Evaluation and decision.

Modern warfare is unprecedented in complexity, dynamism and scale, a circumstance making the appropriate methods for modeling armed confrontation processes an indispensable tool in justified operations (combat operations) plans and rational operations schedules. This prompted command and control elements of force groupings of the Armed Forces (AF) to adopt new generation modeling complexes. For example, modeling was crucial to U.S. and NATO successes in recent local wars, being part and parcel of efforts to devise effective assault methods for use by the air attack forces (AAF).

Modern modeling complexes afford totally new opportunities for upgrading the methods whereby commanders and staffs take decisions on and plan operations (combat operations). We shall use as an example the multifunctional modeling complex (MMC), which was put through its paces at universities and during operational training in the RF Armed Forces and proven capable of being the material foundation of staffs making efficient use of the method for evaluating the situation by elements of an operation (battle) plan.

The method for evaluating the situation by elements of an operation (battle) plan first appears under its name in a well-known book, The Fundamentals of Command and Control Theory, Colonel General P.K. Altukhov published close on 20 years ago. The method implies "a successive analysis of influences the concrete data characterizing the situation bring to bear on the definition and formulation of each element of the plan (concept of operation, field missions, organization of coordination, support, and C & C). For example, an estimate of the adversary reveals the importance of some or other force grouping and its assumed actions. Simultaneously the evaluators determine possible sequence and ways of routing the enemy force grouping, engagement method, and missions to be addressed by forces. After that the main elements of the plan are specified as an evaluation is made of the friendly forces, the terrain and other situational data. A comparison of the capabilities of the adversary and the friendly forces will result in identifying the main enemy targets to be engaged, as well as the engagement sequence; it is also indicated where the main attack should be, what formation the friendly forces must assume, etc." (1)

The book is excessively laconic on the method for evaluating the situation by elements of the plan, which, as we see it, is a disadvantage preventing complete comprehension and identification of procedures for its application in practice. Later publications failed to consider the method in greater detail. More than that, the book imposes severe restrictions on the method itself: "This method is based on analyzing the situation in accordance with a sequence accepted for the determination of the main points of the plan. It helps to cut the time consumed in plan-making under elementary conditions of the situation, since it requires specification of only separate elements of the plan or particular objectives of an operation (combat engagement). Its use is difficult, however, when the situation undergoes dramatic changes, or when it is necessary to accept a plan for an entire operation (combat engagement)." (2)

These and other circumstances are the reason why military universities and commanders and staffs as a rule use the widely known and tested method for evaluating the situation by its elements (the adversary, the friendly forces, the physical and geographic conditions, etc.). Fig. 1 shows the sequence of steps in making an operation (combat operations, battle) plan in accordance with the traditional method, as pursued by the command and staff of a large strategic formation (combined unit).

[FIGURE 1 OMITTED]

Its main defect is in that the evaluation of the situation by its elements gives rise to a contradiction between the existence of a reciprocal influence of the elements of the situation and the weak possibility of taking it into account, given the particular nature of situational analysis and proposals for the use of combat arms and special forces. For example, real actions by the adversary will in large measure depend on the action method chosen by the friendly troops (forces). Chiefs of MF & A, aviation, and air defense evaluate their troops (forces) and draw up proposals on their employment without the knowledge of details of proposed actions by troops (forces) working in coordination; neither can they always take into account reciprocal impeding impacts and restrictions on actions by groupings of troops (forces) that are being created. Indicative in this respect are constant problems in coordination between the surface-to-air missile forces and fighter aviation during combat operations. The controversial nature of conclusions and proposals suggested by chiefs of combat arms and services is responsible for the multi-stage and controversial procedure for making the concept of an operation (combat operations) and battle plan as a whole.

The method for evaluating the situation on the basis of battle plan elements helps to remove the said defect. Since a purposeful estimate of the situation would be impossible without a basic variant of the plan itself, the method was called "the method for evaluating the situation and accepting a plan by elements of the plan." The material prerequisite for its introduction was a multifunctional modeling complex capable of recreating objects of warfare, the essential ties between them, and the geographical medium identical with the real ones.

Notice that the existing models of separate types of weapons and military equipment (WME), combat-arm and service modeling complexes reflect properties of weapon models with sufficient accuracy. But they are based on different technologies and fail to take into account all mutual connections between operating Armed Forces groupings comprising units of more than one service. In turn, certain integral models of actions by AF groupings comprising units of more than one service use coefficient methodologies (the combat potentials method) and do not reflect (take into account) many essential properties of WME and conditions of military operations. This is why using them to model armed confrontation or WME employment produces results that are clearly at variance with the combat reality and fall short of the needs of operational planning or those necessitating the formation of AF groupings.

The MMC enabled the modeling of actions by AF groupings comprising units of more than one service, bringing results that were much more in tune with the reality. This circumstance is due to the MMC technology based on the object-oriented analysis of complex phenomena of the subject world. It also "copies" the characteristics of armed confrontation objects it is out to explore and the processes within these, preserving their properties, logical structure and connections essential for dealing with applied problems. Within MMC, therefore, armed confrontation objects abide by the same laws and keep the same interconnections as show in real objects and actions by groupings of troops (forces).

Formalized representation of the modes of operations by troops (forces) that are the foundation of an operation (combat operations) concept was another prerequisite of the method for evaluating the situation and making a battle plan on the basis of plan elements. (3)

The formalization implies construction of the general structure of a mode of operation, which means that it is represented as a system comprising some definite elements and connections between them. Yet the former modes theory gave no way of describing their elements and interconnections such as it was necessary for their modeling and efficiency evaluation, which was primarily the consequence of considerable vagueness of elements of a mode demonstrated in theory. The classical encyclopedic interpretation defines the mode as "an action or a system of actions used in performing something," (4) a mode of military operations is "the manner and procedures of employment of forces and assets to achieve objectives in an operation (combat)." (5) Comparing the two definitions warrants the statement that a mode of military operations is a system of actions (or procedures) achieving the objectives in an operation (battle, combat engagement). Military Encyclopedic Dictionary says that its description includes: effective engagement sequence; main and other axes of advance (in attack); disposition of areas (lines), which troops mostly concentrate on holding (in defense); disposition (combat formation) of troops (forces), the nature of maneuver they employ. It outlines certain elements of the mode with sufficient clarity, but fails to reveal their general structural connection, what with procedure disappearing from the description.

The Ozhegov dictionary defines procedure (in the meaning relevant to the subject under consideration) as a separate action, movement or performance mode, to wit, procedure is the selfsame, if particular, mode. Extending this tenet to the mode of military operations, one may infer that the mode of operations of any military organizational unit of troops (forces) should include procedures (particular modes) of operations performed by smaller (lower-echelon) units of troops (forces). This enables a coordinated decomposition of the mode of military operations into procedures by analogy with the decomposition of the general mission (objective) of operations into particular ones. Any particular mission tackled by the troops corresponds to a particular mode or procedure whereby it is tackled. Synthesizing those procedures into a system provides the general mode of achieving the objective (general mission) of military operations. This approach will turn an abstract totality of missions, modes and procedures, from the strategic down to the tactical level, into a pyramid tipped with the strategic mission and its corresponding mode. The formalized mode of military operations itself may be represented as a certain totality of procedures and connections between these in time, space and distribution of troops (forces) and assets.

What mostly distinguishes the method for evaluating the situation and making a plan on the basis of elements of the plan from the traditional method for evaluating the situation by its own elements is a changed sequence of work done by persons in authority and a changed modeling mode (Fig. 2).

[FIGURE 2 OMITTED]

For example, upon gaining a clear understanding of the mission, the main staff and command element officers of a strategic formation (combined unit) would update the MMC database as to the composition and state of the adversary, the composition and state of the friendly troops (forces) and those working in coordination therewith. They would also load other information relevant to the situation as it shapes. Furnished with a complete totality of the necessary situational elements, the MMC database will enable the staff and command element officers of a strategic formation (combined unit) to make, within the unified information framework, concrete static models of the initial situation, corresponding to their specific activities. The models make it possible for the officers to analyze (estimate) the adversary, the friendly troops (forces), and their static (potential) capabilities (combat and information fields) as applied to the emerging (forecasted) conditions of the situation. Given the particular importance of information about the adversary, this is the stage where the intelligence chief shall make his report on the adversary's aims, objectives (intentions), troops (force) groupings, and capabilities. His modes of operation will be figured out later along with the modes of operation of the friendly troops (forces).

This estimate of the situation results in the C-in-C (commander) and other staff and operations directorate officers of a strategic formation (combined unit) forming a sufficiently clear view on the main separate elements of the situation needed to define modes of an operation (combat operations).

The dynamic simulation modeling stage, the next stage in MMC employment, completely removes the contradiction of the traditional situation evaluation method. To model, it is necessary to forecast enemy action modes and devise action modes to be used by the friendly troops (forces), that is, operation (combat operations) modes. This is a sufficiently complicated and crucial process that only officers at the operations directorate level and higher can pursue.

For a start, they shall make out the aims and objectives of the operation (combat operations) of their own strategic formation, as applied to the aims and objectives of the opposing troops (force) grouping, and shall forecast targets and defense areas (positions) (Fig. 3). For example, if it is known that the adversary aims to gain air supremacy, seal off the area of operations, breach the defense and seize a certain area, his main objectives may be to neutralize the air defenses, destroy the air force, and engage with fires lines of communications and troops (force) groupings, with his strikes directed primarily at command and control facilities, air defense elements, airfields, MF & A positions, sea and river ports, railway and motor-road hubs, bridges, and troops (force) groupings in the defense breakthrough area (zone).

Based on the targets and the forecasted capture area and with regard for disposition (basing), range and tasking designation, they shall then allot all enemy weapons to targets. They shall determine safe areas and routes by which aircraft and missiles can reach targets in each variant. They shall calculate the strength necessary for breaking through the defenses with regard for the breakthrough tactics. From operational performance standards of troops (forces) and calculations of the time of flight of air weapons, they shall determine and feed to the MMC the general sequence of operations by troops (forces) and the expected (forecasted) maneuver by the enemy troops (forces) in all variants. The created models of enemy troops (force) groupings and the forecast for their maneuver will shape the operational formation.

In parallel, they shall deal with objectives for the benefit of the friendly troops (force) groupings, determining defense areas, and--in an offensive (counteroffensive)--areas where the enemy defenses will be breached, and modes of attacking his targets. They shall also determine and feed to the MMC data regarding the maneuver of troops (forces), form troops (force) groupings to deal with operation (combat operations) missions, and decide on their operational disposition.

[FIGURE 3 OMITTED]

The data obtained form the basis upon which the coordinated variants of actions by the enemy troops (forces) and the friendly strategic formation are made, to wit, the general modes of action by the opposing force groupings. The next step is modeling the resultant variants (modes) of actions by the parties, with parallel observation of the course of confrontation, in real-time or accelerated mode, on display screens, evaluation of results in each moment of the time, and their documenting. A specific feature of MMC modeling is that the main restrictions on and connections between the elements of the situation and actions by combined units and units of combat arms and special forces of the opposing parties are modeled automatically, something that is directly reflected in the results of actions by troops (forces). For example, if the necessary restrictions fail to be imposed on air actions in the antiaircraft fire zones during development of action modes, the air force will sustain major losses. The modeling also automatically takes into account some other plan elements, such as the fundamentals of command and control and coordination.

Modeling results in confrontation indicators, which enable efficiency evaluations and a choice of rational variants of operation (combat operations) modes. Several iterations of the process whereby the action modes by the opposing parties are formed and modeled will assure the approval of a well-grounded operation (combat operations) plan. The MMC record is evidence that an operation plan may necessitate the modeling of between 8 and 12 variants of enemy action modes and between 30 and 50 variants of friendly action modes.

Thus, the MMC is the main peculiarity of the method for evaluating the situation and accepting a battle plan by elements of the plan, the complex used to create the complete totality of situational elements, to form variants of enemy and friendly action modes, to model these and estimate results. As we see it, it makes sense to continue an exchange of views on this matter. It will assist a further headway in the decision and operational planning theory now that the Armed Forces command and control centers are converting to new information technologies.

NOTES:

1. P.K. Altukhov, Osnovy teorii upravleniya voyskami, Voenizdat Publishers, Moscow, 1984, p. 129.

2. Ibidem.

3. Voennaia mysl', No. 4, 1977, pp. 59-62.

4. S.I. Ozhegov, Tolkovyi slovar' russkogo yazyka, Russian Culture Fund, Moscow, 1995, p. 746.

5. Voenniy entsiklopedicheskiy slovar', Voenizdat Publishers, Moscow, 1984, p. 700.

Lt. Gen. V.V. BARVINENKO

Doctor of Military Sciences, Merited Scientist of the Russian Federation 

Col. V.R. LYAPIN

Candidate of Military Sciences