Distributed learning: understanding the emerging workplace knowledge.

This article explores cognitive attributes that allow individuals to function effectively in the emerging world of uncertainty, flexibility, and incongruities. The article presents discussion of the changing nature of our society and workplaces. It is argued that the changing workplaces require a distributed cognitive model of human competence, which promotes learning for life. The notion of absolutes and closure in every activity is no longer a possibility and we live in a world of tensions and paradoxes. The expectation that individuals take on multiple roles and multiple selves, simultaneously, is argued. In particular, the article focuses on the recent debate on location of cognition to provide a backdrop against which to introduce the distributed model of critical thinking. It is proposed that the engine of critical thought is not located in the mind; in the context; in the tools, or in substantive domain knowledge. Rather it is in the relationships between all four of these. A discussion of four element s: (a) cultural disposition, (b) tools and artifacts, (c) strategies and the substantive domain knowledge separately, and (d) then as an interactive model is presented.

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Efforts to develop and define, education and training models that are responsive to the needs of the modem high performance workplace have involved interventions that are well beyond formal instruction derived from cognitive science research on human learning. Current literature on human learning argues that instructional interventions of this type are limited and often considered fragmented--they tend to focus on specific items of decontextualised knowledge (Lave, 1991; Scribner, 1986). While some current models are perhaps more comprehensive and systematic than in the past, they nevertheless reflect a view of developing work expertise that is prescriptive and determinant. Present models may be useful for many types of knowledge and skills development, however, their potential for developing skilled and knowledgeable performance needed in a contingent and dynamic work environment is far from optimal. The emergent model based on a shared cognition or community of learners, while expanding our understanding o f learning is still prescriptive and narrow in that it undervalues the contribution of the individual's cognition in human learning and performance (Lave & Wenger, 1991). To appreciate the emerging ideas of workplace knowledge and skills and their significance for education and training this article will first discuss the multi-dimensional nature of emerging workplace contexts and the associated knowledge base. Secondly, the changing views about human learning are discussed culminating in discussion of an interactive model of critical thinking which is underpinned by the model of human cognition derived from the ideas discussed by Salomon (1993).

UNDERSTANDING THE EMERGENT WORKPLACE

Changing economic, technological, and social conditions have resulted in intensified competition where the concern is not with producing more at a cheaper cost but continuously producing innovative products and services. The need to be continuously innovative has generated an increased emphasis on continuous life long learning to facilitate constant improvement to products, services and workers' knowledge and skills (Ilamel & Prahalad, 1994). Consequently, the creation of knowledge and the application of such knowledge in work practices has become a dominant theme in recent studies of education and training (Starkey, 1996). These changes have influenced the nature of workplaces. We now talk of "learning organizations" and "learning factories" which advocate a holistic approach to training based around knowledge which is of different forms--technical, communicative, and emancipatory (Habermas, 1971).

Previously workplace knowledge focused solely on technical knowledge, specific to the tasks in a job. But now skills such as communication, leadership, and individual responsibility are considered equally important to equip individuals with life long learning skills that encourage engagement with mind, body, and soul (Gee, Hull, & Lankshear, 1996). The expectations inherent in new roles, confounded by uncertainty of the environment and the explosion of information technology, now challenge us to reconceptualise human cognition and develop education and training in a way that resonates with current knowledge and skills. One of the significant themes that is emerging from the redesigning of jobs is the contradictory yet legitimate nature of the roles and their associated values.

During the transition from feudal to capitalist societies workers struggled to conceptualize self as different from labor (Sayer, 1983). It was difficult for "man" to reconceptualise labor as separate from individuals and a commodity, which could be sold for a fee. We now see parallels in the emerging workplaces. There are various tensions in the contemporary world of work such as those between global and local knowledge and performance; learning and work; institution and workplace-based training; self and organizational development, competition and collaboration and these impact the role of individuals and context in developing knowledge and skills to function in current workplaces. We have, in the past, viewed opposing positions in such tensions as only being right or wrong and hence, many are still searching for an absolute black and white solution. Giddens (1998) and Delors (1996) both have written extensively on the emerging tensions and the need to consider ways of dealing with such dualistic/contradic tory positions. For example, in considering globalization Giddens (1998) argues that we now have new trans-national systems that have heightened competition for scarce resources while at the same time creating strong regional blocks (ASEAN, EU, etc.) and a questioning of local customs and ways of life. Such dualistic positions are no longer a question of whether individuals are part of the new global order but rather how they deal with being part of that order, while at the same time living and relating to fellow individuals in local neighborhoods. Similarly, we can see a new individualism that is linked to global mobility, individual skill development, and individual rights. At the same time, the emerging workplaces have given rise to a sophisticated system of welfare, community support, and teams in workplaces to accommodate those who find living with such dilemmas difficult or impossible. Individuals are expected to contribute to welfare, which is associated with the collective, but the contemporary world encourages individuals to take responsibility for the consequences of what they do and the lifestyle they pursue. This type of dilemma is evident in the increasing use of teams and collaborative partners in the commercial world while at the same time there is increasing pressure on individuals to take responsibility for self-development to become independent knowledge workers.

Also, competition for scarce resources is becoming more significant in a global context, and we have witnessed an increasing pressure to exploit the environment for quick profit. At the same time there is increasing recognition that sustaining current levels of environmental capital is significant not only for future wealth but also for the health of the members of current society. Recognizing the pressures to both exploit and conserve in the same breath, has posed significant dilemmas and tensions for the new world order.

In all of these contradictions there is an expectation of individuals to cope with a retreat of tradition and custom while, at the same time, living in and with that tradition. This is part of the emerging nature of the jobs--balancing what appears to be a contradictory set of priorities is part of the dilemma of living and working in the contemporary society. Such fundamental rethinking, involving what were previously imponderable dilemmas, has meant the need for a new knowledge base--one with a capital in ideas. Previously there was an expectation of closure in every activity. This is no longer a possibility, thus we need to adopt different lenses to see the world. The difficulty is that we need to wear multiple sets of lenses at the same time or even be multiple selves. We now have to deal with conflicting situations, often where consideration of opposing ends at the same time is necessary to address an issue, even though they may have different values. We need to recognise dilemmas, resolve them to the b est of our abilities, and live with that resolution until further thought provides other insights. Thus, these dilemmas are not to be solved in a finite sense or in a finite time frame, but lived with in the best possible way. The ability to deal with this fragmented self requires a totally new focus for education, one that evokes critical insight to analyse the underlying assumptions, which is central to understanding the world of dilemmas. We cannot conceive a new education model by looking through old and mono lenses that promoted reactionary thinking. To understand and deal with these dilemmas the traditional models of education driven by cognitive psychology alone may not be sufficient. Communicative and emancipatory knowledge are grounded in issues that are beyond psychological constructs. Thus, to achieve personal meaning in these contemporary contradictory circumstances cognitive systems, such as informal knowledge, social cultural knowledge, and other contextual knowledge, are essential but not sufficient.

EMERGING MODELS FOR LEARNING

Most current learning models are significantly influenced by dominant historical psychological paradigms, which are aligned to biology, cognitive science, artificial intelligence and behaviorism. Thus they encounter difficulties in explaining learning processes associated with complex tasks such as those involving intentions, influences of social context on behavior, and informal learning. Also, these models were driven by the assumption of objectivity available to sciences, which argued that human learning could be objectively mapped and explained. Verillon and Rabardel, (1995) argued that while psychology has furthered our general understanding of individual cognitive process and there are coherent models that are satisfactory and can be adopted, it is insufficient to explain the socio-cultural aspect of human learning and explain the pragmatic action.

This perceived limitation in psychologically driven theories of human cognition has seen the emergence of alternative models such as the situated, and more recently the distributed, cognition models of human learning and performance. While the new models have been an advancement in our thinking about human cognition they seem to assume that all cognition is situated, and distributed. Salomon (1993) in an excellent discussion of the duality imposed by researchers, questioned whether all cognition is really situated or distributed. He goes on to ask if it is distributed, is it only distributed in the environment or also in the individual's minds? Furthermore, he asked can we talk of cognition without reference to individual's mental representations? Just as social evolution is considered an essential part of the situated and distributed cognition can we ignore the individual development (in the mind) issues that influence cognition?

Distributed cognition presumably implies some sort of interaction through which individuals connect with a number of different cognitive systems such as the individuals' mind, the context, and the artifacts. It also emphasises knowledge creation does not reside in any one cognitive system; rather it is in the iterative relationship between these cognitive systems. However, most literature (Lave, 1991; Scribner, 1986; Pea, 1993) on distributed cognition seems to imply directionality--from the context to the individual thereby undervaluing the role of individual cognition. We view the interaction between various cognitive systems in a similar vein to Altman (1988) who argues that it is a reciprocal interaction. He asserts that it is nonsensical to conceive cognitive interaction as unidirectional. Psychological functioning involves a continuous reciprocal determinism between behavioral, cognitive, and environmental influences (Bandura, 1978, p. 345).

Thus, presumably, there is similar reciprocal determinism when considering the interaction between the individual and the social cultural context and/or with tools and artifacts. Individuals are as much a product of their environment as the environment is of them--similar to Newton's theory of mechanics, for every externally introduced force there is a reactionary force which is central to understanding the behavior of the external force. Similarly, Bolter (1984) postulated that reciprocal influences between technologies and culture-cognitive tools are not only the mechanisms to support memory but memory also shapes the design of such tools. For example, computers were constructed by humans--where individuals influenced the environment--whereas, now the computer influences how humans live, think, and play. The dynamic, inter-related nature of human cognition, behavior, social norms, and values means that the meaning derived by individuals cannot be located in any single point--in the mind, the environment, or the artifacts.

Another assumption inherent in current literature on distributed cognition model is that unless one addresses all the variables that influence human cognition any argument thus generated is hollow. Does this mean that individual cognition, distributed cognition, or cognition of artifacts cannot be separated and studied individually? The debate between proponents of distributed cognition and individual cognition appears to imply that one can only consider either holistic or fragmented parts of a whole--suggesting a dualistic view. But the parts and the whole are inseparable if one has to understand any phenomenon. As James (1884) noted, accepting only a holistic view would constitute to an absolutist position, which contradicts the very notion of distributed learning. He argued that a logical conclusion one can draw from this is that "if any member, then the whole system: if not the whole system then nothing" (pp. 282-283). Furthermore, he asked; if the sum of the parts doesn't make the whole then knowing the whole may not necessarily mean that one knows the parts. The misinterpretation perhaps comes from the anthropological argument that one has to be immersed in the context so that one can develop an "organismic understanding"--every thing that is to be known. While this may be desirable there is room for asynchronous learning as well.

Finally, the distributed cognition model assumes a distributed mind that transcends the individual minds. Caporael (1997) challenged this notion when she analyzed group actions and a community of learners. She argued that social groups are like micro societies--members recognize the boundaries with inter- and intra differentiations, the internal organization and a need for it to be a well-coordinated and cohesive entity. She argued that group coordination implies that individuals may be units of other larger or smaller functional units that cannot be reduced to merely a sum of autonomous individuals working. Also these individuals may bring knowledge from their other affiliations to bear on the groups. Accordingly, the flexibility and creation in social groups is not any transcended "group mind," rather it is the coordination of the various individual minds.

The previous discussions illustrate the problems with some of the past and current models of human learning. Most of them are concerned with finite and absolutes when the real world knowledge and skills are relativistic and gradually evolving which makes the need for life long learning essential. Even when findings are reported without clear mandate for any one position it is often interpreted as a single view being the outcome. Just because a large number of people subscribe to a view does not make it right (Friere, 1970). Acceptance of such a position is a rule of democracy not of objectivity or accuracy. Most individuals may not easily recognize and understand subtle ideologies and values that are transmitted through these claims of objectivity and socially determined understanding. For example, in recent work of Brown and Duguid (2000), they challenged the assumption that the Internet is a flexible and decentralized system leading to decentralised practices. They argued that this may be true to a point b ut since all information on the Web is channeled through a central node it is probably the most centralized, controlled, and monitored systems ever. The speed and low cost of communication available through the Internet has seen more decisions made at head offices than at field offices--is this decentralized? Is this empowerment and autonomy?

To discern truth and extract personal meaning from the complex world of uncertainties and "multiple truths" one needs to move away from the previously held beliefs about learning and knowledge to ones that unravel how individuals function and operate within this world full of tensions which are not to be resolved but lived with. As noted earlier the psychological models of learning can explain the mind but they cannot explain the complex environment or the artifacts that influence our cognition. Human cognition is an interactive process and the meaning lies in the interaction rather then in any individual location.

BUILDING CAPACITY IN INDIVIDUALS THROUGH A DISTRIBUTED MODEL OF CRITICAL THINKING

Previously, policy and specific instructional intervention provided direction and assurance for individuals within a known framework. It set out directions for the society and organizations and informed individuals of appropriate actions for them. In the future world, policy and instructional interventions at a national and international level can only be driven by the immediate and pragmatic and become vacuous because there is no framework appropriate for uncertainty and continuous change. Furthermore, the withdrawal of control and regulatory systems associated with the increasing importance of market forces to monitor quality, ultimately assumes the existence of citizens who can discriminate, evaluate, and question assumptions behind rhetoric, advocacy, and promotion, and engage in continuous learning. Accordingly, each individual requires significant discernment to determine sources of good ideas and the legitimacy of such ideas to deal with the tensions inherent in our work and social lives.

As the responsibility for individual actions is increasingly located with the individual there is a need for individuals to develop a deep understanding of the various factors that shape our thinking and the distributed nature of knowledge and performance. For instance, they need to recognize and appreciate the underlying assumptions, standards of judgments, and the interaction between individual cognition, socio-cultural cognition, and the cognition of artifacts. It is argued that one significant way to address this is by developing the ability to become critical consumers of information and experience. While Perkins (1993) claimed that higher order cognition may not lend itself to be distributed, we believe that critical thinking, which is often considered higher order cognition, can be conceived as distributed. This is not to say that we do not acknowledge that there are certain types of knowledge that may not afford themselves to the distributed model of human cognition and that all individuals do not ex perience distributed cognition all the times (Salomon, 1993).

Against the backdrop of the previous two sections we discuss the distributed nature of critical thinking. Critical thinking belongs to a network of concepts such as problem-solving, decision-making, meta-cognition, rational thinking, reasoning, intelligences, and self-reflection. Like most other learning concepts these also have emerged mainly from cognitive psychology, which provide a reasonable "individual cognition" perspective. From the discussions presented in previous sections it is apparent there is a need to expand the scope of critical thinking to include the context and the tools. Paul (1993) and Tishman, Jay, & Perkins (1993) suggest that any discussion of critical thinking must include dispositional, cultural, and philosophical dimensions as well. After all, being critical involves questioning one's beliefs about existing socio-cultural norms and values, professional practices, assumptions underpinning the tools and process one uses, the standards one uses to question assumptions, and the circums tances surrounding the act. Individuals' "residual cognition" is challenged by new situations where new tools are used to analyze and understand phenomena that are beyond the object level. Hence, we propose, like other social and cognitive activities that critical thinking must also be distributed in nature. We propose an interactive model of critical thinking that involves individuals' cultural dispositions, tools, substantive content knowledge, and the strategies (Figure 1). The distribution is within and between the cognitive systems (individual, context, and the artifact) as well the element of the proposed model of critical thinking. The meaning derived through critical thinking processes is not located at the four nodes, rather it is in the voids between them, suggesting that it has to be created, based on available information, from the four areas.

However, most current models of critical thinking tend to be prescriptive and often give a series of magic steps that transform individuals to critical thinkers. This prescriptive approach presumably has been conceived through cognitive psychology thereby undervaluing other cognitive systems. Perry (1981), Schommer (1993), and their collaborators have shown the influence of epistemological disposition on individuals' actions. They argued that learned behaviors are more likely to be sustained when they are assimilated within the individual's belief/value system. We also know that the beliefs and values systems of individuals are social constructs, therefore any cognition dealing with critical thinking must involve socio-cultural aspects of human cognition.

Socio-cultural aspects are particularly important as they capture the potential variations that emerge when global views are adopted. Cole and Engestrom (1993) argued that culture is a patterned ensemble of beliefs, values, symbols, and tools and is considered uniform as it is experienced at a local level with local interaction and values that are locally shaped and controlled and hence can be construed as heterogeneous. However, Schwartz (1978, 1990) viewed culture as being distributed across persons, generations, religion, occupations, social class, and so forth, and the meaning of a culture arises from a shared phylogenetic structure. It is assumed to be evolving. Thus the social distribution of cognition both adds to and subtracts from, the degree of common culture of Cole and Engestrom mediating any particular interactions. Unless one appreciates the complex multitude of variables and their interactions, the significant influence of culture may not be realized and consequently full potential of critical thinking may not be achieved. Freire's (1970) work with the peasants in Brazil is an example of how entrenched one's cognition becomes in their environment. Individuals no longer

recognized the iniquitous system. An enculturation of thinking dispositions is necessary to ensure that critical thinking skill and knowledge are operationalised.

The second condition that is significant in understanding and promoting critical thinking is strategies. Strategies are processes used to develop habits that support and encourage critical thinking. One of the major criticisms of most strategies, in recent years, has been that they are not contextualised. They are mostly concerned with individual cognition. While there is merit in this argument one should also ask the opposite question--should all thinking be contextualised? (Anderson, Reder, & Simon, 1996). The real strength is not in any one position rather in the interaction between individual and contextual cognition. Strategies are influenced by the context and substantive domain knowledge, as is the content and context by the strategies. For instance, self-regulation as a learning strategy is just as much about the self as it is about the community in which individuals live. Self is an individual construct that is influenced by significant others and the environment. As individuals mature they probably draw on new affordances to construct new ways of interacting with significant others and their social environments. One wonders how much this strategy is about self-regulation and how much is about the regulation of the self. Similarly, in the contemporary business world, which is littered with management, productivity enhancement, and human capital development strategies, there is little regard for any cognition other than the individual cognition. Some make spurious claims of incorporating cultural cognition but often fixate it in discrete units. Other strategies to encourage critical thinking are more concerned with procedures for engaging in such thinking rather then developing an understanding of reasons behind such procedures. It is ironical that such approaches claim to teach critical thinking. Critical thinking is often cited as being central to promoting lifelong learning because it has the potential to continuously grow with the changes occurring around individuals. To make this happen, critical th inking strategies need to be integrated with other cognition systems. There is lack of appreciation for the distributed and reciprocal nature of cognition. Sustained changes in individual understanding, performance, attitudes, and values cannot be achieved by promoting one cognitive system only.

The third condition is the role of substantive domain knowledge. Spiro and Jeheng (1990) argued that to comprehend the nature and scope of variability of a concept such as learning, an understanding of the structural and functional aspects of knowledge structures is required. Functional aspects refer to the content, while structural aspects refer to the format and the logic of thinking evident in problem types. All substantive domain knowledge has its own structure, symbols, representations, and so forth. Therefore an understanding of that structure can assist in recognizing functional aspects, which in turn can shape the strategies. Within domain knowledge there are different types of knowledge such as Habermas's (1971) instrumental, communicative and emancipatory constructs and Derry's (1990) procedural, conditional, and declarative, all of which have structural and functional aspects to them. To develop competency in critical thinking one needs to appreciate the reciprocal nature of these knowledge types. There is distribution of cognition between the different knowledge types. The nature of this distribution needs further research. A lack on such understanding, in recent years, has witnessed an emphasis on communicative and emancipatory knowledge (Habermas) which, unintentionally has diminished the significance of technical knowledge.

The other misunderstanding often seen in emerging workplace education literature is the lack of differentiation between theoretical and practical knowledge and formal and informal knowledge. Domain knowledge is often classified as theoretical and formal. Experimental research such as that carried out in engineering, which cannot be done on full-scale products requires practical knowledge. As argued by Kaufman, Patel, and Magder (1996) sound practical knowledge is grounded in some theory and to ascertain the merit of theories we often conduct empirical tests. For example, mathematical modeling is still the central part of professional practice in areas such as ecno-metric and engineering design. The misunderstanding is a result of an absolutist view of the nature and location of knowledge.

Learning and developing critical insight in any subject domain must involve extensive understanding of the domain knowledge which constitutes more than the rules, facts, and theories. It includes a number of different knowledge types. Part of this understanding entails intensive interrogation of the underpinning rules and assumptions of theoretical and practical, situated and individual knowledge. Without such deep understanding, making personal meaning in a professional context may not be straightforward. Anderson, Reder, and Simon (1996) presented the case of LAPD trainees whose substantive knowledge acquired through the training at the police academy interacts with the cultural norms of professional practice (which devalued such domain knowledge), and lead to prejudices. Individuals need to become conscious of what they are trying to achieve, question the issues or problems in hand, and understand the frame of reference (socio-cultural and technical) within which the problem has been cast. As well, it imp lies a need for learning to incorporate the empirical and conceptual dimensions of reasoning, the assumptions about the issues being considered, the implications and consequences of actions and finally, inferences one can make from learning.

The fourth condition is the role of tools and artifacts inherent in cultures and social activities that can influence critical thinking. Societies, cultures, and even strategies are shaped to a large extent by the tools and artifacts of that society. Norman (1991) suggested that tools may form part of an environment but they are distinct and more than just a fixture within the environment. Culture has inherent meaning, which is separate from the environment, but through interaction with it, it can influence our understanding. He challenged us to investigate the genesis of instrumental competencies and argued that they were linked to the origin and nature of artifacts. Tools and artifacts can influence the context, and so content material thus forms an integral part of any cognitive system that considers critical thinking. For instance, Verillon and Rabardel (1995) asked students to imagine the transformation of a block of wood into different shapes and found that tools that potentially caused transformation influenced their imaginations. Removing material was conceived as sawing thus the thinking was contained by the capability of a saw. We invent tools such as medical diagnostic equipment, which in turn end up shaping our thinking. We become dependent and begin to see through the eyes of these equipments thus our cognition is constrained and sometimes enhanced by such tools.

Considering the tools of information communication technology the strategy of mind mapping can now be done extremely well using computer software such as The Inspiration. The software is a generic tool that can be adapted to different knowledge domain and can be used on its own or combined with other strategies. It's meaning is in it's purpose--to provide different types of links to be made between ideas. It does not provide the ideas or the location and directionality of the links. At another level, working with information communication technology requires a new mindset, which includes new cognitive maneuvers such as the ability to access information from multiple sites to construct understanding. The indexing and integration of such information is very different to working from print based material. The nature of this tool has seen an increased use of distributed systems, which support the relativists' argument that knowledge is not about focusing in one corner of the world. Accordingly, a model is propos ed for all learning contexts, which has at its heart, a dynamic interaction of a range of elements. It is the value attached to each of the four elements in the model as well as their interactions that are important.

Having considered the four key factors, which we believe influence critical thinking and discussed the distributed nature of these factors, we now consider cognitive distribution at the next level, which is between the four factors. The proposed model posits that critical thinking involves a dynamic interaction between the four factors. None of the four factors is sufficient on their own to promote critical thinking. The need to consider all elements of a concept can be seen in the social construction of meaning (Vygotsky, 1978) and distributed cognition learning models (Pea, 1993). These authors argued that meaning is not located in the collective composition of a concept, rather it involves an understanding of the elements, which constitute the concept and their interaction. Thus, an understanding of learning requires a full understanding of the elements of which it is constituted and the dynamic interaction of those elements. Leont'ev (1981) in considering the collective nature of human activities, called it the human activity system. The human activity was seen as the basic unit of analysis of human behaviour. Expanding on this work Cole and Engestrom (1993, p. 8) argued that "activity systems are best viewed as complex formations in which equilibrium is an exception and tensions, disturbances and local innovations are the rule" and the engine for learning and transformation.

The operative element in critical thinking is reasoning--the key tool to ensure critical engagement and personal meaning making. Embedded in reasoning are standards for making judgments and accordingly respective reasoning takes different forms. Reasoning cannot be complete without consideration of the context, values, cultures, and so forth. It requires comparisons and inductive and deductive thinking to justify one's position with regard to any issue. Often the level at which the cultural dispositions are dealt with is very superficial. This is often because of the condition individuals are subjected to by the environment. Gherardi, Nicolini, and Odella, (1998) illustrated how casual workplace conversation is "loaded" with instructions and hints, which if not recognized can render the whole learning experience unproductive. They emphasize the role of communication and its associated symbolic interactions, which constitute meaning within a culture. Well-conceived strategies and tools often fail to develop a ttitudes in workers that facilitate critical inquiry when the purpose is not clear. For example, in undergraduate law courses students are instructed in the laws of a country. While they are rules (substantive domain knowledge) for a civil society to function as a community they are really constructed by people. To appreciate the legal implications and operationalise the laws, individuals have to understand the assumptions of the time, and historical circumstances (cultural dispositions) that lead people to formulate such laws. Furthermore, interpretations of these laws form precedents, which can be conceived as tools. Students are taught (strategies) how to research and match precedents but very seldom challenge the precedent. Good lawyers are those who recognize the distributed nature of the legal knowledge and the various mitigating variables in forming an opinion. They have to draw from all the four areas of the model to become truly critical. Hastie and Pennington (1993) provided a detailed discussion of the deliberations (individual and group) of juries in coming up with their final decision. They reiterated the distributed nature of the knowledge that is required to critically analyze a case.

At a simpler level, in a global world, understanding sensitivity of situations in different cultures can be difficult and complex. For example the artifact "chair" can be seen as an object (tool) invented to make sitting a less effortful activity. However, when viewed from a cultural perspective, in some cultures the chair is given to individuals who command respect in the society whereas in others it may be seen as reserved for those who have power. In both of these cases it is an elevated position reserved for special people and yet in another it is for the fragile and weak. Therefore while there is a meaning for chair in the minds of individuals that meaning is mediated by the culture in which the activity is located. So while there is a meaning inherent in the artifact there are also meanings attached to the circuinstances surrounding the instance. To appreciate the multiple, yet legitimate, interpretations one has to accept the nonabsolutist view of knowledge--meaning mediated between the individual, th e artifacts and the socio-cultural interactions

This idea of the dynamic interplay of elements is central to understanding the level of sophistication in our reasoning. The sophistication of our reasoning will, in turn we believe, equip individuals with the ability to function effectively with the uncertainty, flexibility, and incongruities evidenced in our society. The reciprocal determinism between individual cognition and socio-cultural cognition can occur at various levels depending on the standards of judgments expected. This is when the developmental aspect of individual cognition or residual cognition is very important in assessing the assumption and matching with the standards. Strategies such as mentoring and observation are not about merely recognizing the overt behaviors or demonstrations but the development of self-consciousness, which permits one to make critical distinctions between one's own psychological reactions and external events. Often mistakenly, practical expertise is viewed as merely the ability to perform a physical activity, focu sing on external events as evidenced in many of the competency based training programs. The internal and external factors that influence human cognition seem to create unintentionally, a dualistic view. The recent merger of anthropological models of human cognition (Lave & Wenger, 1991; Lave, 1988) and cognitive psychology has thrown new light on our understanding of how human beings engage in learning. While this model advances our understanding of the complexity of human cognition there is an assumption that such a model has the capacity to explain many of the individual developments.

CONCLUSION

Of greater importance now is the question of a conceptualisation of learning that pervades all cognition systems--not whether one learning context is more appropriate than another, or whether individual cognition is more important than other cognition systems or whether one knowledge type is more important than the other. The emerging complexity of our society will not allow us the luxury of adopting one of the given approaches; rather it will be expecting us to function equally effectively in a number of approaches. The fragmented approach to understand learning has caused much tension in identifying the most appropriate approach to leaning. It must be realised that this singularly focused research cannot form the basis of our understanding of something that involves a dynamic interaction between a range of different, yet interrelated concepts. Distribution of knowledge can sometimes harm rather than help the learning process. Wilkins and Ouchi (1983) suggested that a distributed perspective may be benefici al when individuals are not engaged in competing jobs and the prestige attached to the jobs is not significant. Thus, it is necessary to map the critical dimension of thinking onto the distributed nature of cognition if individuals are to develop a capacity to live with tension found in our work and social lives.

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