Digitizing the Army for the objective force. (Interview).

Lieutenant General Benjamin S. Griffin Deputy Chief of Staff, G8, Army Staff, and Former Commander of the 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized)

Q As the former commander of the 4th Infantry Division [Fort Hood, Texas], you have had a unique opportunity to develop and observe digital systems for the Army Battle Command System (ABCS). What does ABCS do for our tactical warfighting units?

A Our digital systems, coupled with UAVs [unmanned aerial vehicles], JSTARS [joint surveillance and target attack radar system] and other ground-based sensors, give us a much clearer picture of where the enemy is--a tremendous combat multiplier. Today, a soldier at the division, brigade or battalion levels--down in the company vehicles with an [FBCB.sup.2] [Force XXI battle command brigade and below]--can see not only where his unit is, but also where other friendly units are in relationship to the enemy. That is a significant advantage in terms of direct and indirect fire. We refer to this as Blue Force Feed and "knowing" where we are.

The role of the Artillery in all this is to provide fires for deep and shaping operations and the close fight plus SEAD [suppression of enemy air defenses] and counterfire. The Artillery, with its AFATDS [advanced FA tactical data system] as part of ABCS, has been critical to the division' s success at the NTC [National Training Center, Fort Irwin, California] and in Warfighters [Battle Command Training Program, or BCTP, Warfighter exercises].

The Artillery has been at the forefront in the development of Army digital systems with AFATDS. But now the other systems have caught up: the MCS [maneuver control system], ASAS [allsource analysis system] and AMDWS [air missile defense warning system]. The challenge continues for the Army to develop and integrate these systems in tandem. Interoperability amongst systems is key; much progress has been made...but much still needs to be done.

I am a strong believer in the enhanced capabilities our digital systems bring to bear for the warfighter. But having those systems doesn't change the requirements to move, shoot and communicate. Soldiers and leaders at all levels still must know the basics.

On the simulated battlefield, NTC, JRTC [Joint Readiness Training Center, Fort Polk, Louisiana] and home station training at night in high tempo operations while facing an enemy coming from three or four different directions, the leader's and the individual soldier's ability to be situationally aware is imperative. It is from this situational awareness that we develop situational understanding.

Q In 2001, the 4th ID participated in Division Capstone Exercise I [DCX I at the NTC] and DCX II [a BCTP Warfighter]. What are some of the lessons you learned?

A Let me first say the best ideas we get are from our young soldiers, officers and NCOs--soldiers and leaders at every level.

We were fortunate to have the M1A2 SEP [system enhancement program] tank, M2A3 Bradley [fighting vehicle], the M3 cavalry vehicle, the M109A6 Paladin howitzer and the tactical UAV [TUAV], which are great systems. But our success boils down to the quality and flexibility of our soldiers, NCOs and officers. I cannot say enough about the motivation and technical expertise of our young men and women today and their ability to work through difficult challenges to accomplish the mission.

We worked some traditional and nontraditional means of employing artillery. We had batteries DS [direct support] to maneuver battalions--dedicated batteries, if you will--as well as the FA battalion DS to the brigade, a more traditional role.

When a battery was in close support of a maneuver battalion, we used the MlA2 SEP tank's long distance laser to acquire those targets, in addition to our FIST-Vs [fire support team vehicles], to create dedicated maneuver shooters. We also used TUAVs to confirm targets indicated by JSTARS; then, based on the TUAV grid, fired artillery at the target and adjusted fire, if we had to. Every maneuver brigade and the division had or will have its own TUAVs.

In DCX I at the NTC, we fought on a fluid battlespace that was about 60 by 70 kilometers in continuous operations, many times at night (our preferred option), against an enemy coming from more than one direction. Our brigade and battalion commanders were able to command and control their units in that battlespace with a very challenging scenario because they could "see" themselves and the enemy. The OPFOR [opposing force], as always, was outstanding and taught us many lessons.

For DCX II, the division had an expanded battlespace of 120 kilometers wide and 200 kilometers deep. With this larger battlespace, our forces tended to fight more decentralized. Our digital systems gave us the situational awareness to decentralize our artillery yet mass fires when and where we needed to at critical phases of the fight.

During the Warfighter, we had units spread all over the place. We had satellite communications shooting digital pictures between Forts McNair and Hood and Brownwood, Texas. Brownwood is about 115 miles from Fort Hood. Over extended distances, the SMAR-TT [secure, mobile, antijam remote tactical terminal] provided the division the ability to pass information over the horizon; this proved extremely effective during both DCX I and DCX II.

We fought a new threat scenario in DCX II as the first unit to do so. The Army has redefined the threat to make it more realistic for what our units could face today from potential adversaries across the full spectrum of conflict. [For more information on the contemporary operating environment (COE), see "4th ID DCX II: The Digitized Division Fights the COE OPFOR" by Colonel Ben Allen in this edition.]

In terms of the Army's transformation, the lessons we've learned in the 4th ID will be refined and additional TTPs [tactics, techniques and procedures] will be developed as we place these new systems in the 1st Cavalry Division [Fort Hood], the IBCT [Initial Brigade Combat Team] at Fort Lewis, Washington, and, ultimately, develop them for the Objective Force. The [C.sup.4]I [command, control, communications, computers and intelligence] technology and software in the Legacy Force will grow in sophistication, but the [C.sup.4]I concept will remain, basically, the same for the Objective Force; our situational awareness, command and control on the move and full integration of joint systems will increase for future conflicts.

But we fought the artillery pretty much the same. Based on the intelligence-- JSTARS, ground reconnaissance and TUAV--the artillery again was key in setting the conditions for maneuver success on the battlefield. And with digitization, fire support officers at all levels are more critical; they can provide more timely and accurate fires, giving maneuver forces more capabilities and opportunities. This is true today and will expand greatly in the future in joint operations.

In the not too distant future, a squad leader will be able to look at his [FBCB.sup.2] embedded in his IAV [interim armored vehicle] and see the battlefield, friendly and enemy forces' positions and fires. Eventually, as Land Warrior technology for the soldier progresses, the individual soldier will have that digital link away from his vehicle. This dismounted capability will provide a true assessment of the friendly situation. Great progress has been made in this area, but we cannot rest until we have the picture of mounted and dismounted forces.

Q Some have said the Field Artillery is failing to provide accurate, responsive close supporting fires at the CTCs. What are your thoughts?

A The digital systems in the division today can send and process information very quickly. It is critical that AFATDS keeps pace and stays integrated with those systems as we go down the road. We must carefully assess when humans must intervene to determine whether or not to fire--have the proper checks and balances to avoid fratricide. At the same time, the Artillery must keep pace with our capabilities to rapidly acquire the enemy so we can rapidly fire on those targets.

One lesson we learned was that inaccurate fires were not always due to the artillery. Timely, accurate target location is still a problem. When the SEP tank acquired a target at longer distances [its max lasing range is eight kilometers] and called for fire, our maneuver soldiers had to adjust artillery fire instead of fire-for-effect. When the SEP lased at the longer distances, it wasn't accurate enough. Now when lasing closer in, the SEP could pinpoint the target for first-round fire-for-effect. We learned this at the NTC and refined our TTP at Fort Hood where we live-fire tested to pinpoint requirements.

We also learned that, sometimes when we fired the grid a TUAV displayed, the round did not hit the target. We learned certain depression angles of the TUAV to the target made the grid readings less accurate. So we came back from the NTC, figured out why we had inaccurate fires and trained on adjusting fires off of the SEP tank and TUAV at home station.

To make fires more responsive, we dedicated a battery to a battalion. In some cases, that worked. For example, when a battalion task force had an independent mission, we gave that battalion a dedicated battery to move with it.

AFATDS needs to improve our ability to clear and process calls-for-fire more quickly. In the 4th ID, the standard for sensor-to-shooter operations is 59 seconds or less from target acquisition to the weapons platform's firing. Of course, at extended distances, this is much more achievable. But when firing close support (i.e., in close proximity to our soldiers), the times were extended--for obvious reasons. When we can track dismounted as well as mounted friendly soldiers, we will be able to reduce the sensor-to-shooter time for close support missions even more.

As technology progresses, we need to enhance AFATDS so it can process Apache (or UAV) calls-for-fire linked directly with the gun that will fire the target. The technology is out there; we just have to incorporate it while ensuring AFATDS remains integrated in ABCS--can talk to MCS, [FBCB.sup.2], etc.

Artillerymen in the field understand that. They are trying to get the capabilities to make these corrections. Until then, it boils down to training with AFATDS in peacetime, sorting through its limitations and developing TTP to make fires more responsive.

The challenge for responsive fires still exists in units with [FBCB.sup.2]. As mentioned, our goal for sensor-to-shooter is less than one minute. These fires are traditionally forward of the CFL [coordinated fire line]. Short of the CFL is still a challenge. With the enhanced ability to fight over a large battlespace on a nonlinear battlefield, we are just now truly working the TTP to clear fires quickly and safely. As we continue to fight as maneuver shooters and get the systems in the hands of our soldiers, we will continue to become more responsive in clearing close fires in the future.

Now, having said all that, our indirect fires in both our Division Capstone Exercises were very impressive and made tremendous contributions to our fights. I am very excited about work being done to further integrate our indirect fires in the joint arena. This will involve both future sensors and platforms; we are seeing this today.

Q The Army recently reorganized and unified the Army and Secretariat staffs (see the figure on Page 3). Why did the staffs reorganize?

A The Army and the Secretary of the Army staffs realigned to improve efficiencies, both inside the Pentagon and for the support we provide to the Army in the field. We realigned and integrated the staffs and their missions, applying successful business practices to develop better products, and reduced the layers of review, resulting in a 15 percent staff reduction. The realignment will result in a leaner, more agile, adaptive staff that works faster with less bureaucracy.

An example of that unification would be that the G8 is aligned with the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Financial Management, so we can improve the interoperability between the POM [program objective memorandum] and budget. This is an improved process for following through with an Army program for formulation to budget execution. In the long run, we will provide better service to the field and, ultimately, the soldier on the ground.

Within the Army staff, for example, we moved FD [Force Development] from the G3 [formerly known as the Office of the Deputy chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, or ODCSOPs] into the G8, so now we have FD, PA&E [Programs Analysis and Evaluation] and CAA [Combat Analysis Agency] in one organization. The G3 and G8 must work very closely together; we have a good system in place to do that. Our success directly impacts the combat readiness of the Army--our main focus.

Let's walk through the example of the IBCT. The IBCT was an Army priority. The requirement went from the G3 to the senior leadership for decision. Then the Army leadership made the decision to field six IBCTs. That came to the G8 for resourcing. We determined where the IBCTs are going to be within what time frame, what the fielding details are (number of systems, crew size, total soldiers, etc.) and work hand-in-hand with G3 to ensure we have the total package fielding at the right place and time--making this capability available to warfighters as quickly as possible.

If I can't resource a requirement, I go back to the Army leadership and say "this" constraint prevents me from resourcing "this" requirement. The decision is then for alternative resourcing and what risks to accept. This is a structured process, and it needs to be. Future capabilities must be weighed carefully against risks.

The realignment should be complete by September. It will maximize our operational capabilities--really the key.

Q As the G8, can you give us an in-progress review on Crusader?

A Crusader gives the Army a significant capability for the Objective, Interim and Legacy Forces. With its reduced weight, it will be transportable by C-17, and Crusader's higher rate-of-fire, maneuverability and speed will make it a significant combat multiplier.

Two Crusaders shoot as much as and faster than one battery of Paladin howitzers, have 33 percent increase in range and are three times more accurate than Paladin. Crusader will be able to engage targets of opportunity in less than one minute versus 10 to 12 minutes for the Paladin, and its sustained rate of fire is 10 times that of Paladin. Logistically, Crusader shares a common engine with the M1A2 tank, is totally robotic and reduces the howitzer crew by one-third.

The bottom line is that Crusader is a critical system for the Legacy Force as we transition into the Interim and then the Objective Forces. Clearly, the Army sees the Crusader AND] Comanche [helicopter] programs as essential in transformation. Crusader will be a tremendous combat multiplier for our Army and the joint force, complementing other means of direct and indirect fires.

Lieutenant General Benjamin S. Griffin is the GB on the Army Staff at the Pentagon. In his previous assignment, he commanded the 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized), the Army' division, at Fort Hood, Texas. He served as the Director of Force Programs in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, also at the Pentagon. In other assignments, he was the Assistant Division Commander (Support) in the 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood; the Commander of Joint Task Force Six at Fort Bliss, Texas; and Executive Officer to the Commanding General of Forces Command, Fort McPherson, Georgia. He commanded the 2d Brigade, 6th Infantry Division (Light) in Alaska; the 3d Battalion, 8th Infantry in the 8th Infantry Division (Mechanized) in Germany; and C Company, 3d Battalion, 325th Infantry in the 82d Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. He holds an MBA from Mercer University, Georgia.