EW weapon system: main development trends.

Changes in the military-political situation, as well as the character and content of tasks facing the RF AF determine the necessity of elaborating scientific approaches to the identification of priorities in the military organizational development of the RF AF, and advancement of the weapon systems, and military and specialized equipment (MSE) with account taken of tough resource constraints (economic, time-related, production and technological, and others). A modern priority in military organizational development both in this country and elsewhere is improving the EW forces and assets. Coming into being practically at the same time as electronic assets began to be used in military affairs, the electronic warfare surged in scale over the recent years, this being primarily the consequence of massive introduction of electronics in systems controlling troops (forces) and weapons.

An analysis of NATO's modern weapons priorities indicates that global-scale introduction of electronics has caused the weapons to grow in complexity thousands of times. But their current complexity is measured not so much by the amount of stock elements and mechanical joints as by an infinite plurality of possible scenarios of weapons' combat employment and information impacts on the enemy, the diversity of initial formalized information liable to prompt handling in real time, and the great number of software functions. A specific weapon model emerges not just as a technically complex system but as an "intellectual" system that is functionally controlled by a human operator or a computer using information systems. The fundamental information support for each soldier is secured in practice already today. This means that actually each soldier and battlefield equipment and weapons are separate interacting management information subsystems united by a common objective. Each of these is a data source, handles incoming information in real time, and implements system plans within the framework of a single concept.

Introduced in any functioning information (management information) system, elements of ambiguity lead to internally circulating information being untimely, incomplete and unreliable, and, as a consequence, to irrational and, possibly, disastrously wrong decisions. Given that the course and outcome of military conflicts is largely decided by one warring side being able to preempt the other, the said circumstance is of extreme importance. The situation being what it is, EW weapons are, in effect, the only thing capable of neutralizing the potential adversary's supremacy in forces and weapons control capability.

In the meantime, we have a number of problems discouraging full realization of the potential inherent in EW forces and assets. In the first place, as I see it, these are the following: underestimation of electronic warfare's importance and its impact on the course and outcome of information confrontation, and consequently on results of military operations; structure of EW forces and assets falling short of the structure of RF AF units and missions they tackle; a lag in the work to improve EW forms and methods and in controlling EW forces and assets by comparison with the rates at which new forms of military operations develop; the off-balance state of the EW weapon system and the continuing destandardization of its elements.

To address these problems with any success, we must specify the main tenets of EW's theory and practice, and define trends in improving the EW weapon system of the RF AF.* We can balance this system solely by pursuing a unified and coordinated military-technical policy in the EW area. Considering the main tendencies in Western electronic systems and assets and their contribution to the effort to control troops (forces) and weapons, we may identify the following main lines in R & D on EW weapon system.

First. Development of interservice multi-function electronic suppression (ES) equipment. Under modern conditions, the traditional approach to developing specialized EW equipment (to suppress only one type of targets) may lead to a surge in its required range. Given the existing stiff constraints on personnel numbers and funding, this approach becomes unacceptable. Creating multi-function EW equipment will secure efficiency of electronic warfare against integrated electronic management information systems.

Second. Developing EW equipment to protect facilities and MSE against engagement with precision weapons. This line is of key importance for securing the required level of survivability of forces, MSE and infrastructure. In this sense, it becomes particularly urgent to increase survivability of EW equipment itself in combat operations, including by using standardized systems for its protection against precision weapons (PW).

Third. Developing high-efficiency equipment for electronic warfare against prospective individual and collective radio communications systems. The main effort in this sense should be concentrated on creating automated (with elements of artificial intellect) wide-band fast jammers to be deployed on prospective highly mobile vehicles. The jammers will engage in radio reconnaissance and suppress the enemy's jam-proof radio communications electronic assets (EA) in a difficult electronic situation in real time.

Fourth. Creating EW equipment based on new physical principles. A promising line in non-traditional EW equipment is developing functional assets to engage (suppress) EA. These are universal and can influence EA and optoelectronic assets (OEA) operating in different frequency bands. A second line in non-traditional EW equipment is creating a set of software to influence the enemy's management information systems.

Fifth. Creating a precision electronic information support system and an automated EW control system. This will enable multi-position detection, identification and location of radio radiation sources. With EW units (subunits) using information from this system, their performance efficiency will grow 20-25%. The main lines in developing EW ACS are the following: increasing supply of data on changes in operational and electronic situation in dynamics of operations (combat operations) to EW command and control elements; developing modeling systems to simulate working conditions of EW command and control elements in the shape of command-and-staff computer games and to provide practical recommendations on combat employment of EW forces and assets.

Sixth. Developing promising assets to protect information from being leaked via technical channels, and assets for active counteraction to technical reconnaissance. Protecting information from being leaked via technical channels is of special importance in peacetime. In this sense, the main emphasis should be on protecting information obtained from vibroacoustic technical channels and channels for spurious electromagnetic radiation and pickups. Active counteraction to the enemy's technical reconnaissance is usually a wartime affair. The main targets in this sense are the enemy's precision radio and radiotechnical reconnaissance systems as sources of information on crucial electronic facilities of an opposing force grouping.

Seventh. Reducing the signature in the main physical fields of weapons as well as military and specialized equipment. Introduction of scientific and technological advances in this area will make it possible to reduce levels of giveaway signs five to ten times. This will change radically the requirements to prospective assets of electronic warfare against radars and the enemy's reconnaissance OEA and PW guidance systems.

To be implemented, the above promising lines in EW weapon system require that a number of military-scientific, methodological, technical and other problems be dealt with.

The main military-scientific problems involved in development and improvement of EW weapon system are the following: specifying the role and place of the EW weapon system in the general weapon system of the RF AF; specifying the operational-strategic requirements to the EW weapon system with account taken of the new conditions; optimizing the links between the EW weapon system and other systems and complexes (within the general weapon system--with the defense-industrial complex, the military-scientific complex, etc.).

The need to specify the role and place of the EW weapon system within the general weapon system of the RF AF is an objective necessity due to EW's changed role and place in military operations of RF AF. Its growing impact on the course and outcome of operations and combat operations, its acquisition of the traits and character of the main combat operations, and other factors confirm that it is logical to consider the totality of adopted, developed, and R & D-slated EW equipment models as the EW weapon system which includes, along with the traditional ES equipment, such types of weapons as missiles and artillery projectiles that can home on radiation sources; functional engagement systems intended against EA; superhighfrequency and laser weapons, etc.

An efficient EW weapon system can hardly be created if the scientific and production infrastructure of the defense-industrial complex fails to develop in an appropriate way. It is equally crucial to use advanced technologies, electronics, automated control, etc. In turn, this will require that difficult scientific problems be addressed that embrace, among others, the area of fundamental investigations.

A methodology to estimate the EW weapon system's efficiency is central to validating promising lines in its development.

The following methodological problems can be formulated on the basis of experience in developing and using in scientific investigations the existing models and methodologies for the evaluation of EW efficiency in operations.

First -- it is necessary to develop EW models covering a new system of operations, specifically for local wars and armed conflicts. The main difficulties in this sense are linked to the absence of military-scientific groundwork for the reproduction of EW in situations where combat operations are restricted to conflict areas, where engagements are fought in populated localities or within a closely circumscribed territory, etc.

Second -- it is necessary to determine the relative contribution by large strategic formations of the services and combat arms of the Russian Federation Armed Forces, as well as their EW units (elements) to the attainment of objectives of joint operations (combat operations).

Third -- models must be developed, which will enable efficiency evaluation in accordance with indicators characterizing different properties of control (promptness, secrecy, stability, quality, etc.) under EW conditions, as well as control supremacy over the enemy. While we have results in respect of the first three properties, there is practically no groundwork on how to evaluate control quality (or degree to which potential capabilities of troops are used) that depends on correctness of decisions accepted by command and control elements. At the same time, R & D is in progress on various assets intended to impact on automation equipment complexes of command and control elements, including software impact assets and those that can functionally engage EA from among enemy ACS with electromagnetic impulses.

A comparative analysis of the current state of the EW weapon system of the RF AF and prospects for the evolution of electronic systems with different functional designation in the leading Western countries enables us to identify these three groups of internal system technical problems: power, information, and functional.

The power problems are essentially about it being impossible to realize the necessary power characteristics of EW systems given the prescribed constraints (relative to mass, overall dimensions, and power consumption) and the existing element base. The following ways of dealing with these problems are possible: use of phased arrays with high amplification ratio; targeted (frequency-wise) jamming based on the signal of a suppressed EA; adaptive management of active jamming parameters (output, duration, band width, etc.); finding and realizing new "conflict-resistant" ES methods geared to exploiting functional technical characteristics (vulnerable elements) of EA to be suppressed.

Information problems are due to the fact that the technical characteristics of the existing reconnaissance system disenable organization of necessary information support for ES systems and assets. This primarily concerns the reliability with which suppression targets are identified and appropriate service priorities are assigned thereto in ES systems amid a difficult electronic situation. The principal ways of tackling these problems are the following: enhancing precision in the process of identification of spatial (primarily angular) coordinates of EA subject to ES and securing control over suppression efficiency on the basis of integration of active and passive information devices operating in different wavelength bands and in accordance with different physical principles; improving the algorithms of primary, secondary and tertiary information handling, as well as algorithms for selecting signals with prescribed parameters in reconnaissance subsystem; information and technical mating of sister systems to form spatially distributed EW systems functioning in real time and securing a chance to supervise jamming efficiency; using information coming from precision radio- and radiotechnical reconnaissance collective systems.

Studies showed that where ES systems were concerned higher information support quality (including through forming a spatially distributed system) would increase efficiency of suppression of the main EA classes (for example, radars controlling forces and weapons) by 15-20%.

Functional problems, in turn, are connected with the necessity of simultaneous (quasi-simultaneous) suppression of EA with different spatial and signal cues, given stiff maintenance time constraints within an ES system's cyclogram. The said difficulties can be removed with the help of antenna installations with an independent control of spatial jamming channels; multichannel wide-band transceivers with parallel channel analysis; fast signal storage and jamming devices enabling a jamming response within an ES probe, as well as optimizing an ES system's cyclogram in line with the dynamics of an information conflict. For example, an analysis of earlier R & D indicates that optimization of time characteristics of (cyclograms) of ES systems alone can boost efficiency by an additional 10-15%.

An advanced modern arrangement to test EW equipment is necessary along with efforts to deal with the above problems. Testing is crucial if the EW weapon system of the RF AF is to be maintained in a combat-ready state and be fit for further development. Currently the Center is the chief organization within the MOD in charge of efficiency testing of EW equipment. It also tests EA for electronic protection, as it does MSE's anti-PW equipment as well as MSE and vital facilities for signature. Testing ranges maintained by the services of the RF AF also pursue work involving congruent testing. This kind of departmental "orientation" leads to differences in reliability indicators as characteristics of tested models get gauged. Therefore, it is quite important today to remove, among other things, the existing service anarchy and lack of coordination between EW equipment testing.

It is worthwhile saying in conclusion that a number of specific traits is inherent in the EW weapon system as a whole, as well as in separate EW equipment models and their development process. These are due to their designation, functioning principles, and the conditions of development and employment.

First. The EW weapon system is a dynamically developing system, a circumstance due to the high rates of improvement of the enemy's electronic systems and assets. Overlooking this trait in practice often leads to rapid moral ageing of EW equipment models.

Second. It takes long to develop new EW equipment models (10-15 years and longer). Given the objectively existing tendency of their rapid moral ageing, it is necessary to organize small-batch production of newly developed models and make it possible, if need be, to subsequently reproduce the technology.

Third. As a rule, the newly developed EW equipment models possess a high level of continuity with previous models both in functional and structural principles and design elements and manufacturing technologies.

Fourth. EW equipment is often "double-purpose" equipment since a number of its main functional components (receivers, transmitters, power amplifiers, antennas and feeders, etc.) are identical to those employed in communications, reconnaissance, radar, etc., equipment.

Fifth. A big number of organizations and industrial enterprises maintained by different agencies take part in development and production of EW equipment. They as a rule are distinguished by different scientific, technical and technological levels (potential), and often pursue different technical policies. This (considering that there are several entities ordering EW equipment in the services and combat arms of the RF AF) leads to parallel R & D on components with congruent, albeit incompatible, characteristics. As a consequence, the types and range of irreplaceable components for EW equipment models grow in an economically unwarranted fashion.

Given restricted funding, all these factors make standardization, unification and cataloguing of EW equipment things of particular importance for the stable onward development of EW weapon system.

Capt. 1st Rank Yu.I. MAYEVSKIY

Deputy Chief, FSRTC EW EESR MOD RF

Candidate of Technical Sciences

Yuri Ivanovich MAYEVSKIY was born in the city of Pinsk, Brest Region, on April 4, 1956. He finished the Higher Naval Electronics School at Petrodvorets (1978). Successively held all main scientific positions at the Center. Since 2002, deputy chief for scientific work, FSRTC EW EESR MOD RF.

* The EW weapon system of the RF AF means a totality of electronic warfare equipment models--a totality interlinked in terms of combat designation and functions--which are handed down to EW units and subunits (and prospectively are likely to be handed down to EW combined units) and their command and control elements. It also means a totality of EW specialized assets intended for individual and facility-scale protection of MSE and the Armed Forces' and national infrastructure from reconnaissance assets and guided weapons.