Disaster at Inchon. (The Korean War From The Other Side).

In response to the communist invasion of South Korea in June 1950, the U.N. Security Council (with the Soviet representative absent from the chamber in protest) approved Resolution 84, which made the United States executive agent for military operations. Thus General Douglas MacArthur commanded both the U.S. troops in the theater under Far East Command and all allied contingents. At the request of President Syngman Rhee, American forces also assumed control of the ROK army. Meanwhile, North Korean commanders relied on Soviet advisers and materiel. After the counterattack at Inchon, street-to-street fighting raged to liberate Seoul as Stalin fired a stream of directives from the Kremlin.

The following message was sent by Stalin to the deputy chief of general staff of the Soviet army and the ambassador of the Soviet Union in Pyongyang on September 27, 1950:

The serious predicament in the area of Seoul and in the southeast in which the Korean People's Army has found itself lately has to a great extent been caused by a series of grave mistakes made by the Frontline Command, the commands of the army groups, and army groupings in matters related to command and control over troops, as well as to the tactics of their combat use in particular. It is our military advisers who are even more to blame for these mistakes. Our military advisers failed to implement scrupulously and in a timely fashion the order of the Supreme Commander in Chief [Stalin] for the withdrawal of four divisions from the central front to the area of Seoul despite the fact that at the moment of adopting this decision such a possibility existed....

One cannot help taking serious note of erroneous and absolutely inadmissible tactics for tank use in combat. Lately you have used tanks in combat without preliminary artillery strikes aimed at clearing the field for tank maneuvers. As a consequence, the enemy easily destroys your tanks. Our military advisers who have personal experience porn the Great Patriotic War must be aware that such ignorant use of tanks leads to their loss.

One cannot help noticing the strategic illiteracy of our advisers and their incompetence in intelligence matters. They failed to grasp the strategic importance of the enemy's assault landing in Inchon, denied the gravity of its implications....

The assistance provided by our military advisers to the Korean Command in such paramount matters as communications, command, and control over troops, organization of intelligence, and combat is exceptionally weak. As a result of this, the [North Korean] troops, in essence, are beyond control: they are engaged in combat blindly and cannot arrange the coordination between the various armed services in battle....

Stalin hoped that supporting North Korea would demonstrate solidarity with the world communist movement while humiliating the United States. Instead he faced the prospects of a crushing defeat in Asia as well as escalating confrontation with the United States in Europe.

Source: Cold War International History Project Bulletin, no. 6-7 (Winter 1995/1996), p. 109.