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Doctrinal tension: the chaplain and information operations.


Army chaplains and chaplain assistants serving in Afghanistan have numerous opportunities to interact with local Muslim clergy. The mullah, or religious leader, of a village is a vital element of village political, religious, and cultural life. Many chaplains reach out to mullahs as points of contact for humanitarian activities (donating school supplies; rebuilding orphanages; distributing gifts and candy to Afghan children in hospital) conducted by U.S. Soldiers. With the permission of unit commanders, chaplains frequently engage in these humanitarian missions.


A potential controversy exists when a chaplain is asked for specific information from commanders or intelligence officers related to his interaction with local mullahs. Chaplains, as doctrinal non-combatants, could be placed in the awkward position of providing targeting information to commanders, a combatant task. In order to examine the doctrinal tension between chaplains and Information Operations (IO), we will first review the roles and responsibilities of Army chaplains. Next we will examine the components and capabilities of IO. Finally, a discussion of chaplains' experiences in Afghanistan related to mullah engagements (religious leader liaison) and IO will illustrate the tensions in this fragile relationship with suggestions for success for the overall mission of the commander.

Doctrinal Guidelines

The two guiding Army documents that articulate the roles and responsibilities of chaplains are Field Manual (FM) 1-05, Religious Support, and Army Regulation (AR) 165-1, Chaplain Activities in the United States Army. The First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, reinforced by Title 10 of the U.S. Code, guarantees every American the right to the free exercise of religion. Americans in the military enjoy this right as well as civilians. Commanders are responsible for insuring the religious freedoms of their troops through the chaplain as a staff officer. FM 1-05 states:
 The mission of the Unit Ministry Team (UMT) is to provide and perform
 religious support to soldiers, families, and authorized civilians as
 directed by the commander. Chaplains serve as personal staff officers
 to commanders at all levels of the command providing essential
 information on troop and unit morale, quality of life matters, free
 exercise of religion issues, ethical decision making, and the impact
 of religion on the operation. (1)

The religious support activities of chaplains are widely known. They consist of religious services, counseling, religious education, advisor to the commander and staff, and other activities, including coordinating "religious/humanitarian support." The FM states that such support includes humanitarian support programs on issues of religion, morale, morals, and ethics." (2) The chaplain, by doctrine, then is to assist the commander with religious/humanitarian support. Chaplains are also, by regulation, to "provide liaison to indigenous religious leaders in close coordination with the G5." (3) Additionally, chaplains coordinate with elements of the G9 (Civil Affairs) in religious liaison/mullah engagements. (4)


Information Operations

Based primarily on advanced technology, IO is an element of combat power. It encompasses attacking adversary command and control (C2) systems while protecting friendly C2 from adversary disruption. Thus IO has both offensive and defensive capabilities. The goal of IO is to produce information superiority over the enemy at decisive points. Commanders conduct IO to apply combat power to achieve information superiority on the battlefield. Enemy intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR), and targeting are all part of IO. Offensive IO seeks to destroy, degrade, disrupt, deny, deceive, and exploit enemy forces. A high value target of IO is enemy center of gravity, typically communication and headquarters locations, to target enemy decision makers and information systems.

IO maximizes the use of technology to shape the combat power of friendly forces. In FM 3-13, Information Operations, the following summary of IO is provided:
 "Commanders conduct (plan, prepare, execute, and assess) IO to apply
 the information element of combat power. Combined with information
 management and ISR operations; effective IO results in gaining and
 maintaining information superiority. Information superiority creates
 conditions that allow commanders to shape the operational environment
 and enhance the effects of all elements of combat power. IO has two
 categories, offensive IO and defensive IO. Commanders conduct IO by
 synchronizing IO elements and related activities, each of which may
 be used either offensively or defensively."

 "IO brings together several previously separate functions as IO
 elements and related activities. To provide unity of effort, IO is
 placed under a special staff officer, the assistant chief of staff
 G7. The G7 has coordinating staff responsibility for IO. He does this
 by means of the G7 section and IO cell. Placing responsibility for
 synchronizing the activities of the IO elements and related
 activities on one special staff officer helps commanders mass their
 effects to gain and maintain information superiority." (5)

The Army chaplain is a noncombatant. As a religious leader and a staff officer, AR 165-1 states, "Chaplains are noncombatants and will not bear arms." (6) This regulation is clear enough. The confusion relates to the idea of information as a weapon, and that a chaplain may receive information that IO personnel in the G2, G3, or G7 would like to use in offensive action against enemy forces. There is no approved doctrinal standard for the role of the chaplain in IO. However, AR 165-1 does suggest possible roles of the chaplain. For example, it states that, "Commanders will detail or assign chaplains only to duties related to their profession. Chaplains may perform unrelated duties in a temporary military emergency." It also states that a commander will not detail a chaplain as an "information" officer. AR 165-1 further states, "Commanders will not ... require a chaplain to serve in a capacity in which he or she may later be called upon to reveal privileged or sensitive information incident to such service." (7)

The Army chaplain will have some role in advising the commander on religious and cultural issues in the area of operations (AO). FM 1-05 states that the chaplain will provide "support to the commander on matters of religion, morals, and morale, as affected by religion and the impact of indigenous religions on the military mission." (8) It further states that the chaplain will "provide liaison to indigenous religious leaders in close coordination with the G5/S5." (9) The question remains: "At what point does a chaplain as a religious advisor to the commander cross the line and partake of combatant activities in IO?"

Army chaplains concerned about their involvement with IO are on safe ground when they concentrate their efforts primarily on providing religious support to soldiers. Religious support includes religious services, rites, sacraments, ordinances, pastoral care and counseling, religious education, and humanitarian support. As a staff officer, the chaplain supports the commander and staff, administrates, and acts as an advisor to the command on indigenous religions. (10) As one chaplain stated, "It is conceivable to witness commanders demanding that chaplains provide information advantageous to U.S. forces that may be gleaned from a liaison and contact with local religious leaders. One would be naive to think that the chaplaincy would be exempt from the pressure of a well-meaning but ill-advised commander." (11) The focus of chaplain ministries must first be on religious support to the soldiers within the unit and not on humanitarian missions to indigenous peoples.


The expanding role of religion in contemporary operations will increase the requests for religious advice on local populations. The senior chaplain should be a subject matter expert in this area, a key point of contact in advising the commander. When the opportunity arises to perform a religious liaison with local clergy, such as the mullah engagements in Afghanistan, chaplains should follow the following guidelines:

* A religious liaison mission must be endorsed by the commander.

* The chaplain must staff his intentions with the G2, G3, G5 and G9 sections.

* Only chaplains of field grade (Major) or higher should participate.

* Emphasis should be on common humanitarian and religious concerns and not on political/military matters.

* After the mission, chaplains are not to provide information related to targeting or offensive operations to the command. Some non-lethal targeting information may be appropriately shared with the command, such as the location of schools, religious sites, and orphanages.

In stability and support operations, chaplains will have an increasing role in engaging indigenous religious leaders to help facilitate the peace keeping and nation building missions of U.S. troops. This liaison role of Army chaplains with local clergy must be practiced with caution, as more and more demand on chaplain religious expertise will be requested by IO personnel. As one chaplain warned, "Caution must be applied to avoid the slippery slope of grasping for a deeper and inappropriate role. With an increasing command emphasis on IO, the [Chaplain] Corps must guard against justifying its value in its role in IO." (12) The role of a chaplain is justified as a provider of religious support to all soldiers, not as a tool of IO to coerce intelligence from indigenous clergy.

The Role of Religion in IO

In Operation Enduring Freedom, religious issues weighed heavily in the commander's decision making process. Religion served as a source of information and as a type of information. As foreigners in a Muslim land, the sensitivity to religious issues for U.S. troops in Afghanistan was paramount. The customs and rituals of Islam are unknown to most Americans, making it increasingly important for chaplains to advise commanders and soldiers on the religious/spiritual aspects of indigenous Afghans. (13)

Chaplains are expected to provide the commander information related to the religious customs and practices of indigenous peoples. In Afghanistan, the typical U.S. soldier has no idea of the differences between Sunni or Shiite, and between a mullah and an imam. First, the chaplain must determine what types of religious information are essential for the commander to understand. Next, the chaplain analyzes the local population to see how it understands these categories. Finally, the chaplain briefs the commander and staff and soldiers as appropriate. This type of religious advice to a commander is standard practice in the Army chaplaincy, a typical responsibility understood by all chaplains.

Army chaplains are not in the intelligence gathering business. Chaplains, as religious advisors, must not allow themselves to drift too far into the realm of IO. It is one thing to interact with local religious leaders to facilitate dialogue and understanding to better advise the commander on the impact of local religions on the military mission. It is another thing altogether for a chaplain to gather information in a religious liaison capacity that unethically could be used for targeting or other offensive operations. (14) Afghan religious leaders place a high value on clergy. The U.S. Army chaplain can engage in a respectful dialogue and exchange of ideas and cultural sensitivities in discussions with indigenous clergy. But the sacredness of such dialogue must not be compromised by IO personnel eager to glean any information from the chaplain that may help their mission. A military chaplain who compromises the sacred bond between clergy will be instantly discredited by Afghan clerics, promoting distrust and disdain of all U.S. personnel.

There are some legitimate ways a chaplain can serve as a staff officer in general support of IO. Chaplains working as liaisons with indigenous clergy can have a positive influence on the way American intentions and operations are perceived. These chaplain "liaison officers" are a part of IO and require a thorough understanding of the key religious leaders, religious worldview of the population, and social structure. The G2, G3, G5, and IO personnel often overlook or under emphasize this understanding. The staff chaplain, as a liaison with indigenous clergy, can be a crucial person in the analysis of religion and culture in IO, preventing U.S. and allied troops from committing cultural or religious blunders. For example, Joint Publication (JP) 1-05 allows the chaplain to advise commanders through their liaison roles with host nation religious leaders. Army Field Manual 1-05 states the same thing, instructing chaplains to support the Commander through relationships with indigenous clergy. (15)

The optimal time to integrate the analysis of religion and culture is during the mission analysis phase of the military decision making process (MDMP). This responsibility generally falls upon the G2/J2 Plans section. Here the chaplain can provide input as to the role of religion on military operations. Since IO sections can be small and limited in time and religious resources, ad hoc members are necessary to develop the cultural analysis requirement. It is here that a staff chaplain can contribute significantly. During the mission analysis, the IO section develops the IO Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (IPB). Essential elements of IO IPB include: an in-depth analysis of religion; an awareness of important religious and cultural dates and observances; an understanding of religious and social structure, and recognition of key religious leaders and their probable influence.

FM 3-13 defines IO as " ... the employment of the core capabilities of electronic warfare, computer network operations, psychological operations, military deception, and operations security, in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to affect or defend information and information systems, and to influence decision making." (16) The FM specifically excludes the chaplain from the list of coordinating, special, and personal staff who have IO planning and support responsibilities. UMT personnel, both chaplains and chaplain assistants, should not be involved in the planning or execution of IO with the sole exceptions of security for themselves and friendly forces and the location of sacred or humanitarian sites.

All the core and supporting IO capabilities and functions, with the exception of operational and physical security, are either combatant tasks which chaplains, as noncombatants, are not legally authorized to directly engage in or highly technical tasks which are outside the realm of chaplain's professional responsibilities. Chaplain assistants, though combatants, should not be involved in the planning or execution of IO with the same exceptions, because their close association with the chaplain could create the appearance or contribute to the perception of the chaplain's involvement in IO. (17)

Chaplains as Liaisons with Indigenous Clergy and IO

Afghanistan is a religious country. Almost 100 percent of Afghans practice some type of Islam. Religion is a major cultural factor throughout all levels of the society. The role of religion and clergy in peacekeeping and nation building here must not be devalued. Most senior U.S. Army chaplains, as clergy and as officers, are well suited to advise commanders on religious issues and to act as intermediaries between military and indigenous religious leaders. Chaplains are positioned to communicate with local religious leaders to promote trust, coordination, problem solving, and to reduce local violence. (18) They can serve their commanders by acting as mediators with local mullahs or imams to build a relationship for civil military operations (CMO). Any role for a chaplain as a liaison with indigenous clergy must be balanced by security concerns, by the commander's intent, and by the skills and willingness of the chaplain. Some chaplains, for theological reasons, opt not to serve as religious liaisons to local clergy.

The primary role of Army chaplains is to minister to the troops, the commander, and his staff. But chaplains as staff officers do have a role in networking with indigenous clergy. Chaplains can help to win the hearts and minds of local populations in support of U.S. policies to rebuild a peaceful Afghanistan which lawfully elects its own leaders and maintains a civil and humane society. The role of Army chaplains as liaisons with local clergy is mentioned in FM 1-05, which states: "Chaplains will support the commander through advisement in the following areas that may influence CMO: Relations with indigenous religious leaders when directed by the commander." (19) When Army chaplains serve in a Joint Task Force or similar assignment with Navy, Air Force, or Marine personnel, Joint Publication (JP) 1-05 provides guidance on chaplains as religious liaisons. Approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 1-05, Religious Support in Joint Operations, states:
 The JFCH [Joint Force Chaplain], after careful consideration and only
 with the Joint Force Commander's approval, may serve as a point of
 contact to host nation (HN) civilian and military religious leaders,
 institutions, and organizations, including established and emerging
 military chaplaincies, through the Civil-Military Operations Center.

As clergy and non-combatants, Army chaplains are respected in the Muslim world. By this status they are in a position to build bridges and networks with indigenous clergy. Unquestionably, the chaplain's primary role is to provide religious support to Soldiers and their families, yet the role of a chaplain as a liaison to local clergy is clearly mentioned in various military publications. The doctrinal guidance is broad, giving commanders and chaplains flexibility in determining how best to fulfill this responsibility. Due to the ongoing nature of the War on Terror in Afghanistan, the U.S. will maintain peacekeeping, nation building, and stability operations for the foreseeable future. Since military personnel will have to engage the local population more and more in these operations, chaplains must be prepared to dialogue and interact with indigenous religious and community leaders.

This is not an unusual or unrealistic expectation. In Afghanistan, military Judge Advocate General officers routinely work with the Afghan legal system; military surgeons work closely with Afghan community medical services; military engineers are active throughout Afghanistan working with local contractors on a wide array of construction projects; military Civil Affairs soldiers are active in rebuilding schools and donating school supplies to Afghani children; and military chaplains throughout Afghanistan are interacting with local mullahs and imams.

Army chaplains routinely coordinate or assist with humanitarian and religious liaison missions. Because of these relationships with indigenous clergy, knowledge is gained through informal conversations that may contain information related to the U.S. military mission. Unsolicited information that affects the security of U.S. and allied forces should be reported. Relaying information about threats against U.S. interests does not violate the non-combatant status of a chaplain. But the chaplain who uses his religious status to gain intelligence from indigenous clergy with the intent of feeding that information to the G2, G3, or the IO staff has crossed the line and has assumed combative targeting tasks in violation of the non-combatant status of chaplains.

Chaplains must instruct their commanders and the command staff as to the roles and responsibilities of a chaplain related to IO. It can not be assumed that a commander or a command staff will know the details of what a chaplain can or cannot do related to the chaplain's non-combative status. Commanders must take care not to utilize chaplains against military regulations. FM 1-05 states, "Under Title X of the U.S. Code, Chaplains should not perform the following: Human Intelligence (HUMINT) collection and/or target acquisition." (21) Commanders must not utilize chaplains as intelligence officers. Chaplains are responsible for advising the commander when such expectations are prevalent. No military regulation states precisely what information a chaplain should or should not relay to the IO staff. The guiding principles are military regulations, maintaining the chaplain's credibility with indigenous religious leaders, guidance from the commander, input from supervisory chaplains, and the conscience of the individual chaplain. These flexible guidelines must be assessed in light of the chaplain's clear understanding of his non-combatant role.

Army chaplains in Afghanistan were frequently involved with humanitarian missions. These missions, typically coordinated by chaplains with local mullahs, helped to renovate schools, supply orphanages, and rebuild mosques. Falling under the general identification of CMO, chaplains on humanitarian missions often worked with Civil Affairs officers and Public Affairs. In such relationships the chaplain must protect his non-combatant status, in that both Civil Affairs and Public Affairs soldiers routinely contribute intelligence to IO. In a Muslim culture, a U.S. Army chaplain is considered a clergyman, a person of esteem at the level of a mullah. The chaplain must ensure that his credibility is not compromised by working on CMO projects with other soldiers who are combatants. As one chaplain stated, "UMTs should ... avoid the appearance of involvement in the execution of IO related activities to avoid undermining their credibility in support of CMO. Part of the reason that UMTs can be effective in conducting the CMO related function of liaison with indigenous religious groups is because of the perception that as religious leaders they will act as "honest brokers." (22)

Contributions of Chaplains to IO: What Can the Chaplain Do?

There are numerous examples of chaplains excelling in their role as a liaison or bridge-builder with local mullahs in Afghanistan. Chaplains were able to successfully perform these liaison and humanitarian missions without compromising their integrity as non-combatants. An example of interacting with indigenous clergy while rejecting the opportunity to feed intelligence to IO personnel was CH (CPT) Eric Eliason, who deployed to Afghanistan during 2004. As chaplain to the 1st Battalion, 19th Special Forces Group, CH Eliason refused to provide HUMINT or targeting information while he worked with local mullahs to coordinate the rebuilding of village mosques. (23)

An example of a senior Army chaplain who properly balanced his roles as a religious leader and a staff chaplain was CH (LTC) Larry Adams-Thompson, the CJTF 76 Chaplain in Afghanistan from March 2004 through March 2005. Continuing the work of his predecessor CH (LTC) Ken Sampson, CH Adams-Thompson organized monthly meetings with local mullahs. The intent of these meetings was to discuss religious issues, moral concerns, and to build clergy-to-clergy relationships. Chaplains obtained funds to assist mullahs in the renovation of village mosques and orphanages. In one encounter, he learned that U.S. funds were readily building Afghan public schools but not the traditional religious schools, the madrassas. This created the perception that the U.S. was secular and not concerned about the religious needs of Afghanistan. CH Adams-Thompson knew that if he could get the construction of some madrassas authorized, a clear message would be sent to the Afghan people that the U.S. cared about the local religion and culture. In reflecting on the relationship between CH Adams-Thompson and local mullahs:
 Note that the feedback from the mullah was not related to combat
 operations. Rather, it provided an awareness of wider issues in the
 area of responsibility (AOR). CH Adams-Thompson encouraged chaplains
 to take similar issues from their meetings with mullahs back to their
 commanders. This example demonstrates how chaplains can advise
 commanding officers on the ways religion impacts the AOR. Local
 religious leaders, who usually are quite influential in their
 communities, can provide unique viewpoints on issues and concerns
 among the populace. Such insight is crucial for commanders, and
 chaplains are often in a unique position to provide it. This
 information is not tactical; rather, it is situational awareness that
 can be utilized to build bridges with the general population. As a
 result of CH Adams-Thompson bringing the education mullah's
 assessment back to the command, approval was given to fund the
 construction of a madrassas in Kapisa Province, the first U.S. effort
 of its kind in Afghanistan. (24)

Staff communication between the chaplain and the commander and his staff is essential to maintaining the unique status of chaplains as non-combatants. As chaplains communicated plainly what they were and were not able to do related to intelligence collection, their commands almost always respected those boundaries. For example, shortly after arriving in Afghanistan. CH Adams-Thompson met with the G2 and told them what he could and could nor do related to IO. He indicated that during his 12 months in Afghanistan the command never asked him to utilize his connections with indigenous clergy in an improper manner. It is the responsibility at the chaplain as a staff officer to inform the command of his non-combatant boundaries. (25) Chaplains must be careful not to allow their networking with local religious leaders to be used inappropriately as targeting or human intelligence collection opportunities. If chaplains allowed themselves to be debriefed by G2. G3, or IO personnel in order to gain information related to combat operations, they would place their unique role as clergy non-combatants in jeopardy.

What the chaplain can or cannot do related to interaction with indigenous clergy is guided by the commander. No commander wants his chaplain kidnapped, killed, or injured. Security for mullah engagements is a vital consideration. The concern is not only for the Army chaplains but for the local clergy with whom they meet. There were instances in Afghanistan in which intimidation, violence, or murder was committed against religious leaders who dialogued with U.S. chaplains. For example, CH (CPT) Guy McBride of the 173rd Combat Support Battalion, who was in Afghanistan from March 2005 through March 2006, recalled, "The mullah engagements in my area were not successful. I remember two of these engagements, after which both times the mullahs were assassinated." (26) Careful consideration must be given as to how much danger local leaders face in relating with U.S. chaplains. Obviously the opportunity for chaplains to interact with indigenous clergy will be restricted or eliminated when the danger is too great. Chaplains must balance their roles as advisors to the commander on local religious issues against operational and force protection concerns.

While Army chaplains typically enjoyed their interaction with indigenous clergy, there were moments of apprehension. Occasionally a chaplain understood that he was very close to becoming an intelligence officer gathering targeting information on the enemy. For example, CH (CPT) Isaac Opara of the 25th Infantry Division conducted four mullah engagements during his June 2004 to April 2005 tour in Afghanistan. He lamented that he did not have set IO guidelines as to what he could and could not report to his commander and staff. While helping with the rebuilding of schools and orphanages, he learned many things about the Afghan people. He stated that he walked "a thin line between hosting mullah engagements and becoming an Intel officer." He stated, "I did not cross the line but I was an ear to the local people to hear complaints ... I never reported info to anyone except my brigade chaplain." (27)


To fully develop the role of the military chaplain as a religious liaison for the commander, more training is needed. It is inaccurate to assume that chaplains with the rank of major or above are competent in religious liaison activities. Military chaplains must be trained at the major level and above to dialogue as religious leaders with indigenous clergy; to be sensitive to the religious culture of allied personnel and the HN; to understand mission and situational awareness related to religious issues; to engage in liaison activities with a clear understanding of the Commander's intent and end state; and to not be used in any way as an intelligence gathering or targeting tool for IO.

Chaplains of the rank of major or above are a valuable but underutilized resource in developing the analysis of an adversary's religion and culture for the MDMP. Many IO missions begin before combat operations, and failure to understand the complexities of religion and culture can negatively impact those operations. Commanders and operations staff officers should understand that experienced chaplains can be a valuable multiplier in the total planning process by assisting in developing a religious impact assessment for the commander and staff. Chaplains should insist on the opportunity to participate in the process, although such participation is always bound by their status as non-combatants. Their products are critical for background support to IO, which requires an in-depth understanding of culture for operations involving combat, peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, and civil affairs.


(1.) FM 1-05, Religious Support, 2003, 1-5.

(2.) Ibid., p. 1-6.

(3.) Ibid.

(4.) Ibid., 4-40.

(5.) FM 3-13, Information Operations: Doctrine, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures, 2003, 1-1, 1-2.

(6.) AR 165-1, Chaplain Activities in the United States Army, 2004, 6.

(7.) Ibid.

(8.) FM 1-05, A-1.

(9.) Ibid., 1-5, 1-6.

(10.) Ibid., 1-1.

(11.) Randy Edwards, "Information Operations and the Army Chaplaincy," Command and General Staff College, unpublished paper, 2003, 3.

(12.) Ibid., p. 5.

(13.) The term "religious/spiritual" refers to the system of beliefs and practices that give meaning and purpose to people's lives, FM 1-05, F-1.

(14.) Greg W. Hill and Rob Meyer, "The Role of the Chaplain in Information Operations," The Army Chaplaincy, Summer/Fall 2002, 54-57.

(15.) JP 1-05, Religious Support in Joint Operations, June 2004, II-3a5. See also FM 1-05, 2003, appendix A, A-1 and A-2.

(16.) FM 3-13, 1-53.

(17.) Jonathan Gibbs, "Unit Ministry Teams and Information Operations," Unpublished Paper, U.S. Army Chaplain Center & School, 10 March 2007.

(18.) George Adams, "Lessons Learned for Iraq and Afghanistan: Chaplains as Liaisons with Religious Leaders," Peaceworks, (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2006), 1.

(19.) FM 1-05, A-1.

(20.) JP 1-05, II-3.

(21.) FM 1-05, A-2.

(22.) Gibbs, 2.

(23.) Adams, 16.

(24.) Ibid., 17.

(25.) Ibid., 18.

(26.) Questionnaire from CH (CPT) Guy McBride, 07 February 2007.

(27.) Correspondence from CH (CPT) Isaac Opara to CH (LTC) Ken Lawson, 14 February 2007.

Chaplain (LTC) Ken Lauison is currently the Installation Chaplain, Fort Buchanan, Puerto Rico. He joined the Army as a private in 1979, and entered the Army Chaplain Corps in. 1989. He holds a PhD In U.S. History and is a 2007 graduate of the U.S. Air Force Air War College.

by Chaplain (Lieutenant Colonel) Kenneth Lawson
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Author:Lawson, Chaplain Kenneth
Publication:Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin
Date:Apr 1, 2009
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