Division Operations across the spectrum--combat to SOSO in Iraq.

Q Having just returned the division from Iraq in March after more than a year in theater, please describe the Iraqi environment before and after major combat operations. What was the 4th ID's mission?

A Basically, our mission was to defeat noncompliant forces in theater while simultaneously conducting stability operations to stand up governments and improve the Iraqi infrastructure--that was after major combat operations.

In January 2003, we were ordered to deploy to Iraq. Our roughly 35,000-man task force, Task Force Ironhorse, included elements of some '22 nations and was subordinate to the CFLCC [Coalition Forces Land Component Command]. We were supposed to attack south from Turkey into northern Iraq while V Corps attacked north toward Baghdad. We never got approval to go through Turkey, so on 21 March, they decided to move us through the Suez Canal and then have us come up through Kuwait.

CENTCOM [Central Command] waited to make that decision for a couple of reasons. One, the 101st [Airborne Division] had to clear the port in the south. The second reason was the strategic deception plan. Saddam Hussein and his leadership felt the Coalition would not attack until the 4th Infantry Division was either on the ground in Turkey or Kuwait. So the Coalition surprised Saddam Hussein by crossing the line of departure in Kuwait and then moved the division south through the Suez Canal.

The first of our 37 ships arrived in Kuwait around 1 April. By the 12th of April, we were moving north. That's probably the fastest a heavy division ever has unloaded equipment, staged and moved out.

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By 15 April, we had seized several airfields north of Baghdad. We then seized the cities of Tikrit, Samarra and Bayji, all by about the 18th of April. (See the map on Page 10.)

For the first 45 days after major combat operations were declared over (1 May), we still dealt with combat skirmishes with company-sized or platoon-sized elements trying to either get ammunition or gain some key terrain around Tikrit. We defeated those elements fairly easily.

Then we went into a period of conducting civil-military operations to engage the Iraqi people for another 45 or so days, meeting with their tribal leaders to see who was going to step forward to lead Iraq into the future. At that time, counterinsurgents began to organize.

We ended up conducting 11 major offensives during the next 10 months we were in Iraq. The first was "Peninsula Strike" on a peninsula formed by the Tigris River near Balad, just north of Baghdad. The mission was to defeat noncompliant forces still conducting operations against Coalition Forces.

We conducted a combined air-ground assault with a 4,000-man heavy-light force. It included our 3d Brigade out of Fort Carson [Colorado] and the 173d Airborne Brigade out of Vicenza [Italy], which was OPCON to [under the operational control of] Task Force Ironhorse, as well as support from Special Operations Forces [SOF] and the Air Force.

It was a complicated and, ultimately, very successful operation done with just 18 hours of planning. We got some good intelligence working with the SOF community and conducted quick air assaults simultaneously on three different objectives. We ended up capturing about 400 targeted individuals, to include several IIS [Iraqi Intelligence Service] agents operating around Baghdad. That was one of the major operations we conducted.

For the next three to four months, we conducted a series of missions to stabilize and build Iraq. We had engineer, armor, infantry, artillery and other battalions patrolling and collecting intelligence, although the FA battalions were still required to conduct counterfire. Early on, we found human intelligence was the key.

We also conducted what we called "intel-based" raids with a battalion-sized, company-sized or platoon-sized elements, depending on the size of the target. From July through when we left in March, we conducted more than 2,000 raids, searching for specific targets, such as weapons caches and individuals involved in counterinsurgency operations. Over time, with our intelligence, we were able to home in on specific targets.

What was interesting was that half the day we'd conduct a raid against insurgents and during the other half, we'd set up governments and repair or build the Iraqi infrastructure--water, sewer, road, schools, hospitals, power generation, etc. In a nine-month period, our Soldiers accomplished 3,000 projects and we spent almost $100 million in captured Iraqi money to build Iraq.

I say, "build" instead of "rebuild" Iraq because the Iraqi infrastructure was nonexistent for the masses.

Right before Ramadan, the Muslim's religious holiday that starts at the end of October and goes through November, we continued to try to reach out to the Iraqi people. We told them we'd pull out of their cities and reduce our patrols for their holiday. We even helped them get some money to celebrate.

But the insurgents took advantage of this, and attacks rose significantly. This is when the roadside bombs really started, IEDs [improvised explosive devices], and mortar attacks increased. Our casualties went up a bit.

In this situation, as a division commander, I faced some of my most difficult decisions, walking the fine line between conducting lethal and nonlethal operations. It has to be a very careful combination of the two, understanding that I don't want to alienate the 95 percent of the Iraqi people who want to move forward but that I must deal with the insurgents conducting operations against Coalition Forces.

When Soldiers were at risk, my decision to use lethal means was easy. But there was always some danger of collateral damage and second, third and fourth order effects.

During Ramadan, I made a conscious decision to conduct some lethal operations. For about a three-week period, we used artillery and mortar H & I [harassing and interdiction] fires, CAS [close air support], and tank and Bradley direct fire on specific targets we knew were conducting these operations. Because of the amount of firepower we employed, the operations got a lot of play from the media.

Using lethal operations was very important for a couple of reasons. One, we went after very specific targets and were able to take down a large number of insurgents by doing this. Secondly, it sent the right message: "We are here to help the Iraqi people, and anytime we need to, we can raise the level of conflict to lethal." The people then understood that we weren't going to abandon them and came forward with a lot of information about the insurgency.

Task Force Ironhorse was in the center of the Sunni Triangle. From June 2003 to January 2004, we had three times more than the combined number of attacks in the rest of the Iraqi theater and at a higher level of conflict. By the time we left in March, we were having about the same number and level of attacks as other division areas of responsibility, so the attacks decreased by about 80 percent.

I think the reduction in attacks was due to our integration of lethal and nonlethal operations. We set up local governments and took down the insurgency while gaining the confidence of the Iraqi people. They understood we could and would be lethal when we had to be.

Q You took your artillery to Iraq how did you employ artillery in stability operations and support operations (SOSO)?

A We took all our radars and didn't have enough of them--we must increase the number of radars available to divisions: Q-36s, Q-37s and future radars or lightweight countermortar radars (LCMRs). We need a combination of all those radars.

The division is authorized three Q-36s and two Q-37s. By the end of the operation, we were using eight Q-37s and six Q-36s and could have used a few more to cover our 500-by-400-kilometer battlespace.

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We used our Paladins the entire time we were there. Most nights, we fired H & I fires, what I call "proactive" counterfire. One of the enemy's techniques was to try to shoot mortars or rockets at large forward operating bases [FOBs] that had a lot of our Soldiers on them. We identified areas from which we knew the insurgents were shooting mortars and shot H & I fires into those areas. When we did that, they did not shoot at us.

We also shot a lot of counterfire. We had free fire areas and became very good at clearing fires--good enough to respond with counterfire in less than a minute. We were careful about collateral damage.

Our counterfire was so successful that the enemy would only shoot one or two mortar rounds because he knew that if he stayed longer than 30 to 90 seconds, he would die. Then he started firing rockets remotely. They were linked to a timer so he didn't have to be in the area when they fired.

We also used the tactical unmanned aerial vehicle [TUAV], the Shadow, very effectively. We fired artillery using data from the Shadow. In one incident in a palm grove, the enemy was setting up mortars at night. The TUAV saw the mortarmen, and before the enemy could shoot the mortars, 3-16 FA [3d Battalion, 16th Field Artillery] destroyed them. Now that's proactive.

We used artillery with our OH-58-D scout helicopters as well as attack helicopters. Depending on the target, sometimes we used them to observe fires for the artillery or mortars and sometimes used them to direct fire. Our helicopter pilots became very good at calling for and adjusting artillery fires.

So, artillery plays a significant role in counterinsurgency operations.

Q Did you have enough artillery?

A I had four 155-mm battalions, including 1-17 FA from the 75th FA Brigade out of Fort Sill [Oklahoma] and my three Paladin battalions, plus mortars. That and our divisional MLRS battalion--the combination was probably okay for our battlespace.

In November when we were conducting many lethal operations, we even fired several ATACMS [Army tactical missile system missiles] at specific targets. The targets were out in the desert, and whenever we tried to conduct raids on them, they saw us coming and moved out. So, finally, we attacked the targets with ATACMS--very effective.

Q What lessons did you learn about employing FA battalions in Iraq?

A First, artillery has to be a versatile asset. The Army can no longer afford to have artillerymen just do artillery missions. So Redlegs also must be able to set up flash checkpoints, patrol, conduct cordon and search operations, etc.

Every one of my artillery battalions owned its own battlespace. My FA battalions were just like my maneuver battalions. And every one had Bradleys and tanks working for them. That's the kind of flexibility we need as we look to the future.

Our FA commanders learned it all quickly and were flexible. But we've got to train for that scenario--shoot, move, communicate plus own battlespace and conduct operations within that battlespace. We have to review our METLs [mission-essential task lists] to be sure FA units have tasks for military operations across the spectrum and then train those tasks.

And we've got to equip the FA properly for the missions. One lesson learned for the entire division is that every Soldier must be equipped like an infantry-man--even if he's a medic, engineer, tanker, Redleg--whatever.

We need FA joint observers qualified to control CAS. Right now we have to have ETACs [Air Force enlisted terminal air controllers] for the ground forces to access CAS, and we didn't always have enough of them. Army fire supporters must be versatile, be joint fire supporters who are trained and qualified to control CAS.

Also we must prepare all Army leaders to conduct SOSO missions. As good as our OES [Officer Education System] and NCOES [NCO Education System] are, we still need to adjust them. We've got to train leaders and establish environments that allow officers and NCOs to think freely and promote their abilities to understand unique circumstances and be flexible. These Soldiers and leaders also must have immense discipline to change their mission and react very quickly to the changes.

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Q What role did information operations (IO) play in the 4th ID's SOSO?

A Information operations were key to everything we did. Everyone in the division was involved in IO.

We have an IO cell at the division level. Every week, we developed about 10 information operations messages--for example. "We are building your infrastructure." "We are working to stand up your government for democracy, and here's the way ahead for democracy ...," and "You've got to help us with these insurgents; they are trying to keep the Iraqi people down. They don't want you to move forward."

IO messages would come down from CJTF-7 [Coalition Joint Task Force-7], and we'd develop and publish our own.

Our leaders, from the brigade to platoon levels, conducted about 300 meeting engagements with the Iraqi people a week, putting out IO messages. The battalions were responsible for using those messages within their assigned battlespaces.

In addition, we had PSYOP [psychological operations] units that transmitted the messages over loudspeakers in Arabic, etc.

Because we were so careful about collateral damage and maximized IO, over time, we found the Iraqis, for the most part, understood what we were doing and why, even when we conducted lethal operations.

Let me give you an example. We tried firing H & I less and less frequently, as long as we were not receiving mortar attacks. At one point, we went three weeks without firing H & I, the longest we had gone. But then we received some rocket attacks. So we went to the Iraqi leaders and said we were going to start firing H & I fires again--that we didn't want to have to do that, but we couldn't allow rockets to be fired at our forward operating bases.

They understood. The leaders knew what we were doing and why.

Q How did you integrate and coordinate lethal and nonlethal effects?

A We have an effects coordination cell (ECC)--not a deep operations coordination cell (DOCC). The DECOORD [deputy effects coordinator] plans and coordinates all effects. both lethal and nonlethal, for the division in the ECC. He runs the planning and integration meetings for the division chief of staff and myself. The ECOORDs plan and coordinate lethal and nonlethal effects for their brigades.

Each of my staff officers became "ministers" of something for nonlethal effects. For example, the financial officer was the minister of finance, my engineer was the minister of public works, my G5 was the minister of education, etc.

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We developed an ETO cycle--effects tasking order cycle, a timeline for targeting, planning and integrating all effects today out to three weeks. The ministers and other staffers attended the daily meetings and worked the ETO, a process that was very effective.

The ETO included CAS, both lethal and nonlethal. In certain situations, we'd fly sorties low as added protection so the enemy would know the lethal air power was readily available ... a show of force. Also, our fixed-wing aircraft see very well at night, so they'd give us timely information for our raids. They could see what was going on, on the ground and coordinate our moves. We got good enough to pass pilot-ground force CAS coordination down to the platoon leader level. We did the same with Apache attack helicopters down to the squad level.

Q What effect did your capturing Saddam Hussein have?

A A significant effect on our Soldiers, the Iraqi people, our families and other Americans at home, and our allies all over the world: his capture meant the regime was truly gone.

We had worked for six months, tracking Saddam. We knew he was in our area. We knew about the network of people helping him. We slowly took down the network in August. September, October and November. Finally, one lead brought us to him.

I don't believe Saddam was directing anything, much less insurgent operations, as some people claimed. He was hiding in a spider hole, running for his life. He was an expert at hiding and surviving, and I think the Iraqis thought we'd never catch him.

Saddam was a symbol. And as long as he was around, the Iraqi people were afraid his oppressive regime could come back into power.

Pulling him out of that hole made a big difference to them. Iraqis came forward and started taking responsibility for establishing governments and writing the constitution, talking about establishing sovereignty for their nation and more.

And human intelligence increased five-to six-fold. Every time we had a success, more human intelligence flowed in. I credit the influx of intelligence, starting 13 December when we captured Saddam, for allowing us to decrease the number of attacks by 80 percent in our area.

The follow-on force still has many tough challenges. Now more than ever, Iraqis are jockeying for positions of power in the future Iraq. For example Muqtada al Sadr, a Shiite extremist who has been in the news, has seen he will not have a role in the future government. So he has tried to take power by force. Coalition Forces will continue to see individuals with small followings trying to affect a fight and have to deal with those enclaves.

And the same is true in Fallujah. Extremists there have been operating against the Coalition from the beginning. They try to convince others that the US never will allow Iraq to be Islamic which is not true.

These are all "blips" the Coalition will have to overcome over time as they move Iraq toward sovereignty.

Q What message would you like to send Army and Marine Field Artillerymen stationed around the world?

A I would like to thank you for your incredible service to our nation--and to thank your families who support you from the home front. You are part of a new generation of smart, young, flexible, innovative, tough leaders who I hope will stay in the Army for the future. We're going to need your talent and skills, America's armed forces are going to be busy for the next few years fighting the war on terrorism.

You make me very proud to be a Field Artilleryman.

Major General Raymond T. Odierno 

Commanding General of the 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Hood, Texas

Major General Raymond T. Odierno commands the 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized) at Fort Hood. Texas, and deployed the division to Iraq from January 2003 until March 2004. In his previous assignments, he was the Director of Requirements and Force Management and Director of Force Programs, both in the G3 of the Army, Washington, DC. He was the Chief of Staff of V Corps and Assistant Division Commander for the 1st Armored Division, both in Germany. During Operation Desert Shield and Storm, he deployed from Germany to the Gulf with the 3d Armored Division as the Executive Officer for the Division Artillery. He commanded the 1st Cavalry Division Artillery at Fort Hood; the 2d Battalion, 8th Field Artillery (2-8 FA) in the 7th Infantry Division (Light) at Fort Ord, California, moving the battalion to Fort Lewis, Washington; and A and Service Batteries of the 1-73 FA, XVIII Airborne Corps at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. He holds two master's degrees, including an MA in National Security and Strategy from the Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island.

Interview by Patrecia Slayden Hollis