ELECTION 2000 and the Culture War.

Some political commentators claim the results of Election 2000 show that U.S. citizens have changed the way they usually vote. They argue that individual moral beliefs now motivate voters' judgments rather than group affinities such as socioeconomic status, ethnicity, gender, region, and urban-rural residence. This claim simply isn't true. Moral beliefs have always collectively reflected the social influence of people's group connections. Election 2000 does, however, reflect the increasing "culture war" in U.S. society. But people's group affinities continue to influence which side they take in our culture's internal conflicts.

CULTURAL CONTRADICTIONS AND CULTURAL CONFLICTS

A national culture is never a homogeneous thing of one piece. In every culture there are internal contradictions or polarities. U.S. culture is no exception For example, the most familiar internal contradiction in the United States is thai between Anglo-American beliefs about equality of opportunity and universal rights, on the one hand, and racism and Anglo ethnocentrism, on the other. Both are equally American.

The so-called culture war arises out of internal contradictions in our culture. The current conflict can be traced back to the rapid social changes of the 1960s, although it began emerging decades before. The essence of the conflict exists between certain traditional ethnic, Anglo-American cultural values versus modernist, pluralistic, multicultural values that depart from Anglo-American tradition. Anglo-American traditionalists, and those assimilated to traditional Anglo culture, reject many of the social changes of the 1960s, such as those in gender role expectations, sexual attitudes, tolerance for diverse beliefs and lifestyles, and especially in the acceptance of cultural relativism. Modernists are more receptive to the social changes of the 1960s because they are in demographic groups that benefit more from the changes. Many of them are also Anglo-Americans, but they are cosmopolitans who live in large metropolitan areas and are open to many nontraditional cultural influences.

TRADITIONAL ANGLO-AMERICAN CULTURE AND POLITICAL ATTITUDES

An "ethnic group," for many Anglo-Americans, connotes those slightly foreign neighbors who maintain some "different" ways of thinking and behaving and who "we" should tolerate. Anglo-Americans don't think of themselves as having a particularly distinctive ethnic culture. They see themselves simply as individuals, or average U.S. citizens. (Anglo-American culture now includes that of other white Protestants--for example, those from Celtic, Scandinavian, and Slavic origins--which have been absorbed into Anglo culture.) Anglo-American social scientists enjoy doing ethnological research on those "different" people but have rarely studied Anglo-Americans and the various Anglo-American subcultures (with the possible exception of the Southern subculture). However, Anglo-Americans of the South, rural Midwest, and mountain West do share some cultural patterns in common, some of which influence their political preferences.

Some of the problematic aspects of traditional Anglo-American patterns are also the same aspects that may be regarded as most admirable. The key problem in Anglo-American culture is a kind of extreme individualism; everyone is thought of simply as an individual without group connections. Differences in group culture and history are seen as either superficial or an impediment to freedom of action. Individual self-reliance and self-sufficiency is highly prized. Anglo-Americans expect people to take personal responsibility for their problems and to endure pain and frustration without complaining or involving other people. They tend to believe that everyone is equally free and that there are, and should be, few external constraints on individual action and ambition. Poverty is viewed to be a result of failures of individual personality. Optimism is valued and pessimism deplored, in part because Anglo-Americans lack a tragic perspective on life. An insular world view and naive ethnocentrism is also an aspect of Anglo-American traditional culture. It causes many Anglo-Americans to be blissfully unaware of and uninterested in learning from other cultures.

As a result of these extremely individualistic folkways, traditional Anglo-Americans tend to be hostile toward collective, mutual assistance programs implemented through governance. (This explains their attraction to polemics against "big government," even from politicians in "big government.") This is why many are angry about collective group grievances from minority groups and resent public complaining about racial and socio-economic injustices in our society. Their optimism and lack of a tragic history impedes their ability to understand social groups that have been an object of prejudice and discrimination. Their naive ethnocentrism and nationalistic boosterism causes many of them to resent any social criticism of U.S. society--as has been the constant experience of Anglo-American intellectuals.

Over the past four decades, traditional Anglo-Americans have been increasingly drawn into the fold of the Republican Party. As historical memories of the Civil War have disappeared, the "solid South"--once dominated by Democrats--has now become "solid" for Republicans, and the Republican Party has become the party for traditional Anglo-American cultural reaction.

EVIDENCE FROM EXIT POLL DATA

The following exit poll data from the 2000 presidential election comes from two main sources: the Voter News Service (VNS) and the Los Angeles national exit poll (indicated as LA Times).

RURAL-URBAN DIFFERENCES. On election night, November 7, the electoral map painted a clear picture of the United States, showing vast rural areas where majorities had voted for the Republican presidential candidate. Across the United States, people in rural areas and small towns voted overwhelmingly Republican: rural vote--37 percent for Al Gore, 59 percent for George W. Bush; small town vote--38 percent for Gore, 58 percent for Bush (VNS). However, in sharp contrast, people living in large cities with populations over 500,000 gave even greater majorities to the Democratic candidate: 71 percent for Gore and 26 percent for Bush (VNS).

People in rural areas and small towns tend to be more traditional and less exposed to diverse multicultural influences. In large cities, the work world pushes great numbers of diverse people together and forces them to learn tolerance and a certain amount of cultural relativism. Sociological research confirms that intolerance of nonconforming ideas and behavior is more common among people from small towns than people from urban areas. This fact is indicated by the greater unwillingness by citizens in rural areas and small towns to extend civil liberties to generally unpopular social types of individuals such as communists, socialists, atheists, and homosexuals. National survey research has found that homophobia is significantly more common in rural areas and small towns than in large cities. In addition, people from rural areas and small towns more strongly disapprove of premarital sexual relations (for girls) and extramarital affairs as forms of nonconforming sexuality. These indicators of traditional morality don't mean, of course, that sexual deviance is rare in small towns but, rather, that the public justification of anything other than traditional morality isn't tolerated.

Differences over gun control basically reflect rural-urban diverse attitudes, as well. Rural white men were easily manipulated by arguments from National Rifle Association propaganda that "big government" is going to take away their right to own hunting guns. A VNS exit poll question asked: "Do you support or oppose stricter gun control?" Those opposed voted overwhelmingly for the Republican candidate (74 percent for Bush versus only 23 percent for Gore). Further indication of the power of anti-gun control propaganda is that in union households owning guns the vote was an even draw, while in all union households the vote was lopsided for the Democratic candidate (59 percent for Gore to only 39 percent for Bush).

Partly as a result of anti-gun control sentiment among rural white men, Gore lost the electoral votes of several states--for example, West Virginia, Ohio, and New Hampshire--that would have probably gone Democratic and could have given him the election. In my own small town in Western New York, I spoke with union activists who told me that many of their male union buddies voted Republican because of the gun control issue.

RELIGION AND RELIGIOSITY. Religion and religiosity clearly distinguished between people who voted Republican or Democratic. A substantial majority of Protestants voted for Bush (56 percent according to VNS and 58 percent according to LA Times), versus Gore (42 percent according to VNS and 40 percent according to LA Times). The Catholic vote split almost evenly for Gore (50 percent according to VNS and 53 percent according to LA Times) and Bush (47 percent according to VNS and 46 percent according to LA Times). However, this indicates that Bush cut into the Catholic vote more deeply than did previous Republican presidential candidates, and he probably did so because of the salience of morality issues. The Jewish vote went overwhelmingly Democratic (79 percent for Gore versus 19 percent for Bush, according to VNS; 77 percent for Gore versus 22 percent for Bush, according to LA Times).

Religiosity, as measured by church attendance, clearly reveals a pivotal difference between U.S. citizens and how they vote. Traditionally religious people were much more likely to vote for Bush. The VNS exit poll data found that the more frequently people attended church the more likely they voted Republican: weekly attendance, 40 percent for Gore, 57 percent for Bush; seldom attend, 54 percent for Gore, 42 percent for Bush; and never attend, 61 percent for Gore, 32 percent for Bush.

Another VNS question that touched upon traditional religiosity queried the importance of moral values in one's choice for president. When asked, "Which issues, if any, were the most important to you in deciding how you would vote for president today?" those who chose to regard "moral/ethical issues" as one of their deciding issues voted 55 percent Republican and only 17 percent Democratic.

Similarly, the reaction of voters to the abortion issue generally reflects differences between people who hold traditional and modernist religiosity (and also between rural and urban residence). According to the VNS exit poll data, among those who said abortion should be illegal in most or all cases, the vast majority voted for Bush (74 percent "in all cases," 69 percent "in most cases"). While among those who said abortion should be legal in most or all cases, the vast majority voted for Gore (70 percent "in most cases," 58 percent "in all cases").

A reasonable interpretation of these exit poll data suggests that the culture of those white Protestants who live mainly in rural areas and small towns and who hold a very traditionalistic religiosity find their cultural preferences reflected in the. Republican Party.

ETHNIC DIFFERENCES. African-American Protestants have a very different culture than that of Anglo-American Protestants, and they vote in exactly opposite directions. According to the VNS exit poll data, 90 percent of African-Americans voted for Gore, compared with only 42 percent of whites. Similarly, Hispanic voters gave a majority of their votes--62 percent--to Gore, as did Asian-Americans (55 percent according to VNS and 62 percent according to LA Times).

The message is clear: Democratic Party support comes primarily from a genuine multicultural coalition of ethnic minorities and cosmopolitan Anglo-Americans--obvious to anyone who saw the audience at the Democratic National Convention.

GENDER DIFFERENCES. Much has been made about the "gender gap" in voting patterns. However, the actual picture of gender differences in voting is more complex than simple male-female dichotomy. Gender differences have more to do with differences in traditional-versus-modernist sex-role expectations than with whether one is male or female.

According to the VNS, a majority of men--53 percent--supported Bush, while a majority of women--54 percent--supported Gore. In other words, a little more than half of each gender voted for the opposing presidential candidate. On the surface, that isn't a very significant difference. The real delineation comes into sharper focus when we look at gender subgroups. Among married men--a more traditional subgroup--58 percent voted for Bush, while only 40 percent voted for Gore (LA Times). The vote of married women was about equally split. However, among single women (never married or divorced), 66 percent voted for Gore. The point is that single women are more likely than married women to hold modernist sex-role expectations and were more likely to prefer the Democratic candidate.

SOCIOECONOMIC LEVEL. The data from both VNS and LA Times show a clear step-by-step difference in voting from low- to high-income levels. People having lower incomes gave majorities to Gore, while people at the median income were about evenly split, and those having higher than the median income gave majorities to Bush. The differences might not have been as wide as in the past because of the influence of so-called morality issues. However, morality issues are linked to socioeconomic advantage and disadvantage.

UPPER CLASS USE OF RELIGIOUS MORALISM. Traditional Anglo-American Protestant moralism serves the vested interests of the upper class and the corporate elite. Traditional Protestant moralism is being used by corporate leaders to attack "big government" as the enemy. On one hand, the rhetoric of the Christian right blames "big government" for taking the Bible and (the Christian) religion out of public schools, supporting laws to sanction "murder" in the form of abortion, and making new laws to encourage homosexual "perversion."

Allies in upper-class families and the corporate elite aren't, however, particularly concerned about these issues. So-called big government is seen as the enemy for entirely different reasons. "Big government" makes laws that inhibit corporations from maximizing their profits--for example, laws concerning equal pay for women, parental leave, work safety conditions, environmental protection, aiding labor organizing, and minimum wages. "Big government" in the hands of genuine social reformers might create new social assistance programs--such as national health insurance and national child day care--which exist in most other industrial societies. Such programs drain taxpayers' money away from the wealthy and the corporations.

Powerful elite groups have often used religion to manipulate the less powerful and to justify their vested economic interests. The elections of 2000 provide yet another example.

Jeffrey S. Victor is a professor of sociology at Jamestown Community College in New York State and has published numerous articles, several chapters of books, and two books, including Satanic Panic: The Creation of a Contemporary Legend, winner of the Free Press Association's H. L. Mencken Award for the best book of 1993.