ECOORD vice FSCOORD: more than a name change.

"Within the Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT) there is only one 'fires and effects' organization and that is the fires and effects coordination cell (FECC), a standing organization within the SBCT headquarters. The FECC expands the functionality of the traditional...fire support element (FSE)...The FECC is led and directed by the effects coordinator (ECOORD) for the SBCT, who is also the FA battalion commander. The FECC is the special staff through which the ECOORD plans, coordinates, integrates and synchronizes all fires and effects activities in support of SBCT operations."

BST 6-20-40 Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Fires and Effects for Interim Brigade Combat Team (IBCT), Operations

Coordinating Draft, March 2002

The SBCTs of the 2d and 25th Infantry Divisions located at Fort Lewis, Washington, are the first brigades in the Army to employ the term "ECOORD" instead of the traditional term "fire support coordinator" (FSCOORD) to describe the role of the FA battalion commander in a direct support (DS) artillery battalion.

This article discusses effects-based operations and compares the roles of the traditional FSCOORD and the ECOORD. In addition, we discuss some of the ECOORD's challenges in in tegrating effects for the SB CT.

Effects-Based Operations. The genesis of effects-based "fires" is in the initial BCT (IBCT) Organization and Operational (O&O) Concept dated 30 June 2000. In this document, the authors stress that the IBCT employs effects to protect the force, shape the battlespace and support decisive operations. The fundamental objective of the effects-based approach is to apply capabilities to achieve a specific effect in time and space.

The O&O defines "effects" in the following way: "Effects are the result of the directed application of lethal and nonlethal capabilities to achieve a desired purpose or outcome in support of the commander's intent. Effects are a component of the operations plan and must be fully integrated and synchronized with other elements of the plan, particularly the scheme of maneuver. Planning must include the control and management of unintended effects and their impact on the mission....When fully integrated, effects and maneuver set the conditions for tactical success and combine to achieve the commander's intent."

In the past, fire support focused more on the allocation of resources, munitions and targets--namely, focused on platforms and systems. On the other hand, effects-based operations focuses on achieving specific outcomes, as specified in the commander's intent, in time and space rather than the systematic allocation of resources.

The Challenge of Integrating Lethal and Nonlethal Effects. In the past, FSCOORDs found that being good at the business of lethal fires integration was a tough enough job. Fire supporters sometimes have struggled to provide effective and responsive fires in support of maneuver.

Some argue that Field Artillerymen should focus solely on the lethal fight. A key point is that, in most cases, the lines are blurred between lethal and nonlethal fires. Experience demonstrates that the two cannot be separated.

The coordination and execution of fire support is by far the toughest task for DS battalions to train completely and sustain competence in because the coordination and execution rely so much on a complete tactical scenario to bring all the "pieces together." Typically, the only time the complete fire support system is challenged fully is in brigade-level operations in the field or at a combat training center (CTC). The question arises as to whether or not making the ECOORD responsible for nonlethal as well as lethal effects will diffuse his effort to get lethal fires "right."

For example, the proper application of nonlethal effects may cause the enemy to surrender, thus affecting the way one targets with lethal effects. An effective information operations (IO) campaign may negate the need for the application of lethal fires or point to better ways to focus lethal fires on an adversary.

The synergy of both lethal and nonlethal effects is a combat multiplier on the battlefield. The two must be integrated in one organization to ensure the plans are mutually supporting and synchronized. The person to do that is logically the ECOORD--a Field Artilleryman. It makes the DS FA battalion commander's job harder, but he ignores nonlethal effects at his unit's peril.

The ECOORD and FECC Operations. The ECOORD has additional resources to accomplish his mission of integrating the brigade's effects in the form of a nonlethal section in the FECC. In the past, when a FSCOORD had to integrate nonlethal fires during contingency operations, he often had to rely on ad-hoc assistance from civil affairs (CA), IO and psychological operations (PSYOP) personnel--people he had never worked with. Conversely, the IO section personnel are organic to the SBCT and the ECOORD works with them regularly.

In the SBCT, the FECC has lethal and nonlethal planners. The lethal cell of the FECC operates similarly to the traditional brigade ESE and will not be discussed in this article. The nonlethal section, referred to doctrinally as the IO cell, is embedded in the FECC and performs the missions outlined in the figure.

In addition, while notpartof the FECC, the brigade operational law team (BOLT) works with the FECC. The BOLT consists of the brigade staffjudge advocate and a paralegal NCO located in the FECC's area. The BOLT provides the brigade administrative and operational law advice, including during the military decision-making process (MDMP) with the aim of facilitating the rapid application of effects.

The IO cell consists of an IO major, who is in charge of synchronizing all IO elements; a CA major, who is the staff lead for planning and coordinating civilmilitary operations (CMO) in the area of operations; a PSYOPNCO, who plans and coordinates PSYOP support from attached PSYOP elements; and an electronic warfare (EW) officer, who works closely with the targeting technician in the lethal cell of the FECC to identify potential enemy command and control ([C.sup.2]) and intelligence surveillance systems for EW.

To a great extent, the IO cell parallels what the division FSCOORD might find on the division staff. The robust nature of the IO cell at the brigade level gives the ECOORD more resources to integrate nonlethal fires into the fight and allows him to train with the IO cell on a daily basis.

The FECC is located in the same area as the brigade tactical operations center (TOC). The IO and CA officer, for example, continually interface with the deputy ECOORD (DECOORD), a Field Artillery major, and the lethal cell to integrate effects in the brigade. (The DECOORD manages FECC dayto-day operations and leads the FECC in the absence of the ECOORD.)

For example, before the daily FECC targeting working group, the IO cell forms an JO working group to formulate nonlethal products and actions to support brigade operations. The DECOORD or his lethal representative normally attends.

During the FECC targeting working group chaired by the DECOORD, the IO or CA officer briefs nonlethal considerations for the target synchronization matrix (TSM). Thus, by the time the brigade commander receives his targeting briefing during the brigade targeting meeting, the plan presented encompasses effects-based fires. After the brigade targeting meeting, the S3 produces a fragmentary order (FRAGO) with an Annex D (Effects).

Other ECOORD Challenges. The ECOORD faces a number of other challenges in the SB CT, a couple of which we discuss as follows.

* Where should the ECOORD physically locate? The ECOORD, like the FSCOORD, both commands the FA battalion and leads the integration of effects into combined arms operations. Traditionally, the FSCOORD splits his time between the brigade and his battalion TOCs. Normally, he is present at the brigade TOC or tactical command post (TAC) during the MDMP and the execution of the operation. He goes to the FA battalion TOC to provide guidance during formulation of the FA support plan (FASP), orders production and rehearsals.

However, the collaborative planning tools available to the FA battalion commander in the SBCT challenge this traditional model. Because the FA battalion TOC is interconnected with the rest of the brigade via the Army battle command system (ABCS) and Force XXI battle command brigade and below ([FBCB.sup.2]), the ECOORD can maintain situational awareness of the battlespace wherever he is located. In addition, transmissions from higher to lower, including orders, occur rapidly. This interconnectivity and the speed of operations mean the FA battalion usually works its MDMP simultaneously with the brigade. In fact, both usually complete their orders at about the same time.

The challenge for the ECOORD is to determine where he should be for the MDMP--the brigade TOC or his battalion TOC. The answer is, "It depends on the situation." But in most cases, the ECOORD will be in the brigade TOC where he can advise the brigade commander and his staff on effects. Depending on how far the FA battalion TOC is from the brigade TOC, the FA battalion S3 and executive officer can complete the battalion MDMP and publish the FASP without seeing the ECOORD.

* What are the advantages and disadvantages of fire supporters' being organic to maneuver units in the SBCT vice the FA battalion? In the SBCT, fire supporters from the brigade to the platoon levels are organic to their respective maneuver units.

The DECOORD and FECC are organic to the brigade's headquarters and headquarters company. The battalion fire support officers (FSOs) are organic to the maneuver battalions. The SBCT's 13 company-level FSOs are organic to their maneuver companies/troops--a total of nine company FSOs in the three infantry battalions; three cavalry troop FSOs in the reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition (RSTA) squadron; plus one company FSO in the antitank company. The platoon forward observers are organic to their maneuver platoons.

At the maneuver battalion level and below, there are some advantages to this force structure. These include strengthened relationships between maneuver and fire supporters that day-to-day interaction fosters. Company FSOs, in some instances, have been challenged and developed by their maneuver brethren by being given additional duties and responsibilities that develop leadership skills. For example, some company FSOs have become the headquarters platoon leader with additional responsibility for company mortars.

Disadvantages include limited opportunities to train these fire supporters as part of the brigade fire support system because the ECOORD does not control these assets. The result is varying degrees of competency across the fire support system; to overcome this, consolidated fire support training is required. The ECOORD also has little flexibility to reassign personnel on short-term notice from one FSE to another as he would if all fire supporters were organic to the artillery battalion.

A final disadvantage is the amount of time the ECOORD has to integrate a new officer or senior NCO into the brigade fire support system and establish uniform standards for all brigade fire supporters. Normally, the fire support officer or NCO goes directly to his maneuver unit without first coming to the artillery battalion.

In the SBCT, the battalion fire support personnel are also the IOs for their respective maneuver battalions. This adds training responsibility on the ECOORD to ensure the fire support battlefield operating system (BOS) is prepared to execute nonlethal effects. Again, it can be a challenge to efficiently assemble and train fire supporters who are not in the FA battalion on IO to one standard. Fortunately, the IO proponent at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, has been helpful in providing mobile training teams (MTTs) to train battalion and company fire supporters in IO at Fort Lewis.

At the same time, because fire supporters are maneuver assets, not all maneuver commanders have their fire supporters manage IO in their battalions. Often the battalion S3 will execute some part of the IO campaign along with an assistant S3 or some other non-fire supporter.

It will take more training and operational experience before the maneuver commander will turn automatically to his fire supporter for information on nonlethal effects.

As the Army transforms to a more versatile and agile force, doctrine is evolving to deal with real-world contingencies. Challenges abound, but effects-based operations make sense, given the relative importance of nonlethal effects and the increased flexibility it brings to the battlefield. The symbiotic nature of both lethal and nonlethal fires and effects calls for an integrator at the brigade level and higher--and he is the ECOORD.

RELATED ARTICLE: Nonlethal Cell Missions

* Plans nonlethal effects to degrade the adversary's informational environment.

* Leverages assets in response to security challenges, such as terrorism, international crime, computer hackers and genocidal violence.

* Advises the brigade leadership on cultural awareness to foster a positive relationship with the local civilian and military leadership in the area of operations.

* Manages the media to portray the unit's best possible image.

* Integrates fully into all targeting meetings to bring the nonlethal capabilities of effects-based fires to the fight.

* Writes the nonlethal portion of Annex D of the operations order (OPORD), a portion that is fully nested with lethal fires.

Lieutenant Colonel Steven A. Sliwa commands the 1st Battalion, 37th Field Artillery, part of the Army's first Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT), 3d Brigade, 2d Infantry Division at Fort Lewis, Washington. He is also the SBCT Effects Coordinator (ECOORD). In his previous assignment, he was a Strategic Planner in the Directorate for Strategy and Policy, J5, Joint Staff at the Pentagon. Among other assignments, he was the Brigade Fire Support Officer (FSO) for 1st Brigade and Battalion Executive Officer (XO) of 3d Battalion, 6th Field Artillery, both in the 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry) at Fort Drum, New York. He participated in Operation Desert Storm in the Gulf with the 3d Armored Division and in Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti with the 25th Infantry Division (Light).

Major Robert O. Kirkland is the Deputy ECOORD (DECOORD) for the 3d Brigade, 2d Infantry Division (SBCT) at Fort Lewis. In his previous assignment, he was the Chief of the Individual Training Branch, G3, I Corps, also at Fort Lewis. He has served as an Assistant Professor in the Department of History at the US Military Academy at West Point. He commanded B Battery, 3d Battalion, 321st Field Artillery, part of the 18th Field Artillery Brigade, XVIII Airborne Corps Artillery at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. During Operation Desert Storm, he was the Assistant G3 Plans Officer for VII Corps. He holds an MA and PhD in History from the University of Pittsburgh.