Excerpts from court rulings

Excerpts from three 5-4 decisions in which the Supreme Court decided to allow corporations and labor unions wide latitude in airing advertisements close to elections, to limit students' speech rights and to bar a taxpayer challenge to the Bush administration's initiative encouraging faith-based groups to apply for federal grants.

Regulation of issue ads:

Chief Justice John Roberts' opinion:

"The First Amendment requires us to err on the side of protecting political speech rather than suppressing it. We conclude that the speech at issue in this as-applied challenge is not the 'functional equivalent' of express campaign speech. We further conclude that the interests held to justify restricting corporate campaign speech or its functional equivalent do not justify restricting issue advocacy.

"Discussion of issues cannot be suppressed simply because the issues may also be pertinent in an election. Where the First Amendment is implicated, the tie goes to the speaker, not the censor."

Justice David Souter's dissent:

"The indispensability of these huge sums has two significant consequences for American government that are particularly on point here. The enormous demands, first, assign power to deep pockets. ... At a critical level, contributions that underwrite elections are leverage for enormous political influence. Voters know this. Hence, the second important consequence of the demand for big money to finance publicity: pervasive public cynicism. ...

"After today, the ban on contributions by corporations and unions and the limitation on their corrosive spending when they enter the political arena are open to easy circumvention, and the possibilities for regulating corporate and union campaign money are unclear."

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Student speech:

Chief Justice Roberts' majority opinion:

"The message on Frederick's banner is cryptic. It is no doubt offensive to some, perhaps amusing to others. To still others, it probably means nothing at all. Frederick himself claimed 'that the words were just nonsense meant to attract television cameras.' But Principal Morse thought the banner would be interpreted by those viewing it as promoting illegal drug use, and that interpretation is plainly a reasonable one.

"The question thus becomes whether a principal may, consistent with the First Amendment, restrict student speech at a school event, when that speech is reasonably viewed as promoting illegal drug use. We hold that she may."

Justice Samuel Alito's concurring opinion:

"The opinion of the court does not endorse the broad argument advanced by petitioners and the United States that the First Amendment permits public school officials to censor any student speech that interferes with a school's 'educational mission.' This argument can easily be manipulated in dangerous ways, and I would reject it before such abuse occurs."

Justice John Paul Stevens' dissent:

"In my judgment, the First Amendment protects student speech if the message itself neither violates a permissible rule nor expressly advocates conduct that is illegal and harmful to students. This nonsense banner does neither, and the court does serious violence to the First Amendment in upholding _ indeed, lauding _ a school's decision to punish Frederick for expressing a view with which it disagreed."

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Faith-based programs:

Justice Samuel Alito, writing for the majority:

"Respondents set out a parade of horribles that they claim could happen.

"For example, they say, a federal agency could use its discretionary funds to build a house of worship or to hire clergy of one denomination and send them out to spread their faith. Or an agency could use its funds to make bulk purchases of Stars of David, crucifixes or depictions of the star and crescent for use in its offices or for distribution to the employees or the general public. Of course, none of these things has happened.

"In the unlikely event that any of these executive actions did take place, Congress could quickly step in."

Justice David Souter in dissent:

"The controlling opinion closes the door on these taxpayers because the executive branch, and not the legislative branch, caused their injury. I see no basis for this distinction in either logic or precedent.

"Here, there is no dispute that taxpayer money in identifiable amounts is funding conferences, and these are alleged to have the purposes of promoting religion. When executive agencies spend identifiable sums of tax money for religious purposes, no less than when Congress authorizes the same thing, taxpayers suffer injury."