Emotional intelligence: Popular But Elusive Construct.

As we begin the new millennium, our society faces a number of economic, health-related, ethnic-racial, cultural, geopolitical and environmental challenges. Most agree that solutions to society's most vexing problems will require citizens to possess not only well-developed intellectual abilities, but also equally impressive social and emotional skills. It is this recognition of the importance of savvy interpersonal skills and the ability to get along effectively with others that has helped fuel the growing interest in the concept of emotional intelligence (EI).

A second reason for the growing interest in the concept of EI has to do with recent theories embracing more broad conceptualizations of intelligence (Gardner, 1983; Sternberg, 1988). Over the past hundred years, most theories of intelligence (Binet & Simon, 1916; Carroll, 1993; Spearman, 1923; Thurstone, 1938; Wechsler, 1958) have posited the preeminence of one general ability, g, at the apex of a hierarchical model (Brody, 1992; Carroll, 1997). This general factor, g, represents what many psychometric researchers feel is the primary mental ability, underlying what all different kinds of intelligence tests have in common (Keith, 1994).

Successively more specific mental abilities constitute the lower strata or levels of generality, depending upon the particular theory. Fluid and crystallized intelligence is one example (Horn, 1976) and verbal-comprehension and nonverbal-perceptual-spatial abilities is another (Wechsler, 1958).

These traditional theories of intelligence, although quite varied, share a small number of consensual attributes. They all agree that intelligence is goal-directed mental activity that is marked by efficient problem solving, critical thinking, and effective abstract reasoning (Neisser, Boodoo, Bouchard, Boykin, Brody, Ceci, Halpern, Loehlin, Perloff, Sternberg & Urbina, 1996; Sternberg, 1986; Stoddard, 1943).

An elegant definition of intelligence that provides a useful theoretical framework for considering the EI construct was recently proposed by Sternberg (1997): Intelligence comprises the mental abilities necessary for adaptation to, as well as shaping and selection of, any environmental context (p. 1030). According to this definition, individuals act intelligently not only when they successfully adapt or react to the environment, but also when they shape and change their existing environment to meet their needs. Sternberg posits that intelligence has a common core of mental processes, irrespective of culture or environmental context. Consistent with Baron (1982) and Dewey's (1933) earlier conceptions of reflective thinking, Sternberg (1997) writes:

   Among the core mental processes that may be key in any culture or other
   environmental context are (a) recognizing the existence of the problem, (b)
   defining the nature of the problem, (c)constructing a strategy to solve the
   problem, (d) mentally representing information about the problem, (e)
   allocating mental resources in solving the problem, (f) monitoring one's
   solution to the problem, and (g) evaluating one's solution to the problem
   (p. 1031).

Later in the article we will return to this definition of intelligence to help consider if the EI construct presently meets the requirements for constituting a type of intelligence.

Alternative Conceptions of Intelligence

Although a majority of theorists postulate a hierarchically-arrayed model of human intelligence, a growing number of critics contend that traditional views of intelligence place too great of an emphasis on g and are too narrowly construed. These critics argue that traditional models give undue weight to mental abilities that are at a premium in academic performance (Ceci & Williams, 1997; Cole, Gay, Glick & Sharp, 1971; Sternberg & Wagner, 1993).

Guilford (1967) pioneered an early view of intelligence as a multifaceted construct--consisting of one hundred and twenty different types of intelligence. In Guilford's Structure of Intellect Model, each specific type of intelligence represents the unique interface of three dimensions (mental operations, contents, and products). Although Guilford did not write about EI, the Structure of Intellect model could support the inclusion of what subsequent writers propose as a new type of intelligence-the ability to process affective information.

More recent theoreticians explicitly contend that traditional views of intelligence neglect important mental abilities, such as the ability to read social cues or to make accurate social inferences. They assert that these cognitive abilities are every bit as important as verbal-linguistic and mathematical-logical skills in behaving intelligently.

Theorists such as Howard Gardner (1983) argue for a new view of non-hierarchically arrayed, primary mental abilities, called multiple intelligences. Gardner's provocative view is based on the logic that there are many ways to be intelligent. Expanding beyond both the two factor (Wechsler, 1958) or three factor typologies (Carroll, 1993), Gardner (1983) proposes seven primary types of intelligence: verbal, mathematical-logical, spatial, kinesthetic, musical, interpersonal and intrapersonal. Gardner's writing on interpersonal and intrapersonal intelligences specifically sets the stage for subsequent, more elaborate theorizing on EI as a type of intelligence.

Many other theorists have followed Gardner's lead in proposing expanded views of intelligence (such as Das, Naglieri, & Kirby, 1994, Feuerstein, Rand, & Hoffman, 1979; Kaufman & Kaufman, 1993). Two important bodies of writing that specifically elaborate upon Gardner's early conceptualization of EI are Goleman (1995a; 1998) and Salovey and Mayer (1990, 1997). This paper provides an overview of their respective theories of EI, discusses unanswered questions with the EI construct and the relevance of EI to the gifted field.

Goleman's Theory of EI

The publication of Daniel Goleman's (1995a) best selling book, Emotional Intelligence, made popular the notion that emotions are a valid domain of intelligence. Goleman writes in an engaging, authoritative, but intentionally non-scholarly fashion, integrating a vast interdisciplinary literature from neuroscience, psychiatry, and child development in a clear and persuasive manner. Although academicians and researchers might take issue with some of his broad and sweeping generalizations and implications, his writing style captures the imagination of the reader.

Goleman (1995a) defines EI as, ... being able to rein in emotional impulse; to read another's innermost feelings; to handle relationships smoothly. (p. xiii). Goleman argues, ... In a sense we have two brains, two minds - and two different kinds of intelligence: rational and emotional. How we do in life is determined by both ... ordinarily the complementarity of limbic system and neocortex, amygdala and prefrontal lobes, means each is a full partner in mental life (p. 28). Goleman's (1995, 1998) thesis is that the balance and management of our emotions determines how intelligently we will act and our ultimate success in life.

Goleman's (1995a) model of EI is expansive. He posits that a large number of human abilities fall within the EI construct, including: frustration tolerance, delay of gratification, motivation, zeal, persistence, impulse control, regulation of mood, ability to empathize, attunement to others, hopefulness, and optimism. Goleman (1995a) defines emotions as impulses to act (p. 6). He points out that, although there is no consensus on which human emotions are primary, the main candidates are anger, sadness, fear and enjoyment.

Salovey and Mayer's Theory of EI

Peter Salovey and John Mayer are credited by many with first coining the term `EI'. Their evolving theorizing on EI is on a considerably less grand scale than the work of Goleman (1995a). They view EI as, a set of skills hypothesized to contribute to the accurate appraisal and expression of emotion in oneself and others, the effective regulation of emotion in self and others, and the use of feelings to motivate, plan, and achieve in one's life (Salovey & Mayer, 1990. p. 185). Their current writing on EI emphasizes four cognitive components: The capacity to perceive emotion, to integrate it in thought, to understand emotion, and to manage emotion (Mayer & Salovey, 1997).

Their work subsumes Gardner's (1983) intrapersonal and interpersonal intelligences and in many ways is consistent with earlier research on social intelligence (Ford & Tisak, 1983). Salovey and ]Mayer contend that it is not problematic to view EI as a legitimate type of intelligence, and acknowledge that neither their theory of EI nor research necessarily supports a g model of intelligence. They affirm, What is more critical is that (EI) fits within the boundaries of conceptual definitions of intelligence, such as those provided by Wechsler (Salovey & Mayer, 1990, p. 187). In other words, they view the ability to process affective information as an intellectual aptitude consistent with the Sternberg's (1997) definition of intelligence described earlier. Reasoning that takes emotions into account is part of what we have referred to as EI (Mayer & Salovey, 1997, p. 4). Sternberg would not disagree with Mayer & Salovey's position. In fact, Sternberg writes, A priori, there is no reason not to posit the abilities to understand and regulate emotions as a kind of intelligence (Sternberg, 1997, p. 1034). However, Sternberg would also argue that the abilities that Mayer & Salovey are describing have not yet been put to the test to qualify as a type of intelligence.

The development of EI measures has not nearly kept pace with the theorizing and popular interest in the EI construct. At this time, there is no brief, objective, theoretically grounded measure of EI that enjoys acceptable reliability or validity. The next section provides an overview of the state of the art of EI measures.

Tests that Measure EI

The following intentionally brief presentation serves to introduce the reader to instruments that purport to measure the elusive EI construct. As mentioned above, there presently is no psychometrically sound measure of EI. However, there are one dozen or more self-report instruments that purport to measure EI, and a smaller number of EI measures that are not in a self-report format.

Goleman (1995b) constructed a set of ten illustrative EI questions that he feels represent a situation in which (an) emotionally intelligent response is quantifiable (p. 1). He suggests that one's responses to these ten questions will provide an estimate of a person's EQ. One of the ten questions on his EQ scale is:

   You and your life partner have gotten into an argument that has escalated
   into a shouting match; you're both upset and, in the heat of anger, making
   personal attacks you don't really mean. What's the best thing to do?

a. Take a 20-minute break and then continue the discussion.

b. Just stop the argument -- go silent, no matter what your partner says.

c. Say you're sorry and ask your partner to apologize, too.

d. Stop for a moment, collect your thoughts, then state your side of the case as precisely as you can.

Goleman (1995b) assumes that there is one correct response to each of his ten EQ items and that the more items answered correctly, the higher one's EQ. However, since there is no test manual, it is unclear how Goleman developed or selected test items and whether he collected any data in support of the EI scale's validity. Also it is not clear what ability or abilities Goleman's EQ test measures. Does the test item above sample an aspect of EI, social information processing, social problem-solving, dyadic negotiation, or some other combination of abilities or traits? Without validation studies, we simply don't know.

Salovey and Mayer's work has incorporated a variety of self-report measures that purport to measure EI. They use tests developed by them and instruments borrowed from other researchers, such as the BarOn Emotional Quotient Inventory (Bar-On, 1996; Bar-On & Parker, 2000); The Style on the Perception of Affect Scale (Bernet, 1996); The Toronto Alexithymia Scale (Taylor, Ryan & Bagby, 1985); The Emotional Control Questionnaire (Roger & Najarian, 1989). Below is a description of three EI measures, one developed by Bar-On (Bar-On & Parker, 2000) and two measures developed by Salovey and Mayer.

The BarOn Emotional Quotient Inventory: Youth Version (Bar-On & Parker, 2000) is a 60-item self-report instrument designed to measure EI in young people ages seven to eighteen years. The authors define EI as, abilities related to understanding oneself and others, relating to people, adapting to changing environmental demands, and managing emotions (p. 1). The instrument includes a technical manual, which provides information about the normative group (nearly ten thousand youngsters), gender-and age specific norms and seven EI scales (intrapersonal, interpersonal, adaptability, stress management, general mood, positive impression, Total EQ, and inconsistency index).

The inventory is geared for a fourth grade reading level and takes about twenty-five minutes to complete. Raw scores are converted into standard scores with a mean of 100 and a standard deviation of fifteen--paralleling the popular IQ tests. Employing a 4-point Likert style format (very seldom true of me, seldom true, often true and very true), items invite self-appraisals about having fun, ease at telling others how you feel or talking about deep feelings, the importance of having friends, and knowledge about how other people are feeling. Other items query areas not typically considered part of EI, such as asking the respondent to assess how well they understand hard questions, their ease in understanding new things, and their tendency to employ different ways of answering hard questions.

The Trait Meta-Mood Scale (Salovey, et al., 1995) is a 30-item self-report scale that measures attention to, and clarity of feelings, and mood repair -- aspects of EI, according to the authors. Subjects rate on a 5-point Likert scale the extent to which they agree with items such as:

When I become upset, I remind myself of all the pleasures in life

I almost always know exactly how I am feeling

In contrast to the two self-report measures above, The Emotion Perception Tests (Mayer, et al., 1990) is one of the few EI tests that is not a self-report inventory. It purports to measure emotional perception in colors, musical vignettes, sound intervals, and faces. Subjects are presented with various stimuli (visual images, musical excerpts, etc.) and asked to rate, again on a 5-point scale, their experience of the amount of emotion present in each stimuli, across six different emotion scales. The six emotion scales are happiness, sadness, anger, fear, surprise, and disgust (Davies, Stankov, & Roberts, 1998).

The next section addresses two areas that warrant further attention if researchers hope to elevate EI to a psychological construct consistent with generally accepted definitions of intelligence. Neither area presents with insurmountable obstacles, but considerable efforts will be required to further EI theory development and validation.

Unanswered Questions with the EI Construct

Measurement Issues

A major weakness with the extant EI research literature is the lack of scientifically sound, objective measures of the EI construct. Unlike the many carefully developed cognitive ability measures, measures of EI are almost all based on self-report instruments, lack norms or a standardization group (other than the BarOn Emotional Quotient Inventory: Youth Version), and if measures exist at all, have unacceptable levels of internal consistency or stability. Almost none of the EI measures provide any data to support the particular interpretations that the test developers claim they can make using a test's score.

This does not necessarily mean that EI may not eventually prove to be a valid or useful psychological construct. Rather, it simply means that, at the present time, we do not have any scientifically acceptable instruments to measure the EI construct (Pfeiffer, Soldivera, & Norton, 1992). Without objective, psychometrically sound measures, it is simply impossible to know what EI is or is not. To apply a simple medical analogy, it would be difficult to talk about the construct of fever if physicians had no reliable measure of body temperature.

A related measurement issue is the fact that many of the existing EI instruments sample an extraordinarily wide range of psychological domains, stretching the boundaries of the EI definition to the breaking point. For example, the Bar-On Emotional Quotient Inventory (Bar-On, 1996) consists of 15 scales that measure self-actualization, independence, flexibility, stress tolerance, impulse control, optimism, and happiness. It is almost certain these 15 scales sample considerably more than the one psychological construct, EI. Much needed validation studies would likely find that the diverse scales do not all enjoy positive correlations with one another, much less reflect a simple factor structure.

Conceptual Issues

One reason why measures of EI have not approached acceptable levels of scientific quality has to do with the lack of precision used in conceptualizing the EI construct. This lack of conceptual precision makes it difficult to develop instruments that precisely measure the particular phenomena of interest and unrelated but nevertheless distinct psychological constructs. It is this issue of the fuzziness of how EI is conceptualized that is particularly problematic.

Goleman (1995a) speculates, for example, that empathy, optimism, assertiveness, and delay of gratification are all specific abilities that fall under the overarching conceptual umbrella of EI. Goleman's speculative model is not dissimilar to those theories of intelligence which posit any number of specific mental abilities subservient to the preeminence of g. However, there is a burgeoning, if controversial, body of empirical literature supporting one single, primary intellectual dimension, g, subserving a subset of primary mental abilities or group factors (Carroll, 1993; Jensen, 1992; Keith, 1994). No such research evidence has been forthcoming regarding the internal or external validity of any of Goleman's specific EI abilities. In addition, there is little basis for contending that the diverse phenomena that Goleman lists as constituting his `primary EI abilities' group together in a conceptually coherent way under any recognized definition of intelligence.

On the other hand, well-researched psychological constructs such as empathy have long been considered a personality attribute or trait, not a cognitive or mental ability. Moreover, most studies have obtained low correlations between measures of intelligence and most personality traits (Eysenck, 1994). High levels of empathy (as well as motivation, zeal, persistence, impulse control, regulation of mood, optimism, etc.) can certainly enhance goal-directed mental activity, sound judgment, efficient problem solving, and abstract reasoning -- intelligence. However, factors such as nutrition and lighting, rest, motivational incentives, and a host of environmental variables can also enhance or constrain intellectual performance.

The above-mentioned factors are important psychological constructs in their own right. However, they appear conceptually more closely aligned with what authorities in the field typically consider attitudes, beliefs, traits, and specific ego functions -- elements of an individual's personality (Hogan, Johnson, & Briggs, 1997).

It is noteworthy that Mayer's recent thinking seems to provide a more focused and clearly demarcated conception of EI and move, in a more parsimonious and productive way, toward a view that conceptualizes personality and intelligence as related, but nonetheless distinct psychological entities (Mayer & Mitchell, 1998). Mayer now conceptualizes intelligence as a distinct subsystem of personality. Mayer suggests that personality characteristics such as temperament and impulsivity adversely influence a person's intellectual performance, and nonintellectual factors such as openness to emotional experience and `flow' enhance intelligence -- but are no longer considered by Mayer as isomorphic with intelligence (Brody, 1992; Csikszentmihalyi, 1993; Mayer & Mitchell, 1998).

Relevance of EI to the Gifted Field

The gifted education movement grew out of the pioneering work of Lewis Terman and Leta Hollingworth, and has long been associated with definitions of giftedness that consider extraordinary abilities and talents in a variety of domains (Feldhusen, 1998). State definitions for the gifted and talented vary considerably, although the majority of states use some form of the 1978 modification of the Marland definition, which recognizes outstanding ability in intellectual, creative, and academic domains, leadership and the performing and visual arts. Leadership is represented in eighteen state definitions of gifted and talented (Stephens & Karnes, 2000). Many of the abilities and personal qualities that constitute outstanding youth leadership potential are defining criteria for EI--such as decoding social information, social perceptiveness, and the use of feelings to motivate, plan and achieve. If one accepts leadership as a type of giftedness, then it is hard not to view EI as relevant to the gifted field.

The EI construct has relevance to the gifted field in a second important way. The gifted field is increasingly recognizing the importance of understanding how to better promote states of excellence among talented youth (Lubinski & Benbow, 2000). It is reasonable to hypothesize that the judicious application of empirically supported psycho-educational strategies to promote EI would support the optimal development of talent in its various forms and expressions. Our own anecdotal experience at the Duke University Talent Identification Program suggests that tailoring the curricular activities and academic demands of gifted students to match their level of social competence and emotional maturity increases their positive learning experience. Relatedly, for those gifted students who present with troubling social, emotional or interpersonal behaviors, the EI construct offers a useful conceptual framework to assist the counselor in designing helpful therapeutic interventions (Pfeiffer, in press; Pfeiffer & Stocking, in press).

Conclusion

For over one hundred years, the fields of education and psychology have focused considerable attention on the topic of social competence (Ford & Tisak, 1983; Scarr, 1989). Mental health practitioners [lave long recognized that clients differ in their ability to perceive, understand, modulate and express emotion. Practitioners and educators also recognize that these social and interpersonal skills can be learned and contribute to an individual's ultimate success and quality of life.

Gardner's (1983) groundbreaking writing on multiple intelligences created the intellectual climate and theoretical foundation for subsequent theorists to expand upon two of his primary intelligences, interpersonal and intrapersonal.

Goleman, Salovey and Mayer, and others transformed and renamed Gardner's two types of social intelligence into the more popular concept of EI. EI quickly captured the interest of the media and public, at a time during the end of the 20th century when society was experiencing a number of perplexing and often violent ethnic, racial, and cultural problems.

EI has been billed by many in the popular press as a panacea for all of society's ills. EI has been suggested as the means to help us become more creative, entrepreneurial, loving, responsible, caring, fair, respectful--in essence, better, more productive members of society (see Cooper & Sawaf, 1997). It is therefore not surprising that EI is seen as an important psychological construct.

Problems remain with the EI construct. The problems can be grouped into two related issues: a lack of precision in how EI is conceptualized, and a lack of scientifically sound, objective measures of the EI construct.

The issue of a lack of precision speaks to the heart of what we mean by EI. There is no question that the attributes frequently associated with the EI construct--frustration tolerance, empathy, persistence, regulation of mood, optimism, and impulse control, to name but a few--are all important human qualities that contribute to making good life decisions. However, simply because they are all socially relevant psychological phenomena does not make them a legitimate type of intelligence. This stretches the boundaries of how we conceptualize intelligence. "To call (EI) intelligence does not do justice either to theories of intelligence or to the personality traits and special talents that lie beyond the consensual definition of intelligence" (Scarr, 1989, 78). Although Salovey and Mayer's recent writings (Mayer & Mitchell, 1998; Mayer & Salovey, 1997) delineate the EI construct in a way that is not incompatible with Sternberg's (1997) definition of intelligence, it seems premature at this time to label EI as a kind of intelligence.

The second issue, that there is not scientifically sound, objective measure of the EI construct, makes it difficult to interpret test scores with any confidence. It is simply impossible to know what are the legitimate parameters of EI without objective, reliable and independently validated measures. It is unfortunate that EI researchers have given very little relative attention to developing scientifically acceptable measures of EI. Without adequate instrumentation we are not able to begin to resolve the lack of precision issue.

In conclusion, the ability to get along with others, delay gratification, persist in the face of frustrating experiences, empathize with others, accurately read social cues, understand, balance and manage our emotions, and process affective information are all important human qualities. Although they enjoy consensus as important psychological phenomena, these abilities do not appear to fit together neatly into one psychological construct. It appears more parsimonious to consider many of them, from both a theoretical and practical perspective, as components of one's personality and not another type of intelligence. However, future research may provide much needed evidence that a subset of these abilities do share common psychological underpinnings and constitute a kind of important core mental process--what we call intelligence.

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Steven I. Pfeiffer is Adjunct Professor of Psychology and Education at Duke University and Executive Director of Duke University's Talent Identification Program (TIP).

Manuscript submitted December, 1999. Revision accepted September, 2000.