Doctrine for the Initial Brigade Combat Team.
Introduction to the IBCT
A flexible force of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) personnel, organizations, and equipment comprises the Initial Brigades' intelligence systems. Individually and collectively, the components of this system provide the brigade with the capability to--
* Plan and direct ISR operations.
* Collect and process information.
* Produce relevant intelligence.
* Disseminate combat information and intelligence to those who need it, when they need it.
The brigade and its subordinate battalions possess organic ISR assets that enable each unit to meet the commander's requirements. Based on mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops, and time available and civilian considerations (METT-TC), the brigade will task-organize its organic ISR assets for the operation. The brigade may receive additional ISR assets from corps, joint, and national organizations.
An intelligence staff is organic to the brigade and its subordinate battalions and squadron. ISR analysis and ISR integration elements from the Military Intelligence (MI) Company and the Surveillance Troop, respectively, augment the brigade and RSTA (Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition) Squadron staffs. The intelligence staff in the brigade's non-maneuver battalions possesses varying numbers of assigned MI personnel, and normally does not receive additional intelligence augmentation. Combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) units may not have any MI personnel. Those personnel designated as an "S2 section" often combine with the battalion's operations staff.
The MI company consists of one ISR analysis platoon, one SR integration platoon, and a human intelligence (HUMINT) platoon. The brigade S2 is the manager of ISR operations; however, the MI company's support is critical in the management of ISR requirements and planning, and in the analysis, production, and dissemination of intelligence. The ISR analysis platoon provides analytic support to the development of the brigade common operational picture (COP), support to targeting and effects, and refinement of the intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB). The ISR integration platoon serves as an extension of the brigade S2 staff for the internal and external management of ISR assets. The HUMINT platoon conducts the brigade's tactical HUMINT collection operations. The company has the organic systems necessary to interface with ISR systems resident at the U.S. Army Forces (ARFOR), joint, theater, and national levels.
Reconnaissance and Surveillance Organizations
Reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) assets vary by echelon and unit type. The IBCTs have organic assets such as the RSTA squadron, the HUMINT platoon of the MI company, and infantry battalion scouts to perform R&S. In contrast, CSS units do not possess dedicated R&S assets but rely upon ad hocorganizations and standing operating procedures to perform such missions as route reconnaissance and occupation of observation posts.
The RSTA squadron is the brigade's primary source of combat information and targeting data. The squadron also provides the brigade with many R&S soldiers on the ground to help the brigade understand the operational environment in detail. This differs from the traditional scout focus primarily on threat forces. The brigade S2 integrates the ISR effort through the S3 (to include providing tasks to the RSTA squadron) and is supported by the ARFOR analysis and control element (ACE) or intelligence element in order to provide situational awareness and understanding in the AO.
The surveillance troop possesses an Air Reconnaissance Platoon, a Ground Sensor Platoon, and a Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Reconnaissance Platoon. The unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) enable the squadron to expand its reconnaissance capability considerably while mitigating risk in the absence of rotary-based reconnaissance. The NBC reconnaissance platoon provides the brigade's core capability for detection and early warning of chemical and radiological contaminants, plus some forms of biological agents.
The RSTA squadron closely integrates its operations with the activities of the infantry battalion's reconnaissance platoons and other ISR assets managed at brigade level. The squadron operates by stealth throughout the brigade footprint, and employs HUMINT collection personnel (who perform very limited HUMINT collection) extensively throughout the AO to compensate for shortfalls in the existing sensor capabilities, which are more suited for open terrain and unit- or force-based threats.
Task organization allows the brigade to optimize the allocation and capabilities of its finite ISR assets based on METT-TC. For example, in a movement to contact, the brigade may direct the HUMINT platoon to reinforce the RSTA squadron with additional HUMINT collection teams to enhance its interrogation and document exploitation (DOCEX) capabilities. The brigade may also receive divisional or higher echelon ISR assets such as a UAV platoon from the division, an air cavalry troop from corps, and counterintelligence (CI) teams from corps or higher echelons when the scope of the mission exceeds the brigade's organic capability.
The brigade conducts centralized planning and decentralized execution of operations characterized by rapid mobility precision fires, maneuver, and decisive actions over extended, noncontiguous AOs dominated by complex terrain and urban settings. The planning and decentralized execution of these operations demands continuous tactical- and operational-level IPB to help commanders understand the context of emerging information and its relationship (cause and effect) within the overall framework of the mission and operations. The nature of the operational environment requires the brigade to have enhanced situational awareness in order to anticipate threat actions and identify opportunities for decisive employment of the brigade's combat power. To enable precision maneuver and fires, the brigade's targeting capability requires timely, relevant, accurate, and predictive targeting data, and intelligence on conventional and asymmetric threats to the brigade's systems and organizations. In addition, entry operations ( forced or permissive--based on the enemy's reaction to the operation) require rapid and detailed IPB products, the ability to locate and engage mobile reserves as well as fire support systems, and situational awareness well beyond the close combat area.
MI support for the operations described above includes--
* Planning and executing ISR operations.
* Analyzing and presenting intelligence to support timely situational understanding and force protection.
* Supporting the decide, detect, deliver, and assess functions of the targeting methodology.
The brigade's MI elements accomplish much as part of the brigade's ISR and security efforts. Using the intelligence process as a framework, Figure 1 discusses some of the IBCT's specific intelligence capabilities.
Capabilities and Limitations
Inherent in any system are capabilities and limitations. The capabilities of the Initial Brigades will continue to improve as more technologically advanced sensors, processors, communications systems, and better-trained soldiers enter the force structure. Its limitations reflect the impact of force structure limitations, advances in adversaries' technologies, and diverse operational environments in which the division must operate.
The IBCTs intelligence system provides some significant enhancements. These improved brigade capabilities include the following:
* The organic RSTA squadron improves the reconnaissance and security capability of the brigade.
* The MI elements supporting the brigade and the RSTA squadron improve the intelligence staff's synchronization of ISR actions and access to intelligence organizations, products, and databases.
* All-Source Analysis System (ASAS) workstations at the brigade, battalions, and squadron facilitate the collaborative preparation and presentation of a common threat picture.
* UAVs in the RSTA squadron extend the brigade commander's view beyond the next hill, and optimize the employment of maneuver, aviation, and fire support assets to shape the battlefield in depth, day or night.
Dependence on non-organic elements results in some of the IBCTs' limitations. Some of their specific limitations are--
* Distribution of ISR reports and products (imagery, overlays, webpages, etc.) requires a robust, high-capacity communications area network.
* Reliance on a higher headquarters for the development of IPB products that are full-dimensional, continuous, and in near-real time. It has the organic ability to tailor products to provide greater fidelity to meet the commander's intent and the command's information requirements.
* Reliance on a force pool of linguists to support requirements based on the operational environment. The Army must identify, train, and track these linguists; it will then place them on call for a period within 24-48 hours as the situation dictates. Linguistic requirements will include translation, as well as tactical HUMINT and signals intelligence (SIGINT) support.
* Reliance on the ARFOR ACE to provide situational updates, technical databases, and predictive analysis of the situation to support the force, from enroute mission planning and rehearsal to successful completion of the mission.
* Inability to operate two UAV systems simultaneously, and a requirement that the brigade command post (CP) locate within 40 kilometers of the UAV flight track in order to receive the video downlink.
FM 34-80-21ST, Brigade Combat Team Intelligence Operations, is due in March 2001. The Doctrine Division intends this publication for use exclusively by the IBCTs that are "standing up" at Fort Lewis. Throughout the process of standing up the IBCTs, we will update the doctrine to reflect the lessons learned from the units' initial training and combat training center (CTC) rotations. To keep up with the changes, visit the Doctrine Division homepage at the top of page 49. We ask the IBCTs to review and comment on the published IBCT doctrine by contacting Captain Lee Goodman via E-mail at edd. email@example.com. [*] Captain Lee Goodman is currently a Doctrine Writer in the Ml Doctrine Division, Operational Branch, Directorate of Combat Developments at Fort Huachuca, Arizona. He is the point of contact for IBCT, information operations, and tactical and Cavalry intelligence issues. He has served in 3d Squadron, 4th Armored Cavalry Regiment, and 3d Squadron, 2d ACR before his assignment to USA IC&FH. CPT Goodman is a graduate of the Armor Officers Basic Course, the Ml Officers Transition Course, and the Ml Officers Advanced Course. He earned a Bachelor of Arts degree in History from Mississippi State University Readers may contact the author via the E-mail address above and by telephone at (520) 538-0971 or DSN 879-0971.
Figure 1. Some Specific IBCT Intelligence Capabilities.
Plan and Direct
* Develop ISR tasks in accordance with the brigade's priority intelligence requirements (PIR), essential elements of friendly information (EEFI), and intent.
* Accept and integrate external ISR planning and execution elements to improve support to situational awareness and targeting.
* Synchronize and provide technical steerage to organic, supporting, and augmenting ISR assets into the brigade's ISR effort.
* Conduct parallel planning while dynamically tracking and adjusting the overall collection effort for organic and supporting ISR resources.
* Provide near-real-time visibility on external collection resources and capabilities, and request support through the use of organic communications and processing systems.
* Maintain an intelligence communications and processing architecture with multi-level security that enables operations in joint and multinational environments using digital and analog communications systems.
* Conduct dynamic sensor steerage.
* Conduct effective requirements management.
* Provide an organic day and night, all weather, and terrain-independent capability to conduct and integrate multidiscipline reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S).
* Leverage time-sensitive information and reporting from joint, interagency, multinational, and commercial collection resources.
* Direct the sensor payloads of organic and non-organic collection platforms.
* Collect weather information from military and commercial sources.
* Fuse vertical and horizontal combat information, targeting data, and intelligence from organic, supporting, joint, multinational, and interagency organizations.
* Receive and process broadcast downlinks from organic and theater assets.
* Maintain intelligence databases with multi-level security that safeguards the intelligence sources and permits authorized access to unprocessed data.
* Provide a capability to develop, transmit, and store graphic products with supporting data.
Process and Produce
* Develop the threat portion of the COP of the brigade AO and area of interest through the distributed analysis and fusion of combat information and multidiscipline intelligence using collaborative analytic, development, and visualization tools.
* Exchange the results of analysis, discuss issues with external regional experts, and develop a common understanding of the situation by fusing external collection and analysis products using collaborative tools like desktop video teleconferencing and electronic "white boards" resident on analyst workstations.
* Access, focus, and tailor the broader technical and analytic products from national and theater analytic centers to meet the brigade's intelligence needs.
* Conduct continuous IPB and near-real-time all-source analysis of threat information. Access the information in order to support situational understanding, targeting, and force protection.
* Conduct trend and pattern analysis during IPB and target development, and also as a means of providing predictive intelligence support for future operations.
* Access--using organic communications and processing systems--existing databases, products, and analytic expertise resident in Service, joint, and national R&S resources. These split-based operations and "reach back" capabilities facilitate collaboration, task sharing, and access to higher echelon databases, as well as IPB products and focused analysis. Split-based operations provide the capability to have a portion of the ISR analytic element remain outside the operational area to support a command post or a command and control ([C.sup.2]) node.
* Leverage local and national weather analysis to produce tailored weather effects products in support of current and future operations.
* Provide dynamic targeting support through integration of organic, theater, joint, and national sensors.
* Possess secure, redundant, dedicated broad-bandwidth communications with a multi-level security capability that enable the exchange of analytic findings and meta-data (web information that facilitates web searches).
* Disseminate and collaborate between ISR elements internal and external to the brigade, in real time, over an expanded battlespace.
* Receive broadcast intelligence that provides indications, warning, and locational information.
* Receive near-real-time updates on the weather, terrain, and threat activities from a supporting ACE during the deployment and entry operations. This includes the ability to receive threat situation displays, written updates, video, and imagery to support enroute mission planning and adjustments to the plan.
* Dynamically update the situation from sensors, collectors, and processors organic to the brigade that provide a higher degree of fidelity of the battlespace.
* Present the current threat situation and threat intent to facilitate situational understanding and support the presentation of the COP. The presentation uses the best mix of supporting information including imagery, video from UAV, or screen captures (meta-data) to reinforce the presented analysis.
* Provide near-real-time tools and products to support visualization of the brigade commander's battlespace across all ISR capabilities from alert through deployment and execution to redeployment.
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|Author:||Goodman Jr., E. Lee|
|Publication:||Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin|
|Date:||Oct 1, 2000|
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