Educational inequalities in the United Kingdom: a critical analysis of the discourses and policies of New Labour.

This paper explores the intentions and attempts of the New Labour government in the United Kingdom (UK) to challenge educational inequalities. It begins with an overview of Third Way philosophy and New Labour s commitment to social justice and social inclusion, then moves on to examine three policy themes in some detail: the economising of education; support for ability setting and selection; and policy related to widening participation in higher education. The paper highlights the contradictions in New Labour educational policies and pronouncements, and concludes that current policy developments are likely to reinforce rather than ameliorate educational inequalities.

Introduction

The education system in Britain has long been seen both to reflect and reproduce inequalities. Campaigns by the trade union, socialist and women's movements of the late 19th and early 20th centuries drew attention to the exclusivity of secondary and higher education, and on-going concerns about the educational opportunities and achievements of working-class children and young people were reflected in a range of government policy initiatives during the last century. The provision of secondary education for all, the introduction of comprehensive schools (1), and the raising of the school leaving age could all be seen as policies aimed to reduce inequalities and widen opportunities for working-class young people.

The story is not, however, one of linear progress towards greater educational equality. Almost two decades of Conservative role from 1979 to 1997, the prominence of the `New Right' and the valorisation of the market contributed to an increasing individualisation of society and renewed threats to equality (Hutton, 1996). A Treasury report published in 1999 noted: `Over the last twenty years not only has the gap between the richest and the poorest increased, but the amount of movement between income groups has been limited. What is more, damaged life chances perpetuate across the generations' (HM Treasury, 1999, p.5, cited in Ball, Maguire, & Macrae, 2000). Educational inequalities not only persist, but in some cases have increased. Economic disadvantage is linked with low levels of achievement (Kennedy, 1997), and `since the late 1980s the attainment gap between the highest and lowest social classes has widened' (Gillborn & Mirza, 2000, p. 18). Educational opportunities and achievements reflect not only class, but also ethnicity and gender inequalities with, for example, African-Caribbean boys, and Pakistani and Bangladeshi gifts and boys doing less well overall than their white counterparts.

New Labour--new priorities: Discourses of social justice and social inclusion

New Labour came to power in 1997 in a dramatic victory over the previous Tory administration, bringing with it new commitments to education, social justice and inclusion. Soon after gaining office, the Social Exclusion Unit was formed, which reported directly to the Prime Minister through the Cabinet Office, with the explicit aim of formulating policy to cut across the traditional boundaries of government departments and contribute to `joined up thinking' about social issues. In a review of New Labour educational policies, Fielding (1999) noted that, among the reviewers, `there is genuinely felt goodwill and substantial admiration for the degree of commitment and tenacity shown by the new administration: this is a government that clearly cares about a positive, challenging educational experience for all students' (p. 179).

This was not, however, simply a continuation of previous Labour administrations' policies. Tony Blair (1998), leader of the party, was concerned to articulate a `Third Way' for `the new politics `which the progressive centre-left is forging in Britain and beyond' (p. 1). It is a politics which sets out to move beyond both the old Left and New Right:

   It is about traditional values in a changed world. And it draws vitality
   from uniting the two great streams of left-of-centre thought--democratic
   socialism and liberalism--whose divorce this century did so much to weaken
   progressive politics across the West. Liberals asserted the primacy of
   individual liberty in the market economy; social democrats promoted social
   justice with the state as its main agent. (p. 1)

A major element of continuity with the previous Conservative government--a firm belief in the importance of the market--is evident here. Indeed Cole (among others) argues that Blair's modernisation agenda is, in many ways, a continuation of the Thatcher policy agenda.

New Labour has retained an emphasis on accountability, standards and choice, all concepts underlying Conservative Party policy and indicative of the `New Right stagecraft' (Esland, 1996) which was remarkably successful in transforming dominant educational discourse in the 1980s and 1990s. Similarly the emphases on market competitiveness, performativity, centralisation and prescription represent continuities between the previous Tory administration's and New Labour's educational policies (Ball, 1999). Ball argues that such policy continuities are local manifestations of a global `paradigm of convergence' (p. 198), and similarities in policy direction can be seen in a number of other countries. Giddens (2001), one of the leading exponents of the Third Way, has recently reaffirmed New Labour's commitment to the market: `The good society requires a competitive market economy, a source not only of economic development but of individual freedom' (p. 37). However Giddens also points out that markets are not perfect and need `active government' to curb the damaging excesses of markets that `produce too much inequality, and too much insecurity' (p. 37). This is an interesting refinement of earlier positions that reflects a slight but detectable shift in New Labour policy as it enters its second term.

Yet New Labour did herald some changes, as in promising higher levels of investment in public services and stressing the importance of partnerships and collaboration to mitigate the worst excesses of market competition: (for example, the Learning age White Paper (Department for Education and Employment (DfEE), 1997). The main discontinuity with Tory policy, however, can be seen in the emphasis on inclusion and social justice and the connection with educational agendas (Hustler, Stronach, & West, 2000). Blair (1998) identified four key values of the Third Way: `equal worth, opportunity for all, responsibility and community' (p. 3). `Equal worth' can be seen to signify the economism which is evident in Third Way policies in relation to the public sector, and it signals a major way in which the discourse of equality is being transfigured under New Labour.

As Blair wrote in 2001, `We seek to combine American economic dynamism with European social solidarity, without the inequity of the one or the rigidity of the other' (Blair, 2001b). According to Blair, `social justice must be founded on the equal worth of each individual, whatever their background, capability, creed or race' (p. 3), and he stressed that the government must `act decisively to end discrimination and prejudice'. He also emphasises the importance of `opportunities for all' to spread `wealth, power and opportunity' as widely as possible, with the new government committed to governing for `the many, not the few'. Blair (1998) has criticised the ways in which the Right traditionally interpreted `opportunity' to mean individual freedom from the state, but he also criticises the Left:

   At worst, it has stifled opportunity in the name of abstract equality.
   Gross inequalities continue to be handed down from generation to
   generation, and the progressive Left must robustly tackle the obstacles to
   true equality of opportunity. But the promotion of equal opportunities does
   not imply dull uniformity in welfare provision and public services. (p. 3)

The discourses of modernisation, excellence, standards, choice and diversity (of provision) are all signalled here, with the critique of `dull uniformity' subsequently used to legitimise the challenge to the comprehensive system.

In addition to `equal worth' and `opportunities for all', the concepts of `community' and `responsibility' make up Blair's construction of social justice. The increase in social exclusion which took place under previous Conservative governments was recognised by New Labour, with the renewed emphasis on society, community and inclusion designed to reverse these trends. `Inclusion' is about being economically and socially included, and emphasises the rights and responsibilities of citizens, although as Loxley and Thomas note, citing Hutton (1996), `if you want to be included you have to "agree" to the conditions of membership' (cited in Loxley & Thomas, 2001, p. 297).

Several commentators have noted how this discourse of social inclusion has replaced one of equality (Bullen & Kenway, 2000; Hatcher, 1998; Loxley & Thomas, 2001), but none has deconstructed New Labour's use of the terms `inclusion' and `exclusion' to the extent that has been achieved by Levitas (1998). She identifies three competing discourses of social exclusion in Britain. The first, RED, is a redistributive discourse in which social exclusion is intertwined with poverty. Blair (1998) identifies investment in public services as a key aspect of the Third Way, although public spending during the first term of New Labour was hardly any better than under the previous Conservative Government (Stewart, 2001). The New Labour commitment to reducing poverty has, however, resulted in one million fewer children living below the poverty line than when Labour came to power (Guardian Leader, 2002). Redistribution, though, is not the only solution by the Government. Levitas (1998) cites David Blunkett, Education Spokesperson, arguing that `the truth is that any government entering the 21st century cannot hope to create a more equal or egalitarian society simply by taking from one set of people and redistributing it to others' (p. 134). In some ways, the recognition that cultural factors play a significant part in the production of social inequalities is a welcome change from the economistic analyses of the old left. The continuing reality of racism and sexism, for example, illustrates that poverty is not the only cause of inequality. However, in their eagerness to embrace the Third Way and find an alternative to the redistributive policies of the past, New Labour failed to take account of the full impact of poverty and its intractability. Young (1999) argues that the Third Way does not take full account of the relationship between wealth and poverty or the power that wealth gives individuals who are making life choices.

The second discourse identified by Levitas, MUD, is the moral underclass discourse which stresses cultural rather than material causes of poverty. Under this discourse, those who are not considered to have fulfilled their responsibilities as citizens are seen to exclude themselves. Under Thatcher's Tory policies, a distinction was made between the `deserving' (respectable, trying to better themselves, etc.) and the `undeserving' (lazy, spongers, think society owes them a living) poor (Gewirtz, Bail, & Bowe, 1995), something that can also be seen in New Labour discourse. Giddens's (1998) articulation of the Third Way, which has been credited with influencing Blair's thinking, conceptualises welfare dependency as `moral hazard'. This constructs and reinforces negative views of those receiving welfare benefits, something which Bullen and Kenway (2000) analyse in terms of the moral agenda of New Labour in relation to teenage young women who become pregnant. Of course such moral assumptions of working-class deficit are not new (Walkerdine, 1990), but it is of concern to see them promulgated by the Labour Party. It is also evident in widening participation and lifelong learning discourse, with the assumption that participation is `a good thing', and anyone who chooses not to participate is regarded as deficient in some way, for example by lacking the appropriate attitudes. In a very explicit articulation of Labour's moral agenda and resistance to re-distributive policies, Blunkett argued:

   Poverty cannot be an excuse for failure. It is poverty of aspiration and
   not poverty of income which prevents a child from taking full advantage of
   their talent. (cited in Levitas, 1998)

The basis for this approach is New Labour's belief in the need to build `social capital' but, as Gamarnikow and Green (1999) point out, there are different interpretations of what social capital might mean. Bourdieu and Passeron developed a radical interpretation arguing that societies assign differential values to different cultural traditions, with more powerful groups using their stores of economic, cultural and social capital to retain their position in society. As Gewirtz (2001) argues, New Labour have adopted a `deficit' model that universalises middle-class values and aims `to make all parents into clones of Tony and Cheri Blair' (p. 366).

The third discourse of social inclusion identified by Levitas is SID, or the social integrationist discourse, emphasising inclusion in the labour market. Levitas notes, however, that the SID discourse is not about equality at all but about entry into a profoundly unequal labour market. This removes people from welfare `dependency' thus freeing up state resources, and places the responsibility on individuals to care for themselves. It is linked with the moral agenda of MUD, and demonises those who remain `dependent' on the state. Concepts of dependence and independence also, however, need to be problematised (Leathwood, 2001b).

All three of Levitas's social inclusion discourses can be found in Labour Party education policy, and different members of the government have emphasised different social inclusion agendas. As can be seen, social inclusion does not necessarily result in equality, and an inclusive society is not the same as an egalitarian one. Hatcher (1998) argues that `the rhetoric of community is not about social justice to overcome equality but social cohesion in spite of inequality' (p. 448). Levitas suggests that the dominant discourses of social inclusion reflect a Durkheimian concern with repressing conflict, whereas McRobbie (2000) calls the Third Way `a managerialism of the centre-left' (p. 103). To deny or repress conflict in a vision of an all-encompassing inclusive society is also to deny, or fail to understand, unequal power relations based on structural and cultural inequalities. Similarly frequent reference to `the disadvantaged' disguises and obscures differences, with `race' becoming invisible in this discourse, thereby doing away with the need specifically to tackle issues of race equality (Gillborn, 1995). Although explicit reference to issues of racial diversity have appeared in New Labour policy documents, thus to some extent challenging the deracialised discourse of the previous Tory administration (Gillborn, 1998), concepts of inclusion and exclusion serve to obscure inequalities (Levitas, 1998), hence making it difficult to speak or challenge them. Walkerdine, Lucey, & Melody, (2001) argue that in this new discursive climate:

   [class] produces signs whose name can only ever be whispered and which can
   more easily be read as evidence of personal failure and pathology than
   social inequality and oppression. It is this conjunction and its
   consequences that has such profound implications for the lives of all in
   Britain today. (p. 19)

New Labour's educational policies: Towards equality and social justice?

In this section of the paper, we discuss three New Labour educational policy areas, all of which raise particular concerns in relation to equality: the economising of education and retention of the market as a major organising principle within the education system; Labour's retreat from its no-selection policies and its commitment to ability setting and other forms of selection; and finally policies related to widening participation in higher education.

Economising of education

The link between educational policy and the economy is not new, and governments across the political spectrum have used changes in the global economy to emphasise the importance of education for national competitiveness (Cole, 1998). Apple (1992) argues that economic competitiveness has been constructed as `the organizing principle of education', and Fielding (1999) suggests that, within New Labour educational discourse, it is economic goals that dominate. Hatcher (1998) states that `for New Labour, modernization ... means accepting the logic of the global market as irresistible, and indeed to be welcomed' (p. 486). Although in 1987 Tony Blair criticised the market and social democrats who supported it, he has since called himself a social democrat (Hartnett, 1998), and the market is clearly welcomed in Third Way discourse.

Blair explicitly links the social justice and economic agendas when he asserts: `Today social justice is an economic essential not an optional extra' (Blair, 2001a), and `every under-educated child is a national asset squandered' (Blair, 2002). Yet the human capital rationale for education signified by these statements has been widely criticised (see, for example, Blackmore, 1997; Gorz, cited in Edwards, 1993; Hutton, 1996; Schuller & Field, 1998), and is unlikely to lead to greater equality, something also emphasised by Hatcher (1998):

   The reality is that the human capital argument does not entail a radical
   equalizing upwards of the future workforce but a stratified and
   differentiated school population which roughly corresponds to the
   stratified hierarchy of the future labour market. (p. 490)

Similarly the role of the market in education has been criticised by many for generating and reconstructing inequalities (Bag, 1990, 1995; Gewirtz et al., 1995; Kenway, 1997; Leathwood, 2001a; Mahony & Frith, 1996; Reay, 1999), with Apple (1999) arguing that race is an `absent presence' in the discourse of markets and the marketisation of education. As Marginson (1994) states:

   Exchange tends to inequality, the capacity to consume is ranked in units of
   money, and producers are ranked in terms of value. Hierarchy and inequality
   of outcomes are necessary conditions of educational markets. (pp. 4-5)

Morley (1997) also argues:

   Under the guise of political neutrality the market economy poses as a
   technology, but represents a range of values which confirm and reinforce
   the established social order of wealth and privileges. (p. 234)

The New Labour government has presented the market as consonant with a social justice agenda. Mager, in a consideration of the role of the market in the Learning to succeed White Paper (DfEE, 1999), notes that the market was seen as central to meeting the Government's objectives--to promote excellence and participation, involve employers, be learner-driven, prioritise equal access, ensure good guidance and support, and provide accountability and efficiency (Mager et al., 2000). Nowhere is there any recognition that the market positions people differently, that the model of the individual making free rational choices is based on a masculinist ideal, that cultural (and other) capital result in class-based constraints on `choice', or that the market itself creates inequalities.

The Learning age White Paper (DfEE, 1997) appeared to promise a move away from the previous government's emphasis on market competition and the consequent limits on collaboration, with partnerships and collaborative relationships foregrounded in the proposed legislation. Although the regional planning of educational provision was encouraged, as Power and Whitty (1999) have noted, new/fashionable discourses of mutuality and partnership are in many ways a re-labelling of marketisation and privatisation. In addition, `Blair and Blunkett have been more bullish about transferring responsibilities from the public to the private sector than Thatcher and Major' (p. 539), and the private sector is now a significant provider of a whole range of educational services. Some local authorities have effectively been privatised, private training providers are able to compete with further education colleges for government funding, and a range of private companies are now running schools, with an expansion of private involvement heralded by the 2001 Education Bill.

Although such policies have their detractors, or `wreckers' as Blair (2002) has recently dubbed those opposed to his privatisation policies, the discourses of the market continue to have considerable appeal, not least to those who have previously been failed by public services. As Morley (1997) notes, `Discourses of choice, consumer power and the resultant entitlement culture can be attractive to members of the community who have traditionally experienced powerlessness and frustration in relation to powerful organisations' (p. 235). It is perhaps no surprise that a Labour Government, keen to retain and maximise its electoral advantage, has also retained and built upon previous Tory policies on selection and parental choice.

Selection and ability setting

Parental `choice' in relation to their children's schooling, trumpeted by the Tories and a key aspect of the discourse of consumer fights within the educational market, does not sit easily with Labour's earlier commitment to the comprehensive ideal, and its opposition to grammar schools and selection at age 11 (the old `11-plus' examination). Indeed Tony Blair caused a future in 1994 when he sent his son to a grant-maintained school (2) eight miles from his home, rather than to the local comprehensive. Contradictions within party policy were evident, therefore, well before the New Labour Party came to power in 1997. At a Fabian Society conference in 1995, Labour's education spokesperson, David Blunkett, insisted, `I cannot see how you can offer choice by having a selective process. We have made a clear pledge that there will be no more selection' (Sutcliffe, 1995). The use of the word `more', however, was already an indication that grammar schools would survive under a future Labour government.

New Labour's concern with standards and choice was enshrined in the School Standards and Framework Bill (1997) which permitted selection by ability where it was intended to produce a mix of abilities for banding or ability setting. The bill also protected the rights of grammar schools to select (subject to a provision for a parental ballot on the issue), and provided for specialist schools to select up to 10 per cent of their pupils (Webster & Parsons, 1999). The Education Bill 2001 not only provided for far greater involvement of private companies in schools and state education, but also proposed a dramatic increase in the number of specialist schools, with almost 50 per cent of all secondary schools in Eng, land specialising (in, for example, technology, the arts, science or sport) by 2005. In addition, an increase in the number of faith schools is also planned. Selection is therefore increased, albeit not explicitly, and the government's commitment to ability setting remains.

As Power and White), (1999) note, New Labour appears to have accepted the arguments of the Right that the search for equality, particularly through comprehensive schooling, had resulted in a compromising of standards. Just as neo-conservative philosophy assumes that inequality is inevitable (Loxley & Thomas, 2001), New Labour discourse appears to accept `inequality as a "fact of life" to be acknowledged rather than a problem to be overcome' (Power & Whitty 1999, p. 540). Blair (2001a) recently stated: `In education, all children are not the same. They don't have the same aptitudes and abilities, and schools which fail to recognise this will fail'. This statement rests on a fixed notion, and a hierarchy, of ability, and it is used to legitimate ability setting, specialist schools and selection.

The problem is that by allowing some schools to select, the highest achieving pupils are `creamed off', with inevitable consequences for other schools in the neighbourhood (Webster & Parsons, 1999). Reay (1999) has clearly demonstrated how choice for some (middle-class) parents increases differentiation within the school system and directly and negatively impacts on the opportunities available for working-class children and their parents. And it is not only selection between schools which is problematic. Gillborn (1997) has pointed out the dangers of ability setting, especially as movement between sets is limited. Pupils in lower sets study a more restricted curriculum, thereby making it more difficult for them to move up into higher sets. In addition, those in lower sets are only likely to be offered the opportunity to be entered into the lower level GCSE exams, making it impossible for them to obtain the top grades. Although, therefore, the tripartite system of education in the UK, whereby children entered different secondary schools with different leaving qualifications, has been theoretically abolished, a similarly divisive system exists within and between schools. The maintenance of grammar schools and the introduction of more specialist schools is likely further to increase differentiation within the system. Gillborn (1997) argues that ability setting is an example of New Labour's `colour-blind' policy, with more working-class and Black children placed in lower sets. He points out that South Asian children are more likely to be in lower sets for language reasons, with African Caribbean children (particularly boys) similarly placed for being `disruptive'. In this way, ` "colour-blind" language can disguise "colour-specific" consequences' (p. 7).

Ability setting is often justified as a way of improving achievements, especially for the most able who, it is claimed, tend to be held back in mixed-ability contexts. Hatcher (1997), however, cites a review of research on ability setting which finds no evidence of improvements in achievement, even for the highest achieving children, a conclusion that is also reached by Lynch (1999). Hatcher also cites evidence from the United States which indicates that a policy of fast-tracking some children can increase racial inequalities, noting `the policy of fast-tracking ends up in practice converting difference into inequality' (p. 11). He concludes that Labour's attack on mixed-ability teaching is political and economic, rather than being based on evidence. Ability setting appeals to middle-class voters, and `sorts out pupils into a hierarchy, which begins to correspond to the hierarchical organisation of the labour market, and also legitimises the ideology of a hierarchy of ability' (p. 11).

As Ball (1999) notes, Labour's policies on selection and ability setting suggest a `confused or at best weak commitment to social justice' as `the excluding effects of educational processes themselves remain unaddressed' (p. 197).

Widening participation

A further key area of New Labour's educational and social inclusion agendas is the promotion of `lifelong learning' and increasing access to university, with a Government target of 50 per cent of 18-30 year olds gaining experience of higher education before 2010. The Learning age Green Paper (DfEE, 1997) articulated the rationale for such a commitment, with learning identified as the `key to prosperity' for individuals and the nation `in a new age--the age of information and of global competition'. The human capital argument, emphasising the importance of a highly trained and skilled workforce, is again very evident. Margaret Hodge (2001), Minister for Higher Education, has since reinforced the economic message, describing the 50 per cent target as `both an economic necessity and a practical ambition'.

The Government's widening participation discourse is not, however, only an economic one; social inclusion elements are also evident. The Green Paper states: `Our vision of the Learning Age is about more than employment. The development of a culture of learning will help build a united society, assist in the creation of personal independence, and encourage our creativity and innovation' (DfEE, 1997). There is also a commitment to bridging `the "learning divide"--between those who have benefited from education and training and those who have not--which blights so many communities and widens income inequality'. Estelle Morris (2001), Secretary of State for Education from 2001, also identified one of the key challenges for higher education as `widening participation and unlocking the potential of poorer sections of society'.

Within this discourse, `learning' is clearly beneficial, an unconditional `good thing', with the consequent danger, as already noted, that those who choose not to participate are seen as deficient or irresponsible. Parry notes the tendency in the Green Paper to place responsibility for engaging in learning on individuals, who are then blamed for the `learning divide' (Parry & Fry 1999, p. 109). Gorard et al., (2000), however, suggest that, given the numbers who do not participate in formal education, perhaps the problem `lies in the provision and not in the non-participants' (p. 513). They argue:

   Non-participants are often blamed for their situation, and threatened with
   exclusion, since the alternative of admitting the existence of
   socio-economic determinants for non-participation might require a totally
   different, and rather more expensive, government programme. (p. 513)

It appears that MUD, rather than RED, is the dominant social inclusion discourse here.

There have been some redistributive elements in policy related to post-compulsory education, including the introduction of the education maintenance allowance for students from low income families in further education. Yet maintenance grants were withdrawn for higher education study, with students now required to take out loans and pay (means-tested) fees. The Government's determination to appease the middle classes by holding down income tax, and the cost implications of dramatically increasing student numbers in higher education, has resulted in a determination to transfer costs directly to the student, rather than recouping such costs through the higher income taxes graduates almost invariably pay.

Yet the likely impact of such policy changes on working-class students were either not anticipated or not understood. The risks involved in university study for working-class young people are multiple, and include social and identity risks as well as financial (Archer & Hutchings, 2000; Archer et al., 2002; Archer, Leathwood, & Hutchings, 2002), but working-class students face considerably higher financial risks than their middle-class peers, making this an important barrier to studying in higher education for many working-class young people. Student funding emerged as an important issue in the 2001 general election, and changes to the student financing systems have been made in Scotland and Wales.

In England, Estelle Moms (2001), Secretary of State for Education, has stated: `We want to think again about any obstacles real or imagined that could discourage young people from low income families from taking up higher education'. A review of the student finance system has been set up with a view to simplifying it, providing `more upfront support for students from less well-off backgrounds', and tackling the issue of debt and `perceptions of debt'. The reference to `perceptions of debt', however, suggests that working-class concerns about debt are in some way flawed or irrational, and if only they had the right attitude and realised that, in the long terns, university study would pay off, they would be OK. But although average graduate salaries are higher than those for non-graduates, the benefits which accrue to working-class graduates continue to be less than those of middle-class graduates with the same degree (Elias, McKnight, Pitcher, Purcell, & Simm, 1999). Furthermore, the labour market is gendered and raced as well as classed, with the higher levels of potential, income still reserved for white middle-class men. It is also becoming increasingly apparent from government statements that expectations of a radical overhaul of student finance in England may be overly optimistic, and any changes to the arrangements in England may be little more than a tinkering around the edges.

Other government policies aimed to widen participation include those concerned with raising achievement in school. Educational Action Zones (EAZs) and Excellence in Cities programs have been introduced `to see if we could narrow the unacceptable gap in performance between children from different backgrounds, something no one has done before' (Morris, 2001). Raising achievement in those communities who have traditionally underachieved is presented by Morris as a key strategy in widening participation in higher education for traditionally underrepresented groups, although she also says that raising attainment on its own is not enough, and there is a need to raise aspirations, ambitions and self esteem too. The Excellence Challenge brings further and higher education into the Excellence in Cities scheme, and offers support to young people from disadvantaged areas who may go on to higher education. 150m [pounds sterling] has been allocated over three years to support outreach work for further and higher education institutions, increased marketing of higher education routes, and some financial support for students through Opportunity Bursaries. Thomas (2001), however, suggests that one of the main limitations of this program is that it is designed to increase the participation of those young people who already have the potential to go to higher education, that is, those who already have the necessary qualifications or are on target to attain them, not the 82 per cent of working-class children who do not. The policy therefore focuses on the `gifted and talented' working-class young people, with a view to getting them into the top universities: `it appears to assume that the majority is not worth bothering about' (p.371).

The same criticism has been applied to a wide range of widening participation projects that include summer schools to prepare students for higher education or `compact schemes' which provide links between school or college and university for identified students (Morgan-Klein & Murphy, 2002; Thomas, 2001). As Morgan-Klein and Murphy illustrate, such schemes can work very well for some students, but they also tend to rest on a fixed notion of academic ability and are in themselves selective.

This concern with ensuring that the top achieving working-class young people go to university has been a major theme underlying widening participation discourse. The case of Laura Spence, a high achieving state school student who was refused a place at Oxford University and later received an offer from Harvard University in the United States, became a cause celebre in the media, with Oxford and other elite institutions subject to heavy criticism from the government for their failure to accept more state school students. Additional government funding was subsequently announced for elite institutions which increased their intake of students from disadvantaged backgrounds.

This leads on to a further area of concern in relation to the government's policies for post-compulsory education, and that is the increasing differentiation of the sector. Working-class young people are more likely to be on sub-degree courses than middle-class young people, and in the poorer and lower status post-1992 universities than in the elite institutions (Gallagher, 2002). The pre-1992 universities are also less likely to accept minority ethnic applicants (Modood & Shiner, 1994). The reasons for this are complex, and include institutional admissions policy, the financial implications of studying away from home in the absence of student grants, and the `process of psychological self-exclusion' whereby working-class and minority ethnic students avoid institutions where they feel they would not fit in (Reay, Davies, David, & Ball, 2001), Hutchings and Archer (2001) note how many working-class non-participants perceived the higher education that might be open to them, the inner-city post-1992 institutions `which one respondent referred to as `crap universities', as inferior to `real' higher education (p. 87). The unit of resource per student in these universities is considerably lower than in the elite institutions, resulting in larger class sizes, fewer tutors, poorer library facilities, and lower teaching quality assessments. Blackmore (1997) notes that `the under-resourcing of teaching has meant a shift from "fat" to "lean-and-mean" pedagogies, with reduced tutorials, increased tutorial size, and less student contact' (p. 92), and students in post-1992 universities are suffering most. In addition, changes in student funding mean that many students are having to work to support themselves as they study, with working-class students less likely to be able to rely on the safety net of parental handouts and financial support. On top of this, a degree from a new university is generally less valued than one from an elite institution, and their future earning potential may suffer. As Gallagher (2002) notes, in so far as widening participation is occurring, it is occurring in the least privileged sections of post-compulsory education, with the most privileged institutions remaining relatively immune to these trends.

There is no evidence from current government policy that the gap between rich and poor institutions is likely to decline in the foreseeable future. The Labour Party (2001) has expressed its commitment to `a broad diversity of higher education institutions, building on the wider range which already exists, with institutions embracing different missions, including vocationally oriented teaching excellence' (p. 25), and it seems highly unlikely that such `teaching-only' institutions will be able to match the elite status of their more privileged research-led peers. Margaret Hodge, the Higher Education Minister, recently reaffirmed this commitment to diversification by asserting that market forces should determine the shape of higher education (Thomson, 2002).

Conclusions

There are many contradictions within the government's education policy agenda, with New Labour's retention of the market, competition and selection, and its support for a hierarchy of institutions, effectively reconstructing those inequalities which the social justice agenda seeks to reduce. Loxley and Thomas (2001) refer to this as `incremental dissonance ... What is happening is the layering of new policies that have as their notional objective "inclusion" on top of policies that have demonstrably contrary effects' (p. 299).

Although the commitment espoused by New Labour to social justice, social inclusion and equality is a very welcome and refreshing change from the almost two decades of Tory Party rule and the dominance of the New Right, the discursive framing of these policies is unlikely to produce the sorts of radical changes needed to construct a more egalitarian society. The equality discourse drawn on is a liberal one of equality of opportunity, which rests on notions of fairness for (differently abled/ talented) individuals within a meritocratic system. Giddens (2001) regards a meritocratic approach as one of the cornerstones of Third Way politics which he regards as morally as well as economically desirable in order to allow talented individuals to live up to their potential (p. 39). Such an approach, however, although potentially enabling some individuals from `disadvantaged' backgrounds to succeed, necessarily means that many will not, and fails to challenge existing structures of inequalities. Meritocracy, rather than constituting a fair and just system of allocating societal rewards, legitimises and further constructs inequalities (Lynch, 1999; Young, 2001).

The contradictions in New Labour's policy agenda stem from its attempt to reconcile social justice and inclusion with capitalism and the market. Levitas (1998) concludes that we need to rethink alternatives to capitalism, whereas Lynch (1999) presents the case for a radical egalitarian perspective `which confronts inequalities both within and without education in distributive terms' (p. 309). If New Labour is committed to its social justice agenda, it needs to do some serious rethinking about the implications of its current policy direction.

At the time of writing (April 2002), New Labour has just announced its proposals for the first budget of its second term in office. For the first time, a direct commitment to redistribution of wealth has been made to fund the creaking National Health System. This is widely regarded in the media as representing a decisive political shift. It is too soon to judge the extent of the change or the effect it will have on the electorate. It is quite clear, however, that previous policies to improve public services and eradicate disadvantage have not been as successful as many of us would wish, including a government seeking a third term in office.

Notes

(1) Comprehensive schools are secondary schools (age 11-18) designed to cater for pupils of all abilities. They were established in the 1950s and 1960s and were intended to replace the earlier tripartite and selective system of grammar, technical and secondary modern schools.

(2) Grant maintained schools are selective schools which are supported by a direct grant from central government.

Keywords

educational discrimination
equal education
policy analysis
political issues
political parties
public policy

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Carole Leathwood is a Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for Policy Studies in Education, University of North London, 236-250 Holloway Road, London N7 6PP.

Annette Hayton is the School Manager at the Institute of Education, University of London, 20 Bedford Way, London WC1H OAL.