Digging deeper.

Ken Ward's article ("Shafted," March 2007) contains several erroneous facts and distortions that typify his ongoing biased reporting of the Sago mine incident.

Two points merit specific mention. At the time of the Sago accident, the federal Mine Safety and Health Administration required mine seals to be built to withstand explosive forces at 20 pounds per square inch (psi). In testing performed by governmental agencies after the accident, seals constructed in the same manner as those at Sago withstood explosion forces at or above 20 psi, the regulatory standard. More importantly, however, according to the report of the West Virginia Office of Miners' Health, Safety and Training, the explosive forces at Sago likely exceeded 95 psi.

Second, Mr. Ward writes that rescue operations at Sago were delayed because "not enough rescue teams were available." This is also erroneous. The first mine rescue team was on-site at Sago at 10:40 a.m. on January 2. Other mine rescue teams continued to arrive during the day. What Mr. Ward did not say in his article is that federal and state authorities would not let rescue teams enter the mine until 5:25 p.m. Contrary to Mr. Ward's reporting, rescue efforts were not hampered by a lack or a delay in the arrival of rescue teams.

When it comes to mine safety, we believe that the interests of all are best served by a focus on the facts rather than a distortion of the truth.

Roger L. Nicholson

Senior Vice President,

General Counsel and Secretary

International Coal Group, Inc.

Ken Ward responds:

ICG General Counsel Roger Nicholson is right that federal standards at the time of the Sago disaster required mine seals to withstand explosive forces of 20 pounds per square inch.

But he is wrong to suggest that the seals that failed catastrophically during the Sago explosion were properly built. Investigators from the West Virginia Office of Miners' Health, Safety and Training found that the Sago seals varied in a number of ways from the mine's approved seal permit. For example, mortar was improperly applied, inadequate header boards were installed, and the seal size did not comply with approved mine plans, according to the state agency's report. Further, sworn testimony given to investigators showed that inexperienced contractors with little if any background in constructing such seals performed the work at the Sago mine.

More importantly, Nicholson does not mention that the Sago disaster has exposed the Mine Safety and Health Administration's incredibly flawed rules--based on a misreading of a 1971 government study--for mine seals. MSHA has beefed up its mine seal requirements to 50 psi, and states are taking similar actions. But thousands of seals based on the 20-psi rule are still in coal mines across the country, putting miners at risk every day until companies do something to reinforce them.

On the issue of mine rescue teams, Nicholson is right that a collection of decisions--by federal and state regulators (but also by ICG)--added to the delays at Sago, keeping rescue teams out of the mine for nearly twelve hours.

But Nicholson does not mention that, at the time of the explosion, ICG had no onsite rescue team trained and prepared to conduct an extensive underground search for the trapped miners. Like most coal companies, ICG took advantage of a federal rule that allowed mine operators to contract out this job to rescue teams up to two hours away from their mines. Some companies, like Pittsburgh-based CONSOL Energy Inc., have opted to maintain extensive rescue teams of their own, adding safety costs in an extremely competitive business.

When Sago blew up, the nearest ICG rescue team was 600 miles away, at the company's Viper mine in Williamsville, Illinois, according to a report by Davitt McAteer, special Sago investigator for West Virginia Governor Joe Manchin.

According to McAteer's report, ICG did not try to contact its contract rescue team in Barbour County, West Virginia, until ninety minutes after the 6:30 a.m. explosion. The first of the Barbour County teams did not arrive on-site until between 10:40 a.m. and 11 a.m.--more than four hours after the blast. A backup team, needed for going underground, did not arrive until about 12:30 p.m.

A new federal law passed after Sago will require some reforms in the mine rescue system. But the shortage of trained teams and the rules allowing most mines to contract out the service were problems recognized by both industry and labor for more than a decade before. The real point of my story was that, as in so many areas, reforms of the mine rescue system were in the works when President Bush took office, only to be scuttled in the name of being friendlier to industry.