Effects-based operations for joint warfighters.
Current discussions of effects-based operations involve various definitions and descriptions of the concept. According to the US Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) J9, effects-based operations is "a process for obtaining a desired strategic outcome or effect on the enemy through the synergistic and cumulative application of the full range of military and non-military capabilities at all levels of conflict." Furthermore, an "effect" is the physical, functional or psychological outcome, event or consequence that results from specific military or non-military actions. (3)
The defining elements in the J9 description include emphasis on effects-based operations as a process, beginning with developing knowledge of the adversary (viewed as a complex adaptive system), the environment and US capabilities. Knowledge of the enemy enables the commander to determine the effects he needs to achieve to convince or compel the enemy to change his behavior.
The commander's intent plays a central, critical role in this determination and in explicitly linking tactical actions to operational objectives and desired strategic outcomes. Execution of the plan follows; the task then is to use all applicable and available capabilities, including diplomatic, information, military and economic.
A study done by the Institute for Defense Analyses in Alexandria, Virginia, offers a second interpretation of effects-based operations. (See a representative model in Figure 1.) It begins by arguing that effects-based operations rest on an explicit linking of actions to desired strategic outcomes. It is thus about producing desired futures.
Moreover, effects-based thinking must undergird the concept by focusing on the entire continuum (peace, pre-conflict, conflict and post-conflict) and not just on conflict. (4) Understanding how to think in this manner enables effects-based operations.
This study also emphasizes the need to understand and model an adversary as a complex, adaptive system driven by complex human interactions rather than just collections of physical targets. Therefore, one should be able to focus operations more coherently. (5)
Of note, this study places great importance on communications among decision makers at the strategic, operational and tactical levels and underlines the criticality of the commander's intent for ensuring focused efforts and effects. (6) Finally, this work says those engaging in effects-based operations must continuously adapt plans, rules and assumptions to existing reality-in other words, effects-based thinking and operations help the commander "fight the enemy and not the plan."
Given the predominant ideas in these theories, one might produce the following definition: "Effects-based operations represent the identification and engagement of an enemy's vulnerabilities and strengths in a unified, focused manner and uses all available assets to produce specific effects consistent with the commander's intent." Potentially then, the concept of effects-based operations can serve as a common conceptual denominator or language for executing joint operations in a unified, holistic approach.
Historical and Theoretical Perspective. History provides many examples of theorists arguing for and commanders planning and executing military operations focused on outcomes--in essence, effects-based operations. In fact, one can reach back to antiquity to see that classical theorists advocated the efficacy of combining all elements of power to compel an enemy to do one's will and achieve one's aims. Sun Tzu, the classical Chinese theorist, emphasized the use of force as a last resort: "those skilled in war subdue the enemy's army without battle" and "the best policy in war is to take a state intact." (7)
Carl von Clausewitz, the Prussian theorist, focused on the primacy of military means and the physical destruction of the opponent's forces as the best way to achieve desired ends. However, Clausewitz explicitly recognizes the importance of using all the elements of power, not just military force, to create desired outcomes.
In a discussion of how to disrupt the alliances of an enemy, he argued, "But there is another way. It is possible to increase the likelihood of success without defeating the enemy's forces. I refer to operations that have direct political repercussions, that are designed in the first place to disrupt the opposing alliance or to paralyze it, that gain us new allies, favorably affect the political scene, etc. If such operations are possible it is obvious that they can greatly improve our prospects and that they can form a much shorter route to the goal than the destruction of the opposing armies." (8)
One recent example describes the potential efficacy of effects-based operations. Evidence of effects-based thinking and operations show up clearly in the planning and execution of the Gulf War in 1990-1991, primarily in the use of air power. General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, Commander-in-Chief of US Central Command, developed a four-phased operation to achieve President George Bush's objectives.
A portion of his commander's intent stated: "We will initially attack into the Iraqi homeland using air power to decapitate his leadership, command and control, and eliminate his ability to reinforce Iraqi ground forces in Kuwait and Southern Iraq. We will then gain undisputed air superiority over Kuwait so that we can subsequently and selectively attack Iraqi ground forces with air power in order to reduce his combat power and destroy reinforcing units." (9)
Clearly, the commander's intent reflected a view of the enemy as a system and the effects desired against that system. According to the planners of the strategic air operation, they employed an effects-based approach toward achieving the stated objectives. Apparently, air planners continually thought through how they could best employ force against enemy systems so every tactical strike contributed toward achieving a desired effect on the system.
A good example of this approach comes from the attack of Iraqi air defense sector operations centers. Initially, air planners determined that destruction of the facilities would require eight F-117s to deliver four 2,000-pound bombs against each of the hardened underground facilities. However, planners argued that to achieve the effect desired, the facilities had only to be rendered inoperative. Therefore, complete destruction was not necessary; forcing the operators to abandon the facility and cease operations would achieve the desired effect.
In this case, effects-based thinking and operations produced the most efficient and effective way to employ force, achieve the commander's intent and increase flexibility and responsiveness by freeing up scarce assets for use elsewhere. One can see, therefore, that effects-based thinking and operations are nothing new.
Much of the current discussions on effects-based operations appear to center mostly on discussions of air power. One must ask why it is that many of the leading writers and thinkers regarding effects-based operations seem to be primarily airmen? The answer is found in the Army's familiarity with the concept that was institutionalized in AirLand Battle doctrine and the most current joint operations manual Joint Publication 3.0, Doctrine for Joint Operations.
AirLand Battle doctrine evolved from the mid-to-late 1970s to the early 1980s. It culminated in the publication of the Army's FM 100-5, Operations in 1982 and in a revised version in 1986. Experiential observations and thinking about modern combat by senior field commanders in the 197 Os, including General Donn Starry, moved the process of doctrine development from the central battle to the integrated battlefield to the extended battlefield and finally to AirLand Battle.
General Glenn K. Otis described AirLand Battle doctrine in Military Review just before its official publication: "AirLand Battle is now the doctrine of the United States Army. It states that the battle against the second echelon forces is equal in importance to the fight with the forces at the front. Thus, the traditional concern of the ground commander with the close-in fight at the forward line of own troops (FLOT) is now inseparable from the deep attack against the enemy follow-on forces. To be able to fight these simultaneous battles, all of the armed services must work in close cooperation and harmony with each other. If we are to find, to delay, to disrupt and kill the enemy force, we will need the combined efforts of the Air-Army team." (10)
Thus, AirLand Battle contains the key components of effects-based thinking and operations. Further examination of the doctrine reveals a methodology that enables the idea of creating and achieving desired effects: target value analysis.
The target value analysis process is an adjunct to the Army's current military decision-making process (MDMP), a single, established and proven analytical process for solving problems. The purpose of the process is to produce an integrated, coordinated and detailed operational plan. This process was the cornerstone methodology for the practical application of AirLand Battle and remains so, as "the estimate process" found in Joint Publication 3.0. (11)
Joint doctrine describes targeting as the analysis of enemy situations relative to the mission, objectives and capabilities at the commander's disposal to identify and nominate specific vulnerabilities that, if exploited, will accomplish the commander's purpose through delaying, disrupting, disabling or destroying critical enemy forces or resources. (12) In turn, target value analysis offers the commander the means to identify effects criteria, prioritize the engagement of targets and plan for contingencies based on the enemy's likely adaptations when his operation fails; it also enables the estimate of friendly unit capabilities. (13)
As a methodology, target value analysis helps determine assets critical to the enemy commander's likely strategy. Furthermore, it examines and anticipates the enemy's critical nodes and potential decision points and suggests what might happen if the enemy commander's plan fails and what actions make up his failure options. Evaluation of the potential and likely enemy strategies identifies critical enemy functions and determines where and when the commander can selectively apply and maximize his combat power against the enemy to achieve desired effects.
Additionally, the process seeks to identify specific enemy activities or events that confirm or deny potential enemy strategies, thereby enabling the assessment of friendly desired effects and, ultimately as necessary, adapting friendly actions. (14) The decide, detect, deliver and assess ([D.sup.3]A) targeting methodology serves as familiar shorthand for targeting and target value analysis. (15) (See Figure 2.)
If, as the Institute for Defense Analyses study proposes, effects-based operations identify and engage an enemy's vulnerabilities and strengths in a unified focused manner using all available assets to produce a specific effect consistent with the commander's intent, then this concept should look very familiar. Certainly it is not new to practitioners of AirLand Battle.
Because this is the case, the Army is singularly well-suited to lead the debate on effects-based operations and may have a fleeting opportunity to shape the conceptual foundation for implementation of Joint Vision 2020.
Conceptual Implications. Most of the Army's recent conceptual work on effects-based operations originates from the Training and Doctrine Command's (TRADOC's) Depth and Simultaneous Attack Battle Lab at Fort Sill, Oklahoma. The technological developments and maturation of the idea of effects-based operations spurred Fort Sill to look for ways to increase the effectiveness of fires.
One of the emerging concepts, the fires and effects coordination cell (FECC) focuses more on organizational changes designed to employ fires (lethal and nonlethal) to create effects efficiently and successfully. The first Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT) at Fort Lewis, Washington, is testing this organizational design.
Naturally, the Battle Lab's core competency is thinking about the employment of fires with a complementary professional expertise in targeting and target value analysis processes. And because fire supporters have shaped the nature of the Army's discussion of effects-based operations, the result has been a narrower interpretation of the concept as compared to the current analysis.
Many in the joint community perceive the Army's position on effects-based operations as limited to discussions of creating effects solely with fires. Nothing could be further from the truth.
Because the Army adopted effects-based operations and codified the concept in its AirLand Battle doctrine, the idea and current debate appears to many in the Army as the "same candy bar--different wrapper." There are however, some critical differences between effects-based operations and AirLand Battle's target value analysis methodologies.
Like AirLand Battle doctrine and the enabling methodology of target value analysis, effects-based operations causes practitioners to think in terms of desired outcomes and the importance of using all available assets. The concept of effects-based operations differs in that it places more emphasis on understanding the enemy and determining the linkages between cause and effect. It also demands a greater capability to assess and adapt to the vagaries and unknowns of warfare.
Thus, effects-based operations, as a concept, is a refining and broadening evolution of Army doctrine. It offers the potential for improving the Army's ability to achieve desired effects through a more holistic and systematic approach to planning, executing and assessing the results of military actions across the entire spectrum of conflict.
Effects-based operations lend themselves to a broader application--one that encompasses more than just military operations. Such operations incorporate all the applicable elements of national power for a given situation--diplomatic, economic, military and information--and are relevant across the full spectrum of operations.
More so than current Army doctrine, effects-based operations require commanders and staffs to link tactical actions to operational objectives and desired strategic effects. The interrelated focus at every level of command achieves the desired effects commensurate with the commander's intent.
The strengths of effects-based operations include predicting, controlling and achieving desired effects and understanding that, that goal is not always achievable. Acknowledging this reality leads to the requirement for adaptation in planning and decision-making. The requirement to adapt and seize opportunity relies on a thorough understanding of the commander's intent and leader's ability to make decisive and sound decisions that will achieve the desired effect without creating unwanted or unpredicted second- and third-order effects.
However, it is not enough to say US forces will operate in an effects-based way. Commanders and staffs must think in an effects-based fashion if they are to operate successfully. It may no longer suffice to tolerate a subordinate's cursory understanding of the commander's intent two levels up. Leaders everywhere along the chain of command must have a clear understanding of national security and campaign objectives and at least a basic understanding of those actions necessary to create effects that cumulatively result in the desired end state.
Moreover, commanders must develop and subordinates understand clear measures of success that explain why the operations will work (planned actions, causal linkages and desired effects). This requirement and a thorough understanding of the commander's intent provide the two elements that will enable subordinates to exercise initiative and seize fleeting opportunities.
Most would agree that this emphasis on adaptation is a great strength of effects-based operations. But it also exposes a critical vulnerability. The viability of effects-based operations becomes questionable if commanders fail to provide subordinates clear intent or measures of success.
Moreover, commanders must trust and have confidence in their subordinates' abilities to exercise initiative and operate within the intent. If commanders become overly concerned with the need to control second- and third-order effects, the potential exists for them to "reach into the turret" and personally direct operations, negating the advantages of effects-based operations.
Decisions and actions taken by General Tommy Franks, Commander, US Central Command, during the opening stages of Operation Iraqi Freedom, provides an excellent example of effects-based thinking and operations. During a 22 March press conference, General Franks described actions he initiated to attack, as he described it, an "emerging target." Information regarding the location of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein had reached President Bush and General Franks on the afternoon/evening of 19 March.
While President Bush considered options, General Franks, demonstrating a clear understanding of the commander's intent and anticipating potential orders. directed two F- 117s into the air, each carrying two 2,000-pound bombs. No better example exists of effects-based thinking and actions.
General Franks' decision to launch the F-117s anticipated President Bush's order to strike, but more importantly, his actions envisioned a desired future informed by the President's stated intent of removing the Iraqi regime from power. Without General Franks' flexibility of thought and willingness to adapt his plans, President Bush would not have had the opportunity to order the attack, as the target, Saddam Hussein, reportedly would have departed the known location in a matter of hours.
Moreover, Franks' decision reflected an acknowledgement of and accepted the risk associated with executing a mission not planned for the current air tasking order (ATO). Normal, expected and necessary planning for suppression of air defenses would not be possible. In short, General Franks demanded the immediate adaptation of the current plan with its accepted, attendant risks in an attempt to achieve the commander's intent in one quick, decisive strike.
At the time of this writing, the outcome remains in doubt. What is not in doubt, however, is General Franks' effects-based approach to planning and executing operations. His actions reflect his background as a fire supporter, a professional, accomplished in the Army's AirLand Battle and full spectrum dominance operations doctrine. In turn, this anecdote describes a soldier who knows the importance and necessity of seeing the desired future and creating conditions necessary to achieve the commander's intent.
Practical Implications. The differences found in the evolution, refinement and broadening of current doctrine and the conceptual dynamics of effects-based operations will have practical implications for changes in joint cultural, organizations and leader training. Implementing effects-based operations as a concept described in this article will provide challenges, all of which are surmountable.
Cultural Challenges. Implementing effects-based operations in the Army should prove relatively easy. However, leading the transition to effects-based operations in the joint community is likely to be problematic and will require cultural changes within each of the services. Changing the culture will take many years as leaders and staffs become familiar with the concept and effects-based thinking becomes inculcated in service and joint educational programs and institutions.
While I have proposed a definition of the effects-based concept, it is apparent that an agreed upon definition that is incorporated into service and joint doctrine is necessary before the methodology can be of use. Almost as important as agreeing on a definition is the need to establish a common language.
The Army has an extensive but not always well-understood language to define effects. A familiar example involves the use of the terms "disrupt," "delay," "limit" and "destroy" that are so nebulous as to be of little use. (16) These terms have primarily served to describe effects associated with the kinetic attack of a specific target. Moreover, their intended use is to guide those involved in fire support operations.
In this context, effects-based operations take on a narrow definition of the effects of fires in support of maneuver. This limited viewpoint fails to address other areas where effects are important, such as the effects created by maneuver. On the other hand, the view that associates effects-based operations as achieving effects without fires or maneuver fails to address the concept in the holistic manner in which its value rests. A key step in implementing any effects-based concept, then, would be to get the services and joint community to agree on usage of the relevant terms.
Organizational Challenges. Of most importance is the need to field organizations with a physical makeup that enables commanders and their staffs to cooperate in dynamic and orchestrated ways. Instead of having linked but separate centers for intelligence, operations, logistics and information operations (among others), the Army needs a combined operations center of generalist operators and functional area specialists, including intelligence analysts and technical equipment operators.
This team of experts who are aware of the desired effects, linkages between objectives and the commander's intent would understand the "why" of changes in policy goals that inevitably occur during operations. More importantly, they could adapt to the new realities, given the shared knowledge and cooperation derived from the proposed organization. In this instance, the Army is well on its way toward the proposed command and control organization.
Having experimented with command and control issues connected to digitization and Force XXI, the Army has moved forward in innovative and varied ways, including conducting tests with effects coordination cells (ECCs) and deep operations coordination cells (DOCCs). Supporting these organizational initiatives are those programs involving the Army battle command system (ABCS), which provides digital communications among strategic, operational and tactical headquarters down to the individual soldier/weapon system level. This point is critical to the successful use of effects-based operations because of the cyclic, nested nature of the concept.
Determining correct organizational design by itself is a necessary condition for enabling effects-based operations and so too is the requirement to develop leaders with the broad background needed to apply the concept.
Leader Training Challenges. For reasons other than developing proficiency in effects-based operations, the Army has initiated a new approach to conducting initial-entry officer training, the basic officer leader course (BOLC) with a pilot at Fort Benning, Georgia. Designed to expose every Army officer to basic warfighting fundamentals, this training could provide an institutional "start point" for developing effects-based operations as a common conceptual denominator, a way of thinking for the Army's future leaders.
The holistic, nested and integrated nature of effects-based operations places a premium on leaders who understand the big picture and the potential impact their decisions could have on achieving desired effects. Coupled with increased emphasis on rapid adaptation, leaders of the future will have to think in new ways that are more comprehensive. They must have the confidence to deal with uncertainty, the willingness to bridge gaps with thinking, the desire to take insightful calculated risks and the ability to visualize an abstract battlespace and think in nonlinear dynamic ways, incorporating multiple perspectives. This effects-base thinking is no small challenge.
The conceptual thinking skills required by practitioners of effects-based operations will change the way the Army develops and trains leaders. The Army's current approach to leader training focuses too much on process to the detriment of outcome. Battle drills, situational lane training and rote teaching of the military MDMP all contribute to the development of leaders who are able to apply proven, but limited responses to battlefield realities.
Faced with complex challenges, leaders often resort to executing conditioned, practiced battle drills with little regard to current realities. This technique offers predictability of response, which is an important component for success at the tactical level, but one that is increasingly less useful in operational and strategic level decision-making. Incorporating an effects-based approach to operations calls into question the future utility of the "battle drill," approach even at the tactical level of decision-making.
Effects-based operations demand the Army develop leaders capable of conceptual thinking. Leaders must be able to admit what they do not know, recognize patterns, spend more time in problem identification and determination and, ultimately, be adaptable. Educating leaders with these skills requires a shift in the emphasis in their training away from process to outcome.
Leaders of tomorrow employing effects-based operations must train in environments that center on the student, not the instructor, in situations where complexity is maintained, not removed. Checklists and process will remain important, but the focus must be on outcomes instead of getting the procedures right.
Of course, there is no substitute for leaders having a complete knowledge of the art and science of military operations. Implementation of effects-based operations will expand the requirement for leaders to develop and maintain a minimum competency in areas previously deemed outside the prevue of military leaders.
If not expertise, for example, proficiency in domestic and international politics, culture, diplomacy and economics will prove critical to the successful application of effects-based operations. Leaders rightly will focus on being experts in the realm of military art and science, but they also must develop a depth of knowledge in other elements of power.
Developing future leaders with the right specific and general skills to use effects-based operations must begin from the moment they enter the service. The broader education requirements demanded by this concept are achievable if they are instilled in leaders beginning with their initial entry into service.
Implementation Recommendations. The Army has an unparalleled understanding of effects-based operations. Of all the services, it is best suited to "show the way" in the development of the concept as a joint common conceptual denominator. This will require moving forward on two fronts simultaneously: one joint and the other services pecific.
Define Effects-Based Operations and Terminology. First, the joint community and the services must agree on a common definition of effects-based operations. Realizing the potential of the concept requires the Army to expand what is a "fires centric" notion of effects into a more comprehensive definition, such as the one suggested. This should be a relatively simple task, given the Army's desire to focus on creating effects with all means available.
Hampering the debate over effects-based operations is the ambiguity of the language in the many descriptions of the concept, each of which employs unique descriptions and terms of reference. Before going forward, the services must reach consensus in defining effects-based terminology. Without a clear understanding provided by jointly codified terms of reference, development of the concept may deteriorate into service-centric views, ultimately negating the unifying potential of effects-based operations. Approved definitions and language will provide the means to expand and begin the institutionalization of effects-based operations.
Establish a Joint Professional Military Education Strategy (JPMES). Effects-based operations places a premium on leaders with specific expertise in military art and science and a working knowledge of the characteristics of the other elements of national power. Necessarily, practitioners of the methodology will use conceptual thinking focused by internalized and well-understood guidance in the form of the commander's intent. Institutionalizing the training and education of leaders must begin at the outset of their careers and continue for the duration.
The same must be true for each service. For the Army, BOLC is the place to start. However, service-specific training and education alone will not suffice. If the concept is to serve as common to the joint community, it also must be taught as part of a JPME strategy.
Design Effects-Based Organizations. Leaders, educated to employ effects-based operations, must have facilities and communications networks that enable their skills. Here too, each service must design field organizations to take advantage of the inherent potential of the concept.
The Army's FECC is a step in the right direction. While currently narrow in focus, the idea brings together operators, intelligence analysts as well as system technicians to employ lethal and nonlethal fires more efficiently and successfully. Easily expandable, this idea provides a start point for the creation of a more all-inclusive organization designed to orchestrate all effects, not just fires.
The bilateral command and control relationship of battlefield coordination detachments (BCDs) that the Army resources in cooperation with the Air Force could serve as a start point to expand the concept to joint task force organizational design. This proven command and control organization that was designed to synchronize and integrate fires, air power and ground maneuver-effects is expansible. And, given the evident interest shown by the Army and Air Force, effects-based operations could serve as a platform for the joint development of the concept as well as needed experimentation.
As with any new idea, testing and proving the theory through experimentation, practice and limited application is a perquisite to specific service and joint adoption. JFCOM already has begun experiments that include looking at effects-based operations.
Beyond this initiative, separate service experimentation must occur. In the Army's case, many venues and organizations exist that could conduct experiments with effects-based operations. TRADOC should task a specific battle lab with the lead--logically, the Battle Lab at Fort Sill.
Clearly, effects-based operations are not new. The renewed interest in the idea provides an opportunity to expand effects-based operations to the joint community.
The Army is uniquely suited to take the lead in the further development of the effects-based operations concept through a collaborative effort involving all services. Championed by the Army, the concept of effects-based operations may provide the enabling idea needed to achieve the goals of joint intellectual, operational, organizational, doctrinal and technical integration set out in Joint Vision 2020.
(1.) Henry H. Shelton, Joint Vision 2020 America's Military: Preparing for Tomorrow (Washington, DC: 2000), 3.
(2.) Ibid., 2.
(3.) Effects-based Operations White Paper Version 1.0," (Norfolk, VA: concepts Department J9, US Joint Forces Command, 2001), 5.
(4.) "New Perspectives on Effects-Based Operations" (Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analyses, 30 June 2001), 2-3.
(5.) Ibid., 4.
(6.) Ibid., 8.
(7.) Sun Tzu, The Art of War, translation by Samuel B. Griffith (Hem York: 1971), 79.
(8.) Ibid., 92-93.
(9.) T. W. Beagle, "Effects-Based Targeting: Another Empty Promise?" (US Air Force Air War college), 59.
(10.) General Glenn K. Otis, "The AirLand Battle," Military Reviem, No. 5 (1982), 2.
(11.) Joint Publication 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations (Washington, DC: US Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2001), B-1-3.
(12.) Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Washington, DC: US Joint chiefs of Staff, 2001), 429.
(13.) US Army Field Manual (FM) 6-20- 10, Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for the Targeting Process (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 8 May 1996), A-9.
(14.) Ibid., A-1.
(15.) Ibid., 1-5.
(16.) FM 6-20-10, chapter One.
Lieutenant Colonel (Promotable) Allen W. Batschelet is an Action Officer in the J3 Operations Directorate, Deputy Directorate for Information Operations on the Joint Staff at the Pentagon. Prior to that, he was a student at the War College at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, and Commander of the 3d Battalion, 82d Field Artillery, 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, Texas. He also commanded A Battery, 3d Battalion, 82d Field Artillery, 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, Texas, during Operations Desert Shield and Storm in the Persian Gulf and A Battery, 21st Field Artillery following those operations. In 1996, he deployed as the S3 and then Executive Officer of theist Battalion, 7th Field Artillery, 1st Infantry Division (Mechanized) out of Germany in support of Operations Joint Endeavor and Joint Guard in Bosnia-Herzegovina. He holds a Master of Military Arts and Science (MMAS) from the Command and General Staff College and an MMAS from the School of Advanced Military Studies, both at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and a Master of Strategic Arts from the War College.
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|Author:||Lieutenant Colonel Batschelet, Allen W.|
|Date:||May 1, 2003|
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