Engineer support of the defensive battle of Soviet troops in the Battle of Kursk.

The Battle of Kursk is the central event of the summer-autumn campaign of 1943. As a result of the historic victories of the Soviet armed forces in the Battle of Stalingrad and in the winter offensive of 1942/43, strategic initiative went over to the Soviet command. Beginning in March 1943, the front stabilized along the Mga, Velikiye Luki, Rzhev, Kirov, Sumy, Belgorod, Taganrog line. The salient around the city of Kursk was a bulge in the Soviet lines that protruded 100-120 kilometers westward. Both sides were trying to take advantage of the strategic pause in fighting to prepare new operations for decisive objectives.

By the summer of 1943, the Soviet Union built up its war industry potential to a considerable extent. Its war industry began supplying the troops with massive amounts of new types of military equipment. The artillery adopted in service: the 152-millimeter corps howitzer, the 160-millimeter mortar, the 57-millimeter antitank gun, subcaliber armor-piercing and shaped-charge projectiles. That year production was launched of Soviet self-propelled artillery pieces and new heavy first-class tanks IS-2. The air force was getting modernized fighter planes La-5, Yak-3, Yak-9 and the new dive bomber Tu-2.

The country's greater military-economic capabilities made it possible to meet the needs related to improving the organization of Soviet troops. The combined-arms armies basically completed the changeover to a corps-based organization. They formed new tank armies, put together major high command reserve artillery task forces. Thus, by the start of the Battle of Kursk, the Red Army was equipped with up-to-date types of weapons and had a new organizational structure in line with the requirements of contemporary warfare and surpassed in every component Nazi Germany's army despite the fact that the Wehrmacht had added to its equipment the heavy Tiger tank, the Panther medium tank, the self-propelled Ferdinand gun; the modernized fighter plane Fw 190D, and the ground attack aircraft Hs 129. Nazi Germany's army was still strong and capable of tough resistance to our forces (in the Soviet-German front, it included 227 divisions and 10 separate brigades). Enemy forces in the Kursk sector had 65 divisions, including 48 infantry, 14 panzer and 3 motorized divisions. The infantry divisions were up to full strength (12,500 men each) and the panzer divisions had between 14,000 and 16,000 men and 150-170 tanks each.

The general military-political situation was favorable for the Red Army. Having lost a number of battles in the winter of 1942/43, Nazi Germany sustained huge losses and casualties. To restore its prestige and prevent the Nazi bloc from disintegration, Germany launched preparations for another summer offensive planning the main offensive in the Kursk sector to surround and destroy the Soviet forces within the bulge and then to strike at the rear areas of the Southwestern Front and Donbas. The plan called for the employment of new tanks and self-propelled guns (SPGs) in all narrow sections of the front using lightning operations. The troops of the northern and southern forces were tasked with reaching the assigned objectives "in a single dash" and link up east of Kursk as early as in the second day of the offensive. It also called for the completion of Operation Citadel during the subsequent four days and then for pressing toward north and southeast (Operation Panther). (1)

The Supreme High-Command Headquarters (HQ SHC) surmised the enemy plans beforehand and decided to use the advantageous aspects of its defenses in order to rely on the well-prepared positions and wear down the enemy and then launch a counteroffensive to destroy the enemy in the Kursk salient. Following which there should be a general offensive toward west and southwest.

Special attention was attached to "engineer support as a type of operational (combat) support of combat actions of troops (forces) comprised of a set of engineer activities and tasks performed with the purpose of creating for the troops favorable conditions for their timely and undetected movement to contact, deployment or maneuver and performing the assigned combat missions ..." (2)

By the spring of 1943, the Red Army had accumulated a wealth of experience in defensive operations near Moscow, Leningrad and Stalingrad and the defense of Odessa and Sevastopol. The experience in engineer preparation of the ground was summed up and communicated to the troops on 21 March in the form of "Brief instructions on constructing defensive lines," and on 27 April, in the form of "An instruction on reconnaissance and construction of field defensive lines" approved by the chief of the General Staff. The main requirement for engineer preparation of the defense line was the use of a system of fighting and communication trenches provided with weapon positions of machineguns, antitank rifles and mortars, as well as with shelters for the personnel and materiel. The instruction laid special stress on the organization of antitank defense and a system of fire in conjunction with antitank obstacles.

The HQ SHC issued, on 2 July 1943, Order No. 0396 "On the employment and the crossing of minefields." This order pointed to the enormous importance of skillful use of antitank and antipersonnel obstacles and, above all, explosive obstacles. In defense, explosive obstacles can turn sections of terrain negotiable for tanks and infantry into a terrain hard to negotiate. In offensive operations, they helped our units to consolidate positions captured from the enemy and protect from enemy counterattacks the flanks of our infantry and tanks that were pressing forward. The order also stressed that the correctly organized and timely completed by the engineer troops work to clear the terrain of enemy mines facilitated success of our troops in offensive operations and their maneuverability.

The HQ SHC also directed to install minefields against tanks at least 100 meters deep placing the mines laterally in irregular rows 6-10 meters apart with a distance between the rows of 15 to 40 meters; to have as part of force dispositions of troops motorized engineer subunits for building obstacles in the path of penetrating enemy tank and motorized units and, in the offensive, to consolidate the lines taken by us by a prompt installation of minefields. This order also required that in offensive the force dispositions of infantry and tanks should have engineers for minefield reconnaissance and making minefield lanes. The order also required that there should be, in defense, a high density of explosive obstacles and that there should be set up mobile obstacle construction detachments (teams) both in defense and the offensive, as well as teams to remove obstacles and accompany troops in the offensive.

Under the decision of the HQ SHC, defending the Kursk salient was made the responsibility of the forces of the Central Front (CF), the Voronezh Front (VF) and the Stepnoy Military District--later known as the Stepnoy Front (StF) with their respective commanders and chiefs of engineer troops: General of the Army KK. Rokossovskiy and Major General. of Engineer Troops A.I. Proshlyakov, General of the Army N.F. Vatutin and Major General of Engineer Troops Yu. Bordzilovsky, Col. Gen. I.S. Konev and Engineer-Colonel A.D. Tsirlin.

The preparation of defenses began on 15 April and continued until 5 July 1943. The season of mud caused by thawing that began in the first weeks of the engineer preparations of the ground greatly hampered the work. The trenches became often flooded by spring water and collapsed and had to be dug again; the antitank minefields often lost their combat properties. The lack of hard-surface roads in the combat area, the massive destruction of bridges by the enemy and the impassible mud on unpaved roads created untold difficulties for the movement of troops and cargoes.

The engineer troops during that period had the following main tasks to perform: to detect enemy engineer activities related to preparations for the offensive; fortify army defensive zones and defensive zones of the fronts; to build and maintain, before the forward edge of the battle area and in the depth of the main defensive zone, continuous antitank and antipersonnel obstacles to the entire depth of defensive zone of the armies; to prepare a road system to facilitate maneuver of troops; to build facilities at the command and observation posts; to organize and train mobile obstacle construction detachments; to facilitate concealment of the massing of forces, carry out operational concealment and deception activities; to provide the troops with engineer munitions, equipment and materials, etc.

To cope with these tasks, every front had 230-240 engineer companies, which signified that there was on average 0.8-1.0 engineer company per one kilometer of the front. As a result of the tremendous efforts of all troops and with technical guidance and direct participation of the engineer units, preparation of defensive lines in the Kursk salient made a progress that proved unprecedented during the entire period of the war. Each combined-arms army prepared its main, second and rear defense lines. In some sections, these lines were supplemented with switch and intermediate positions. Each front prepared two or three defense lines complete with centers of resistance in the cities (Kursk, Staryy Oskol, Novyy Oskol). The Stepnoy Military District forces behind the lines of the Central and Voronezh fronts prepared a defense line along the eastern bank of the Kshen River. Defense construction agencies built a state defense line along the Don. All in all, eight defense zones and lines were built by the start of the Battle of Kursk to a general depth of up to 300 km.

The main zone of defense was comprised of battalion defense areas, antitank areas, fortified positions and a system of artificial obstacles. All in all, there were 350 battalion defense areas in the defense zone of both fronts. The wide and deep system of fighting and communication trenches made it convenient for the defending troops to conduct fire and facilitated broad maneuver of forces and offered comparatively reliable protection against rifle and machinegun fire, artillery and mortar fire and against air bomb fragments. For example, the 13th Army of the CF, which was in a threatened sector, dug almost 8 km of fighting and communication trenches along one kilometer of the frontage of the main defensive zone. Besides, it built a far-flung system of roads and cross-country routes for maneuver of troops. In the CF and VF zones, they prepared, rebuilt and repaired 3,000 km of roads and 250 bridges (6,500 linear meters in all).

Marshal of the Soviet Union Rokossovskiy wrote in his book of memories: "Considering that the enemy would, most certainly, strike with big forces, the command of the front gave the troops, in its orders of the day and directives at the end of March, specific instructions concerning preparation of defensive lines. The chief of the front's engineer troops Maj. Gen. A.M. Proshlyakov prepared a detailed schedule and made a great effort to see that work activities should be completed as scheduled. Systematic preparations for the defense of the Kursk salient began in April and went right until the enemy offensive. The fortifications in the main defensive zone were built by military units. Local civilians were taking active part in the construction of the second and third defensive zones, the rear army and front zones alongside military units." (3)

The chief of engineer troops of the 7th Guards Army that defended the Belgorod-Volchansk section, Col. V.Ya. Plyaskin, writes: "I was required more than once to make situation reports to the VF commander General of the Army N.F. Vatutin and the Military Council member Lt. Gen. N.S. Khrushchev who wanted to know literally every detail about engineer preparation of the zones and positions and paid special attention to building a system of artificial obstacles. Without exaggeration, the most popular military terms heard between March and April 1943 in the Kursk salient were engineer work activities, obstacles, mines, trenches, etc." (4)

The engineer preparation of defensive zones was carried out in full compliance with the concept of the operation and the operational disposition of forces, took into account the advantageous conditions of terrain and included engineer activities to conceal the troops, positions, vehicles and installations. Every defense zone consisted of several positions with an extended system of fighting and communication trenches. They also prepared primary, alternate and temporary positions for artillery and mortars, as well as dugout shelters for the entire personnel, combat equipment and motor vehicles. Special attention was paid to command posts which were especially robust structures to withstand direct hits of 105-150 mm artillery projectiles and air bombs of 50-100 kilograms.

The system of fighting and communication trenches broadly developed laterally and to a great distance in depth made it convenient for the defending troops to conduct fire and facilitated broad maneuver of forces. It gave the defending forces a number of advantages. First, it offered concealment to the troops, good communication between subunits along the frontage and in depth; made it hard for enemy reconnaissance to find out the pattern of our defenses, disposition of troops and the location of infantry weapon emplacements. Second, it drastically reduced the possibility for the enemy to conduct aimed fire; it minimized casualties among the defending forces from area air bombing, artillery and mortar fire, as well as during low-angle fire of tanks and machineguns, the fire of snipers and other close-combat weapons; the system also made possible concealed maneuver of subunits. (5)

To make the antitank defense more reliable, they employed on a hitherto unprecedented scale various types of obstacles: antitank obstacles, antipersonnel mines, controlled and uncontrolled ground bombs, barbed wire entanglements, antitank ditches and so on. Mined and explosive obstacles were used very extensively and they were planted in the most dense manner along the probable paths of enemy attack: Along the Orel-Kursk line in the CF zone there were 1,600 antitank mines and 1,000 antipersonnel mines per one square kilometer, along the Belgorod-Oboyan line in the VF zone there were 1,400 antitank mines and 1,200 antipersonnel mines. During preparations for the defense of the Kursk salient, the engineer troops installed nearly one million antitank mines, antipersonnel mines and ground bombs, a great number of bridges and important installations were prepared for being blown up. (6)

The enemy casualties and losses data offer a clear idea of the tremendous importance for the stability of defense of the system of obstacles built in the zones of the first-echelon combined units. The enemy lost to mines in the Battle of Kursk 1,055 tanks 84 percent of which were lost as they were breaking through the tactical defense zone which attests to the huge amount of work done by the engineers to make defense stable. A shining example of thoroughly reasoned and successful employment of mines and explosives is the system of obstacles built in the defense zone of the 13th Army of the CF, where our engineers installed, before 5 July 1943, more than 50,000 antitank and antipersonnel mines; and an additional 23,000 of them between July 5 and July 12, that is to say, when the defensive battle was in progress.

Special attention in the organization of defenses was paid to concealment and deception. Alongside the meticulous camouflaging of positions and troop deployment areas, especially of the second echelon and the reserves, they built a great number of dummy structures and various artificial camouflage screens. Complete with dummy tanks and artillery pieces and motor vehicles, demonstration concentration areas were often bombed by enemy aircraft while the real targets remained intact.

The engineer troops of the VF camouflaged four fuel depots and four special-purpose facilities and manufactured prefabricated dummies of 883 tanks and 220 planes, prepared three demonstration concentration areas and built 13 dummy airfields. The front's armies manufactured more than 1,000 dummy artillery guns and 120 dummy tanks. Engineer activities related to operational camouflage and deception achieved their aim: 90 percent of the dummy targets were attacked by enemy aircraft whereas the enemy reconnaissance failed to discover the skillfully concealed real targets. The enemy dropped on dummy airfields alone 140 air bombs totaling 10,250 kg and fired at them from the air on numerous occasions. (7)

Engineer reconnaissance units were tasked during the period of defense preparations with determining what the enemy was doing to prepare for the offensive. The reconnaissance established: concentration of enemy bridge trains, places where bridges were built and it discovered, toward the end of June and the beginning of July, lanes made by the enemy in its land obstacles. Furthermore, the engineer reconnaissance units discovered on the night of 5 June that the enemy made lanes in our minefields in the zone of the 13th Army of the CF and captured a German combat engineer who revealed that the enemy planned to start of artillery preparation at 0430 on 5 June. This considerably reduced the element of a surprise enemy attack and made it possible to successfully carry out an artillery counterpreparation.

At 0730 on July 5, the enemy launched an offensive in the defense zones of the 13th Army and partly the 70th Army aiming its main strike at the Arkhangel-skoye-Verkhneye Tagino section in the direction of Olkhovatka employing the forces of the 41st and 47th panzer corps. Leading the offensive were medium and light tanks in groups of 50-100 machines which were rapidly approaching the forward edge of our main line of resistance. The tanks were followed by infantry. The heavy Tiger tanks and Ferdinand SPGs covered the medium and light tanks and infantry with their fire. The massive employment of tanks in narrow sections, Nazi generals thought, was to help breach the defense zone and exploit the success of the offensive. But they miscalculated. The engagements for the main line of defense showed stability of our troops in defense.

Alongside the antitank artillery, the engineer troops played a major role in repulsing enemy attacks. The first echelon rifle divisions of the CF included approximately 100 engineer companies (30 percent of their total number). The remaining companies were employed to tackle the tasks of the fronts and armies.

The main task of the engineer troops during the defensive battle was the maneuver of obstacles. In accordance with plans made in advance, division-level mobile obstacle construction detachments (MOCDs) were moved along the prepared routes to forward lines of deployment. The engineers immediately went down to installing mines in threatened sectors. Army-level MOCDs detailed part of their strength to go up front to maneuver the obstacles in the path of the attacking enemy tanks and the main zone of defense while they used the remaining units to put in combat readiness obstacles in the second defense zone. During the first day of fighting, MOCDs installed about 6,000 mines and blew up 14 bridges in the path of enemy advance. That day, the enemy lost 98 tanks and SPGs and more than 2,000 men and officers to the CF zone minefields. The greater part of the tanks (about 70 percent) were blown up as they negotiated the minefields installed in advance along the forward edge of defense and in the depth of the main zone of defense.

The mined obstacles restricted the movement of enemy tanks which enabled our artillery to conduct aimed fire and destroy them. As early as in the second day of fighting, CF engineer units installed more than 9,000 mines, blew up 16 bridges and put in top combat readiness all the mined obstacles in the second zone of defense. During that day, 88 tanks and SPGs were blown up by our mines, 65 of them were blown up by mines installed during the course of fighting.

Paying a huge price in casualties and losses, the enemy could advance across the main zone of defense, break into our defenses 6-8 km and break into the second zone of defense along a 25-km stretch north of Olkhovatka. Fierce fighting was going on July 6, 7 and 8 for the second zone of defense. Special attention on these days was being paid to maneuver of obstacles in the area of Ponyri and on the boundary between the 13th and 70th armies. The operations of engineer units and combined units were directed in this sector by Major General of Engineer Troops A.I. Proshlyakov, chief of the front's engineer troops. On July 7, 108 tanks and SPGs were blown up on our minefields, 76 of them were blown up by mines installed by MOCDs. On July 8, the engineers put in place 8,000 mines. In the course of that day, 98 enemy tanks and SPGs were blown up by our mines, 68 of them were blown up by mines installed in the course of action.

In a bid to break through the defenses in the area of Ponyri, the enemy concentrated up to 200 tanks and two infantry divisions. They were stopped by the 307th Rifle Division and MOCDs of the 13th and 70th armies and could not breach the second zone of defense and reach the area of Ponyri. Supporting the counterattacks and counterstrikes delivered by our troops, in order to restore the situation, the engineer troops were supposed to install obstacles in the second zone of defense. During the course of fighting, MOCDs usually installed minefields in the depth of defense on the attack course of tanks. Especially efficient were units and subunits of the 1st Guards Engineer Brigade under Major General of Engineer Troops M.F. Ioffe. Operating mainly in the defense zone of the 13th Army, mine specialists of this brigade blew up and destroyed 140 enemy tanks and SPGs between July 5 and July 9, 1943. Mine specialists--destroyers of tanks Senior Lieutenant Tushev, Senior Sergeants Podoprigora and Shchiptsov and ordinary mine specialist Dzhim became famous through their heroic deeds. Two battalions of this brigade especially distinguished themselves: the battalion under Major A.V. Vanyakin in the area of Ponyri, and the battalion under Major Frolov on the left flank of the 13th Army.

Many regiment- and division-level mine specialists showed courage and fortitude. One possible example is the heroic deed by combat engineers of the 280th Rifle Division who installed, during the course of fighting, 1,785 antitank mines to blow up 15 enemy tanks. Excellent job was done by combat engineers of the 81st Rifle Division on 7 July 1943 when enemy tanks broke through to the northern edge of Ponyri and, while rolling, they tried to seize the bridges across the Snov River. However, the engineers of the division blew up the bridges literally in full view of the enemy. This stopped the tanks and they came under deadly artillery fire.

In the engagements of 6-8 July, CF combat engineers set up examples of heroism and fortitude combating enemy tanks. In cooperation with the antitank artillery, the engineers skillfully maneuvered obstacles. Despite its desperate attempts, the enemy could push as little as 10-12 km forward in the Orel-Kursk sector. Even this limited tactical success cost the enemy so big losses that it had to call off further offensive and go over to the defensive on July 10.

During the period from July 5 and 12, the engineer troops operating in the zone of the 13th and 70th armies installed 34,890 antitank mines and 3,780 antipersonnel mines and blew up 40 bridges on the roads used by the enemy. The enemy lost, to the minefields and the fire of our artillery, 420 tanks and SPGs, 7 APCs and more than 4,000 men and officers.

A battle of equal ferocity was going on at the same time in the southern section of the Kursk salient where the enemy aimed its main thrust at the defensive area of the 6th Guards Army, and the VF was pressing from the area of Tomarovka in the general direction of Oboyan. At the cost of enormous losses, the enemy troops broke 30-35 km into this sector by the end of July 9, but the enemy could not continue advance. Thanks to the courage and tenacity of our fighting men and the competent use of all armed services, the enemy did not achieve operational success in any part of the defense area. Combat engineers made their own contribution to defeating this enemy disposition of forces. The minefields alone installed by MOCDs blew up 113 tanks, 30 assault guns and 73 motor vehicles. All in all the minefields installed by engineer units of the 6th Guards Army were responsible for the blowing up between July 5 and 11, 365 enemy tanks and SPGs.

A characteristic example of the successful employment of obstacles and maneuver of them during the course of the defensive battle were the combat operations that unfolded in the defense area of the 81st Guards Rifle Division of the 7th Guards Army of the VF that took up a defensive position opposite of the so-called Mikhaylovka base of operations seized by the enemy on the eastern bank of the Seversky Donets near the village of Mikhaylovka. The repeated attempts of units to eliminate this base of operations failed and only resulted in needless casualties. The commander of the front, General of the Army N.F. Vatutin, studied the situation in the field and ordered that further attempts to eliminate the Mikhaylovka base be stopped. In order to deny the enemy the possibility to use it he said that a number of difficult and responsible problems should be first solved. He required the organization in that area of a firm defense position saturated to the maximum with mined obstacles. Installed along one kilometer of the defensive frontage were 2,133 antitank mines, 2,626 antipersonnel mines and 3.4 kilometers of barbed wire entanglements.

The German 19th Tank Division, which launched offensive from the Mikhaylovka base on July 6, could not continue it as faced fierce resistance from the 81st Guards Rifle Division. This was facilitated to a considerable extent by installing around the base massive obstacles covered by all types of fire, as well as the skillful maneuver of mined obstacles during the fighting. Describing combat operations on 5-18 July 1943, the command of Germany's 19th Tank Division painted the following picture of the battle in its report: "The Russians surrounded the crossing (Mikhaylovka base) with such an impregnable defensive zone with deep minefields that the battalion could not breach it despite its dedicated efforts. Owing to our huge losses, offensive toward the Donets River had to be called off."

The report of the 19th Tank Division headquarters did not admit an outright defeat that befell the division, glossed over the huge losses it sustained and only cited special difficulties attending the offensive operations in conditions of "mined obstacles up to now unprecedented for their depth and power." To fill the gaps in the German report, it would be recalled that the German 19th Tank Division lost during the battle in the defensive zone of the 81st Guards Rifle Division more than 100 tanks, including 7 Tigers, and approximately 1,000 men and officers, and the division commander, General Schmidt, shot himself unable to bear the setback. In the Oboyan sector of the defensive zone of the 6th Guards Army, 335 German tanks, including 29 Tigers, 30 SPGs, 60 motor vehicles and 7 armored vehicles were blown up in the minefields on 5-11 July. (8)

Making sure that it could not breach the defenses in the Oboyan sector, the enemy resumed its offensive in the Prokhorovka zone on July 11 only to encounter resistance from antitank reserves and mobile obstacle detachments. Very effective, in addition to the mobile obstacle detachments in the VF, were also smaller teams of engineers equipped with antitank rifles, grenades and mines operating in the paths of enemy tanks and behind enemy lines. Their operations gave rise to more and more operations involving engineers who hunted and destroyed tanks.

Tanks were also fought by engineer reconnaissance teams in enemy communications zones. These teams blew up bridges, mined roads, bombed tanks and motor vehicles thus disrupting enemy lines of communication. During the German offensive on 5-17 July, VF engineers installed more than 55,000 mines which inflicted heavy losses on the enemy. (9) The methods the engineers used were extremely diverse and they varied with the situation, the number and types of tanks, kinds of terrain, disposition of the friendly forces and the availability of antitank weapons.

In the morning of July 12, the VF forces counterattacked the enemy force that broke in to the positions of our troops in the southern flank of the Kursk salient. The 6th Guards Army and the 1st Tank Army attacked from the Melovoye-Kruglin line in the direction of Yakovlevo. The main attack from the area of Prokhorovka in the direction of Yakovlevo was led by the 5th Tank Army and the 5th Guards Army. This was the largest tank battle.

For the purposes of redeploying and concentrating troops in the staging areas for an offensive, the front's engineer troops repaired roads, built and reinforced 58 bridges, assembled 4 floating bridges and saw across them 680 tanks, 1,200 motor vehicles and 420 two-horse carts. (10) In support of the offensive the engineers made lanes in enemy mined obstacles, prepared cross-country routes and protected the boundaries between units and flanks by installing obstacles there.

In a bid to entrench in the captured positions, the enemy widely used mined obstacles and, as it was retreating under pressure from our forces, it destroyed the bridges and roads and mined built-up areas. To facilitate maneuver of our troops, as they surged forward, the engineer troops made lanes in the enemy minefields, repaired and built roads and bridges in combat environment. To give the reader an idea of the scope of work done by the engineer troops, it is sufficient to say that they removed and defused 48,500 enemy mines near Belgorod when the fighting was in progress for reversing the situation.

We should point out in conclusion that the new forms of preparing defensive areas the Soviet troops used near Kursk, including the other factors, contributed to the successful repulsing of the massive enemy tank attacks. Thanks to the great number of fighting and communication trenches and shelters, our troops sustained insignificant casualties under the fiercest enemy artillery and mortar fire and air bombing and were fit physically and morally to maneuver in all environments on the battlefield and repulse the enemy attacks.

A big role in thwarting the enemy tank attacks was played by the mined obstacles installed by combat engineers both before the front edge of the defense and deep in the defense with a density of more than 1,500 antitank mines and the same number of antipersonnel mines per one kilometer of the frontage. The antitank and antipersonnel minefields were, as a rule, covered by the fire of antitank artillery and small arms.

Our mobile obstacle construction detachments, which were set up in regiments, divisions, corps, armies and fronts, were widely employed in the Battle of Kursk. They became a component part (element) of the combat lineups of units and combined units, as well as the operational dispositions of forces of large strategic formations. There was smooth cooperation between them and antitank artillery reserves.

NOTES:

1. "Kurskaya oboronitelnaya operatisiya 1943," in: Voennaya entsdiklopediya, Vol. 4, Voenizdat Publishers, Moscow, 1999, pp. 360-362.

2. "Inzhenernoye obespecheniye," in: Voennaya entsiklopediya, Vol. 3, p. 341.

3. K.K. Rokossovskiy, Soldatskiy dolg, 3rd supplementary edition, Voenizdat Publishers, Moscow, 1985, p. 366.

4. Inzhenernyye voyska Sovetskoy Armii v vazhneyshikh operatsiyakh Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny, Voenizdat Publishers, Moscow, 1958, p. 308.

5. Inzhenernyye voyska Sovetskoy Armii 1918-1945, Voenizdat Publishers, Moscow, 1985, p. 487.

6. Inzhenernyye voyska Sovetskoy Armii v vazhneyshikh operatsiyakh Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny, p. 308.

7. Central Archives of the RF Defense Ministry, rec. gr. 69, inv. 24771, f. 103, sheet 41.

8. Ibid., rec. gr. 69, inv. 24771, f. 103, sheet 125.

9. Ibidem.

10. Ibidem.

Maj. Gen. B.G. ZAITSEV

Col. V.N. DERKACH (Ret.)

Candidate of Military Sciences