Developments in coastal defense and the amphibious anti-landing operations.

Analysis of the centuries old history of wars and the military art shows convincingly that coastal defense is a highly topical military security problem for any state that has an outlet to the sea. This problem has always been multidimensional in so far as its successful resolution presupposes the organization of the reliable protection and defense of maritime (littoral) cities and ports, naval and air bases, and other installations both against attack from the sea and from enemy troops advancing on land or along the littoral.

The global shifts that occurred in the military-political and operational-strategic situation in the 1980s and the 1990s changed the military strategic priorities of the world's major powers, leading to a review of their military doctrines. Thus, in the early 1990s, U.S. military experts developed a new "regionally oriented" military strategy whose basic propositions were subsequently reflected in the Navy Operational Concept known as Forward ... from the Sea. It differs from the naval strategy of the 1980s principally in that the thrust is shifted from the conduct of large scale maritime operations (fleet against fleet or sea control) to the conduct of combat action in littoral areas (fleet against land or power projection).

The UK naval strategy also gives a very high priority to the Navy's action against the enemy's ground forces. The growing probability of the outbreak of local armed conflicts, according to UK military analysts, requires the employment of balanced national and coalition forces, whose naval component should necessarily include amphibious assault (landing) forces. Furthermore, the increasing importance of amphibious landing operations as one of the principal methods of invading a state's zones of vital interests as part of the "expeditionary warfare" concept naturally predetermines the building up of the Marine Corps combat capabilities.

The character and content of amphibious landing operations and therefore the evolution of the requirements for modern anti-landing defense of the littoral are to a very considerable extent influenced by the current trends in the development of amphibious assault assets in forward from the sea operations. Let us now consider the basic ones.

Aircraft carriers, due to their high combat survivability, maneuverability and the capability to act independently, without outside assistance, will retain their role as the core element in providing operational covering to amphibious landing detachments. In the foreseeable future they will have to meet the following requirements: ensure the deployment of up to 100 and more attack and ASW aircraft and helicopters; the depth of impact on ground targets between 250 km and 750 km (with the area of maneuvering 400 km to 250 km away from the littoral line) and the depth of direct fire support of 500 km to 900 km (with the area of maneuvering 200 km to 280 km from the coast line); cruising capacity, 12 to 15 days before refueling (at a rate of two sorties a day by each aircraft); air ammunition, five to eight days.

Light helicopter carriers that are in operational service in the navies of a number of countries can carry 15 to 20 vertical take-off and short take-off and landing aircraft as well as up to six to 10 helicopters. This makes it possible to extend the fleets' zones of operation to a depth of up to 1,000 miles from their coast. Warships of this class are assigned the following functions: ASW, ensuring the survivability of ship-borne attack and search and strike groups, anti-submarine protection of amphibious landing forces, and covering the landing of amphibious assault forces, as well as other tasks.

The main trend in building multirole submarines is to enhance their operational effectiveness and survivability, concealment, maneuverability, and the provision of advanced EW and electronic surface and subsurface target illumination systems that make it possible to ensure an accurate and effective engagement of naval targets. At the same time, the number of submarines as part of the fleets' combat composition will remain at approximately the same level as new modern submarines are accepted into service.

Analysis of the shipbuilding programs of the world's major naval powers shows that cruisers, destroyers, and frigates will retain their importance in naval warfare, including in amphibious landing operations. The following requirements are set for them: the availability of sea launched cruise missiles capable of hitting targets from a distance of 1,800 km to 2,000 km; the cruising range of not less than 5,000 miles to 6,000 miles; and anti-ship and ASW weapons with an effective range of up to 260 km and 55 km to 60 km, respectively. This gives them a multirole designation, expanding the zone of their combat application, the content and character of missions to be performed.

Of the Navy's aircraft park, carrier aviation and Marine Corps aviation are of the most interest in terms of coastal defense and amphibious anti-landing operations. It can be predicted that the ongoing reduction in the number of aircraft types will remain a principal trend here. Thus, the U.S. Navy should be expected to take out of service the majority of carrier attack aircraft with priority among the remaining aircraft being given to F-22 and F/A-18E aircraft.

The next generation of Marine Corps aircraft, designed to provide air support for amphibious landing groups based both on ships and on coastal airfields, are JSF tactical fighters and MV-22 Osprey transport aircraft. According to reports in the foreign press, (1) the U.S. Navy Marine Corps command is planning to buy up to 609 and 360 such aircraft, respectively. In addition, a modification of the JSF vertical take-off and short take-off and landing tactical fighter will in the foreseeable future replace the AV-8B Harrier and F/A-18E aircraft that are now in service. Thus, it should be expected that by 2010-2015, carrier aviation in each of the amphibious assault groups will be represented mainly by the most advanced, modern JSF (five to 10) and MV-22 Osprey (10 to 12) aircraft, as well as CH-53 (three to four), AH-1Z (six) and UH-1Y (three) helicopters.

The main trends in the development of carrier helicopters consists in increasing the duration of their loitering and patrolling missions, their effective range and speed, and ensuring an effective performance of a broad range of missions regardless of the time of day, the season or weather conditions, as well as in enhancing their operational effectiveness and survivability, including by reducing their radar cross section. It should be expected that the role of carrier helicopters in performing various missions in the course of amphibious assault operations will be growing, which is predetermined by their ability to take off from various types of craft and drop amphibious assault forces on unprepared sections of the littoral. CH-53E Super Stallion transport helicopters are now the sole high-capacity transport facility of this kind in the U.S. Marine Corps aviation. They have a maximum capacity of up to 16 tonnes and can airlift virtually all types of arms and equipment (except tanks and self propelled guns) of the Marine Corps division.

It is especially important to note that in the past few years much development work has been in hand to design mine countermeasures ships and other means of making passages in minefields and other explosive obstacles in littoral waters. This is due to the navy's low mine sweeping capability which was revealed in the course of the Persian Gulf War (1991) and was highlighted by Gen. H. Norman Schwarzkopf at a U.S. Senate hearing. In addition to ships, it is also planned to make a wide use of mine sweeping helicopters, as well as 600S Skyships which can clear much vaster water areas of mines.

Analysis of shipbuilding programs implemented in the world's leading states shows that high priority is being given to the further development and modernization of amphibious transport and amphibious landing facilities. It is planned to enhance their aviation and aviation equipment carrying capability, reduce the time of cargo operations, and ensure a better operational effectiveness and survivability of transport assets. In addition, the U.S. Navy is seriously considering the possibility of buying high speed, high capacity civilian vessels capable of sea-lifting marines and cargoes within a particular theater of operation. One such vessel was tested at a Marine Corps expeditionary division. It took five hours for 870 Marine Corps personnel and equipment to embark and 15 hours to reach Japan from the Island of Okinawa, whereas it would have taken 10 to 14 days to airlift a Marine Corps division from Okinawa to the Japanese air base of Yokota by two S-17 aircraft. The U.S. Marine Corps command believes that the use of such vessels will help to substantially reduce the workload placed on transport aviation.

It is planned to provide more LCAC (landing craft air cushion) that feature a 50 percent higher capacity than LCU and four to seven times the capacity of LCM-8 or LCM-6 craft. Their use will make it possible, at the start of disembarkation, to redeploy heavy equipment (tanks, self propelled guns, and armored fighting vehicles) on the shore, more expeditiously to build up the landing force, more quickly to expand the bridgehead, and to ensure the delivery of assets and the evacuation of casualties in a timely manner. The U.S. Navy command is planning to modernize LCAC landing craft in order to extend their operational service life. Seventy four of 91 landing craft will be modernized and retrofitted--specifically, equipped with advanced engines and command and control and communication facilities, as well as state of the art navigation equipment. LCAC will likely remain the "work horse" of amphibious ready groups for years to come. Even so, work is currently in hand to study the possibility of creating air cushion landing craft with higher capacity and protected by light armor, but this work is only at a conceptual analysis stage now.

In the future, it is planned to provide the U.S. Navy with the AAAV Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle. A sum of $712 million was allocated for its development and prototype demonstration. By the year 2015 the Marine Corps command plans to buy 1,013 such vehicles that will replace the present AAV vehicles. The AAAV will have a crew of three and will carry up to 17 marines with combat gear and equipment at a speed of 25 knots (46 km/h) by sea and 70 km/h on land. Amphibious vehicles can be launched from a landing craft at a distance of 40 km to 45 km from the coast.

Thus, landing vessels with air cushion landing craft are becoming a major component of amphibious assault landing forces. At the same time, transport craft will become less vulnerable with stealth technology, which will substantially increase the probability of an unhindered deployment of assault forces to particular landing spots on the littoral. It is especially important to stress that the use of new-generation landing craft in the course of amphibious assault operations will make it possible to land amphibious assault forces on sea and oceanic littorals that were earlier deemed inaccessible. So the favorable geo-physical conditions of the coast line will no longer be a principal determining factor in making a decision to conduct amphibious assault landing operations.

Today navies in a number of countries are conducting research and development programs whose results can be used directly in the interest of the Marine Corps. Thus, work is underway to study the possibility of building an expeditionary target detection and tracking network that will provide amphibious landing assault force commanders with fuller information about the operational situation and the enemy's actions to interdict an amphibious landing operation. Foreign military experts also see great potential in the use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), for example, Fire Scouts that can provide effective support to amphibious landing forces. Vertical take-off UAVs are expected to operate from all types of air carriers, including amphibious assault vehicles.

One new trend in the operational employment of U.S. Navy amphibious assault forces in the recent period has been the creation and constant presence of amphibious ready groups in operationally important parts of the World Ocean, designed to perform impromptu missions. Each such group, as a rule, is comprised of one or two Tarawa or Wasp general purpose amphibious assault ships, NAS Whidbey Island, as well as auxiliary vessels. They provide a platform for a Marine Corps expeditionary force up to a battalion with combat and special gear and equipment. One important component of an amphibious ready group is air cushion landing craft since they, according to U.S. experts, ensure the landing of assault forces on 50 percent to 70 percent of the world's littorals (as compared to 15 percent to 20 percent without them). The use of these landing craft in combination with helicopters enable an amphibious ready group to operate not only in a particular littoral sector but along the entire coast. At the same time, landing craft can transfer marines to ship-to-shore vehicles at a distance of up to 40 km to 45 km from the coast, not three kilometers to five kilometers, as in the case of water displacing craft.

The U.S. Navy and possibly U.S. allies should be expected to increase the number of such alert duty amphibious ready groups in various operationally important parts of the World Ocean since they are extremely effective and can, within six to 10 hours of an order being issued, begin the landing of marines to the coast with the aim of taking control of it and ensuring the subsequent unhindered building up of forces in a given region as well as participation in other operations.

Analysis of the aforementioned trends in the development of amphibious assault operations from the sea leads to the following conclusions about their impact on the character and content of amphibious assault operations.

First, some insignificant reduction in the number of warships in the navies of the world's leading states is fully compensated by the quantitative and qualitative growth in the operational effectiveness of new-generation warships that are being brought into service. As a result, on the one hand, the operational capabilities of the naval forces of these states are being increased, while on the other, the scope of missions that they can perform in combat is expanding. Therefore the views of their command on the preparation and conduct of amphibious assault operations are also evolving. Analysis of these views suggests that the scope and scale of the use of amphibious assault forces in possible wars and armed conflicts of the 21st century will only be growing. The content of amphibious assault operations will change substantially, as will the character of their combat tasks and missions.

Second, the past decade has seen a substantial increase in the capability of a possible adversary to effectively engage amphibious assault assets. In this context, sea and air launched missiles pose a new danger. Thus, if an amphibious assault operational covering force includes two or three missile cruisers and six to eight GM destroyers, 20 to 30 or even more strikes can be delivered against littoral targets, especially against command and control, reconnaissance, and EW elements, as a result of which their operation can be disrupted or completely disabled with the amphibious anti-landing force sustaining heavy losses.

Third, the probability of amphibious landing forces achieving the element of surprise has increased considerably. During World War II and in the course of the subsequent armed conflicts, aviation and warships had a relatively small range of operation so in order to deliver effective strikes, they had to approach the littoral, which to a very large extent made it difficult to achieve the element of surprise. In the past several decades the situation has changed substantially. The high range capability of sea and air launched cruise missiles ensures the effective engagement of amphibious anti-landing assets from a considerable distance, virtually in a stand-off mode. In addition, the element of surprise is objectively facilitated by a massed use of alert duty amphibious ready groups deployed in different parts of the World Ocean.

Fourth, the landing of amphibious assault forces on the littoral is becoming more dynamic, which allows for a rapid building up of the assault force that has been landed. In amphibious assault operations during World War II and the War in Korea (1950-1953), the high tempo of landing on the littoral was mainly achieved through an overwhelming numerical superiority of the advancing force. Thus, in the invasion of Okinawa in 1945, the 80,000 strong Japanese garrison was opposed by 548,000 U.S. troops with the overwhelming superiority in warships and aviation. (2) Then, during the first day of the operation, 1,140 amphibious landing craft ensured the landing of 50,000 assault troops. In the Inchon Landing Operation (1950), the U.S., South Korean, and British troops and naval forces had a more than 20 times superiority over the anti-landing forces. The landing operation was supported by 257 warships and more than 500 tactical and naval aviation aircraft. (3) In the present conditions, the high tempo of landing operations will be achieved mainly by using more advanced amphibious landing assets.

Fifth, the littoral's increased landing accessibility will require at least a 50 percent to 100 percent increase in the numerical strength of amphibious landing defense forces. Furthermore, the use of air cushion landing craft in the course of an amphibious landing operation reduces by a factor of three to five the time that an amphibious assault landing force needs to cross the areas exposed to effective fire delivery by a defending force also substantially reduces the probability of amphibious landing troops stepping on mines and other explosive obstacles. This raises the task of achieving the required effectiveness of the engagement of an amphibious assault force at the landing stage.

Sixth, modern amphibious assault operations will make a wide use of "over the horizon" (OTH) landing of amphibious assault forces. In this event, landing craft external and internal anchorage and maneuver areas will be located at a considerable distance from the littoral--specifically, 40 km to 50 km. Therefore, in the course of transferring from amphibious transport to amphibious landing craft, the marines will be virtually outside the range of the majority of the weapons of the defending force, while with the traditional amphibious landing method this particular stage of the operation provided the most favorable conditions for inflicting maximum losses on an adversary.

Seventh, the modern amphibious landing operation is, essentially, more of an air and naval operation as a greater thrust is being placed on the use of the air assault element. Thus, during World War II, large air assault forces were dropped in the interest of amphibious assault operations only in the course of amphibious landing operations in Sicily (1943), Normandy (1944), and Southern France (1944). Today, the rapid development of aviation has made it possible to drop far more substantial forces not only from fixed wing but also from rotary wing aircraft, which was not possible before. It is important to note that up to 30 percent of an aggregate assault force can be airlifted and paradropped.

Thus, the constant modernization and provision of the Navy with modern warships and transport craft, marine aircraft and helicopters, and air cushion assault landing craft, as well as more powerful, precision weaponry featuring a higher effective range to a very large extent modify the character of the modern amphibious assault operation. This is an objective factor necessitating new requirements for coastal defense and anti-landing operations.

As is known, aggressiveness and firmness are the general requirements that are set on any form of defense. With regard to modern coastal defense, there is good reason to say that aggressiveness is the ability to continuously impact on an adversary at all stages of an amphibious assault operation. It consists in delivering consecutive powerful air strikes against the amphibious assault forces and their operational covering (support) forces, naval strikes in the course of the embarkation of the assault force and its redeployment by sea (sea-lifting), and then strikes by ground troops in repulsing the assault landing force and its engagement on the littoral, as well as in the timely maneuver with reserves and fire in sectors of threat.

The aggressiveness of modern coastal defense should manifest itself above all in imposing one's will on an adversary and in achieving and maintaining sea and air superiority in the coastal defense area. The imposition of one's will consists in forcing an adversary to change the original plan of its amphibious assault operation--for example, compelling it to land assault forces in those sectors of the littoral that are the most reinforced and prepared to resist the assault. Analysis of combat experience shows that this can be achieved as a general rule by misleading the enemy command as to the organization of coastal defense, by conducting a carefully thought through and well prepared maneuver with troops, naval forces and aviation, as well as by implementing well organized activities to disorganize and disrupt the enemy's command and control, reconnaissance, and EW systems. Another avenue in organizing aggressive coastal defense is to increase the numerical strength of forces and assets assigned to fight the enemy's air assault groups and to concentrate their efforts on striking helicopter carriers at sea and then air assault groups as they are airlifted to be dropped into the objective area and as they perform their missions on the littoral.

The firmness of coastal defense is characterized by the ability of troops and naval and air forces deployed in possible amphibious assault sectors to successfully repulse the enemy's air and naval strikes in the course of the firefight for air and sea superiority as well as by their ability to effectively disrupt the landing of amphibious and the dropping of air assault groups and to firmly hold areas and sectors of the littoral. In the present conditions, the firmness of coastal defense is achieved above all by ensuring a high level of the survivability of troops and the operational effectiveness of naval forces, a good organization of defense, close interaction and synchronization of efforts of large strategic formations, combined-arms units and units of various branches and arms of service participating in coastal defense operations, as well as by providing all round support for their actions. It is in fact the firmness of coastal defense that ultimately helps to achieve the objective of amphibious anti-landing operations.

Analysis of the current trends in the evolution of naval warfare at sea and in coastal areas, as well as of the views of the naval command of the world's leading states on the conduct of amphibious assault operations, points to a number to new requirements for coastal defense in present-day conditions.

First, the increased scale and scope of the employment of amphibious assault forces makes it necessary to effectively build up the combat capability of troops, naval and air forces in possible sectors of amphibious assault, as well as to ensure a further development of the theory and practice of the preparation and conduct of coastal defense on the basis of scientific studies and research, and the practical realization of the most advanced achievements of military thought.

Second, given the substantially increased capabilities of an adversary operating forward from the sea to effectively engage coastal defense installations, as well as the threat of the massed use of sea and air launched missiles, it is necessary to give special attention to enhancing the effectiveness of operational and tactical concealment and camouflage activities, as well as to creating and constantly upgrading the littoral missile defense system.

Third, the increasing probability of the surprise landing of amphibious assault forces objectively necessitates such a requirement for modern coastal defense as the implementation of defense organization activities within a very short time frame.

Fourth, the process of the landing of amphibious assault forces becomes more and more dynamic, which enables an adversary to build up assault landing forces within a short period. This necessitates the constant, focused, target specific modernization and upgrading of the operational organization of maritime areas in the interest of ensuring a timely and unhindered forward movement of second echelons and reserves to carry out counteroffensives and to deliver counterstrokes against the amphibious assault groups that have managed to land on the littoral.

Fifth, the littoral's increased landing accessibility, resulting in an expansion of the possible sectors for landing (dropping) amphibious assault forces, necessitates the high mobility of troops defending the littoral in the interest of conducting a timely maneuver in sectors of threat.

Sixth, the use of air cushion landing craft in the course of an amphibious assault operation seriously complicates the effective engagement of marine striking echelons as they approach the coast. This problem should be addressed by modernizing and upgrading the fire delivery system in the littoral area and enhancing the effectiveness of minefields and other explosive obstacles in the water.

Seventh, the use of the OTH amphibious landing method enables an adversary to avoid heavy losses in the course of transferring the amphibious assault force from sea transport to amphibious landing craft. This sets such a requirement for modern coastal defense as the capability to conduct effective reconnaissance at sea in the interest of providing weapon systems with accurate information to ensure an effective engagement of enemy forces at a substantial distance away from the landing area.

Eighth, because air assault forces are going to be widely used in the course of modern amphibious assault operations, it is especially important to ensure the high effectiveness of air defense, as well as the ability to conduct perimeter, all round defense since once they have been landed (dropped), air assault groups will attack the defending troops mainly from the rear.

The aforementioned requirements for modern coastal defense necessitate the theoretical and practical resolution of a number of problems involved in the preparation and conduct of amphibious anti-landing operations. The main problems here are as follows: the need to substantiate the expedient methods of conducting amphibious anti-landing operations and the forms of employing coastal defense forces under various operational and strategic conditions; the search for ways of ensuring the covert deployment of troops and naval forces in sectors of possible threat of attack; ensuring the needed effectiveness of repulsing massed air and missile strikes by enemy forces; making proposals on ways of enhancing the effectiveness of the enemy's engagement at the stage of landing amphibious and dropping air assault forces; improving the organization of the interaction, synchronization of activities and all round support for the activities of troops, naval and air forces in coastal defense operations; better organization of maritime sectors, and some others.

NOTES:

1. M. Kauchak, "Americas' Waterborne Expeditionary Forces," Armed Forces Journal International, September 2001, pp. 72-76.

2. A. Volny, Okinava, 1945, OOO Izdatelstvo AST, Moscow, 2002, p. 40.

3. Voyna v Koree 1950-1953 gg. (Voyenno-istoricheskiy ocherk), Voenizdat Publishers, Moscow, 1959, pp. 382-383.

Col. L.V. BOYKOV

Doctor of Military Sciences

Leonid Viktorovich BOYKOV was born in 1952, in Moscow; education: the Kazan Higher Tank Command School (1973), the M.V. Frunze Military Academy (1984).

Served in different command and staff positions in the Moscow, TransBaykal, and Far East Military Districts; the last operational command position: head of the Command and Control Directorate at the Far East Military District Staff; since 1993 (after completing a post-graduate course), faculty member at the Military Academy of the General Staff.

At present, deputy head of the Operational Art Department, associate professor, leading specialist on coastal defense and amphibious anti-landing operations; author of more than 100 research and academic papers; full member of the Academy of Security, Defense, and Law Enforcement Studies.