East Mediterranean Peace & Trade Pacts, Or Hell, Stretching From Cyprus To Kurdistan.

*** Some Kurds Suspect That The Bomb Blast Which Killed 67 Was Masterminded By The Turkish Secret Services, While Most Believe That It Was The Work Of Al Qaida; The Main Political Parties Vow To Show Greater Unity In The Aftermath

*** The Islamic Iran Participation Front, The Party Of Mohammed Reza Khatami, The President's Brother, Says It Will Boycott The Feb. 20 Parliamentary Elections As Tensions Rise In The Country

NICOSIA - A highly placed APS source tracking US behaviour and European reaction sees two alternative scenarios for the East Mediterranean region that will have a positive or negative impact from Cyprus to Kurdistan. The first scenario has a convergence of interests among the major powers and among the local players opening a window of opportunity in 2004, a "once-in-a-lifetime opportunity" for peace and free trade pacts involving key groups in this zone - the Turks, the Greeks, the Greek Cypriots, the Turkish Cypriots, the Kurds and their Iraqi Arab neighbours. The second scenario gives the reverse, with the US failing to keep Iraq in one piece and the Arabs paying the short-term price of a more belligerent but potentially self-destructive Israel.

The source believes the US - despite this being a year of American presidential elections - has the opportunity now to create the momentum required for the first scenario to become a reality, with most of its key elements to be in place in time for President George W. Bush to get re-elected. A set of viable peace deals in the East Mediterranean, quickly but carefully brokered by the US, the UN and the EU would have a rapid domino effect impacting positively on all the parties concerned. "The magic of this rare opportunity", he warns, "may not last beyond end-March".

A set of peace deals should first address Ankara's concerns about the Kurds of northern Iraq. A deal settling the Cyprus problem can provide the framework for trade pacts with Greece and Turkey. For Ankara it will mean a smoother road to EU entry and a more confident hand in dealing with the Kurdish issue in northern Iraq. The Turkish capital market is following the current diplomatic moves closely, mindful that the absence of a deal would certainly upset the country's steady recovery from a 2001 financial crisis.

In a plan co-ordinated with the US and EU, the UN will be the main force behind a last-minute deal in Cyprus. At the same time, the US should quickly godfather a better accommodation between the Turks and the Kurds. The window of opportunity for the Kurds will not last long.

Speaking after talks with Turkish Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul on Jan. 29, 2004, US Secretary of State Colin Powell said: "There is a moment of opportunity here (for resolving the Cyprus problem)... I think it's time for all of us to put pressure on all sides to get a resolution". Powell expressed the hope that a settlement of the dispute could come before May 1, when the Republic of Cyprus, which controls the Greek Cypriot-dominated southern part of the island, is scheduled to become part of the EU.

The Annan plan, named after UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, is the central document on which the proposed Cyprus peace settlement is balanced. The plan calls for a federated state based on the concept of "sovereign equality" between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots, with some territorial adjustments to occur as well as adjustments to allow a small number of refugees to return to their homes. There is a sense of urgency on all sides brought about by the May 1 deadline, just as the Kurds of northern Iraq have until Feb. 28 to agree with Iraq's Arabs on a federal system acceptable to all concerned including the Turks.

Turkish Premier Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who met with President Bush at the White House last month, had requested Annan in early January to revive the Cyprus negotiations because in the absence of a solution by May 1 the window of opportunity for Turkey to join the EU may close for the foreseeable future. Annan said a deal will have to be reached even sooner, by end-March, to allow time for both sides of the island to hold votes on their future. This means the two sides would have to resume negotiations by end-February at the latest.

Turkey has offered to allow the UN to "fill in the blanks" on unresolved issues in the plan at the final stages of negotiations, provided the Greek Cypriots do the same. Republic of Cyprus President Tassos Papadopoulos, speaking for the Greek Cypriot side of the tentative peace equation, pledged that "if the secretary-general tomorrow asks for talks, I will be there. No conditions, no terms, nothing". The obstacle is the Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash, who has rejected the plan outright. However, he will have little choice but to accept the plan as a basis for negotiation if the Turkish military establishment - which has hitherto been his main source of political strength - decides it is time to compromise in view of a December 2004 deadline for the EU to set a date for accession talks.

Ankara, in the meantime, is depending on the US to ensure that Kurdish autonomy in northern Iraq does not metamorphose into independent statehood. Washington views the Kurds in a favourable light, as they have co-operated with the US since before Operation Iraqi Freedom was launched. At the same time, they have to maintain a delicate balance to ensure that their relationship with Turkey is not damaged as a result.

As part of the balancing act, Bush assured Erdogan last month that Iraq will remain in one piece. Bush told Erdogan the US did not support a further expansion of autonomy for the Kurds and added that America's "ambition is for a peaceful country, a democratic Iraq that is territorially intact" (see Recorder of this week).

Just hours before Bush's comments, Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) chief L. Paul Bremer 3rd said in Baghdad the US was committed to expelling from northern Iraq the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) rebels who have fought Turkish forces for years. This satisfied a longtime Turkish demand. Bremer said coalition and Iraqi security forces would treat the PKK rebels and renamed affiliate groups as terrorists, adding, "There is no place for terrorism or terrorist organizations in the new Iraq". For its part, the State Department had indicated in November 2003 that it would not allow the PKK to escape attention by changing its name.

These moves signalled clearly that the US-Turkish relationship, severely strained following the Turkish refusal to let American forces open a front from south-eastern Turkey into northern Iraq for the US-led invasion last year, has gradually come back on track. This was suggested by Erdogan himself in an article in the Wall Street Journal on Jan. 27 in which he noted out that 2003 was a year marked by "periods of uncharacteristic unease" between the two countries. After the talk with Bush, Erdogan told reporters he was "very happy" with the assurances of the president and added: "We share the same views regarding our strategic partnership in restructuring Iraq".

The message to the Kurds is that they will only get geographical federalism, not ethnic federalism, and that there is little chance of their area becoming an independent state. But within those constraints, the US will move to support the Kurds in whatever way it can - through economic aid and other forms of assistance. Washington will work to ensure that the Kurds are not disadvantaged in whatever form the Iraqi state takes in the future.

Iraq's Sunni Arabs want their country to be "part of the Arab nation" and their nationalist slogan is "Uruba", which is something the Kurds oppose. They prefer that the constitution describe Iraq as a "binational: Arab and Kurdish" state.

The Shiites, who form about 60% of the population, reject both definitions and want to emphasise what an Iranian journalist calls the country's Iraqitude (Uruqa). Both the Shiites and Sunnis oppose the Kurds' desire for Iraq to become a federation.

The Kurdish parties - KDP and PUK - are depending on the US to ensure that they either get increased autonomy, even if it is minor doses, or at least they are not forced to give up the level of autonomy they already exercise. But the only way Washington will be able to convince Turkey to let the current level of autonomy be maintained would be if the Kurdish side is prepared to provide some form of guarantee against claims on Turkish territory, and to agree to enter into economic and security agreements with Ankara. It remains to be seen if the Kurdish side will be prepared to move in that direction, especially after the latest violence in the area.