Deployment of UN observers authorized for South Africa.

The Security Council on 17 August authorized Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali to deploy UN observers in South Africa to help end the spiralling cycle of violence, the continuation of which, the Council said, "would seriously jeopardize peace and security in the region".

In unanimously adopting resolution 772 (1992), the Council invited then Secretary-General to assist in strengthening the structures set up under the 14 September 1991 National Peace Accord (NPA) aimed at ending the violence and facilitating the socio-economic development and reconstruction in South Africa.

Deployment of UN, observers, the Council stated, should be implemented by the Secretary-General "in such a manner and in such numbers as he determines necessary to address effectively the areas of concern noted in his report" (S/24389).

On 9 September, the Secretary-General deeply deplored the killing of at least 28 people and the wounding of nearly 200 in Ciskei during a 7 September demonstration organized by the African National Congress (ANC).

The Special Committee against Apartheid at the same time stressed that "such senseless killing at this crucial juncture in South Africa's transition process cannot fail to undermine all progress so far made". it called on the country's authorities to assume immediate control of the Ciskei military and initiate an urgent investigation, in order to "identify and bring to justice those found responsible for this act of violence".

On 10 September, the Council emphasized the responsibility of the South African authorities for the maintenance of law and order, and called on them to "take all measures to end the violence and to protect the right of all South Africans to engage in peaceful political activity without fear of intimidation or violence".

Observers in 11 areas

On 9 September, it was announced that 50 UN observers were being sent to South Africa. An advance party of 13 observers left for South Africa on 11 September.

Observers are to be stationed in 11 areas around the country: Natal/Kwazulu, Border/Ciskei, Wits/Vaal, Western Cape, Orange Free State, Northern Cape, Far Northern Transvaal, Northern Transvaal, Eastern Transvaal, Eastern Cape and Western Transvaal.

Also in resolution 772, the South African Government, parties and organizations were called upon to extend their full cooperation to the UN observers to "enable them to carry out their tasks effectively". The Council also invited international organizations, such as the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the Commonwealth and the European Community, to consider deploying their own observers in South Africa, in coordination with the UN and the structures set up under the NPA. The Council decided to remain "seized of the matter until a democratic, non-racial and united South Africa is established".

Following the 17 June massacre of some 40 demonstrators in Boipatong township, the Council condemned the escalating violence in South Africa and urged measures to end the violence and bring those responsible to justice. In adopting resolution 765 (1992) on 16 July, it also called for the appointment of a Special Representative to recommend steps to assist in reaching that goal.

On 17 July, Cyrus Vance, former United States Secretary of State, was named Special Representative to South Africa. He is also serving as the Secretary-General's Special Envoy on Yugoslavia and on Nagorno-Karabakh.

During his mission to South Africa (21-31 July), Mr. Vance held meetings with South African President F. W. de Klerk and other senior Government officials, as well as with representatives of political parties, church groups, business and trade union organizations, and leading individuals.

Reasons for violence

On 7 August, Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali reported (S/24389) that the reasons for violence in South Africa were "complex and deep". The "special desperation" that apartheid brought could in the long run, he said, only be remedied by rapid progress towards the creation of a democratic, non-racial and united South Africa. That was the goal not only of the negotiations within the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA), but also of the international community as a whole.

Working close association with the National Peace Secretariat, UN observers would be stationed in various parts of the country and their number could be supplemented, as necessary, by other appropriate international organizations.

Also recommended was the establishment of offices or operations centres at major "flashpoints" in the country where violence was most likely to occur. Those offices should be staffed on a 24-hour basis and each should have a standing group composed of representatives of the Government, the ANC, the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) and other concerned parties.

While urging the major parties to return as early as possible to the negotiating table, the Secretary-General stressed that the task of conducting those negotiations was "uniquely the responsibility of South Africans themselves". In his view, the immediate release of all remaining political prisoners could "contribute greatly to improving the political climate, creating trust and burying the unhappy past".

For all of its shortcomings, the CODESA process must be pursued, improved, better coordinated and made much more transparent, as it "needs to encourage others, who have not yet joined to do so", he continued. A deadlock-resolving machinery should be established at the highest political level and CODESA should consider appointing an eminent and impartial person, who need not be a foreigner, to "draw the strings together and to provide the impetus and cohesion" that the negotiations needed to be successful.

According to the Secretary-General, the far-reaching work being undertaken by Justice Richard Goldstone Chairman of the Commission of Enquiry into Public Violence and Intimidation, should be supported by the international community, and the Commission's recommendations, especially those relating to a total ban on the public display of dangerous weapons and the security of hostels, should be fully and speedily implemented by the South African Government and parties.

The Commission's code of conduct for mass demonstration could also do much to control violence and the leaders of major political parties should, as the Commission recommended, take firm steps to stop their supporters from participating in acts of violence.

The Secretary-General proposed that the Goldstone Commission undertake a series of investigations into the functioning and operations of certain agencies, including the army and the police, the Umkontho we Sizwe, the Azanian People's Liberation Army, the KwaZulu police and, more generally, certain private "security firms".

Finally, the Secretary-General proposed that UN missions should be undertaken on a quarterly basis or more frequently, if the situation so warranted, in order to provide regular, impartial and objective information to the Security Council.

10-day mission

During the 10-day Vance mission, Government representatives reported that the South African President had taken numerous initiatives to combat the violence, which had resulted in the coming into being of the NPA in 1991 and the appointment of the Goldstone Commission.

The ANC emphasized the need for an "adequate and not merely a symbolic" number of UN monitors, having freedom of movement and the independent resources needed to act as the "eyes" of the international community. It suggested a team of some 450 members for that purpose, with the monitors having a background in policing.

The IFP believed a "multiparty conference of review" was needed to "look into the entire situation and to serve as a permanent structure for deadlock resolution", since CODESA lacked a "dispute-resolving machinery at the level of head of party".

The Vance mission had held extensive discussions with Justice Goldstone, who indicated his readiness to work with the UN, if necessary, to gain further international support for his Commission.

The mission was urged to do all it could to strengthen the NPA mechanisms. Existing South African structures, Mr. Goldstone added, should be used as "instruments through which the international community should play a role in seeking to curb the violence".

Through discussions were held with the chairmen of the National Peace Committee and the National Peace Secretariat, who explained that NPA provided a "comprehensive framework for ending violence", since it had been signed by all of the major political parties, trade unions, and religious and civic organizations.

The mission had met with Archbishop Desmond Tutu and a senior delegation from the South African Council of Churches. Mr. Tutu said the breakdown in constitutional negotiations resulted from the Government's demand to build into any constitution a minority veto.

Addressing the Security Council meeting on 16 July on behalf of the OAU, Foreign Minister Djibo Ka of Senegal said South Africa had been "plunged into an atmosphere of unacceptable violence", which the Boipatong tragedy had "significantly worsened". The massacre of innocent people and physical violence was the "daily lot" of millions of South Africans, and the country had reached a "dangerous impasse". The Government was responsible for guaranteeing the security of people, safeguarding individual integrity and creating a climate of civil peace.

Violence opposed

ANC President Nelson Mandela told the Council that over the past six years, at least 11,000 people had died as a result of violence in the black townships,"tearing our country apart". Control of State power b the National Party regime allowed it the "space to deny and cover up its own role, as well as those of its surrogates and the States security forces in fostering and fomenting the violence", which was "organized and orchestrated".

Although conceding to instances of counter-violence by members of the democratic movement,he stressed that the ANC policy was opposed to the promotion of violence, and the organization was firmly committed to that position.

Faced with the "horrendous escalation" of violence and in view of the regime's failure to carry out its May 1991 agreements with the ANC to curb the violence, the ANC had been forced to withdraw from the multilateral process of the CODESA negotiations, Mr. Mandela said.

Also at its 16 July meeting, the Council reviewed an 8 July letter (S/24255) from South African Foreign Minister R. F. Botha, who stated that his Government sought an urgent resumption of the CODESA negotiations - launched in December 1991, but suspended in June with the ANC withdrawal after the Boipatong massacre. The leaders of the major parties should totally accept responsibility for further steps to curb the violence, he stated.

Addressing the Council, Mr. Botha said President de Klerk had taken "initiative upon initiative" to combat violence, often without support from other parties. The changes initiated were irreversible. There could be no justification for the claim that the Government's constitutional proposals manifested a desire to cling to power or to entrench a white veto, Mr. Botha contended.

IFP Chief Buthelezi said that the ANC's withdrawal from CODESA and its adoption of confrontational politics in mass-action programmes were "aimed at shaping South African politics to its liking". The construction of a non-racial, non-sexist, democratic State would call for "reconciliation and statesmanship of the highest order".

De Klerk meets

Mandela

An agreement to resume efforts towards establishing a democratic order in South Africa, as well as the immediate release of 150 political prisoners, marked the 26 September meeting between Mr. Mandela and President de Klerk. The Government stated it would also release the remaining political prisoners by 15 November.

Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali, warmly welcoming this development, hoped that the meeting would help transform the political atmosphere in the country in a "positive way and lead rapidly to the resumption of multilateral negotiations involving all parties concerned".

However, hours after the meeting, Chief Buthelezi said he was breaking off relations with the Government. He vowed to oppose the creation of an interim government and accused President de Klerk of "connivance" with Mr. Mandela.