djakarta); and perhaps it was his Pacific perspective that won over the WIC. The prince of Orange also played a part in the fleet's preparation, furnishing Brouwer with letters of credentials (brieven van credentie) and ceremonial gifts for the native caciques. So invested, Brouwer foresaw little trouble concluding an alliance of friendship with the Chileans. The Peruvians, he hoped, would join ranks, too; and this confederacy of Batavian-American arms would route the Spanish, reconquer America, and displace the world hegemony of the Habsburgs. It never got this far, of course, though the Dutch did in fact present their credentials, gifts, and terms to a gathering of Chileans who indulged, then finally ignored, their fair-skinned saviors. This final fiasco, off the coast of distant Chile, forced the Dutch to confront the cumulative failure of their three-quarter century pursuit of an alliance with America.

The selection of Chile was a fitting starting point for this final appeal in America. Chile had long exerted a "peculiar fascination" for the Dutch, who, since the early seventeenth century, had imagined a special affinity for its natives.(42) Renowned for the beauty of its landscape, the fairness of its climate, and the richness of its products, Chile also had acquired a reputation for the fierceness of its natives, who had stoutly resisted Spanish rule from the mid-sixteenth century. By common (Dutch) consensus, the Chileans represented the best hope for an American ally. Early descriptions of the land came from Olivier van Noort, among the first Dutch navigators to reach the South Sea. In the early 1600s, van Noort sent back reports of an uprising in 1599 by the "valiant warriors" of Chile (Mapuches), who had successfully attacked Spanish positions in Valdivia and Imperial. After their "glorious victories," wrote van Noort with approval, the native braves had raised their cups "to the vengeance of the tyranny and slavery under which Spain would have them suffer." The Chileans had also razed Spanish churches and cloisters, and piously destroyed all "popish idols . . . saying, 'Now we have put an end to the Spanish Gods.'" Van Noort considered the landscape south of Santiago "the most fertile under the sun, for all that is planted, grows in great abundance . . . the gold mines and earth are indescribably [rich]."(43) The Walloon merchant Isaac le Maire concurred, and he petitioned the Advocate Johan van Oldenbarnevelt "to infest the whole coast of Peru" (by which he meant western South America) with Dutch vessels and to establish there a league against Spain.(44) Spilbergen, who reconnoitered the coast of Chile during his 1614-1617 circumnavigation, paid particularly high compliments to the natives of La Mocha. "These Chileans were well bred, very polite, and friendly," he reported. "They ate and drank with manners nearly the equal of a good Christian's." They also received Spilbergen's men "with all affection," and "showed great friendship and good intentions" in their dealings. When the admiral showed them the great guns of his ships "and made signs to the effect that [the Dutch] had come also to fight the Spanish, the natives conveyed how much this pleased them, as they were enemies of the same."(45) Friendly and fierce, the Chileans were rebels to boot, as more than one Dutch chronicler noted. They had fought courageously for their freedom and swore to struggle to the last man against Spain. "The native of this land will not suffer the foreign Spaniards and will not bear the yoke of Spain," wrote a highly regarded Dutch authority on America. "After diverse secret and conspiratorial gatherings, they commonly resolved to use every means possible to rid their country of these tiresome guests."(46)

The high reputation of the Chileans also rested in part on Alonso de Ercilla's La Araucana, published in Dutch in 1619.(47) An epic poem in three parts, La Araucana narrates the valorous struggle, in the Andean highlands, between the native Araucanians and Spanish conquistadors. It distinguishes itself from virtually all other literature of the Conquista by its unusually high-minded and evenhanded treatment of the natives - this despite the author's impeccable credentials as a Spanish aristocrat and veteran of the early Chilean campaign. For reasons both artistic and historical, Ercilla's account ennobled the Araucanians and endowed them with traits that a Dutch audience in particular found especially admirable. The invincible spirit of the Chilean warriors, their stalwart endurance, their ancient bravery - even the tidiness of their homes - had obvious appeal to a patriotic Netherlander. Above all, the poet celebrated the Araucanian's love of freedom and pious resistance to the invaders from Spain:

Never has a king subjected Such fierce people proud of freedom, Nor has alien nation boasted E'er of having trod their borders.

The Araucanians reviled the "bearded villains" from Spain with their "puffed ambition" and insolent demands for tributes. Rather than submit, the Araucanians fought a heroic and protracted war against the Habsburg enemy. "Blood or life is a paltry payment," cried their chieftain, Caupolicano, in a climactic, pre-battle oration.

Let our ancient laws dishonored Be restored by free men's power! Let them be inviolate, holy Stretching through far distant kingdoms!(48)

This rang particularly true in the Republic. The Dutch editor praised the love of patria among the Chileans and the valor of sons so zealous to avenge the death of their fathers and to carry on a by now (1619) seventy year war with Spain.(49)

It was with these freedom-loving and Spanish-loathing warriors that Brouwer hoped to ally.(50) Toward this end, he directed his fleet in the spring of 1643 around Cape Horn and along the Chilean coast as far as the Isla de Chiloe, where he hoped to link up with the natives. This occurred in a series of curious encounters that reads like a bizarre comedy of diplomatic manners. Anchored in the newly christened Brouwershaven, the Dutch first caught sight of the "ally" in early May of 1643. A white flag, a knife, and a string of coral were left for the natives, who inspected the Dutch offerings before they dumped them, unceremoniously, in a nearby river. A few days later the natives approached on horseback and reproached their visitors - first in a native tongue and then in Spanish - for their ill intentions. This irked the Dutch, who exchanged their white flag for a red one and fired their cannons. Brouwer's men then marched on the country and took prisoners, including "an old Chilean woman with two children." Relations quickly worsened. Over the coming weeks, the natives remained aloof in the hills above the coastline, and the "alliance" degenerated into a "flee and feast" pattern: the natives fled whenever the Dutch touched shore, and the Dutch feasted on the abandoned cattle and sheep.(51)

Only by mid-July did Brouwer finally make a breakthrough. In a moment of clemency, the admiral released a captive family of natives on the condition that they convey to their countrymen, "that we [Dutch] were their friends and the enemies of Castile," and that their release had been delayed only so that the Dutch could enumerate for them "the numerous tyrannies and ill-treatments suffered by the Hollanders." This, for whatever reason, encouraged the Chileans, who sent a party of dignitaries to board the admiral's ship and ascertain the Dutch intentions. Brouwer discoursed to this audience on the natural affinity of their two nations, on their shared antipathy toward Spain, and on the "manifold reasons" to conclude an alliance. Intrigued, perhaps, the native ambassadors listened patiently. (The Dutch reported their "especial happiness" with Brouwer's lecture.) They positively warmed to the idea, though, when Brouwer displayed for them the cache of arms they would receive as their part of the bargain. "They were especially gratified," concluded the published Dutch journal of the expedition. At this point, however, the negotiations took a turn for the bizarre. Upon learning that the Dutch intended to sail for Valdivia (the site of a former Spanish fort, now in Chilean hands), the ambassadors volunteered their tribes' assistance and asked if they might possibly hitch a ride up the coast aboard Brouwer's fleet. (They claimed that swollen rivers and Spanish soldiers would prevent their timely arrival in Valdivia and that a Dutch ferry would serve both parties' interests.) Brouwer agreed and further rewarded his visitors with swords and pikes to prove his honorable intentions. Nine days later, two more caciques visited the ship bearing with them, as a sign of their good faith and zeal, the fourteen-day-old head of a slain Spaniard. Brouwer diplomatically accepted their gift, and agreed to arm and transport them, together with their cohorts, to Valdivia. "What a pleasant odor this head emitted one can easily guess," the Dutch report dryly commented. One month later (21 August) the Dutch departed the Isla de Chiloe for Valdivia to continue their quest to liberate America. Along for the three-day, nearly two-hundred mile ride came 470 Chilean men, women, and children who had pledged their allegiance to the Dutch, "so as to be delivered from the intolerable tyranny of Spain."(52)

This ferry of friendship reached Valdivia with little incident. Their passengers safely delivered, the Dutch promptly initiated consultations with the local caciques and resumed their Chilean diplomacy. The Valdivians, to be sure, called on the Dutch ships often and enthusiastically enough, yet not always for the desired purpose. While the Europeans discussed strategy for a future assault against Spain, the natives concentrated on matters closer to hand: "[They] were very impressed with the size of the ships, yet also very thievish [of their contents] and desirous of iron. Everything they saw was to their liking, including the compasses, which they removed from the binnacles."(53) The merchants deemed it expedient, accordingly, to bolt down, lock up, or hide anything of value. The ranking commander - Elias Herckmans, who had replaced the recently deceased Brouwer - also made the decision to circumvent the self-appointed native middlemen and present his case directly to the Chilean people. On 29 August, Herckmans landed with two companies of troops and delivered "an excellent harangue and oration" to a crowd of about three hundred. The general expanded on the Dutch purpose in the South Pacific, presented the "Letters of Credentials" from the prince of Orange, and distributed (also in the name of the prince) gifts to the ranking Valdivian cacique. And, "after many discourses of the fidelity that would be shown to [the Valdivians] in the struggle against Spain," the Dutch "politely" took their leave.

Five days later, Herckmans returned in full force and, "under blue skies and before approximately 1200 Chileans," delivered a second oration. This speech was grand, dramatic, and ultimately decisive - though not quite as Herckmans had hoped. It began by extolling the renown of the Chileans, their devotion to freedom, and their martial endurance. Herckmans reminded his audience "that the Netherlanders had likewise engaged the Spanish for nearly eighty years to maintain their freedom" and, on this basis, proposed an alliance of friendship. The Dutch would provide the Chileans with arms and other (unspecified) "merchandise," while the natives would furnish the Dutch with "provisions" and other (unspecified) products. In this way, the two nations would bolster one another's efforts against Spain. To emphasize the solemnity of his offer, Herckmans issued each cacique an authorized letter from His Majesty, the prince of Orange. Perhaps to dramatize their curiosity at the offer, each cacique then "kissed" the prince's letter and marveled at the distance it had traveled. In any case, the Chileans agreed to an exchange of livestock for muskets, and, from the Dutch perspective, all would seem to have gone well up to this point.(54)

It did not take long for the alliance, however limited, to unravel. "After these and other discourses," reports the fullest version of the encounter, "the Netherlanders finally and gingerly [met soete redenen] made mention of the ends and designs for which they had also brought their weapons thither, that is to trade them principally for gold." The mere mention of gold, coyly and somewhat digressively broached, had the effect of thunder in the cloudless sky. It arrested the caciques' indulgent attention and turned the whole negotiation process abruptly on its head. Confronted with the all-too-familiar European demand for gold, the caciques "thereupon uniformly denied all knowledge of the gold mines." Instead and much to the chagrin of their visitors, they now lectured the Dutch and recalled for them their own memories of the Spanish tributes and tyrannies imposed upon them in pursuit of gold. Herckmans tried to soothe the ruffled feathers of the Indians by mentioning the Dutch willingness to offer fair prices and good merchandise - yet to no avail. "At this moment the caciques glanced at one another and gave no further reply." The assembly soon dissolved without any further exchange of arms, foodstuffs, or good will. A few weeks later, the caciques rescinded their offer of provisions and aid. Though the Dutch would linger along the coast until mid-October, this effectively terminated their visit and pursuit of a Chilean alliance. When Herckmans bid farewell on 19 October, the caciques expressed their regret at the fleet's departure and submitted that, had the Europeans announced their visit at least two years prior, the Chilean farmers would surely have sown enough to feed them. The Dutch left it at that; though in concluding their account of the journey, they wistfully noted the remarkable abundance of livestock, grain, and fruit of the Chilean countryside, the caciques' protestations notwithstanding.(55)

In its aftermath, the Dutch tried to put the best possible face on an expedition that would appear to have signaled an end to their attempts at an alliance with Chile. An early broadsheet circulated news of the Republic's success in the South Pacific in penetrating Spanish strongholds, in confederating with the natives, and - most far-fetched - "in liberating 470 Chilean men, women, and children." By this account, the Chileans heartily "welcomed" the Dutch, showed great interest in the proposed alliance, and, despite their bad harvests, "prayed for us [Dutch] to stay, pledging to apply their utmost industry in sowing more crops . . . and hoping that we would free them from slavery of Spain."(56) A report of the voyage written a number of years later - after the signing of the Peace of Munster (1648) with Spain - repeats the assertion that the Dutch "liberated" the Chileans, yet takes a more frank view of the failure of the mission and the Chilean policy more generally. Of Herckmans' attempt to enlist the natives' assistance, it notes: "This all pleased them well enough, yet as soon as they [the Dutch] began to say that they had come to barter for gold (which was the only motive of the West India Company) their caciques or chieftains began to excuse themselves, [saying] that for many years they neither had had nor had sought any gold." The author concludes with the notably candid - and surprisingly bleak - admission of defeat: "Thus did this voyage, which General Brouwer considered of such great consequence, come to a fully fruitless and ineffective close."(57)

The same might ultimately be said of the futile, if earnest, pursuit by the Dutch of an elusive alliance with America. The three major initiatives to solicit the partnership of the Indians ended with little result. In all three instances - which collectively spanned a quarter of a century - genuine anticipation of American collaboration motivated large-scale, public undertakings by the Republic. In each case, though, considerable expenditure produced negligible return - a fact which dampened not in the least enthusiasm for, and claims of, "successes," "liberations," and "alliances" with the natives. Throughout a costly conflict in Brazil which occupied the Republic's attention (and drained the WIC's coffers) for the decade following Brouwer's escapade, and a series of devastating Anglo-Dutch wars in the ensuing years which spread across the Atlantic, "Chile" somehow remained on the horizon. As late as 1671 - by which time both the Dutch Brazilian and North American colonies had fallen - Arnoldus Montanus' monumental geography, America, could describe Chile and Peru alike in the most glowing of terms, admiring especially the stout resistance of the "war-like Araucanians." Herckmans would have secured the region for the Dutch, Montanus opined, but for an (unspecified) "exceptional inconvenience." The conquest of America seemed yet possible.(58)

Though an eventual confederation of Batavian and American arms never did transpire, the Dutch-Chilean encounter deserves our attention. Taken together, the Nassau Fleet, the Aventroot Epistola, and the Brouwer expedition demonstrate, most basically, the remarkable resilience of the image of eager Americans waiting to ally with the Dutch. The very staying power of the rebels' construct testifies to a highly imaginative rhetorical strategy, which involved less a process of "othering" the natives of the New World than projecting affinities, similarities, and even kinship with the "innocent" Indians. These overseas ventures, moreover, indicate the seriousness with which the Dutch took the rhetoric of America and the willingness of the Republic to act upon its rhetorical constructions. Ideology, costly or not, played a powerful role in the Netherlands' New World strategy. And America, "realistic" or not, occupied a prominent place in the Dutch imagination. Finally, the Republic's efforts in "Chile" and "Peru" have much to say about the process of cultural geography in the Renaissance. New worlds, it would seem, spoke quite compellingly to the Old. Their impact may have been "muted" under certain circumstances, but could be downright clamorous under others. The confident Dutch courtship of America hardly suggests "uncertainty." It does suggest, however, how particular political and social factors influenced European assimilation - or, perhaps, appropriation - of the New World, and how geographic discourses, even when they related to the most exotic of locales, reflected decidedly domestic concerns.

UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON

For their helpful suggestions and encouragement, I would like to thank Willem Klooster, Steven Mullaney, Henk van Nierop, Anthony Pagden, Simon Schama, John Schwaller, Louise Townsend, and an anonymous reader for the Renaissance Quarterly. This essay was first presented at the annual meeting of the Renaissance Society of America in Bloomington, Indiana (1996), and later to the History Research Group of the University of Washington, and I am very grateful to both of those audiences for their comments. I wish also to acknowledge the generous financial support of the H. F. Guggenheim Foundation, the Keller Fund of the University of Washington, and the Committee on Degrees in History and Literature at Harvard University.

1 Spaenschen ende Arragoenschen Spiegel, t.p. For more complete bibiliographic details on this and many of the other pamphlets cited in this essay, see Knuttel - in this case, cat. no. 1078.

2 Spaenschen ende Arragoenschen Spiegel, t.p.: "Inde Spaensche Tiranij tot den deser spatie / Spiegelt hem te recht alle des Werelts natie."

3 Much of this costume design is, at best, vaguely imagined. Though the turban had strong Renaissance associations with Ottoman dress - hence the etymology of "tulip," a flower originally imported from Turkey and whose name derives from the Turkish tulbend (muslin, the material of the turban) - the sartorial reference in this case points more likely to Persia, since a subtitle to the pamphlet speaks negatively, in another vein, of "Turkish cruelty." The fur-lined hat, usually associated with Asian "Tartars" (see Bruijn, plate 42: "Tartarus gentili more armatus"), would seem to suggest in this case African costume, paired as it is with a distinct gold breast-plate. In all events, the print is meant to convey a world-wide gallery of Habsburg enemies, and the Indians and Geuzen are placed prominently in the center.

4 On the Geuzen, see Cornelissen in conjunction with the semiotic study of Nierop, which deals with issues of costume and political drama.

5 See, along with Elliott, two wide-ranging collections that take up and generally bolster the Elliott thesis: Chiappelli and Kupperman (both of which contain updated essays by Elliott). Of the many Quincentenary publications and review articles to follow the Elliott line, see for example Axtell, 1992 (followed up by Axtell, 1995), Larner, and Danforth (esp. the introductory essay of McNeill). Faintly revisionist rumblings can be heard in Grafton, Farago, Canizares, and Armitage. The last-cited essay makes the very useful suggestion that "To speak of the reception of America, rather than its impact or assimilation, may help us to see more clearly what uses America had within earlier intellectual projects" (52). This is the position assumed by Pagden and, if perhaps less explicitly, by Greenblatt, 1991.

6 Ryan's "minimalist" point is broadly made in much of the literature cited in note 5 above and reiterated in the recent review article by Nader. Virtually none of these studies, it should be emphasized, considers the case of the Netherlands, which has received remarkably limited attention in Dutch studies as well. Among the very few Quincentenary publications with a Netherlandish focus, see Lechner, Doel, and especially Emmer, who makes the important (if fairly typical) historiographic disclaimer that the relative lack of Dutch success in the West (versus the East) Indies has had the effect of discouraging research on the subject. The issue of America's reception in the Netherlands, in any case, has gone unremarked in all of these studies.

7 The reference is to Greenblatt, 1980, and the suggestion is that geographic fashioning during this period fits into a context not unlike the literary self-fashioning Greenblatt describes.

8 See, for example, the 1608 Vertoogh, sigg. B-B4.

9 See the Octroy, by de Hooge Mogende Heeren Staten Generael, which appeared in pamphlet form in 1621 and in subsequent, amplified versions in 1623 (three times) and 1624 (like all the previous editions, from the official printer in The Hague).

10 The rather simple, if surprisingly overlooked, thesis of divergent European strategies for assimilating the New World is developed, for slightly different purposes, by Seed.

11 This subject is treated in greater detail in Schmidt, 1995.

12 "Verbintenis van eenige Eedelen," in Water, 4:61.

13 Vriendelicke vermaninghe aen de Heeren de Staten van Brabandt, sig. Aiv, and Vriendelijcke waerschouwinghe aen de Staten van Artois, sig. Cvii-v, which represent but two of the dozens of cases in which the rebels cited the "example of the Indies." A more detailed and wide-ranging review of these materials appears in Schmidt, 1994.

14 Apologie of Prince William of Orange, 53-59. Like many of the rebel propagandists, Willem targeted a broad, international audience, and had the Apologie, originally written in French, translated immediately into Dutch, German, Latin, and English. I have used the reprint of the English edition, modernized the spelling, and cross-checked all quotations with the French and Dutch editions.

15 Ibid., 59.

16 See the Plakkaat van Verlatinge, 105 (emphasis added) and cf. 97, 99, and 117.

17 And when the Apologie appeared in 1581, the worst years of the war had already passed.

18 The Spiegel der Spaensche tyrannye gheschiet in West Indien was based on Bartolome de Las Casas' Brevissima relacion; while the Tweede deel van den Spiegel der Spaensche tyrannye gheschiet in Nederlandt derived from Joannes Gijsius's popular narrative of the Revolt. The two Spiegels were published together from 1620 onward and, combined and individually, in dozens of further editions that appeared throughout the seventeenth century. See Schmidt, 1996 for a discussion of these and other examples of patriotic history.

19 Levendich discours vant ghemeyne Lants welvaert, sig. C4 v; Memorie vande ghewichtighe redenen, sig. iij; and Onpartydich discours, sig. Aij. See also the Memorie vande ghewichtighe redenen, sig. [ij]v, which appeals to the moral obligations of the Dutch to their Indian "friends" and warns that inaction could cause "irreparable" damage.

20 For Usselincx's confidence in the competitiveness of Dutch pricing, see the Levendich discours, sig. B4. For the Indians as consumers, see Vertoogh, sig. B, and Memorie, sig. [ij]v.

21 More generally, a sluggish subscription rate induced the directors of the WIC to focus more squarely on economic issues - though political rhetoric did remain part of their pitch. Debates over the Company's origins can be found in Hoboken and Dillen. Also useful for the early development of the WIC are Hart, Heijer, Boogaart, Klooster, Winter, and Menkman. Usselincx, who carried on his initial campaign for a trading company largely between 1606 and 1609, resumed his pamphleteering in 1622 - though to little effect. The classic biographies of this important, if often overlooked, figure in the history of early modern colonialism are Jameson and Ligtenberg.

22 Sources for the Nassau Fleet are collected and excellently introduced in Voorbeijtel Cannenburg. Major expeditions left the Republic before the Truce, to be sure, though without substantial backing from the state. Fleets of salt ships carried out raids against the Spanish in Punta de Araya, for example, though without either the official support of the Republic or the necessary aid of firepower. Note that of the 1637 personnel a full six hundred were soldiers, making this the most powerful force yet to enter the Pacific.

23 Spilbergen spent over half a year - from May through November of 1615 - harassing enemy shipping and Spanish ports all along the western coast of South America. He scored his greatest victory just south of Lima, when he sank the vice admiral of the (larger) Spanish fleet sent from Callao to challenge him. Yet, despite taking the lives of more than 400 Spaniards, Spilbergen never managed to capture the precious cargo ships that sailed between Spanish America and the Philippines. See Warnsinck for the text of the voyage's "Journaal" and esp. lxviii-lxxxii, which details the naval engagements off the Peruvian coast.

24 Journael vande Nassausche Vloot in Voorbeijtel Cannenburg, 3.

25 See the contemporary descriptions of the fleet's departure in Wassenaer, 5:48, and in Baudart, 15:132-33.

26 Prior as cited in Voorbeijtel Canneburg, xvii.

27 Voorbeijtel Cannenburg, 3.

28 Pieter van Dam, Beschryvinge van de Oosindische Compagnie (1693-1701), as cited in Voorbeijtel Cannenburg, xix. Van Dam observes that, in these pre-WIC days, it was the directors of the Dutch East India Company (VOC) who hatched a plan to contact (in this case) the "Chileans." Note that I have generally followed the nomenclature of my sources in describing these and other native populations encountered - or imagined - by the Dutch.

29 See the "Instructie voor u, Jacques l'Hermite, vanwegen de Ho. Mo. Heeren, de Staten-Generaal" (esp. articles 11-13 and 29), signed by Maurits and reprinted in Voorbeijtel Cannenburg, 105-15; and see also the testimony of the deserters (recorded by their Spanish interrogators, it should be noted) as quoted in Ibid., lvi. One of the articles of the "Instructie" does mention a supply of arms which the prince would provide the American allies, yet it then speaks of making the natives "understand" - presumably through persuasion - the Republic's good faith and the Habsburgs' malevolence. The "letters of libiberation" are mentioned, too, in another Spanish source - the viceroy's report, as cited in Bradley, 70 - indicating Spanish knowledge of, and concern with, these Dutch documents, which were understood by the viceroy to be drafted with the native Americans and African slaves in mind.

30 Jacob Vegeer, "of Spanish parents," administered large doses of antimony to the patients in his care, causing their rapid and apparently dramatic deaths. Vegeer's motives were never adequately ascertained, though, after a failed suicide, he confessed to a pact with the devil and an appropriately diabolic range of delusions. See Voorbeijtel Canneburg, lxx; the report of Wassenaer, 9:68; and the fascinating study of antimony's infamous past in McCallum.

31 Journael vande Nassausche Vloot, 55, 68-71, 77-79, 92-93: "In het landen dachten wij mede te gebruycken den goeden dienst van eenighe Indianen in het barkjen op eergisteren bekomen. Dese toonden haer seer vyerig voor ons en versekerden ons van de toeval der Indianen ende revolte der Negros, so wij maer vaste plaetse aen lant kregen" (69). Details of the ambush are given in the unpublished journal of the captain of the Delft, Witte Cornelisz de With, cited in Voorbeijtel Canneburg, xciii-xciv (original manuscript in the Algemeen Rijksarchief).

32 Herckmans, 194: "Een ellef-kielde vloot, in Holland werd ghemant / Die na de Zuyd-zee, en de Peruaensche strand, / Door l'Hermijts beleyd, de Spanjaerds ende Mooren, / Te water en te vyer, en swaerde ringhelooren."

33 The Waerachtigh verhael, ironically enough, was based on a Castilian report which describes the success of the much smaller Spanish fleet in defending Peruvian harbors against the Dutch armada.

34 Purchas, 1860 (pt. 2, bk. 10). The French pamphlet was published in Paris and alludes to a "copie Flamande" printed in Antwerp, yet no known copy of this edition exists.

35 The Journael vande Nassaussche vloot came out in Amsterdam in 1626. Other editions appeared circa 1630, 1631, 1643, 1644, 1648, and twice more in the late 1660s.

36 Aventroot, 1630. The original Spanish letter is dated 1627, as is the Aliance itself.

37 Aventroot, 1613.

38 See the thirteenth article of the "Instructie voor u, Jacques l'Hermite, vanwegen de Ho. Mo. Heeren, de Staten-Generaal" (in Voorbeijtel Canneburg, 108) and the "Instructie voor den Generael" (Ibid., 115). Aventroot may himself have joined l'Hermite's crew on their voyage: the admiral's instructions refer explicitly to "Jan Aventroot, die onder u is." He may also have visited Peru in his capacity as a merchant in precious metals. See Elst for further biographical details.

39 Aventroot 1630, 22, 14, and passim. Aventroot opens his work with a reference to Rev. 17, and maintains a decidedly apocalyptic tone throughout. He calculated the year of the American uprising by adding up the days between his visions (105), plus the seven days extra it took him to realize his mistaken prediction (112), and then adding this figure to the year Charles V ascended to the Spanish throne (1516 + 112 = 1628). The reference to the purification of the temples derives from 1 Maccabees 4:36-61 and 2 Maccabees 10:1-9.

40 Ibid., 24-25 (and cf. also 26-28): "De conscientie des Conincx van Spaengien is alsoo versopen inde gierigheydt. . . . Niet toelatende dat ghy [Indianen] meught tracteren met vreemt volck, om te ghenieten den goeden koop van koopmanschappen ghelijck andere Natien: maer dat ghy die als slaven, alleenlijcken moet ontfangen uyt sijn geslooten handt van Spaengien."

41 Ibid., 28-29: "Ende aen desen uwen Koninck, beloven de Hooghe Moghende Heeren Staten hare assistentie, ende gheven in dese Aliance haer ghetrouwe Woordt, hem te assisteren soo vele moghelijck te water ende te lande, tot dat Godt u sal hebben ghestelt in uwe Christelijcke vryheydt. Ende desghelijcken beloven sy u oock eeuwighe correspondentie van koophandel, dat sy sullen soo uyt Oost-Indien als uyt dese hare Provintien, bevelen u te provideren van alle nootdruftighe Waren, beter ende ten pryse vele minder als ghy die nu uyt Spaengien moet betalen."

42 Bradley refers to "the lure of Peru" in his account of Dutch and English forays into the South Sea, though in fact most of the Republic's efforts (which preceded those English voyages studied by Bradley by three-quarters of a century) focus on "Chile" in preference to "Peru." Cf. also Bachman, 45-47. Note that, in the case of the "Chileans," the Dutch made bona fide contact with actual native peoples: most basically with the Araucanians (Araucano; see below), more specifically with the Mapuche, and perhaps also with the Huilliche.

43 IJzerman, 1:69-79 (esp. 1:77-78). Van Noort (or his publisher) also represented the Chileans in rather flattering prints (e.g., facing 1:60 in the IJzerman edition and on folio 33v in the original), which made the natives look like cheerful, almost Bruegel-esque peasants. Positive reports derived, too, from the voyage of Jacques Mahu (1598-1600), who had the intention of settling the Dutch in the region around Valdivia. Testimony (unpublished) from the savvy Dirck Gerritsz "China" alludes to a Dutch plan to bring back certain representatives of the native tribes, who would then learn to speak Dutch and presumably offer strategic assistance to their allies in Holland. See Bradley, 11-12, on Gerritsz; and Wieder on the Mahu expedition more generally.

44 Isaac le Maire, "Remonstrance to Oldenbarnevelt," cited by Bachman, 46 n. 7. When Oldenbarnevelt took no action, Le Maire financed the voyage himself and sent his son, Jacques (together with Willem Schouten) to explore the region.

45 Baudart, 174; and cf. Langenes, 165, which contains a remarkably similar comment on the Chileans' "goede manieren."

46 De Laet, 432, and cf. more generally the entire eleventh book. Much in de Laet's description of the Chilean uprising resembles contemporary Dutch representations of the heroic uprising of the ancient Batavians against Rome. The Batavians were led by their barbaric chieftain, Claudius Civilis (who, like the Araucanian leader, Caupolicano, had the use of only one eye; see below), and they were believed to have likewise gathered "conspiratorially" to swear an oath of resistance against imperial tyrants. For a remarkable visual illustration of this theme, see Rembrandt's monumental Conspiracy of Claudius Civilis (Nationalmuseum, Stockholm), painted for the Amsterdam Town Hall in 1661.

Among the many other references to the Chileans, their valor, and their resistance to Spain, see van Meteren, 587v; Warachtighe beschrijvinghe, 277; N. G., sig. B (on which see Knuttel, cat. no. 3540); and Usselincx, Waerschouwinghe over den treves met den coninck van Spaengien, sig. B. Special mention goes to Maarten Hamckema's (Hamconius) verse history of Frisland (the northwestern-most province of the Netherlands), which claimed that the ancient Frisians sailed to Chile and planted a cross there. Whether or not these intrepid Frisian explorers colonized, they did leave their cultural mark, according to Hamckema: the word "Chile" is Frisian for "severe cold," which would have been the ancient mariners' description of the land. See Hamconius, 74-5.

47 Ercilla y Zuniga 1619. The Dutch translation was based on the Spanish edition printed in Antwerp: Primera, segunda y tercera partes de la Araucana (1597). The poem came out in three installments, which appeared originally in 1569, 1578, and 1589, respectively. A Spanish-language edition comprising the first two parts appeared in Antwerp already in 1586 at the address of "Pedro Bellero" (Petrus Bellere?). Ercilla's critics have resisted calling the work an epic for a variety of technical and historical reasons. In all events, it is a grand, heroic, and masterful poem, unhappily overlooked by most students of sixteenth-century literature and the history of the encounter. Notable exceptions include Pastor Bodmer (see esp. 207-76) and Quint (see esp. 157-85).

48 Ercilla y Zuniga 1945, 37 (and cf. 33) and 163 (and cf. 128).

49 "Moor reden," in Ercilla y Zuniga 1619, sig. A. Note the wonderful irony of the Dutch appropriation of a work the Spanish original of which explicitly condemned the "godless States" of the Netherlands (Ercilla y Zuniga 1945, 179).

50 Brouwer's motives resembled those of Caupolicano remarkably: love of patria and liberty. This, at least, was the thesis posited in the published journal of the voyage, which notes that, "just as the birds were created to roam the skies and the fish to swim the seas, so are the Netherlanders apparently born to defend their ancient freedoms" (Journael ende historis verhael, 3). Ercilla could hardly have said it better.

51 Journael ende historis verhael, 29-32. The natives encountered were most likely Mapuche.

52 Ibid., 53-60. The natives who crowded Brouwer's four ships and single yacht are reported to have brought their own provisions for the journey. They lacked, however, any navigational skill, and their poor advice caused the ships to be grounded in the sands approaching Valdivia.

53 Ibid., 69: " . . . over de gestalte der Schepen verwondert zijnde, doch waren seer diefachtigh ende begeerigh naer Yser-werck, alles wat sy saghen was haer gadinge, jae tot de Compassen toe, die sy uyt de nacht-huysen wegh namen."

54 Ibid., 70-74. However enthusiastic they might have been about the deal, the caciques pleaded ignorance when asked actually to sign an alliance - though European writing, in theory, would not have meant all that much to them.

55 Ibid., 75-76, and cf. 88-89, which discusses the richness of Chilean agriculture.

56 See the Tydingh uyt Brasijl.

57 Commelin, 2:150-51: "Dit alles behaeghde haer wel, maer soo haest men begon te segghen, dat men aldaer gekomen was, om met haer te handelen voor goudt ('t welcke her eenighste oogmerck van de West-Indische Compagnie was) begosten hare Casiques of Oversten sich te ontschuldigen, datsy langhe jaeren geen goudt gehadt hadden, noch 't selve sochten. . . . Alsoo is dese tocht, die de Generael Brouwer van soo grooten ghewicht achte, gantsch vruchtloos ende sonder eenighe effect afgeloopen."

The esteemed humanist Caspar Barlaeus, writing around the same time as Commelin, similarly dismissed all but the most mercenary motives for the voyage. He saw Brouwer as an "ambitious man," autocratic and unpopular with his men. Herckmans, on the other hand, he considered a good man "and a poet" (Barlaeus, 333).

58 Montanus, 568. Dutch plans for South America (and even "Chile") did in fact persist - if on less grandiose terms and with less official backing than during the first half of the century, when the Republic was actively at war with Spain. In the later 1650s, for example, the Dutch engaged a citizen of Cumana (Venezuela), who was interviewed in Amsterdam to determine if he might help in a planned insurrection designed to seize the northern section of the continent (from Venezuela to Brazil). Other plans called for attacks on the southern corner of the continent, too, and a Dutchman fluent in Spanish was dispatched to the region around the Rio Plata to make inquiries. He wandered some five hundred miles inland, drafted strategic maps, and made clandestine contacts - though he ultimately failed to spark the much anticipated American revolution. His efforts are dutifully reported in a letter to the Spanish ambassador to The Hague, dated 26 April 1662 (Archivo General de Simancas, Estado 8389, fol. 111; I would like to thank Wim Klooster for this reference).

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