Do Several Winning Coalitions Exist in a State for Senators of the Same Party? Evidence from an Event Study.

Joseph P. McGarrity [*]

Armand Picou [+]

We argue that U.S. senators from the same state and in the same party form different winning coalitions. We also develop a theory that stipulates that parties encourage these senators to form very distinct constituency coalitions. Parties use committee assignments as a carrot to give these senators an incentive to represent different groups. In our empirical analysis, we find that there are fewer overlapping committee assignments among senators in the same state when they are from the same party. We also consider the case of John Heinz and Arlen Specter, both Pennsylvania Republicans. When John Heinz died in a plane crash, Political Action Committees (PACs) that bought influence from Specter but not Heinz now had the possibility that the new senator replacing Heinz would include them in his resource constituency. The resulting competition by the new Pennsylvania senator and Specter for campaign resources would lower the price these firms had to pay for representation, thus improving their expected future earn ings.

1. Introduction

When two senators hail from the same state, they may potentially serve the same voters and the same interest groups. If the Denzau and Munger (1986) model is correct, interest groups make campaign contributions to senators to get them to deviate from their voters' preferences and voters punish these deviations with less support at the polls. In this framework, two senators representing the same voters face identical opportunity costs in lost votes from accepting money from any particular interest group. Because interest groups buy influence from the senators who offer the cheapest service and these two senators from the same state have identical reservation prices for going against their voters' wishes, they are equally attractive to any single interest group. An interest group will want to either buy representation from both senators or from neither senator. Further, both senators will want to represent the same interest groups because these groups provide each senator with campaign money at the lowest cost in foregone votes.

If the two senators offer their services to the same voters and interest groups, they are forced to compete for electoral resources. As in any market for a homogeneous good served by more than one producer with identical costs of production, competition among senators allows the buyer to pay a lower price (campaign money and votes) and to receive more output (Senate representation). These two incumbent senators are vulnerable to challengers who include a different set of voters and interest groups in their winning coalitions. These challengers can charge the new voting blocks a monopoly price (number of votes) for their services. While the challenger will face competition from politicians running in other senate races, these outsiders represent different constituents, giving him/her a cost advantage over some of these politicians toward some interest groups. This politician will be spared direct competition against a legislator with identical opportunity costs for accepting campaign money.

When two senators from a state are in the same party, there is a heightened risk they will try to represent the same voters and thus the same interest groups. They may try to serve the same voters simply because some groups of voters in a state tend to be republicans and some groups tend to be democrats. Senators from the same party would gain if they could agree to differentiate their electoral and resource constituencies as much as possible to avoid competing with one another. However, this agreement is not enforceable and the cartel by itself will collapse. Parties, while unable to enforce the collusive agreement, can provide incentives for senators from the same state in their party to choose to represent some different voters and thus some different interest groups. The party, by allocating different committee seats to members from the same state, influences each senator's choice of which voters and interest groups to represent. A seat on a committee lowers the cost to a senator for serving voters and in terest groups concerned with the policy under the committee's jurisdiction, leaving extra electoral resources for a senator who chooses to represent this group.

In this article, we develop a theory that stipulates parties use committee assignments to lessen the competition for electoral resources among senators from the same state. By giving these senators different committee assignments, the party provides incentives for senators in their party to serve different groups of voters and different interest groups. Dividing the market increases each senator's electoral resources, providing an edge in the legislator's reelection efforts. In our empirical analysis, we find evidence consistent with our theory. For instance, in the 101st and 106th Congresses, there are fewer overlapping committee assignments among senators in the same state when they are from the same party; this result suggests parties try to limit competition among members from the same state. We also consider the case of John Heinz and Arlen Specter, both Pennsylvania Republicans who had different committee assignments, different electoral constituencies, and different resource constituencies. We employ a n event study and find that corporations with PACs that contributed to Heinz but not Specter experienced an abnormally large drop in their stock prices after Heinz's unexpected death in a plane crash on April 4, 1991. We also found that companies that gave money to Specter but not Heinz experienced an abnormal gain in their stock prices after the crash. These results suggest Heinz and Specter offered interest groups a different price to provide representation. Each senator's choice of which voters to represent as well as his committee assignments impacted the PACs to which he or she could cheaply sell influence. PACs who were able to buy cheap influence from Heinz had their access to influence put at risk by Heinz's death. Contrastingly, PACs that could cheaply buy political representation from Specter now had the possibility that the new senator who replaced Heinz would put together an electoral constituency much like Specter's. These PACs may soon have another senator who would compete with Specter for inte rest group money, driving down the price Specter can charge for his representation and giving these interest groups the benefit of senatorial competition.

2. There Can Be More Than One Winning Coalition of Voters

Black (1948) found that, under certain conditions, majority rule yields stable electoral outcomes. His analysis assumed voters have single peaked preferences and one issue is being decided on at a time. He found that, in a pairwise election, the candidate who adopts the optimal policy position of the median voter is the condorcet winner in a majority-rule election; that is, another candidate picking a different policy position cannot beat the first candidate.

However, when we relax either of Black's two assumptions, the stable outcomes disappear and no unique electoral equilibrium emerges. When voters have double (or more) peaked preferences and outcomes are determined by majority rule, more than one election result may take place. For example, during the Vietnam War, citizens may have had preferences that gave them the most utility at two different extreme policy decisions. Citizens may have wanted us to either stay out of the conflict or go into the region with immense firepower and take care of the job with overwhelming superiority. [1] A candidate can win an election by picking either platform. Second, when voters consider more than one issue at a time, a candidate can create a platform to attract a majority of the voters. However, several winning platforms exist and outcomes will vary over time. [2]

Nevertheless, whether or not majority-rule outcomes produce stable platforms for the winners of Senate elections is primarily an empirical question. Many studies have documented the wide spread occurrence of split party representation in the Senate. For example, Brunell and Grofman (1998) report that 28% of the states had split delegations between 1788 and 1996. The range for this data was 4% and 60%, which occurred in 1904 and 1830, respectively.

Several reasons have been given for divided representation. Brunell and Grofman (1998) report evidence that split representation in a state's Senate delegation is often caused by staggered elections extending the period of time it takes for a realignment to translate into changes in representation. Fiorina (1992) claims a moderate electorate may find it rational to send a split delegation to Washington. Cox and Katz (1996) and Gelman and King (1990) claim this phenomenon may be a result of the increased importance of incumbent performance and the relative decline in the importance of party ties.

Only two studies have attempted to empirically determine whether different winning platforms exist for members of the same party. [3] However, these articles do not measure the composition of a legislator's winning coalition directly. The first article used an index of roll call votes as a proxy for constituent interests, in effect assuming politicians vote the interests of their voters. This article by Goff and Grier (1993) finds the differences in the absolute value of Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) scores between senators from the same state (they use ADA scores to measure different constituent interests) can in part be explained by party as well as various measures of the heterogeneity of the voters in a state. Their results suggest a more diverse electorate allows politicians more choice of which groups to represent. The second article used a lower level of aggregation than is typical. In this article, Peltzman (1984) used county-level data instead of statewide data to control for constituent inte rests.

However, both of these important articles still use quite a bit of aggregation to measure constituent support. Goff and Grier use statewide variables to explain differences in voting scores. Peltzman uses county-level data for electoral constituents. Goff and Grier do not attempt to specify a monetary constituency; Peltzman, however, does. His variable, the percentage of contributions given to a legislator by labor PACs, aggregates monetary constituents into two groups: labor and nonlabor. Labor PAC dollars may include money given by steel worker and automobile unions. These unions will have diametrically opposed preferences on a bill that, for example, places quotas on steel imports. The steel union favors the bill because it insulates its workers from more efficient competition. Contrastingly, auto workers oppose the bill because it threatens their jobs and wages by increasing the cost of manufacturing a car in the United States. Similarly, the use of nonlabor PAC expenditures is also just as ambiguous a method of capturing the preferences of the money constituents. Nonlabor PAC money represents business and special interest groups that may come down on either side of a political issue. In the example given above, the steel and automobile industries have preferences in line with their union's views and that are opposed to each other. Therefore, Peltzman's monetary aggregation may obscure the true preferences of a legislator's monetary constituency. In short, only Peltzman and Goff and Grier have attempted to determine if several winning platforms exist in a state without relying solely on party to explain the differences. However, their level of aggregation may obscure the answer.

3. Why Senators from the Same Party in the Same State Can Gain if They Represent Different Constituents and How the Party Enforces This Arrangement

This section outlines how senators from the same party and state can increase their reelection chances if they do not compete for support. It then goes on to show how parties use committee assignments to prevent such competition.

Consider two voting blocks, M and N. In this discussion, we only consider voting blocks and senators from the same state, although we relax this assumption later by allowing interest groups from the senators' own state or other states to make campaign contributions. Suppose Senator 1 already includes voting block M but not N in his/her winning coalition. Figure 1 explains this transaction. Let [D.sub.0] depict the demand for Senate representation by M in a state, say Pennsylvania. Suppose [MC.sub.1] characterizes the cost to a senator of providing legislative service. The x axis is the number of senators (up to two) who provide representation. The x axis is the price the voting block pays for a senator's service measured in votes. If one senator serves this interest group, price ([P.sub.1]) and quantity ([Q.sub.1]) are read off the demand curve.

The second senator in a state has a choice of whether to also represent voting block M or instead include voting block N in his or her winning coalition. When a second senator chooses to represent M, we move down the demand curve in Figure 1, and the price it is willing to pay each senator is [P.sub.2]. In this case, M buys service from two senators. The second senator gains the area represented by A in electoral support. The first senator loses B in electoral support since the price he/she can charge dropped from [P.sub.1] to [P.sub.2].

The second senator's other option is to represent interest group N. Suppose [D.sub.0] in Figure 2 represents the demand curve for senate representation in Pennsylvania by interest group N. Let [MC.sub.1] be identical in the two figures. As this graph illustrates, compared with voting block M, voting block N has less demand at any given price. If only one senator wants to represent this group, he or she can charge [P.sub.3] and receive D in electoral support.

Each senator will maximize his/her own chances of getting reelected and ignore the effect of this decision on the other senator from the same state. The second senator will represent group M if A [greater than] D. This politician will ignore B when making a decision since he or she does not bear this cost. Of course, if A [less than] D, the senator will represent group N.

If senators were concerned with the best interests of their party, not their own self-interest, they would act differently. Suppose one state is served by two senators from the same party. The second senator maximizing party welfare will represent group M if A - B [greater than] D and represent group N if A - B [less than] D. In this example, a senator treats the cost of B that his counterpart bears as if it were his or her own. If senators in this state were from different parties, then each senator, even if looking out for his/her own party, would ignore B since a member from another party, not his/her own, bears this cost. When A - B [less than] D but A [greater than] D, whether or not senators are from the same party will determine which group the second senator chooses to include in his/her winning coalition. In this case, the second senator will represent M if he/she is from the same party as senator 1 and represent N otherwise.

Now, of course, the party cannot make a senator act in the party's interests instead of his/her own personal interests. However, the party can give an incentive for the second senator to choose to represent coalition N even when A [greater than] D. The party can give senator 2 a committee seat that lowers his/her cost of servicing group N but leaves his or her ability to serve group M unchanged. Such a committee assignment will lower the marginal cost of providing representation to group N to [MC.sub.2]. The lower cost curve increases the electoral profit (votes) a senator receives from representing group N by E. If E = B, then the party has given the senator a benefit from representing group N that allows him/her to make the same decision as if he/she were including B in his/her calculation. Also if E [greater than] B, the second senator will choose to represent group N in some cases when A [greater than] D.

This model illustrates how a party enforces cooperation among senators from the same state and party. The party uses committee seat assignments to prevent competition among members from the same state. This cartel makes party members better off by preventing competition and allowing both members to gain more campaign resources. Voting coalitions that might otherwise be represented by two senators are worse off because they pay a high price for representation and only buy one senator. Voting blocks not represented by the first senator may be made better off because they can now buy representation that was otherwise not available to them.

4. Including Interest Groups in the Model

The model above assumes senators try to build a winning coalition of voting blocks within their own state. A senator is obviously concerned with these blocks because they provide the votes the incumbent needs to be reelected. However, interest groups can also assist his/her reelection bid by offering campaign money to the politician's reelection effort. This section considers what happens to the model when senators consider campaign contributions in addition to votes.

In this case, when deciding whether to include a voting block from his own state in his winning coalition, a senator will take into account three things: (1) the votes this group offers; (2) the impact of this commitment on the amount of money he can raise from in and out of state interest groups, and (3) the electoral cost of serving the voting block and each interest group. In a seminal article, Denzau and Munger (1986) provide a model that explains how considerations 1 and 2 influence consideration 3.

The Denzau and Munger (1986) model predicts interest groups contribute to the legislators having the lowest positive supply price for the service they seek. The supply price of a legislator is a function of the cost of providing the service. There are two relevant costs. First, the cost of providing a service is in part determined by the productivity of a legislator. Membership on a relevant committee, seniority, and institutional knowledge all reduce a legislator's cost. [4] Second, the preferences of a congressman's voting constituents influence his cost of accommodating interest groups. [5] If an interest group wants a congressman to provide a service that his voters will not appreciate, the legislator must be compensated quite a bit to make this service worthwhile. His supply price will be high. If, on the other hand, an interest group wants a service a congressman's constituents only mildly dislike, then the legislator will have a low supply price. For example, consider a roll call vote. A PAC will accum ulate low-cost votes to gain a majority on a favored piece of legislation. In sum, productive politicians with agreeable constituents will tend to receive PAC contributions. [6]

Senators make a simultaneous decision of which voting blocks and interest groups to cater to. Choosing one voting coalition determines a senator's supply price to interest groups and thus which interest groups he/she is likely to represent. Our model extends to include interest groups quite easily. Specifically, parties use committee seats to provide an incentive for senators in the same party and from the same state to choose to represent combinations of voting blocks and interest groups that are as different as possible. Among their members, parties minimize the competition between senators from the same state for voting blocks and interest group money.

5. Data and Methodology

This article uses an event study to quantify how interest groups are affected by a sudden loss of one senator who possesses a unique combination of committee assignments and represents a certain subset of voters. On April 4, 1991, a plane carrying Senator John Heinz crashed. The tragic death of Heinz caused the representation of his electoral and resource constituents to be at risk. Some of the groups in Heinz's coalition would be left out of the one formed by his replacement. The voters and interest groups in Specter's winning coalition may benefit from Heinz's death. These groups may be represented by Heinz's successor. If so, the competition among senators will lower the price they pay for Senate representation and make these groups better off.

Event studies assume stock markets are efficient; that is, all available information is used to determine price. The price of a stock is an expected value of this year's as well as future years' earnings. This methodology assumes that stock prices immediately respond to new information that alters expected future earnings (Brown and Warner 1980, 1985). The full impact of an event that changes a company's expected earnings over an extended period of time will be incorporated into the stock price on the day the event becomes known. [7]

Several articles have used event studies to capture the economic impact of a political event. Schwert (1981) found that security prices were influenced by regulation. Gilligan and Krehbiel (1988) reported that the adoption of various amendment rules for legislation impacted stock prices. Finally, Roberts (1990), in the study most similar to our own, provides evidence that the unexpected death of the Chairman of the Senate Arms Services Committee, Henry "Scoop" Jackson, hurt the stock prices of Jackson's monetary and electoral constituents but helped the stock prices of the constituents of his likely replacement. Roberts argues that the chairmanship of the committee allowed its occupant some ability to affect the distribution of federal expenditures. Jackson's death reduced the expected business his constituents could expect to receive, while at the same time increased the federal business Sam Nunn's constituents were likely to be awarded. The changes in the expected future earnings were fully translated into stock price movements on the day of the crash. [8]

We specify the following model to test whether firms that contributed to either Heinz or Specter experienced abnormal returns on the day of the plane crash:

[RWP.sub.it] = [[alpha].sub.i] + [[beta].sub.1i][RM.sub.t] + [[beta].sub.2i][D.sub.t] + [[xi].sub.it],

where

[RWP.sub.it] = the daily return for a weighted portfolio of stocks that contributed to Senator (i = Heinz, Specter) at time t. The returns for each stock are multiplied by the weight, summed, and divided by the number of firms in the portfolio.

[RM.sub.t] = the return for the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) value weighted index of all the stocks in The New York Stock Exchange, The AMEX, and NASDAQ at time t. [9]

[D.sub.t] = a dummy variable or series of dummy variables that represent the event window. Several event windows are estimated. The event window ranges from 1 day, April 4, 1991, the day of the crash, to 3 days, April 4-8 (a Monday), 1991.

[alpha] and the [beta]'s are estimated parameters; the first [beta] measures the sensitivity of the portfolio to the market return, and the second [beta] captures the change in portfolio return specific to the event day. Also, [[xi].sub.it] indicates the stochastic disturbance term. The model is estimated for every trading day from April 4, 1990, to the end of the event window. Because information may not immediately translate into stock price changes, various event windows are used that include the date of the crash (April 4) and the next two trading days, April 5 and 8. These windows are captured in various specifications that use up to three dummy variables, one for each event day. Depending on which event window is employed, the number of observations ranges from 253 to 255.

Two portfolios are created to capture each senator's monetary constituency. The first portfolio consists of firms that gave money to Heinz for his 1988 election but not to Specter for his 1986 election. The second portfolio is made up of firms that contributed to Specter but not Heinz in these elections. These elections, 1986 and 1988, represent the last election each senator faced before the plane crash. We only include companies in a portfolio if their stock has a ticker symbol, is traded on a major exchange (NYSE, AMEX, NASDAQ), and has daily closing prices included in the CRSP database over the period of the sample. [10] We also only include companies whose contributions to each senator were available in the Federal Elections Commission (FEC) reports.

The portfolios include the common stock of 159 firms. The Heinz portfolio contains 92 PACs from 88 firms. There are fewer firms than PACs since some firms have more than one PAC. The Specter portfolio has 76 PACs and 71 firms. The firms in Heinz's portfolio appear in Appendix A, while the firms in Specter's portfolio appear in Appendix B. [11]

We omit from these portfolios firms that made a major announcement on April 4, 5, or 8. We omit these firms because it would be impossible to identify what portion of the change in return is due to the announcement and what portion is due to Senator Heinz's death. Elimination of firms with unusual news releases increases the likelihood that subsequent stock price volatility is due to the plane crash. Four firms in each portfolio are deleted because of news events and are listed in footnote 12. [12] Two firms from Heinz's portfolio are deleted because they do not report contributions to the whole Senate in the FEC data. These firms are Peoples Westchester Savings Bank and SFFed Corp. [13] Therefore, after accounting for the last two types of deletions, the final portfolios are 82 firms for Heinz and 67 for Specter.

For each firm in portfolio i, the ratio of dollars it gave to senator i over the dollars it gave to all senators is used to weigh each firm's contribution to the portfolio. The weighing scheme allows variation in the expected severity of each firm's reaction to the accident. This ratio captures the diversification a PAC has in its political contributions. If a company's PAC contributions are well diversified (no single Pennsylvania senator receives a significant portion of the funds contributed by the firm), the ratio is a small value. In such a case, the firm may experience a muted reaction to the crash. The contribution of that firm's stock price reaction to the portfolio's volatility is accordingly small. Conversely, if a firm contributes a majority of its PAC funds to either Heinz or Specter, then its lack of diversification will increase the severity of the firm's price reaction. Since these firms have all their eggs in one politician's basket, their lack of diversification should increase the severity o f the firm's stock price reaction.

6. Heinz and Specter Represented Different Constituents and Had Different Committee Seats

As Table 1 indicates, Heinz and Specter had different committee seats. In the 102nd Congress (1991-1992), Heinz had seats on the Banking, Finance, and Government Affairs committees, while Specter had seats on Appropriations, Judiciary, and Veterans' Affairs. Democratic Governor Robert Casey appointed Harris Wofford to finish Heinz's term. The Democrats appointed Wofford to four committees in the 103rd Congress: Environment and Public Works, Foreign Relations, Labor and Human Resources, and Small Business. Wofford lost in the 1994 general election to Rick Santorum. The Republican, Santorum, was appointed to Agriculture, Armed Services, and Rules and Administration. Because Heinz's committee seats differed from his successor's seats, the voting blocks and interest groups he could service cheaply were different from those his successors could represent cheaply. Therefore, the two senators who served in this seat after Heinz could offer some interest groups a better deal than Heinz could and they could offer some interest groups a worse deal.

Heinz and Specter also had different electoral constituents. In Table 2, we look at the percentage of the two-party vote each candidate won in each of Pennsylvania's 67 counties in their general elections prior to the 1991 plane crash. Heinz's election was in 1988 and Specter's was in 1986. The coefficient of determination for the vote shares across the 67 counties was 0.74, indicating 74% of the variation in one senator's vote share was accounted for by the variation in the vote share of the other senator. A full 26% of the variation in vote share was not accounted for by the other senator's vote share, suggesting these politicians may have had some different voters in their winning coalitions. The final column in this table presents a variable that represents the difference between the two senators' vote share. Specter's vote share is subtracted from Heinz's vote share. The counties in Table 2 are listed in the descending order of the vote share difference. Heinz did comparatively better in counties on the top of the list while Specter did relatively better in counties near the bottom of the list. Generally, Specter did relatively better in counties surrounding Philadelphia, while Heinz did better in counties surrounding Pittsburgh. Since Specter lives in Philadelphia and Heinz lived in Pittsburgh, these results suggest each senator built his electoral base from his home base.

Besides having different electoral constituents, the senators also had different monetary constituencies. Each senator received money from different PACs. Appendix A shows the firms with ticker symbols that gave money to Heinz but not Specter. Appendix B shows those that gave to Specter but not Heinz. In all, 159 firms contributed to one senator but not the other. [14] Also, 162 firms gave to both senators. [15] Therefore, 49.5% of the firms that made contributions gave money to one but not both senators. Half of each senator's monetary constituency was unique relative to the other senator.

Further, Heinz's committee assignments seemed to play a role in the type of firm that contributed to his campaign. His portfolio of firms listed in Appendix A has 16 firms with SIC codes for banks [16] and 15 with codes for finance. These firms represent over a third of Heinz's portfolio. Heinz's seats on the Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, and Finance committees allowed Heinz to offer senatorial service to these firms at a lower cost than Specter, who did not have the benefit of the former senator's committee assignments.

7. Results

Next we estimate the mode! outlined in section 5. PACs that gave to both senators are ignored since no obvious weighting scheme presents itself when constructing a portfolio. We limit our analysis to the portfolios of firms in Appendixes A and B. The reported t-statistics are generated using Newey-West heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors.

Table 3 presents the results when the model is estimated on a portfolio of PACs that contributed to Heinz but not Specter. The first five equations estimate the impact of the crash on the weighted portfolio. Because the effect of the crash on stock prices may not be fully realized in one day, we present five event windows. In Equation 1, the window, measured with a dummy variable, is limited to April 4, 1991, the crash date. It is plausible that a wider event window is needed since the crash was reported by the Associated Press very late in the trading day (3:10 P.M). [17] Equation 2 adds to the previous equation an additional dummy variable that equals one on April 5. Equation 3 measures the event window with one dummy variable equal to one on April 4 and April 5. The fourth equation has three separate dummy variables for April 4, 5, and 8 (April 8 is a Monday). Equation 5 lumps these three dates into one dummy variable. Generally, these results suggest Heinz's weighted portfolio had a negative stock price r eaction on April 4 and April 5. On the day of the crash, holding the market's fluctuations constant, Heinz's portfolio returned a negative 0.03%. The t-statistic on all specifications including the first two event dates as separate variables find these variables significant at the 0.01 level. However, on April 8, this portfolio experienced a positive and significant increase that Equation 5 suggests may cancel Out the loss from the first two days.

One possible explanation for the April 8 return is that five firms in Heinz's portfolio had a very large influence on the results since they only gave Senate contributions to Heinz. These firms can be found in Appendix A. [18] Of these five, the STV Group had a 4.7% return, Toll Brothers Inc. had a 2% return, and UGI had a 1.4% return on April 8. Although the Wall Street Journal did not mention any of these companies in a story on April 8 or 9, these firms clearly had large positive returns. Because the 8th is the last day of the window, it seems improbable that these large positive returns are due to the crash, especially since the STV Group and UGI had large negative returns of 6.7 and 1.4% on April 5. The positive returns on the 8th are more likely due to sector-specific, not firm-specific, news.

Because these three firms may be driving the results when April 8 is included in the window, we estimate the portfolio in a manner that will not allow just a few firms to dominate the portfolio's movements. Toward this end, we repeat our estimates reported in the first part of Table 3 on an unweighted Heinz portfolio. The same five specifications previously discussed are reported in Equations 6-10. Without the weights, the portfolio clearly indicates the plane crash caused an abnormal drop in the rate of return of Heinz's portfolio. All three event dates are individually negative and significant at the 0.05 level or better. Further, the dummy variables that group various event dates are also negative and significant at the 0.01 level. Equation 10 suggests the crash decreased the rate of return of the unweighted Heinz portfolio by 0.09% over the 3 days.

Next we repeat this exercise for the Specter portfolio. Table 4 reports the estimates of the previously discussed five specifications for the weighted portfolio in Equations 1-5 and the same specifications for the unweighted portfolio in Equations 6-10. The estimates using the weighted portfolio clearly suggest Heinz's plane crash increased the returns of the firms in Specter's portfolio. In the three specifications that include April 4 as a separate dummy variable, this variable always has a t-statistic over five. The separate dummy variables for April 5 and 8 are always significant at the 0.1 level or better. The event windows of 2 and 3 days reported in Equations 3 and 5 are significant at the 0.01 level.

There were only two firms in Specter's portfolio that gave all of their Senate money to Specter. [19] Therefore, it is less likely in Specter's portfolio relative to Heinz's portfolio that a few firms are driving the results. However, to be consistent, we report the unweighted estimates below. These results are conflicting. In the unweighted portfolio, the rates of return were abnormally negative on April 4 and abnormally positive on April 5. It is not very surprising that April 4 did not see a raise in the unweighted portfolio since (1) the news was announced with 50 minutes left in the trading day and (2) the link between the crash and the expected returns of firms that bought influence from Specter is not as immediately obvious as the link between the accident and the expected future earnings of firms that bought influence with Heinz. Therefore, it may take more than 50 minutes for the market to assimilate this information into the stock prices of firms in Specter's portfolio and (3) the unweighted portfol io exacerbates the previous problem since it gives equal weight to all firms even though a firm's investment in Specter may have been small and therefore its influence difficult for investors to detect in 50 minutes.

Overall, every specification of the model seems to fit the data well when estimating either senator's portfolio. For firms contributing to Heinz, the [R.sup.2] are typically 0.5 in the weighted portfolio and 0.86 in the equally weighted portfolio. These [R.sup.2] are 0.65 and 0.82, respectively, for firms contributing to Specter. The market index variable is always significant at the 0.01 level and its t-statistics reach as high as 35 in one specification.

Generally, the results support two hypotheses. First, PAC contributions to Heinz bought a valuable political asset. His Senate representation translated into extra expected future earnings for the firms that gave to him. After Heinz's tragic death, firms could no longer count on his influence over government policy to increase their earnings. This loss in future profits caused a drop in the stock prices at the time of the crash.

The second hypothesis supported by the data is firms contributing to Specter are made better off when Heinz left the Senate because these firms now have a chance of being represented by a Pennsylvania senator who wants to include them in their resource constituency. This increases the competition among Pennsylvania's two senators, allowing these firms to pay a lower price for Senate representation. This lower price results in increased expected future earnings that the event windows captured.

8. Generality of Pennsylvania Example

The difference among committee assignments by senators from the same state is not unique to Pennsylvania. As Table 5 shows, in the 101st Congress, only six states had senators with overlapping committee assignments. During the 106th Congress, 11 states had two senators with seats on the same committee. [20] Further, as the theoretical discussion in this article predicts, there is significantly less overlap in committee seat assignment when the senators in a state are from the same party. In the 101st Congress, 29 states have two senators from the same party. None of these states has any senators with the same committee assignments. In contrast, in the remaining 21 states with split party representation, 6 of 21 states (28.57%) have senators with seats on the same committee. The same story holds in the 106th Congress. Only 12.9% (4/31) of the states have duplicate committee assignments in states with one party representing the state in the Senate, while 36.8% (7/19) of the states have overlapping committee mem bership in states with split party representation in the senate. Actually, these numbers understate the duplication of committee membership among states with split party representation since, in each of the 101st and 106th Congresses, two states represented by a Democrat and Republican senator had legislators with two committee assignments that were identical.

9. Conclusion

This article develops an explanation for why it is likely that several winning coalitions exist in a state for senators in the same party. It presents a theory that parties use committee assignments to lessen the competition for voters and PAC money among Senators in the same party and from the same state. The party offers these senators different committee assignments to ensure that they choose to include different voters and interest groups in their winning coalitions. This works because a committee seat will influence a senator's choice of whom to include in his/her winning coalition. Since committees allow the senator to cheaply serve the electoral and resource constituencies concerned with the policy area under the committee's jurisdiction, the cost advantages afforded by a committee seat influence a senator's decision of whom to represent. By lessening competition between two senators in the same party, the party has allowed the senators to charge more for their services, which should increase their ree lection chances.

We consider the case of Pennsylvania in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The state was served by two Republican senators, John Heinz and Arlen Specter. These legislators had different electoral constituencies. Generally, Heinz's support was strongest near Pittsburgh, while Specter's support was strongest near Philadelphia. The implications of divergent electoral constituencies were developed by Denzau and Munger (1986). They provide a model that predicts the electoral constituency of a legislator influences which PACs contribution to him/her. In this model, PACs provide campaign contributions to the candidate who represents voters with the least distaste for the PACs' objectives. Consistent with their model, we find that two senators from the same state and party but with different electoral constituents were given contributions by different PACs. We also found evidence that a significant portion of the firms that gave to Heinz but not Specter were in the banking and finance industry. Heinz's seats on the Fina nce and Banking Committees seemed to affect which PACs he drew his support from.

The tragic death of Senator John Heinz affords us the opportunity to test whether winning coalitions are sustainable. We find that investors do not expect them to be. We employ an event study and find that corporations with PACs that contributed to Heinz experienced a significant drop in their stock prices on the day of Heinz's death. These results suggest PAC contributions to Heinz bought a valuable political asset. His Senate representation translated into extra expected future earnings for the firms that gave to him. After Heinz's death, firms could no longer count on his influence over government policy to increase their earnings. This loss in future profits caused a drop in the stock prices at the time of the crash.

We also found companies that gave money to Specter experienced a significant gain in their stock prices. These firms were better off when Heinz left the Senate because these firms now have a chance of being represented by a Pennsylvania senator who wants to include them in his/her resource constituency. This will increase the competition among Pennsylvania's two senators, allowing these firms to pay a lower price for Senate representation, resulting in increased expected future earnings and thus higher stock prices.

Finally, we also found that the difference in committee assignments by Heinz and Specter was not unique. In the 101st and 106th Congresses, members from the same state were less likely to have identical committee assignments if they were from the same party than if they were from different parties.

This article is a first step in examining how parties act to limit intraparty competition. More avenues in this area need to be explored. Some questions for future research are as follows. Do parties with an incumbent from one area of the state try to recruit candidates from a different geographic area of the state? Is party money allocated in a way to reduce competition? Are committee assignments allocated to reduce competition among senators from different states?

(*.) Economics and Finance Department, 201 Donaghey Avenue, University of Central Arkansas, Conway, AR 72035, USA; E-mail [e-mail]; corresponding author.

(+.) Economics and Finance Department, 201 Donaghey Avenue, University of Central Arkansas, Conway, AR 72035.

Received November 1998; accepted November 2000.

We thank Walter Block, Pat Cantrell, Ling He, Bill Kordsmeier, Roy McLean, Dan Sutter, and two anonymous referees for helpful comments.

(1.) Mueller (1989) provides the example of a voter's attitude toward the proper level of involvement for the United States in Vietnam as an example of double-peaked preferences.

(2.) For a review of the literature, see Mueller (1989).

(3.) Fenno (1978) recognized that all members in a representative's district are not included in his reelection constituency. On this point, also see MeKelvey (1986).

(4.) The legislator productivity component of the Denzau and Monger (1986) model has received extensive testing. Grier and Monger (1986, 1991, 1993) find that tenure, which measures institutional knowledge, and relevant committee assignments positively influence labor and corporate PAC contributions. Romer and Snyder (1994) report that PACs target members and chairs of specific committees. Roberts (1990) presents evidence supporting an assumption of the Denzau Monger model. He found that seniority positively influences legislator productivity.

(5.) The other component of cost (constituent characteristics) and its relationship to campaign expenditures has received some attention. Snyder (1992), Stratmann (1991), and Fleisher (1993) alt find Constituent characteristics measured by statewide averages arc significant variables in equations explaining PAC contributions. However, in the literature explaining PAC contributions, there have been virtually no attempts to precisely define the electoral constituents in a senator's (representative's) winning coalition with anything other than state (district)-wide data. To our knowledge, Stratmann (1996) is the only exception.

(6.) Bronars and Lott (1997) test a model similar to the Denzau and Munger model. They find support for the notion that PACs contribute to their "friends," that is, politicians with agreeable constituents.

(7.) For a recent example of an event study, see Berry (2000).

(8.) He, Myer, and Webb (1998) is another article in this vein. They find less mobile assets are more sensitive to unforeseen political events.

(9.) The permanent CRSP number for the index is 100080 (CRSP 2000). We report the index return including dividends. However, using the return excluding dividends did not appreciably change our results.

(10.) The CRSP database did not have data over our sample period for the following firms: (1) in the Specter portfolio, Illinois Central Corp., Imperial Corp. of America, MGM UA Communications, and Southland Corp.; and (2) in the Heinz portfolio, Amerifirst Bank FSB, Chambers Development Co., Columbia Savings and Loan Association, and Mcorp. These firms are not included in the portfolios.

(11.) The PACs contributing to Heinz were found in the Federal Election Commission 1987-1988 Candidate Index of Supporting Documents--(E). Specter's were found in the 1985-1986 version of the same document. We found the public firm associated with the PAC from information given in the FEC documents and the Almanac of Federal PACs (1992-1993). We found the companies ticker symbol in Ward's Business Directory of U.S. Private and Public Companies (1992). We found all of the PACs affiliated with a firm in the Almanac of Federal PACs (1992-1993). We found total Senate contributions to each PAC in the FEC Reports on Financial Activity: Final Report: Party and Non-Party Political Committees, Volume 3 (1985-1986. 1987-1988).

(12.) The following firms were omitted from the Specter portfolio because of major news stories: USF and G Corp. announced they would cut 900 jobs in early 1991 and another 1900 later (April 5); Pan Am Corp. renegotiated lower lease payments for many of its planes (April 5); New York State Electric and Gas Corp. completed the sale of its New York Gas distribution unit; Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Co. announced a new chairman and CEO (April 8). The following firms were omitted from the Heinz portfolio because of major news stories: First Interstate Bancorp posted lower earnings in the first quarter (April 5); National City Corp. reduced its first quarter earnings estimate by $0.10 a share (April 4); UAL reported a 6.9% decrease in revenue passenger miles (April 8); Xerox settled a law suit the Wall Street Journal termed very significant (April 4).

(13.) All of the firms in the Specter portfolio had Senate contributions cited in the FEC data.

(14.) This includes firms omitted from the portfolios used in the later event analysis.

(15.) The list of these firms is available from the authors upon request.

(16.) Heinz also received money from SFFed Corp. and Peoples Westchester Savings Bank. Both these companies are banks, but they were dropped from the portfolio because they did not list total Senate contributions in the FEC data. If these two firms are counted, then 18 banking firms contributed to Heinz but not Specter.

(17.) Thanks to Peter Santilla of Associated Press for this information.

(18.) The tickers for firms that only gave Senate contributions to Heinz are UGI, TOL, STVI, PPL, and INBC.

(19.) The tickers for firms that only gave Senate contributions to Specter are EQT and AYD.

(20.) We picked the 101st and 106th Congresses for analysis since there is a decade between them, preventing us from double counting committee assignment overlaps. Also, the 106th Congress is the current Congress and the 101st Congress is the last Congress for which Heinz served out the session.

References

Amward. Almanac of federal PACs, various issues. Washington, DC: Amward.

Berry, Keith S. 2000. Excess returns in electric utility mergers during transition to competition. Journal of Regulatory Economics 18:175-88.

Black, D. 1948. On the rationale of group decision making. Journal of Political Economy 56:23-34.

Bronars, Stephen G., and John R. Lott. 1997. Do campaign donations alter how a politician votes? Or, do donors support candidates who value the same thing that they do? Journal of Law and Economics 40:317-50.

Brown, S. J., and J. B. Warner. 1980. Measuring security price performance. Journal of Financial Economics 8:205-58.

Brown, S. J., and J. B. Warner. 1985. Using daily stock returns: The case of event studies. Journal of Financial Economics 14:3-31.

Brunell, Thomas L., and Bernard Grofman. 1998. Explaining divided U.S. Senate delegations, 1988-1996: A realignment approach. American Political Science Review 92:391-411.

Congressional Quarterly Inc. Various years. Congressional Quarterly Almanac. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Inc.

Cox, Gary W., and Jonathan N. Katz. 1996. why did the incumbency advantage in U.S. House elections grow? American Journal of Political Science 40:478-98.

Denzau, Arthur T., and Michael C. Munger. 1986. Legislators and interest groups: How unorganized interests get represented. American Political Science Review 80:89-106.

Federal Election Commission. 1985-1986 and 1987-1988. Federal Election Commission candidate index of supporting documents-(E). Washington, DC: Federal Election Commission.

Federal Election Commission. 1985-1986 and 1987-1988. FEC reports on financial activity: Final report, Volume 3. Washington, DC: Federal Election Commission.

Fenno, Richard. 1978. Home style. Boston: Little Brown.

Fiorina, Morris P. 1992. Divided government. New York: Macmillan.

Fleisher, Richard. 1993. PAC contributions and congressional voting on national defense. Legislative Studies Quarterly 18:391-409.

Gale Research. 1992. Ward's business directory of U.S. private and public companies. Detroit: Gale Research.

Gelman, Andrew, and Gary King. 1990. Estimating incumbency advantage without bias. American Journal of Political Science 34:1142-64.

Gilligan, Thomas, and Keith Krebbiel. 1988. Complex rules and congressional outcomes: An event study of energy tax legislation. The Journal of Politics 50:625-54.

Goff, B. L., and K. B. Grier. 1993. On the (mis)measurement of legislator ideology and shirking. Public Choice 76:5-20.

Grier, Kevin, and Michael Munger. 1986. The impact of legislator attributes on interest-group campaign contributions. Journal of Labor Research 7:340-61.

Grier, Kevin, and Michael Munger. 1991. Committee assignments, constituent preferences, and campaign contributions to house incumbents. Economic Inquiry 29:24-43.

Grier, Kevin, and Michael Munger. 1993. Comparing interest group PAC contributions to House and Senate incumbents. Journal of Politics 55:615-43.

He, Ling, F. C. Neil Myer, and James R. Webb. 1998. The impacts of Tiananmen Square events on Hong Kong real estate and non-real estate wealth. Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics 16:289-99.

McKelvey, Richard. 1986. Covering, dominance, and institution-free properties of social choice. American Journal of Political Science 30:167-81.

Mueller, Dennis C. 1989. Public choice II. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Peltzman, Sam. 1984. Constituent interest and congressional voting. Journal of Law and Economics 27:181-210.

Roberts, Brian. 1990. A dead senator tells no lies: Seniority and the distribution of federal benefits. American Journal of Political Science 34:31-58.

Romer, Thomas, and James Snyder. 1994. An empirical investigation of the dynamics of PAC contributions. American Journal of Political Science 38:745-69.

Schwert, William. 1981. Using financial data to measure effects of regulation. The Journal of Law and Economics 27:121-58.

Snyder, James M., Jr. 1992. Long-term investing in politicians; or, give early, give often. Journal of Law and Economics 35:15-43.

Stratmann, Thomas. 1991. What do campaign contributions buy? Deciphering causal effects of money and votes. Southern Economic Journal 57:606-20.

Stratmann, Thomas. 1996. How reelection constituencies matter: Evidence from political action committees' contributions and congressional voting. Journal of Law and Economics 39:603-35.

[Graph omitted]

[Graph omitted]

Table 1.

The Pennsylvania Delegation's Committee Seats: 102nd-104th Congress


102nd Congress  Heinz
                  Banking, Housing, and Urban
                  Affairs
                  Finance
                  Government Affairs
103nd           Wofford
                  Environment and Public Works
                  Foreign Relations
                  Labor and Human Resources
                  Small Business
104th           Santorum
                  Agriculture, Nutrition, and
                  Forestry
                  Armed Services
                  Rules and Administration


102nd Congress  Specter
                  Appropriations

                  Judiciary
                  Veterans' Affairs
103nd           Specter
                  Appropriations
                  Energy and Natural Resources
                  Judiciary
                  Veterans' Affairs
104th           Specter
                  Appropriations

                  Judiciary
                  Veterans' Affairs

The Senator's committee assignments for each congress appear below his
name.
Table 2.

Vote Share by County for Last General Election Before the Plane Crash


Spector  Heinz  County          Difference
42       63.2   Beaver          -21.2
56.3     75.8   Armstrong       -19.5
46.8     65.4   Cambria         -18.6
49.6     66.9   Westmoreland    -17.3
61.7     79     Butler          -17.3
53.4     70.5   Elk             -17.1
46.9     63.9   Lawrence        -17
63.2     79.9   Clarion         -16.7
57.9     74.6   Erie            -16.7
50.4     66.6   Washington      -16.2
50.4     66.5   Luzerne         -16.1
51       66.7   Allegheny       -15.7
62.4     78     Jefferson       -15.6
62.5     78     Montour         -15.5
62.3     77.5   Adams           -15.2
60.9     76.1   Columbia        -15.2
59.4     74.5   Somerset        -15.1
58.9     73.9   Indiana         -15
56.3     71.3   Delaware        -15
61.8     76.4   Juniata         -14.6
54.2     68.6   Lackawanna      -14.4
55.6     69.9   Clearfield      -14.3
62.7     76.7   Mifflin         -14
62.8     76.8   Venango         -14
71       84.8   Perry           -13.8
53.2     66.9   Carbon          -13.7
57.6     71.3   Northumberland  -13.7
66.4     79.8   Huntington      -13.4
62       75.3   Centre          -13.3
65.3     78.6   Lycoming        -13.3
67.7     80.9   Cumberland      -13.2
64.5     77.6   Crawford        -13.1
66.6     79.4   Franklin        -12.8
66       78.7   York            -12.7
55.8     68.4   Clinton         -12.6
64       76.4   Forest          -12.4
50.6     62.9   Greene          -12.3
61.3     73.5   Berks           -12.2
72.7     84.9   Union           -12.2
68.8     80.9   Blair           -12.1
65.5     77.6   Bedford         -12.1
61.2     73.2   Schuylkill      -12
68.4     80.2   Lebanon         -11.8
61.2     72.8   Fulton          -11.6
61.2     72.7   Sullivan        -11.5
62.3     73.3   Monroe          -11
77.2     87.7   Snyder          -10.5
72.1     82.5   Bradford        -10.4
69.2     79.5   Chester         -10.3
63.8     74.1   Warren          -10.3
72.8     83.1   Wayne           -10.3

75       85.2   Wyoming         -10.2
65.5     75.4   Dauphin         -9.9
60.1     70     Lehigh          -9.9
45.4     54.9   Fayette         -9.5
70.8     80.2   Susquehanna     -9.4
54       63.3   Northampton     -9.3
54.9     64     Mercer          -9.1
68.9     75.3   McKean          -6.4
67.4     73.7   Cameron         -6.3
64.7     70.9   Bucks           -6.2
71.3     77.5   Tioga           -6.2
75.2     81     Lancaster       -5.8
69.4     74.9   Pike            -5.5
69.6     73.8   Potter          -4.2
68.9     72.8   Montogomery     -3.9
43.7     39.2   Philadelphia    4.5
Table 3.

Event Study--Heinz

                             Weighted Portfolio Equation
Variables          Equation 1          Equation 2      Equation 3

Constant            3.54E-05            3.54E-05        3.54E-05
                    (0.587)             (0.586)         (0.587)
Market return        0.1103              0.1103          0.1104
                    (16.38) [***]       (16.35) [***]   (16.45) [***]
D4                  -0.0003             -0.0003
                    (-4.59) [***]       (-4.59) [***]
D5                                      -0.0004
                                        (-4.96) [***]
D4 + D5                                                 -0.0004
                                                        (-5.31) [***]
D8

D4 + D5 + D8

[R.sup.2]            0.500               0.502           0.502
n                     253                 254             254

                   Weighted Portfolio Equation
Variables      Equation 4           Equation 5

Constant        3.54E-05              3.52E-05
                (0.585)              (0.585)
Market return    0.1103               0.1107
                (16.32) [***]       (16.59) [***]
D4              -0.0003
                (-4.58) [***]
D5              -0.0004
                (-4.95) [***]
D4 + D5

D8               0.0009
                (12.12) [***]
D4 + D5 + D8                          4.62E-05
                                     (0.236)
[R.sup.2]        0.503                0.502
n                 255               255

                           Unweighted Portfolio Equations
Variables      Equation 6              Equation 7     Equation 8

Constant        -7.02E-05               -7.02E-05      -7.01E-05
               (-0.250)                (-0.249)       (-0.249)
Market return    1.015                   1.015          1.015
               (35.22) [***]           (35.15) [***]  (35.33) [***]
D4              -0.0012                 -0.0012
               (-3.94) [***]           (-3.93) [***]
D5                                      -0.0006
                                       (-1.70) [**]
D4 + D5                                                -0.0009
                                                      (-3.03) [***]
D8

D4 + D5 + D8

[R.sup.2]        0.861                   0.862          0.862
n              253                     254            254

               Unweighted Portfolio Equations
Variables      Equation 9     Equation 10

Constant        -7.02E-05       -7.01E-05
                (0.249)        (-0.249)
Market return    1.015           1.015
               (35.09) [***]   (35.41) [***]
D4              -0.0012
               (-3.93) [***]
D5              -0.0006
               (-1.69) [**]
D4 + D5

D8              -0.0009
               (-2.69) [***]
D4 + D5 + D8                    -0.009
                                (3.19)
[R.sup.2]        0.862           0.862
n              255             255

(*)Significant at the 10% level;

(**)significant at the 5% level;

(***)significant at the 1% level.
Table 4.

Event Study--Spector

                        Weighted Portfolio Equation
Variables              Equation 1             Equation 2

Constant                  2.22E-05              2.22E-05
                         (0.597)               (0.595)
Market return             0.0802                0.0802
                        (26.37) [***]         (26.32) [***]
D4                        0.0002                0.0002
                         (5.19) [***]          (5.17) [***]
D5                                              6.76E-05
                                               (1.50) [*]
D4 + D5

D8

D4 + D5 + D8

[R.sup.2]                 0.654                 0.655
n                       253                   254

                         Weighted Portfolio Equation
Variables      Equation 3     Equation 4      Equation 5

Constant         2.22E-05        2.22E-05        2.22E-05
                (0.596)         (0.594)         (0.596)
Market return    0.0803          0.0802          0.0803
               (26.46) [***]   (26.27) [***]   (26.52) [***]
D4                               0.0002
                                (5.16) [***]
D5                               6.76E-05
                                (1.50) [*]
D4 + D5          0.0001
                (3.14) [***]
D8                               5.49E-06
                                (1.29) [*]
D4 + D5 + D8                                     0.0001
                                                (2.51) [***]
[R.sup.2]        0.654           0.655           0.655
n              254             255             255

                            Unweighted Portfolio Equation
Variables           Equation 6         Equation 7      Equation 8

Constant               8.99E-06           8.99E-06        9.35E-06
                      (0.035)            (0.035)         (0.037)
Market return          0.9320             0.9320          0.9314
                     (30.17) [***]      (30.11) [***]   (30.21) [***]
D4                    -0.0009            -0.0009
                     (-3.02) [***]      (-3.01) [***]
D5                                        0.0016
                                         (4.66) [***]
D4 + D5                                                   0.0004
                                                         (0.823)
D8

D4 + D5 + D8

[R.sup.2]              0.821              0.821           0.821
n                    253                254             254

                Unweighted Portfolio Equation
Variables      Equation 9      Equation 10

Constant          8.99E-06         9.39E-06
                 (0.035)          (0.037)
Market return     0.9320           0.9313
                (30.05) [***]    (30.28) [**]
D4               -0.0009
                (-3.00) [***]
D5                0.0016
                 (4.65) [***]
D4 + D5

D8                9.25E-05
                 (0.278)
D4 + D5 + D8                       0.003
                                  (0.827)
[R.sup.2]         0.821            0.821
n               255              255

(*)Significant at the 10% level;

(**)significant at the 5% level;

(***)significant at the 1% level.
Table 5

Instances When Two Senators from the Same State Serve on the Same
Committee

                                101st Congress
                           States with Same Party
                               Representation
                               in the Senate

Number of states                     29
Instances of same                     0
 committee representation










                                   101st Congress
                           State with Split Party
                               Representation
                               in the Senate

Number of states           21
Instances of same          (1) Colorado: Budget
 committee representation  (2) Florida: Banking, Housing
                               and Urban Affairs
                           (3) Iowa: Appropriations
                           (4)       Small Business
                           (5) Kentucky: Energy and
                               Natural Resources
                           (6)            Rules
                           (7) Montana: Small Business
                           (8) North Carolina: Foreign
                               Relations

                                   106th Congress
                           States with Same Party
                               Representation
                               in the Senate

Number of states           31
Instances of same          (1) Mississippi: Rules
 committee representation  (2) New York: Rules
                           (3) South Dakota: Agriculture
                           (4) Wisconsin: Judiciary








                                     106th Congress
                           States with Split Party
                               Representation
                                in the Senate

Number of states           19
Instances of same          (1) Georgia: Small Business
 committee representation  (2) Iowa: Agriculture
                           (3) Michigan: Small Business
                           (4) Minnesota: Foreign relations
                           (5) New Mexico: Energy and
                               Natural Resources
                           (6) Oregon: Budget
                           (7)         Energy and Natural
                               Resources
                           (8) Washington: Appropriations
                           (9)            Budget

Does not include select, special, or joint committee assignments.
Appendix A

PACS Contributing to Heinz but not Specte

PAC                                                              Contri-
Number  PAC Name                    Company Name                  bution

 1      First Interstate Texas      Allied Bankshare Inc.            250
          Leadership Funds/Federal
 2      Home Savings of America     H.F. Ahmanson and Co.           6000
          PAC
 3      American Information        American Information            1571
          Technologies Corp. PAC    Technologies Corp.
 4      ARMCO Employees' PAC        Armco Inc.                      3000
 5      Avon Products, Inc. Fund    Avon Products Inc.              1000
          for Responsible
          Government
 6      Bankmerica Federal          Bankamerica Corp.               1000
          Election Fund
 7      Barnett People for Better   Barnett Banks Inc.              2500
          Government Inc.
 8      California Federal          Calfed Inc.                     1500
          Savings Public Affairs
          Committee
 9      Chubb Corp. PAC             Chubb Corp.                     1000
10      CBI Industries PAC          CBI Industries Inc.              250
11      Champion International      Champion International          1000
          Corp. PAC                  Corp.
12      First City Bancorporation   First City Bancorp Inc.          250
          PAC
13      Cleveland-Cliffs Iron Co.   Cleveland-Cliffs Co.            1000
          PAC
14      Chase Lincoln First Bank    Chase Manhattan Corp.            100
          National Federal PAC
15      Chase Manhattan Corp. PAC   Chase Manhattan Corp.           2000
16      Central Pennsylvania        Central Pennsylvania             500
          Savings PAC               Financial Corp.
17      Deere and Co. Civic         Deere and Co.                   1000
          Action Fund
18      Dime Savings Bank of        Dime Savings Bank of            1000
          New York PAC              New York FSB
19      Consolidated Edison Co.     Consolidated Edison Co.          100
          of New York Inc.          New York Inc.
          Employees PAC
20      Equifax PAC                 Equifax Inc.                    1000
21      Enron PAC                   Enron Corp.                      500
22      Enserch Corp. Employees     Enserch Corp.                   1000
          Political Support
          Association
23      New Orleans Public          Entergy Corp.                    500
          Service Inc. for
        Responsible Government
24      Ethyl Corp. PAC             Ethyl Corp.                     1000
25      First Commerce Corp. PAC    First Commerce Corp.             250
26      Fleetwood Enterprises,      Fleetwood Enterprises Inc.      1250
          Inc. PAC
27      First Chicago Corp.         First Chicago Corp.              500
          Governmental
        Affiars, 1st National
          Bank of Chicago
28      Colonial Penn PAC           Colonial Penn Group Inc.,        500
                                     FPL Group Inc.
29      Good Government             Florida Power and Light          285
          Management Association     Co., FPL Group Inc.
        Florida P & L Co.
          Employees PAC
30      First Mississippi           First Mississippi Corp.         1000
          Corp. PAC
31      Freeport-Mcmoran Inc.       Freeport-Mcmoran Inc.           2000
          Citizenship Committee
32      World S&L Association PAC   Golden West Financial Corp.      500
33      General Mills Inc. PAC      General Mills Inc.              1000
34      Genentech Inc. PAC          Genentech Inc.                   500
35      Great Western Financial     Great Western Financial         4000
          Corp. Good                 Corp.
          Government Committee
36      Gencorp Inc. PAC            Gencorp Inc.                    1000
37      Harley-Davidson Inc. PAC    Harley-Davidson Inc.            1000
38      Henley Group Inc.           Henley Group Inc.               2500
          Employces Comittee
          for Sensible Government
39      Household International     Household International         1000
          Inc. and Subsidiary        Inc.
          Co. PAC
40      Hewlett-Packard Co. PAC     Hewlett-Packard Co.              500
41      First Interstate Bank       First Interstate Bancorp         500
          of California PAC
42      Dain Bosworth               Inter-Regional Financial        1000
          Incorporated PAC           Group Inc.
43      Independence Bancorp        Independence Bancorp            1125
          Inc. PAC                   Inc.
44      Intel PAC                   Intel Corp.                      250
45      Torrington Co. PAC          Ingersoll-Rand Co.               750
46      Corporate                   ITT Corp.                       1000
          Citizenship Committee
47      Hartford Insurance          ITT Corp.                        500
          Group PAC
48      Illinois Tool               Illinois Tool Works              500
          Works Inc. PAC             Inc.
49      Kansas City Southern        Kansas City Southern            1000
          Employees PAC              Industries Inc.
50      Mckesson Corp. Employees    Mckesson Corp.                  2000
          Political Fund
51      Manor Healthcare            Manor Care Inc.                 1000
          Federal PAC
52      Motorola Employees          Motorola Inc.                   2000
          Good Government
          Committee
53      Navistar International      Navistar International          1500
          Transportation Corp.       Corp.
          Good Government
          Committee
54      National City Corp. PAC     National City Corp.             1000
55      NL Industries Inc. PAC      NL Industries Inc.              5000
56      National Semiconductor      National Semiconductor          1000
          Corp. Employcees           Corp.
57      Nynex Federal PAC           Nynex Corp.                     2000
58      Owens-Corning Fiberglas     Owens-Corning Fiberglas         1000
          Corp. Employcees           Corp.
          Better Government Fund
59      Pennsylvania Power          Ohio Edison Co.                  600
          Co. Employee Federal
60      Primerica Corp. PAC         Primerica Corp.                 2000
61      Smith Barney Better         Primerica Corp.                 1000
          Government Committee
62      PEGPAC                      Public Service Enter-            500
                                     prise Group Inc.
63      Texas Eastern PAC           Panhandle Eastern Corp.         1000
64      Parker-Hannifin Corp. PAC   Parker Hannifin Corp.           1000
65      Piper, Jaffray, and         Piper Jaffray Inc.               500
          Hopwood Employees
          Fund for Responsible
          Government
66      Pennsylvania Power          Pennsylvania Power              1000
          and Light Co.              and Light Co.
          People for Good
          Government
67      Painewebber Fund for        Paine Webber Group Inc.         3500
          Better Government
68      Peoples Westchester         Peoples Westchester             1000
          Savings Bank Pw PAC        Savings Bank
69      Pennzoil PAC                Pennzoil Co.                    2000
70      Energy Absorption Systems   Quixote Corp.                    500
          of Quixote Corp.
          Political Committee
71      Recognition Equipment       Recognition Equipment           1000
          Inc. PAC                   Inc.
72      Reliance Group Holdings     Reliance Group Holdings         1000
          Inc. PAC                   Inc.
73      Reynolds Metals Co.         Reynolds Metals Co.              500
          Political Participation
          Program Fund
74      Salomon Brothers Inc. PAC   Salomon Brothers Inc.           1000
75      San Francisco Federal       SFFed Corp.                     1000
          Saving PAC
76      Schering-Plough Corp.       Schering-Plough Corp.           1000
          Better Government Fund
77      STV Engineers Inc. PAC      STV Group Inc.                   500
78      Stanley Works PAC           Stanley Works                   1000
79      Torchmark Corp. PAC         Torchmark Corp.                  166
80      Toll Bros PAC               Toll Bros Inc.                  2000
81      United Airlines PAC         UAL Corp.                       1000
82      UGI/PAC                     UGI Corp.                        400
83      AAI Corp. PAC               United Industrial Corp.          500
84      Electric Employees          United Illuminating Co.          500
          Committee of the
          United Illuminating Co.
85      Union Carbide Corp. PAC     Union Carbide Corp.             1000
86      Upjohn Employees PAC        Upjohn Co.                      2000
87      United Telecommunications,  United Telecommuni-             2500
          Inc. PAC                   cations Inc.
88      Varian Associates, Inc.     Varian Associates, Inc.          500
          Employees' PAC
89      Wells Fargo and Co.         Wells Fargo and Co.              500
          Impact Fund
90      Williams Companies PAC      Williams Companies Inc.          500
91      Team Xerox PAC              Xerox Corp.                     1000
92      Yellow Freight System       Yellow Freight System           1000
          Inc. PAC                   Incorporated of DE

PAC                                                       Firm
Number  PAC Name                         Senate  Ticket  Number

 1      First Interstate Texas           14,500  abga       1
          Leadership Funds/Federal
 2      Home Savings of America          34,950  ahm        2
          PAC
 3      American Information             43,597  ait        3
          Technologies Corp. PAC
 4      ARMCO Employees' PAC             18,450  as         4
 5      Avon Products, Inc. Fund         24,279  avp        5
          for Responsible
          Government
 6      Bankmerica Federal               48,800  bac        6
          Election Fund
 7      Barnett People for Better       125,500  bbi        7
          Government Inc.
 8      California Federal               11,000  cal        8
          Savings Public Affairs
          Committee
 9      Chubb Corp. PAC                  13,000  cb         9
10      CBI Industries PAC                 5850  cbh       10
11      Champion International           31,539  cha       11
          Corp. PAC
12      First City Bancorporation        24,250  city      12
          PAC
13      Cleveland-Cliffs Iron Co.        11,750  clf       13
          PAC
14      Chase Lincoln First Bank         51,650  cmb       14
          National Federal PAC
15      Chase Manhattan Corp. PAC        51,650  cmb
16      Central Pennsylvania                625  cpsa      15
          Savings PAC
17      Deere and Co. Civic              53,550  de        16
          Action Fund
18      Dime Savings Bank of               8844  dma       17
          New York PAC
19      Consolidated Edison Co.            2400  ed        18
          of New York Inc.
          Employees PAC
20      Equifax PAC                      20,100  efx       19
21      Enron PAC                        49,800  ene       20
22      Enserch Corp. Employees          51,500  ens       21
          Political Support
          Association
23      New Orleans Public                 5000  etr       22
          Service Inc. for
        Responsible Government
24      Ethyl Corp. PAC                    4300  ey        23
25      First Commerce Corp. PAC            750  fcom      24
26      Fleetwood Enterprises,           17,500  fle       25
          Inc. PAC
27      First Chicago Corp.              40,650  fnb       26
          Governmental
        Affiars, 1st National
          Bank of Chicago
28      Colonial Penn PAC                20,745  fpl       27

29      Good Government                  20,745  fpl
          Management Association
        Florida P & L Co.
          Employees PAC
30      First Mississippi                13,500  frm       28
          Corp. PAC
31      Freeport-Mcmoran Inc.            52,450  ftx       29
          Citizenship Committee
32      World S&L Association PAC        13,000  gdw       30
33      General Mills Inc. PAC           81,000  gis       31
34      Genentech Inc. PAC               21,150  gne       32
35      Great Western Financial          37,500  gwf       33
          Corp. Good
          Government Committee
36      Gencorp Inc. PAC                 26,670  gy        34
37      Harley-Davidson Inc. PAC           1500  hdi       35
38      Henley Group Inc.                60,300  heng      36
          Employces Comittee
          for Sensible Government
39      Household International          61,400  hi        37
          Inc. and Subsidiary
          Co. PAC
40      Hewlett-Packard Co. PAC          23,500  hwp       38
41      First Interstate Bank            18,450  1         39
          of California PAC
42      Dain Bosworth                    10,450  ifg       40
          Incorporated PAC
43      Independence Bancorp               1125  inbc      41
          Inc. PAC
44      Intel PAC                        14,500  intc      42
45      Torrington Co. PAC                 8250  ir        43
46      Corporate                        65,550  itt       44
          Citizenship Committee
47      Hartford Insurance               65,550  itt
          Group PAC
48      Illinois Tool                    17,749  itw       45
          Works Inc. PAC
49      Kansas City Southern             52,000  ksu       46
          Employees PAC
50      Mckesson Corp. Employees         17,500  mck       47
          Political Fund
51      Manor Healthcare                 11,500  mnr       48
          Federal PAC
52      Motorola Employees               61,739  mot       49
          Good Government
          Committee
53      Navistar International           22,250  nav       50
          Transportation Corp.
          Good Government
          Committee
54      National City Corp. PAC          12,450  ncc       51
55      NL Industries Inc. PAC           52,750  nl        52
56      National Semiconductor           12,500  nsm       53
          Corp. Employcees
57      Nynex Federal PAC                54,199  nyn       54
58      Owens-Corning Fiberglas          49,088  ocf       55
          Corp. Employcees
          Better Government Fund
59      Pennsylvania Power                  850  oec       56
          Co. Employee Federal
60      Primerica Corp. PAC              50,640  pa        57
61      Smith Barney Better              50,640  pa
          Government Committee
62      PEGPAC                           14,925  peg       58

63      Texas Eastern PAC                36,050  pel       59
64      Parker-Hannifin Corp. PAC          9500  ph        60
65      Piper, Jaffray, and                5000  pipr      61
          Hopwood Employees
          Fund for Responsible
          Government
66      Pennsylvania Power                 1000  pp1       62
          and Light Co.
          People for Good
          Government
67      Painewebber Fund for             52,750  pwj       63
          Better Government
68      Peoples Westchester         None listed  pwsb      64
          Savings Bank Pw PAC
69      Pennzoil PAC                     19,300  pzl       65
70      Energy Absorption Systems          2000  quix      66
          of Quixote Corp.
          Political Committee
71      Recognition Equipment            36,321  rec       67
          Inc. PAC
72      Reliance Group Holdings          13,300  rel       68
          Inc. PAC
73      Reynolds Metals Co.              10,120  rlm       69
          Political Participation
          Program Fund
74      Salomon Brothers Inc. PAC        66,279  sb        70
75      San Francisco Federal       None listed  sffd      71
          Saving PAC
76      Schering-Plough Corp.            36,000  sgp       72
          Better Government Fund
77      STV Engineers Inc. PAC              500  stvi      73
78      Stanley Works PAC                10,400  swk       74
79      Torchmark Corp. PAC              99,498  tmk       75
80      Toll Bros PAC                      2000  tol       76
81      United Airlines PAC              23,750  ual       77
82      UGI/PAC                             400  ugi       78
83      AAI Corp. PAC                      4250  uic       79
84      Electric Employees                 7500  uil       80
          Committee of the
          United Illuminating Co.
85      Union Carbide Corp. PAC          10,000  uk        81
86      Upjohn Employees PAC             21,250  upj       82
87      United Telecommunications,       88,134  ut        83
          Inc. PAC
88      Varian Associates, Inc.            4000  var       84
          Employees' PAC
89      Wells Fargo and Co.              15,750  wfe       85
          Impact Fund
90      Williams Companies PAC           18,500  wmb       86
91      Team Xerox PAC                   25,500  xrx       87
92      Yellow Freight System            70,800  yell      88
          Inc. PAC
Appendix B

PACS Contributing to Spector But Not Heinz

 PAC
Number                PAC Name             Company Name

   1    American Cyanamid        American Cyanamid Co.
   1    Advo-System,             Advo-System, Inc.
         Inc. PAC
   3    Alumax Employees         Amax Inc.
         Political Fund
   4    Amax Inc. Concerned      Amax Inc.
         Citizens Fund
   5    Ashland Oil Pac          Ashland Oil Inc.
         for Employees
   6    Alco Standard            Alco Standard Corp.
         Corp. PAC
   7    Aydin Corp. PAC          Aydin Corp.
   8    Boise Cascade            Boise Cascade Corp.
         Political Fund
   9    Planning Research        Black and Decker Corp.
         Corp. PAC
  10    Beverly Health PAC       Beverly Enterprises Inc.
  11    Browning-Ferris          Browning-Ferris Industries, Inc.
         Industries PAC
  12    Ball Corp. PAC           Ball Corp.
  13    Beneficial Management    Beneficial Corp.
         Corp. and Affiliated
         Corp. PAC
  14    Bankers Trust PAC        Bankers Trust New York Corp.
  15    Cabot PAC                Cabot Corp.
  16    Citicorp Voluntary       Citicorp
         Political Fund
         Federal
  17    Carter Hawley            Carter Hawley Hale Stores Inc.
         Hale Stores
         Inc. PAC
  18    Clorox Employees'        Clorox Co.
         PAC
  19    Consolidated             Consolidated Freightways Inc.
         Freightways Inc.
         PAC
  20    Comsatpac                Communications Satellite Corp.
  21    Dana Corp. PAC           Dana Corp.
  22    Consumer and             Dow Chemical Co.
         Health Employees
         PAC of the
         Dow Chemical
  23    Dow Chemical             Dow Chemical Co.
         Co-Headquarters
         Unit Employees PAC
  24    Dow Eastern              Dow Chemical Co.
         Employees PAC
  25    Midland Com for          Dow Chemical Co.
         Employees of the
         Dow Chemical Co.
  26    Employees Federal        Duke Power Co.
         PAC--Duke Power Co.
  27    Duriron Co. Inc. PAC     Duriron Co. Inc.
  28    Ecolab Inc. PAC          Ecolab Inc.
  29    Eastpac--PAC of          Eastman Kodak Co.
         Eastman Chemicals
         Division Eastman
         Kodak
  30    Equitable Resources      Equitable Resources Inc.
         Inc. Political
         Involvement Committee
  31    Eaton Corp. Public       Eaton Corp.
         Policy Association
  32    United States            USF and G Corp.
         Fidelity and
         Guarantee PAC
  33    Figgie International     Figgie International Inc.
         Employees Better
         Government Committee
  34    Federal-Mogul Corp.      Federal Mogul Corp.
         Committee for
         Better Government
  35    Grayhound Good           Greyhound Dial Corp.
         Government Project
  36    Bfgoodrich PAC           B F Goodrich Co.
  37    Gulf States Utilities    Gulf States Utilities Co.
         Federal PAC
  38    Broyhill Furniture       Interco Inc.
         Industries PAC
  39    Kerr-Mcgee Corp. PAC     Kerr-Mcgee Corp.
  40    Quaker State Political   Quaker State Corp.
          Participation Fund
  41    Lone Star Steel PAC      Lone Star Technologies Inc.
  42    Loews Corp./Lorillard    Loews Corp.
         Public Affairs
         Committee
  43    Mapco Inc. PAC           Mapco Inc.
  44    Manufactures Hanover     Manufactures Hanover Corp.
         Corp. Assoc. for
         Responsible Government
  45    Minnesota Mining         Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Co.
         and Manufacturing
         Co. PAC
  46    American Security        MNC Financial Inc.
         Bank PAC
  47    Philip Morris PAC        Philip Morris Companies Inc.
  48    Minnesota Power PAC      Minnesota Power
  49    Monsanto Citizenship     Monsanto Co.
         Fund
  50    Diamond Shamrock         Maxus Energy Corp.
         Employees PAC
  51    New York State           New York State Electric and Gas Corp.
         Electric and Gas
         Corp. PAC
  52    NII Political            National Intergroup Inc.
         Action Fund
  53    Norwest Corp. PAC        Norwest Corp.
  54    Olin Corp. Good          Olin Corp.
         Government Fund
  55    Richardson-Vicks         Procter and Gamble Co.
         Inc. PAC
  56    Kraft, Inc. PAC          Premark International
  57    Pan Am PAC               Pan Am Corp.
  58    Pepco PAC                Potomac Electric Power Co.
  59    Effective PAC            Pogo Producing Co.
  60    Oregon Nerco             Necro Inc. (Pacificorp)
         Employees PAC
  61    Puget Power              Puget Sound Power and Light Co.
         Good Government
         Committee--Federal
  62    Ralston Purina Co.       Ralston Purina Co.
         Committee for Good
         Government
  63    Rollins Environmental    Rollins Environmental Services Inc.
         Services Inc. PAC
  64    Roadway Services         Roadway Services Inc.
         Inc. RexPAC
  65    Sears PAC                Sears, Roebuck and Co.
  66    Allstate Insurance       Sears, Roebuck and Co.
         Co. PAC
  67    Square D Co. PAC         Square D Co.
  68    Sun Banks Inc. PAC       Suntrust Banks Inc.
  69    St. Paul CO. Inc.        St. Paul Co. Inc.
         Volunteer Committee
         for Good Federal
         Government
  70    Savannah Foods and       Savannah Foods and Industries Inc.
         Industries Inc.
         Nonpartisan Committee
  71    Turner Broadcasting      Turner Broadcasting System Inc.
         System PAC Inc.
  72    Tesoro Petroleum         Tesoro Petroleum Corp.
         Corp. PAC
  73    Washington Gas           Washington Gas Light Co.
         Light Co. Federal
         PAC
  74    Sunbelt Good             Winn-Dixie Stores Inc.
         Government Committee
         of Winn-Dixie
         Stores, Inc.
  75    Weyerhaeuser Co.         Weyerhaeuser Co.
         Special Shareholders
         PA
  76    Exxon Corp. PAC          Exxon Corp.

 PAC                             Contri-                    Firm
Number                PAC Name    bution   Senate  Ticker  Number

   1    American Cyanamid            500     7250  acy        1
   1    Advo-System,                 650     1650  advo       2
         Inc. PAC
   3    Alumax Employees             500   12,750  amx        3
         Political Fund
   4    Amax Inc. Concerned          500   12,750  amx
         Citizens Fund
   5    Ashland Oil Pac             3000   49,167  ash        4
         for Employees
   6    Alco Standard               1000     6150  asn        5
         Corp. PAC
   7    Aydin Corp. PAC             2150     2150  ayd        6
   8    Boise Cascade               2000   42,500  bcc        7
         Political Fund
   9    Planning Research            250   15,279  bdk        8
         Corp. PAC
  10    Beverly Health PAC           500   24,250  bev        9
  11    Browning-Ferris             1000   30,500  bfi       10
         Industries PAC
  12    Ball Corp. PAC              1000   12,025  bll       11
  13    Beneficial Management       2000   64,430  bnl       12
         Corp. and Affiliated
         Corp. PAC
  14    Bankers Trust PAC            500   27,500  bt        13
  15    Cabot PAC                    500     2500  cbt       14
  16    Citicorp Voluntary           500   95,743  cci       15
         Political Fund
         Federal
  17    Carter Hawley               1000   29,000  chh       16
         Hale Stores
         Inc. PAC
  18    Clorox Employees'           1000   16,500  clx       17
         PAC
  19    Consolidated                1000   49,250  cnf       18
         Freightways Inc.
         PAC
  20    Comsatpac                   1000   27,779  cq        19
  21    Dana Corp. PAC               500   13,500  dcn       20
  22    Consumer and                1000  130,400  dow       21
         Health Employees
         PAC of the
         Dow Chemical
  23    Dow Chemical                1000  130,400  dow
         Co-Headquarters
         Unit Employees PAC
  24    Dow Eastern                 1000  130,400  dow
         Employees PAC
  25    Midland Com for             1000  130,400  dow
         Employees of the
         Dow Chemical Co.
  26    Employees Federal            500   12,850  duk       22
         PAC--Duke Power Co.
  27    Duriron Co. Inc. PAC        1000     4000  duri      23
  28    Ecolab Inc. PAC             1000   23,000  ecl       24
  29    Eastpac--PAC of             1000   17,000  ek        25
         Eastman Chemicals
         Division Eastman
         Kodak
  30    Equitable Resources          400      400  eqt       26
         Inc. Political
         Involvement Committee
  31    Eaton Corp. Public          1000   71,750  etn       27
         Policy Association
  32    United States               1000   25,500  fg        28
         Fidelity and
         Guarantee PAC
  33    Figgie International        1500   30,000  figi      29
         Employees Better
         Government Committee
  34    Federal-Mogul Corp.         1500   21,000  fmo       30
         Committee for
         Better Government
  35    Grayhound Good              3000  123,000  g         31
         Government Project
  36    Bfgoodrich PAC               500   14,000  gr        32
  37    Gulf States Utilities        500   15,750  gsu       33
         Federal PAC
  38    Broyhill Furniture          1000   36,821  iss       34
         Industries PAC
  39    Kerr-Mcgee Corp. PAC        1000   22,000  kmg       35
  40    Quaker State Political       300      800  ksf       36
          Participation Fund
  41    Lone Star Steel PAC         2000   25,250  lsst      37
  42    Loews Corp./Lorillard       1000   12,000  ltr       38
         Public Affairs
         Committee
  43    Mapco Inc. PAC              1000   46,950  mda       39
  44    Manufactures Hanover         500   46,104  mhc       40
         Corp. Assoc. for
         Responsible Government
  45    Minnesota Mining             500   46,600  mmm       41
         and Manufacturing
         Co. PAC
  46    American Security            500     4700  mnc       42
         Bank PAC
  47    Philip Morris PAC           4000  139,979  mo        43
  48    Minnesota Power PAC          250     6200  mpl       44
  49    Monsanto Citizenship        1000   39,780  mtc       45
         Fund
  50    Diamond Shamrock            2000   42,956  mxs       46
         Employees PAC
  51    New York State               500     2850  nge       47
         Electric and Gas
         Corp. PAC
  52    NII Political               7200   15,450  nii       48
         Action Fund
  53    Norwest Corp. PAC            250   25,250  nob       49
  54    Olin Corp. Good             1000   17,250  oln       50
         Government Fund
  55    Richardson-Vicks             500     6172  pg        51
         Inc. PAC
  56    Kraft, Inc. PAC             1000   17,350  pmi       52
  57    Pan Am PAC                   250   16,613  pn        53
  58    Pepco PAC                    750     7350  pom       54
  59    Effective PAC                250     3450  ppp       55
  60    Oregon Nerco                 250     1750  ppw       56
         Employees PAC
  61    Puget Power                  500   10,550  psd       57
         Good Government
         Committee--Federal
  62    Ralston Purina Co.           500   16,125  ral       58
         Committee for Good
         Government
  63    Rollins Environmental        500     1500  ren       59
         Services Inc. PAC
  64    Roadway Services            2500   31,950  road      60
         Inc. RexPAC
  65    Sears PAC                   1000   81,550  s         61
  66    Allstate Insurance           500   81,550  s
         Co. PAC
  67    Square D Co. PAC             500   26,000  sqd       62
  68    Sun Banks Inc. PAC          1000   29,000  sti       63
  69    St. Paul CO. Inc.            500     4950  stpl      64
         Volunteer Committee
         for Good Federal
         Government
  70    Savannah Foods and           500     9000  svan      65
         Industries Inc.
         Nonpartisan Committee
  71    Turner Broadcasting          500   11,000  tbs       66
         System PAC Inc.
  72    Tesoro Petroleum            1000   11,500  tso       67
         Corp. PAC
  73    Washington Gas               250     1500  wgl       68
         Light Co. Federal
         PAC
  74    Sunbelt Good                2000  102,200  win       69
         Government Committee
         of Winn-Dixie
         Stores, Inc.
  75    Weyerhaeuser Co.            2000   73,500  wy        70
         Special Shareholders
         PA
  76    Exxon Corp. PAC             2500   59,250  xon       71