Emergence and evolution of the methodology of validation of the Armed Forces weapons system and the state weapons program.

December 19, 2002 is the 25th anniversary of the 46th Central Research Institute (CRI) of the Defense Ministry of the Russian Federation, the leading institution specializing in the validation of state weapons programs. It has been, since its inception and to the present time, the leader among the Defense Ministry's other research institutes in the area of program planning of development, standardization and unification of weapons and military equipment (WME), and where the shaping of the state defense order is concerned.

On December 19, 1977, in keeping with an order issued by the Defense Minister, two directorates of a branch of the 27th Institute formed a new scientific research establishment, whose organizational structure was further expanded following incorporation of another three scientific directorates created within a brief timeframe. During the past years, CRI was through several reorganizations designed to enhance the efficiency of tasks it tackled, which, as work experience accumulated and military scientific knowledge grew, were specified and amended. More than 70% of the several thousand research assignments performed in those years were of comprehensive nature and in the majority of them the Institute was the leader within the Defense Ministry. There are scientific schools, which took shape during the period of its existence and which ensure training of top-level specialists. As of today, the Institute has 20 doctors, 115 candidates of sciences, and over 100 professors, senior research fellows and lecturers on its staff.

We join the choir of congratulations on the occasion of the anniversary of the 46th CRI DM RF and offer the readers an article by its chief, Colonel V.M. Burenok, written jointly with two veteran scientists. The article contains a brief historical survey of the evolution of the domestic methodology of WME program development planning.

States' Armed Forces' weapons systems had different composition at different historical stages in their development and, accordingly, different combat employment efficiency. The themes of research works performed by the 46th CRI from the moment of its creation and to the present day were devoted precisely to investigating the weapons system and developing a methodology for its validation in the short term, the mid term, and the long term. They show that there are two ways for building up combat capabilities of military technical systems: qualitative and quantitative. The former means improving the characteristics of the existing weapons systems and creating fundamentally new ones; the latter, increasing the total number of models of weapons and military equipment.

It must be mentioned that requirements as to the quality of weapons systems are mostly determined by the character of combat (operational, strategic) tasks, which depends on features of an object to be weapon-engaged (target), as well as on the conditions of mission performance (time of the day and season, climatic conditions, nature of the terrain, etc.). The aim behind target engagement is also of importance, of course, but it is precisely the nature of tasks that predetermines the main requirements to the necessary WME characteristics.

In turn, the number of models of weapons and military equipment (main systems) and hence the total amount of weaponry manufacture within a unit of time (a month, a year) depend on the total amount of combat tasks of some or other nature, as well as on the intended scale of combat operations-strategic, operational, and tactical.

What was formulated above as the two ways of building up combat capabilities of weapons systems-qualitative and quantitative-form so-called "assignment principle" in WME development, without which it makes no sense to discuss what weapons systems are necessary and how many of them there should be. To define the "assignment principle," we must consider "the beginning of beginnings," namely, the nature of tasks determining requirements to the quality of weapons systems. Unless we answer the question about the quality of weapons, it is senseless to state the task (problem) regarding their necessary number. Hence follows the conclusion about the priority of the qualitative trend in weapons development. Clearing up changes in the nature of tasks (their substantive aspect) is of decisive importance for the validation of the Armed Forces' weapons system. As a rule, it starts with an analysis of tasks at the top, doctrinal level, which must proceed from the principles of the National Security Concept of the Russian F ederation and the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation.

It is appropriate to note that these top state documents formulate the tasks of armed warfare only at the functional, "liability" level, that is, indicate their character alone: aggression containment; conduct of operations and combat action on various scale; localization and neutralization of border armed conflicts; defense of the population and economic and infrastructure facilities; rout and elimination of illegal armed units and terrorist groups; participation in peacekeeping operations, etc. To be sure, this sort of information does not permit one to formulate the tasks of validation of the quantitative composition of forces necessary for their implementation, and consequently for determination of the required number of WME. But the said documents are by definition something other than the ones that should contain the detailed information (for otherwise they would not be long-term propositions). And yet, the doctrinal-level information is exceptionally useful, because it enables conclusions about the con figuration of the Armed Forces fit for performing possible tasks of armed warfare. And this already is a good deal for tackling the problem of WME development prospects.

The initial period in the evolution of the methodology of validation of Armed Forces weapons system was marked by the emergence, in the late 1950s and the early 1960s, of early scientific schools concerned with the theory of firing efficiency, operation analysis, and optimization of decision-making on WME development, as well as by the publication of a number of well-known textbooks and treatises on these scientific disciplines. In that period, it was the works of I.I. Anureyev, N.P. Buslenko, E.S. Ventsel, A.M. Parkhomenko, G.S. Pospelov, I.V. Khudyakov, Yu.V. Chuyev and others that played the leading role in shaping the domestic methodology of scientific validation of the Armed Forces weapons system. Some contemporary foreign writers, whose works found an application in the course of efforts to develop the domestic methodology of operational studies and analysis of complex systems, are Charles Hitch, Roland McKean, Edward Queid, Paul Ravett, Benjamin Rudwick, Russell Ackoff, and others. The scientific cont ent of the domestic methodology that appeared in that period, methodology based on an optimal combination of formalized and heuristic principles, in a sense remains the standard to this day, forming the basis for different variants of methodologies of operative efficiency evaluations and military-economic analysis of force groupings possessing a corresponding weapons system.

Goal programming methods of AF weapon system validation came to be used in the late 1960s and the early 1970s, when the Institute accomplished a number of pioneering research works (RW) aimed at substantiating prospects for the development of weapons systems, as well as at creating a scientific methodology for the development of weapons programs in the AF services. That period was characterized by a rapid advance of scientific schools engaged in program planning of WME development in the AF services and combat arms. Several consistent research cycles designed to validate projects for the main development trends and weapons programs resulted in the creation and subsequent continuous improvement of a scientific base for long-term weapons and military equipment plans in the AF services and combat arms.

A characteristic feature of the period was the shaping of three specific traits distinguishing the leading scientific schools concerned with the optimization of WME development strategies, traits that are, as we see it, of fundamental importance for elaboration of requirements to be met by a scientific methodology of investigations in the interests of WME development planning.

The first trait consists in an attempt to make a balanced use of formalized and non-formalized (heuristic) methods. It recognizes the objective expedience of a multi-criteria approach to the optimization of WME development processes under consideration and that of determining the qualitative and quantitative composition of groupings of disparate forces and assets of AF services and combat arms. This principle was implemented, on the one hand, via a hierarchical organization of the research and evaluation process, and on the other via the use of a fitting methodological apparatus providing for an interactive relationship of the detailed lower and the generalizing upper levels of investigations.

The second trait was that in the process of mathematical modeling, methods of combat employment of forces and assets were determined subject to the results of combat operations at previous stages rather than specified in advance out of a priori considerations as had been the case at the initial stage of work on the methodology. Stage-by-stage modeling with the participation of expert operators and expert evaluators of combat efficiency of troops (forces) revealed the required WME characteristics and composition of force groupings. It also identified tactical techniques for employing prospective weapons and military equipment.

The third trait consists in a close and dynamic cooperation between the research staff, who know how to use the methodology, and persons responsible for decision-making and issuance of the necessary recommendations.

The main principle of WME development planning in that period was characterized as the "branch" one, where each service of the Armed Forces and each combat arm planned what it saw as the necessary qualitative and quantitative composition of weapons and military equipment on its own, with practically no links between the services. The general methodological principle, which served as the basis for this process, was its sub-optimization (meaning that an optimization decision accepted at the upper level of the organizational structure is a result of integration of decisions accepted at the lower levels). This sort of approach could not fail to lead to disproportions between separate models and types of weapons and military equipment, as well as between combat and supporting weaponry.

First research works dealing with inter-service problems were carried out in the early 1970s. The principles of and approaches to the planning of a relevant weapons system that appeared in the process formed the basis of officially accepted general methodological provisions in this area, which remain valid to this day. Some of these are as follows: validation of the AF weapons system and elaboration of weapons programs (WP) in accordance with the tasks facing the Armed Forces (goal planning); a comprehensive (through) nature of planning (program planning); conformity of AF tasks to state resources (realistic planning); optimization of the AF weapons system and WP on the effectiveness- costs principle (optimal planning); planning weapons development in the long term (long-term planning). Proceeding from these principles, the weapon program came to be defined as an economically rational, resource-based ten-year WME development plan ensuring execution of the Armed Forces' tasks in a specific sphere of their act ivities. (1) The said methodological principles and provisions were further developed in the transactions of the 46th CRI, which became, in the late 1980s, the USSR's leading scientific organization specializing in the validation of state weapons programs.

The first comprehensive investigation devoted to the validation of the weapons system as a whole, an entity designed to deal with the operational-strategic tasks facing the Armed Forces, was a comprehensive research work (CRW) ordered by the Weapons Chief in 1986. The work embraced practically all the main inter-service (supra-service) research trends and therefore was tackled by the main service RI under the auspices of the 46th CRI as well as by a number of higher military schools.

A most important stage in the investigations was preparing unified operational-strategic data that included the space-time pattern of a possible war, which linked its stages with the main forms of combat action in AF operations. There were also a differentiation of missions pursued by troops and quantitative links between them and WME. To validate quantitative-qualitative WME development with account taken of vagueness surrounding a number of factors, the researchers considered several start-of-war scenarios involving the use of conventional weapons. In the process, they for the first time formed a system of so-called reference combat tasks at the supra-service level, which embraced the main forms of combat operations conducted by the Armed Forces and the main means of warfare used to deal with the tasks. The combat reference tasks included the following: destruction of the adversary's offensive nuclear missile weapons, his naval task forces, land forces, Air Defense, combat space systems and support spacecr aft, and forces of combat aircraft on the ground; protection of AF formations and most important facilities from air and rocket strikes; demolition and destruction of the adversary's military, military-industrial and power-generating facilities, communications and infrastructure facilities; disruption (thwarting) of strategic maritime and air transport movements. The specialized tasks were the following: mining (mine clearance) of terrain, crucial facilities, maritime lines of communication and bays; assault landing, seizure of the adversary's territory, retention of captured positions, opposition to airborne and amphibious assaults in the CTO and maritime sectors.

The methodology of validation of the Armed Forces' WME needs (a rational weapons system for the AF) for dealing with the totality of "reference tasks" was based on the weapons systems principles, correspondence of the AF weapons systems to a system of tasks in peacetime and in a possible war, the balanced nature of WME, and others. Results of this particular CRW as well as those of investigations on the program themes as conducted by research institutions of the Armed Forces services were put at the base of adjustment of the then Weapons Program (1986-1995) and the proposals for a draft WP for a period till 2000.

A cycle of new works designed to validate AF weapons systems and formulate a new Weapons Program (1991-2000) started in 1989 with the commissioning of a CRW, whose implementation involved research organizations of the Defense Ministry and the industrial sector, Independent Development Offices, military and civilian universities, Institutes of the Academy of Sciences and other organizations engaged in WME validation and development (around 400 all in all), with the 46th CRI acting as the umbrella. The system of control and the methodology of state planning in that period were oriented to the final result of WME development, to wit, the attainment of the long-term goal on the basis of the military-political, operational-strategic, scientific-technical and military-economic forecasts with account taken of the real potential of the R & D and industrial base. The CRW included four groups of works: preparation of the source data; validation of the AF weapons system and WP in general; validation of weapons systems of the AF services, combat arms, and separate WP; investigation of particular problems of WP validation.

The main methodological features of the investigations aimed at the validation of the AF weapons system in this particular CWR were the following.

First. Identification of the end goals of WME development planning, methods of their attainment and the means of warfare relied on for the purpose, something that found a reflection in the development of a system of unified operational-strategic source data for holding investigations at all hierarchical levels (the stage of strategic prognostication of the military-political situation and the state of the Armed Forces). In the process of preparation of the totality of source data, the scenarios of combat operations and reference tasks that had been drawn up during the previous cycle of investigations were specified in the course of the investigations, grouped, and hierarchically structured. The main tasks of the Armed Forces at the upper inter-service level of the hierarchy were the following: deterrence of the potential adversary from launching a nuclear or conventional war; repulsion of an aggression in continental and oceanic (maritime) TO; command and control of the Armed Forces; support for the Armed For ces' peacetime military action and activities. While validating forces and assets required for their performance, these tasks were subsequently subdivided into reference subtasks and particular tasks for strategic sectors and different organizational entities and weapons systems.

Second. Determination and validation of the ways and deadlines for the creation of WME on the basis of consideration of a number of alternative assets and systems at the inter-service level, as well as evaluation of resources required for the purpose; validation of weapons and military equipment systems and drafting of proposals for inclusion in WP (programming stage).

Notice the special features of the methodological approach to the validation of the AF weapons system at the inter-service level as implemented in the course of this particular CRW. As is common knowledge, (2) formalization of tasks similar to this one were earlier limited, as a rule, to variants of "direct" and "inverse" formulation, which received wide currency in the AF services in the process of validation of WME needs. The direct formulation implies (in connection with weapons system optimization) a fixed amount of generally available resources for a given period of time and aims investigations at the maximization of its efficiency as a whole. The inverse formulation implies stipulation of a required level of efficiency of a weapons system and minimization of required resources.

The concepts of "system effectiveness" and "resources" usually have a complex vector structure. For example, the term "effectiveness of a weapons system" must include at least three groups of characteristics, namely, the effect on the adversary (his losses and depth of penetration in the enemy territory, destruction of force groupings, etc.), the time it took to achieve the effect, and losses among friendly forces and assets. Besides, efficiency indicators of a weapons system may include its quantitative-qualitative characteristics, such as the combat potential and its increment by program period stages, rates of adoption of new equipment, etc. "Resources," such as financial, production, manpower and other resources, may have concrete task designation indicators: overall defense expenditures, allocations for the weapons system, stage-by-stage financing of program planning of WME development, industrial capabilities for producing WME, cost characteristics of weapons systems and models, expenditures on their cr eation by the stages of weapons' life cycle, etc.

Each of the above formulations of the direct and inverse problem of validation of the AF weapons system falls short of meeting the requirements of validation and optimization of the system at the inter-service level. The necessary efficiency characteristics of the AF weapons system and the resources allocated for its development are in many respects determined by forecasts of changes in the military-strategic background and the sum total of political and economic decisions on matters of military organizational development as passed by the top state authorities.

Thus, the formulation itself of the problem of long-term validation of the AF weapons system at the inter-service level is inevitably made to include indeterminacy of the required quantitative efficiency characteristics of the weapons system and the forecasted level of resources allocated for its development. * As is common knowledge, any attempt to take into account such indeterminacies in system optimization problems unequivocally leads to the necessity, on the one hand, of parametric representation of the quantitative indicators of required system efficiency levels and allocations levels, and to that of using the variance approach to weapons system validation on the other.

The specific feature of the methodological approach to the optimization of the AF weapons system as a whole, i.e., at the inter-service level, as implemented in the course of this particular CRW, was the fact that for the first time it became possible to merge the direct and the inverse formulations of the problems in a single algorithm of validation of the AF weapons system on the basis of the combined "efficiency--costs" criterion in the minimax representation, construction of a set of Pareto-optimal alternative variants of solutions, production of aggregated estimates of each of the alternative variants of the system, and choice of the final solution. The result was a chance to comprehensively take into account at the inter-service level a number of new factors: uncertainty of the starting moment of a possible war and of its nature (the scenario and conditions of combat operations), as well as state resource allocations for defense forecasted in the long term; the dynamism of rearmament processes; differen t variants of composition of forces and assets in the AF weapons system under consideration, etc. Besides, consideration of numerous factors in the direct or inverse formulation makes it possible to optimize variants of development of the AF weapons system, while ensuring coordination of resources allocated for the system's making with its expected efficiency.

Third. Rational distribution of allocations from the point of view of ensuring a balance between the Armed Forces' requirements as envisaged by the long-term plans and the state's budget capabilities. Based on the functional relations "efficiency of accomplishment of reference combat tasks--cost of weapons for their accomplishment," proposals were formulated on the distribution of allocations in accordance with "the tasks" (with regard to their importance), weapons sub-systems, general contractors and subdivisions of the Weapons Program (1991-2000).

Following the collapse of the USSR and emergence of the Russian Armed Forces, the chances for implementing WP-2000 became radically different. (3) For this reason, the Defense Ministry made an attempt, in 1993, to draft State Weapons Program for the Period 1996-2005. Yet, on account of galloping inflation, the Program's economic parameters proved practically unacceptable because of their vagueness.

The total lack of opportunities, on the one hand, to formulate long-term tasks of the Armed Forces, and on the other to forecast, at least approximately, the possible costs, as well as the amount and dynamism of allocations for WME development actually put paid to the practice of long-term and possibly mid-term planning of the effort to bring military-technical equipment to the Armed Forces on the basis of the above ("classical") system of validation and development of weapons programs. So, it was only one-year plans that guided development of weapons in that period.

In 1994, after the Economics Ministry of the Russian Federation came up with a macroeconomic forecast for Russia's short-term and long-term economic development prospects, the RF Armed Forces promptly carried out additional investigations (within six months) in the context of the existing CRW. The works involved the main executors of works in the program themes from the Ministry of Defense and industrial organizations of the Russian Federation. In 1995, the investigations resulted in the drafting of Russia's first Weapons Program for the Period 1996-2005. It became possible, in the process of drafting, to take into account (and to a certain degree to coordinate) the military-technical requirements of the other power agencies of the Russian Federation and to define relevant budget financing sources. If before that it was only implied that weapons programs were "state-run," then 1995 saw them officially receive the state status. In November 1996, RF President approved Russian SWP-2005 as a new programmatic docu ment.

Its main peculiarity was in taking into account the general regress of the existing weapons system of the state's Armed Forces and putting replacement of a portion of WME systems in connection with the dynamism of the system's development as a whole. Given the uncertainty of expected allocations that were restricted by certain limits, the focus in the course of the investigations was on making different variants of the Program (to fit different levels of allocations).

As is to be regretted, the planned figures of allocations as contained in SWP-2005 proved overly optimistic. In consequence of expenditures on the Chechnya war, the 1996 sequestration, the 1998 default, and production decline in Russia, the military organizational development had to be oriented to smaller (by several times!) budget allocations than those envisaged, for which reason the first SWP-2005 remained practically unrealized.

The next cycle of program planning investigations the 46th CRI carried out in 1996-2000 put the main emphasis on coordination of WME requirements as fitting different variants of the reform of the RF Armed Forces and the extremely limited resources allocated for weapons development. For reason of considerable uncertainty involved in the efforts to forecast the state of the Russian economy in the long term (15 years) and vagueness as to the expected defense allocations, the SWP-20 10 research project was from the start in the form of different variants pegged to different levels of allocations. The main goal in WME development for the period till 2010 was creating the scientific-technical and technological basis necessary for rearming the army and the navy, as well as maintaining the corresponding technical level of the Armed Forces and other troops (bodies) of the Russian Federation on the basis of preservation of the nucleus of defense scientific and industrial potential and Russia's ability to create and pr oduce the required classes of weapons and military and specialized equipment (WMSE) on its own.

In this cycle of goal program planning, validation of the state's AF weapons system as a whole (and SWP-2010 in particular) was also within the structure of the main defense tasks and sub-tasks characteristic of the military-technical systems existing in Russia and on the basis of the 46th CRI's relevant "task" methodology enabling identification of stable priorities and a hierarchy of crucial trends in WME development in conformity with the nature of possible military threats invariant in regard to levels of defense allocations. (4)

On January 20, 2002, President of the Russian Federation approved the State Weapons Program for 2001-2010. The Program is the result of a broad spectrum of scientific investigations designed to validate WMSE development over a 10-year term on the basis of an upgraded systems methodology (5) of goal program planning and a coordinated participation of an unprecedentedly big number of WMSE users (contractors). But the main difference is the fact that it is backed with state resources and contains clear-cut financial and economic indicators approved by the RF President.

The RF State Council played a major role in preparing the new Program, having generated the drafting of conceptual documents, which it approved at its meeting on August 11, 2000. That became the starting point in the shaping of a clear-cut system of views on long-term development of the army and the navy, as well as weapons and military equipment.

A characteristic trait of the work done on SWP-2010 is the emphasis on enhancing the quality of WMSE and creating the necessary scientific-technical basis for the future. This is why R & D is the priority in its implementation over the next five years. It is understood, of course, that the state weapons program (6) cannot be implemented unless there is a dynamically developing defense industrial complex (DIC), which currently is going through an active reform process. The main aim of the reforms is to achieve new qualitative indicators. Within the framework of efforts to implement the Foundations of the Russian Federation Policy in the Area of DIC Development for the Period till 2010 and More Remote Future, it is intended to reform the existing system of orders for weapons and military and specialized equipment and to ensure their unification and standardization, including through a considerable reduction of the number of general contractors. Apart from that, it is planned to convert the Armed Forces and all power structures of the Russian Federation to an inter-agency unified technical support system. The necessity is long overdue of a stage-by-stage transition to a joint (military and civilian) state system of maintenance and warranty service for weapons and military and specialized equipment. A set of difficult problems is yet to be solved in order to implement in full the decisions approved at the top state level, including SWP-2010. (7)

Thus, the methodology of goal program planning of WME development as elaborated by the 46th CRI and implemented in the practice of controlling the Armed Forces' military-technical equipment in the period from the 1970s to the 1990s plays an exceptionally important role in WMSE optimization, expenditure of defense allocations, and establishment of correspondences between national defense tasks and military expenditures. It also has a determining influence on the intensification of military-scientific investigations, including introduction of goal program planning methods in the system of validation of the organizational development of the RF Armed Forces as a whole and in the solution of a broad range of other scientific-technical problems of military-technical support for national defense in the modem conditions.

* It must be mentioned that what resources the state allocated for WME development so as to deal with the entire totality of military tasks with the required efficiency fell short of the mark even in the USSR in a period of stable economic development, when an incomparably greater amount of funds was envisaged for defense than in post-Soviet Russia. This can be explained primarily by overstated efficiency requirements placed on the weapon system and the level of performance expected from the Armed Forces.

NOTES:

(1.) N.V. Mikhailov, "Kak dolzhno sozdavatsia oruzhie zavtrashnego dnia," Nezavisimoye voennoye obozreniye, No. 43, 2000.

(2.) E.S. Ventsel, Issledovaniye operatsiy, Sov. Radio, Moscow, 1972; Yu. V. Chuyev, Tekhnicheskiye zadachi issledovaniya operatsiy, Voenizdat Publishers, Moscow, 1971.

(3.) N.V. Mikhailov, "Kontseptsiia proizvodstva vooruzhenii nuzhdaetsia v suschestvennoi korrektirovke," Nezavisimaya gazeta, September 24, 1998.

(4.) Voyennyi byudzhet gosudarstva. Metody obosnovaniya i analiza, Voenizdat Publishers, Moscow, 2000,

(5.) A.P. Sitnov, A.A. Rakhmanov, "Osnovy sistemnogo razvitiya vooruzheniya i voennoi tekhniki Rossii," Voennata mysl', No. 5, 1999; A.A. Rakhmanov, V.M Burenok, I.D. Melnikov, "Gosudarstvennaya programma vooruzheniya: etapy i printsipy formirovaniya," Voennaia mysl, No. 1, 2000; V.M. Burenok, ID. Melnikov, "Ob osnovakh formirovaniya predlozheniy v gosudarstvennyi oboronnyi zakaz," Voennaja mysl', No. 2, 2000.

(6.) A.A. Rakhmanov, V.M. Burenok, G.A. Lavrinov, "Otsenka realizuyemosti gosudarstvennoi programmy vooruzheniya," Voennaia mysl', No. 1, 2001.

(7.) A.A. Rakhmanov, A.E. Tyulin, V.M. Burenok, "Gosudarstvennaya programma vooruzheniya--kontrol ispolneniya," Voennaia mysl', No. 4, 2001; V.M Burenok, I.D. Melnikov, GA. Lavrinov, "Otsenka kachestva Gosudarstvennoi programmy vooruzheniya," Voennaia mysl', No. 1, 2002.