Excerpts from the IGS message board - learning GS topics, metaphors.

The following edited excerpts come from a recent conversation on the IGS message board. If you haven't joined the board yet, you might want to think about doing so now. Those of us who participate in these conversations find the topics varied, stimulating and a great way to exchange thoughts and strengthen understanding about GS methods and concepts. Note--the nature of the message board makes it both difficult and imperative to denote emphasis. Internet etiquette interprets text in all capital letters as "shouting" which most people consider rude. To avoid that criticism, posters have taken to wrapping asterisks around the word or phrase to intensify it, without "shouting."

First Poster: Linguist George Lakoff and philosopher Mark Johnson have pretty clearly established that metaphors play a significant part in our use of language. The, to me, interesting aspect of their theories is that they show that metaphors are *mappings* from a source *conceptual-domain* onto another target domain, and which preserve the *structure* of the source domain.

It is also interesting to note that such metaphors are almost invariably (at least so far as I have seen), mappings of *intensionally defined* domains onto *extensionally* defined domains which give us, in some sense, more clearly defined "handles" to the *intensional* domains.

Somehow, I can't help but feel that this theory has a place within the GS framework, but I am struggling at present to determine just how it fits. One very obvious question is, "What, precisely, is a 'domain' and how does it fit"? Obviously, both domains of the metaphors are being represented at the verbal level, but it would seem to me to be necessary that they would also be represented in the non-verbal level in order for the relationship of the structures of the two domains to be recognized.

What do you think?

Second Poster: I believe Lakoff and Johnson's tour de force on this is Philosophy in the Flesh, which I hope to read in the coming months (after I get my copy back from my son!).

As I understand it, this book brings all their previous thinking into focus, identifying the fact that we *have* or *are* bodies as the source for our most effective metaphors. Our brains have a frame of reference for eating, so we can apply eating metaphors to other concepts and use all the brain's wired-in associations to make the concept understandable.

So a "domain," I think, means "the set of information and associations relating to a concept"--like eating, which has wires running to food categories, methods of consumption and preparation, flavors and aromas, health and illness, etc., etc. When we apply any part of the eating "domain" to an unrelated concept, like, say, thinking, we can call on all the associated items to "flesh out" the metaphor.

Hence, "food for thought" and an idea that "sticks in your craw" and a proposal you can "sink your teeth into," etc., etc. The more of the original domain that we can map to the metaphorical domain, the better the fit--or maybe that should read the other way 'round, I don't know.

For GS purposes, these ideas give us both a framework for explaining how our language conditions our perceptions (by creating a "domain" within which we operate without full conscious awareness), and a signpost indicating where we should look for pitfalls and abstraction confusions.

FP: So, do you think that 'domains' are to be found in the 'object' level or only in the 'verbal' levels? That's where I seem to be having problems in grasping the concept. (Look Ma, another metaphor!) It would seem to me that they would have to exist at the 'object' level in order for the correlation between the source and target domains to 'come out' at the 'verbal level.' Does any of this make sense to you?

SP: Well, good question. Not having read the book, I can't say for sure, but, I guess I would say, yeah, and no.

I think the substance for domains exists on the object level--bodies and food, e.g. And I think Lakoff postulates that *because* we "are" bodies, we perceive/conceive domains on the object level in a certain way. A body that has an exoskeleton, for example, would have an entirely different "domain" concerning skin, and therefore a different set of metaphors to use verbally.

It occurs to me to wonder if an aspect of elementalism exists regarding the terms "object" and "verbal." I mean, I understand that the word *is not* the thing. But in terms of perceiving/conceiving, can we validly separate one from the other? Never occurred to me before.

FP: I have been looking over the list of metaphors on Berkeley's website [1] and I have found that my earlier observation that metaphors appeared to be mappings from 'extensionally' defined domains to 'intensionally' defined ones is not correct, and a lot of them do not relate to any bodily relationships that I can determine. Well, I should modify that slightly. While *many* metaphors are not 'extensionally' defined, there are, indeed, many which are.

However, I still think that 'domains' exist on the non-verbal level. The question then becomes: how do they get there since they are not in any received through the senses? What occurred to me is that this happens because of the link from the higher levels as demonstrated in the Structural Differential. As I understand it, things defined at the higher levels can become part of the non-verbal level.

[1] http://cogsci.berkeley.edu/lakoff/MetaphorHome.html

SP: Well, surely *some* metaphors qualify as second-order metaphors, or higher. In fact, if you browse that list on the Berkeley site, you can see that. For example, the metaphor "Maintaining A Belief Is Loving A Partner" comes from the domain "Beliefs Are Love Objects" which relates to "Love Is A Unity (of Two Complementary Parts)."

I believe if you pursue the last one further, you come to the object level, where because our bodies experience certain physical phenomena in proximity to other bodies, we have a set of concepts that we verbalize as "love." Here again, we bump into the difficult line between the sensed and the spoken. How much of the "oneness" one feels with a loved one is object level and how much verbal?

FP: When I first read about L & J's 'Metaphor work,' as a linguist, I was very excited, but as a fledgling 'General Semantician,' I now see the whole thing in a totally different light. I seem to recall Korzybski writing something about 'metaphors' in S & S. I'll have to look back into S & S [1] for that.

Now, I feel the need to work on a second paper, to examine 'Metaphors' in a GS framework. As I said above, I think that such metaphors are possibly an even *more* insidious influence on our proper 'evaluating' than is the simple 'is' of identification.

[1] Maybe some kind posters know about this and can post the relevant items.

[2] However, I am trying now to develop a *true* GS orientation, which is why I am calling myself a 'fledgling General Semantician.'

SP: I'm sorry, but I think you have missed the major points of Lakoff's work by a mile. He does NOT promote metaphors as a "better" way to influence others.

He has uncovered the mechanism by which we, as human animals, develop metaphors intrinsically as an extension of our "being" an organism. His work completely rejects previous philosophical thought about the meaning and operation of metaphor. We cannot and need not try to escape metaphor-making. "All" communication involves some level of metaphor-making. Indeed, I think this can work as an alternative or complementary explanation of Korzybski's "levels of abstraction."

A metaphor provides a verbal handle on a concept that has no extensional referent. "Love is a journey" allows us to talk and think about the insubstantial feeling we call "love" with the tangible experiences we have when we move in a purposeful way. Otherwise, we have NO handle for such talk.

Lakoff's advice to the Dems has nothing to do with poetic language. Indeed, such as evaluation harkens back to the traditional dismissal of metaphor as nothing but poetry. Lakoff shows that metaphor operates constantly whenever we communicate. He suggests that the choice of the words we use to talk about something can "frame" or trigger different, intrinsic metaphors. Without remaining aware of our choice of words (consciousness of abstraction), we simply use the words of whoever started the conversation. If that person chose a metaphor that doesn't include handles for the values we seek to espouse, we are TONGUE-TIED.

The Reps use a lot of strong-father, obedient family metaphors. In that circumstance, the attempt to discuss nurturant behavior comes across as weak and feminine. Lakoff has suggested that the Dems reject the wording forced on them by the Reps metaphors and find their own metaphors that provide handles to their values. This is not evasiveness or propaganda. This is taking control of the symbols by which they communicate.

This is GS at its best.

FP: I seem to be seeing contradictory statements here:

"He [Lakoff] does NOT promote metaphors as a 'better' way to influence others."

and

"Lakoff has suggested that.... [Democrats] find their own metaphors that provide handles to their values. This is not evasiveness or propaganda. This is taking control of the symbols by which they communicate."

How is this latter quotation not implying that he wishes to use 'metaphors' to influence, (assuming that the purpose of communication from a political point of view is to influence)? In other words, "Rule the Symbols" by which they communicate?

All I am saying is that the use of metaphors seems to promote precisely what K was arguing against, i.e. Identification of different levels of abstraction so that proper evaluation is hindered.

"A metaphor provides a verbal handle on a concept that has no extensional referent. 'Love is a journey' allows us to talk and think about the insubstantial feeling we call 'love' with the tangible experiences we have when we move in a purposeful way. Otherwise, we have NO handle for such talk."

I agree that we may, indeed, have no other way to handle such, but I still think that we must become more conscious of the abstractions involved.

SP: I cannot but agree that communication, especially political communication, has the purpose of influence. So, yes, of course, we use metaphors in political language in order to influence people.

My point is that we can't NOT use metaphors in political language, or any other language for that matter, because metaphor is in our nature ("in the flesh" as Lakoff says). Proper evaluation requires understanding and controlling the inevitability of metaphor.

You say you grant that we have no other way to handle such things. I say that's true because, as Lakoff explains, we intrinsically make metaphors based on our existence as an organism, AND because, as Korzybski says, we intrinsically abstract from the object level. To me, these two views sound like two ways to say one thing--we WILL abstract from one level to another, especially from the object or physical level to the metaphorical or verbal level, by our very physical nature.

Perhaps an example will help: the word "comprehend," which we use to mean "understand" comes from the Latin for "to grasp." This represents the movement from the object level (fingers grasping an object) to the verbal and metaphorical level (minds grasping an idea). A huge fraction of language contains these kinds of metaphors, which don't even rise to the level of consciousness in everyday language. If I use a word that relies on a touch metaphor and your brain tends to respond to sight metaphors, you will have a harder time "grasping" what I mean to say. So as I become more conscious of my language choice, I can improve my communication by choosing words that convey more meaning to you.

So, yes, we must become more conscious of the abstractions involved. That, to me, is precisely what Lakoff is recommending to the Dems. Don't just take the language offered and ignore the implications of the abstractions contained therein. Become CONSCIOUS of what words and metaphors imply to and elicit from listeners. CHOOSE the language you want to use so that you have a better chance of communicating YOUR ideas and not the ideas of someone else.

How is this promoting anything but what K prescribed for sanity? Consciousness of abstracting, to me, implies more than the passive act of awareness. It implies acting ON the awareness to change my behavior.

FP: I will agree that *some* metaphors are 'in our flesh,' but I am not yet convinced that this constitutes the sole source, but I can't argue the point at this time. Looking over the list from Berkeley that I posted up-thread, it appears to me that some of the metaphors do *not* appear to be derivable "in the flesh," e.g., TIME IS MONEY, or IDEAS ARE OBJECTS. I think that a *lot* of research needs to be done on this.

No, I didn't say that we *don't* have any other way, what I said was that we *may not* have any other way. This remains to be seen also, in my opinion.

I am still skeptical of the ability of *any* political entities to not use 'metaphors' in a way that will be consistent with 'awareness of abstraction.' Without a GS-aware electorate, I think that it would be difficult for their values to be understood otherwise [1]. However, I will have to wait and see on that one also.

[1] I rewrote this sentence 3 times, and the first 2 were expressed strictly in metaphor. It's too, too easy to do, but sometimes, I think, that it can be done without loss of understanding. Yes, a lot of our vocabulary has its roots in metaphor, 'understand' as well as 'comprehend,' but to the average person without specialized knowledge, the metaphorical origin no longer has significance.

Third Poster: Well, interesting here: Brooke Gladstone mentions framing (though it's not sure whether she is using it in Lakoff's sense) in this week's "On The Media" (just the first segment): http://www.onthemedia.org/stream/ram.py?file=otm/o tm072905stream.mp3

The discussion is on the change from "war on terrorism" to "global struggle against violent extremism." Frame shift? Metaphor shift? Political correction? Something else?

This post could also go in the Symbol Rulers Forum, but I chose to put it here for the mention of framing.

SP: This sounds to me like "all of the above" to some extent, but mostly a political correction, more like "doublespeak." I suppose we will have to watch out for people applying the "framing" concept to any matter having to do with language for a while.

To me, a framing change would go from "war on terrorism" to something like "reconciliation of global philosophies" (not a very metaphorical example but hey, I just got up.) Meaning, a framing change involves substantive changes in the underlying principles espoused.

In the Brooke Gladstone example, the change in wording has little to do with presenting a different view of the referent, only with softening or elucidating or elaborating or embroidering the same view. They still want to get the bad people; they just think the listener has objections to the idea of war. Using "struggle" does imply some solidarity, a labor union concept, which does imply a small shift in view. But since the "global" part probably still doesn't involve *every* nation, since some of them are the bad people, the phrase does little to change the frame.

A big shift in view, i.e., a framing change, has to encompass a different evaluation of the bad people, into victims or at least into people with justification or reasons for their behavior towards us, and with some redeeming features. It has to replace the "us and them, good and evil" basis of the starting statement with a fundamentally different basis, like "bringing home the prodigal sons" or "saving the boats sinking in the rising tide."

When the symbols ruler says "violent extremism," the frame changer, assuming they truly don't agree with that term, has to use a different term to show that what THEY call "extremism" could also be called "patriotism" or "understandable outrage" etc., etc. After all, wasn't it a member of the party in power who said "extremism in the defense of liberty is no vice"? A radical frame change might show that TO THE ISLAMIST, this "extremism" is in defense of THEIR liberty against OUR terrorism--"middle eastern freedom fighters defending their homelands against the grasping greed of the 1st and 2nd world militarists."

And of course, other frames no doubt exist. Such as "one more skirmish in the age-old struggle between rich and poor," which puts this "global struggle" into the perspective of "normal" human behavior. Or how about "supply and demand"--they have the supply and we demand it.

As usual, we come to find that word choice has a huge effect on the way the listener thinks about the ideas behind the words and about the speaker of those words, for better or worse.

At least, that's how I see it.

Fourth Poster: I have read Lakoff (Metaphors, Elephants, etc.) and have become enamored of the constructivists (e.g., Paul Watzlawick). Per that view, "reality is unspeakable," so we model it with words and symbols (e.g., math). Our models "are not the territory" and none of us has a pipeline to reality to verify them. Instead, we hold various confidence levels in the models based upon criteria (e.g., form, fit, and function).

Framings are constructions of situations or actions. When we "reframe" something, we reconstruct it. Both the framing and the reframing are constructions. Framing thus has no priority over reframing, for the sequence could as well have been reversed in order.

We frame "problems," only to hear some gung-ho optimist say, "That's not a problem. That's an opportunity!" Pogo's answer to that was, "Then we is surrounded by insurmountable opportunity."

I understand the administration's motive for reframing "The War on Terror" because they've constructed a "war" we can't win. So let's not frame it as a war.

Not all reframings are specious. I remember in the 1970s when the gasoline supply became scarce. The then government said, "We don't have a gas shortage ... we have an energy shortage." I thought, "Here we go again with the useless word games," but I changed my mind when I was educated about the conversion of various energy sources into each other.

I feel strongly about your points on framing from one's point of view. To us, we own patriotism and the "terrorists" own extremism. To them, we own capitalistic extremism and they own piety. Who is right? Form, fit, and function won't tell us. The constructivists might say, "That's the way both sides have constructed it." If we say, "But who is right?" they might respond, "That question is unanswerable. Reality is unspeakable."

So we and the "terrorists" continue our deadly squabbles, and there is no parent to tell us, "Now you kids just STOP that nonsense or you're BOTH going to your rooms!" I'd like the U.N. to be that parent, but my own country won't let it be (e.g., our opting out of the World Court, et al).

Constructivism says we have a choice between framing and remaining mute. If we choose to frame, our normal human tendency is to frame from our own "privileged" viewpoint. A civilized world requires that we disputants step up a meta level to frame from a more no-fault viewpoint, but patriotism, ours and theirs, prevents that.

SELECTED BY NORA MILLER