Ex-offenders.

13. Ex-Offenders

U.S. District Court   Cox v. Malone, 199 F.Supp.2d 135 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
                      A state prisoner filed a [section] 1983 action
  PLRA-Prison         against prison officials, alleging excessive use
  Litigation          of force during a pat down frisk search, and due
  Reform Act          process violations in connection with a
                      disciplinary hearing. The district court granted
                      summary judgment in favor of the officials,
                      finding that the physical injury requirement of
                      the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) applied
                      after the prisoner was paroled, and that the
                      scratch on the prisoner's hand allegedly
                      resulting from a pat frisk was not sufficiently
                      serious to warrant Eighth Amendment protection.
                      (Mid-Orange Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. District Court   Donaldson v. Purkett, 204 F.Supp.2d 1199 (E.D.Mo.
                      2001). A former state prisoner filed a [section]
  RELEASE             1983 action alleging that seventy days of
                      imprisonment were unlawfully added to his state
                      court sentence. The district court dismissed the
                      complaint, finding that the claim did not involve
                      a violation of a liberty interest protected by
                      the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
                      Amendment, but rather only involved an
                      interpretation of state law. (Farmington
                      Correctional Center, Missouri)

U.S. Appeals Court    Meloy v. Bachmeier, 302 F.3d 845 (8th Cir. 2002).
                      A former state inmate filed a [section] 1983
  CLAIMS              action alleging that prison medical personnel
                      violated his civil rights by failing to provide
                      him with a continuous positive air pressure
                      machine (CPAP) to treat his obstructive sleep
                      apnea. The district court denied summary judgment
                      for the director of the prison's medical services
                      and the director appealed. The appeals court
                      reversed and remanded, finding that the director
                      was entitled to qualified immunity. The appeals
                      court held that the decision of the director to
                      adhere to a prison doctor's order that the prison
                      need not provide the inmate with a CPAP machine
                      was objectively reasonable in light of legal
                      rules in place at the time, entitling the
                      director to qualified immunity. The court noted
                      that the director was functioning in an
                      administrative role, even though she had some
                      medical training as a nurse, and she was not
                      responsible for examining and treating the inmate
                      herself. (North Dakota State Penitentiary)