Deployment experience of Pacific Fleet diesel submarines.

The Pacific Fleet submarines were most intensively deployed in the 60s-70s of the 20th century. The Cold War peak of the military confrontation between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. fell on this period.

At that time, the national-liberation wars began for the independence of Indonesia (1962), for the independence of Northern Kalimantan (1963), for the independence of Laos (1964). In 1965, the U.S.A. unleashed the war in Vietnam. The Pacific Fleet submarines had to fulfill the assigned tasks in such a complicated military and political situtation.

The diesel submarine forces, as judged by the Fleet's stated tasks, by theater of operation geography and deployment specifics, were deconcentrated along the entire coast from Kamchatka to Vladivistok. As the harbor basins of Magadan and Sovietskaya Gavan are frozen in the winter, the combat-ready submarines were transferred, from November till March, to Petropavlovsk-Kamchatski and to the Bay of Vladimir, respectively. Organizationally, initially diesel submarine formations constituted a part of the Pacific Fleet Submarine Forces. In 1961, the Submarine Forces were discontinued.

Originally, the tasks assigned to diesel submarines and their actions covered only the coastal zone of the Pacific theater of operations. By that time, our Fleets had not taken to the open sea yet. But, with the development of the U.S. and NATO Navies, and the escalation of threat to our country from ocean directions, the task of countervailing them was becoming ever more critical. At the same time, in the Far East, there were, practically speaking, no forces, which were capable of countervailing these threats effectively. The nuclear-powered submarine fleet was just gathering momentum. Therefore, in the Pacific theater of operations, the main brunt in submarine confrontation between the Pacific Naval Forces and the U.S. Navy fell on diesel-powered submarines. The medium diesel submarines were assigned the following tasks in the ocean zone of the theater of operations: the detection of the combat duty zones of fleet BM subs, nuclear propulsion and of other foreign subs, the detection and monitoring of aircraft-carriers. And concurrently--tactical action workouts for solo submarines and groups of submarines, the opening-up of new combat action areas. The effective implementation of those tasks corresponded to the military capabilities envisaged in the submarine designs, but they did not fully meet the needs of the Naval Fleet. Nevertheles, notice that such combat cruises, on the one hand, allowed to overcome the feeling of uncertainty and even ocean fright among some members of the crew, who had never been in direct contact with enemy forces, and permitted to develop the "ocean" mentality of Brigade Staffs and of submarine crews, and on the other hand, forbade the enemy's uncontrolled prevalency in the ocean depths.

At first, the diesel submarine cruises at full ship endurance (30 days and nights) were called "autonomous expeditions." The term "combat duty" was introduced later. Slated for such cruises were the submarines, which had worked out the full course of combat training tasks and which were technically operational, with maintenance and repair schedules not becoming due until the end of the cruise. Submarines assigned for autonomous cruises were meticulously prepared in the naval base: full strength crew recruitment, replenishment to full norms of the fuel reserves, of the fresh water supplies, provision of the spare parts, tools and accessories (SPTA), the food rations, the torpedo load, etc.

Notice that diesel submarines had moderate-size refrigeration chambers for lading the sufficient quantities of fresh foods (meat, vegetables, fruits, etc.) to last for three days and nights only. During the remaining twenty-seven days and nights, the edibles consisted of dry and canned products, ship buscuits and rusks instead of bread. One can wonder, this being said, at the ingenuity of our cooks, who managed to prepare various and rather tasty dishes for the crew. Much later, food rations included fresh canned potatoes, cellophane-sealed wheat and rye bread loafs. The submarine design did not provide storage places for food rations to last for the entire cruise at full ship endurance, therefore all the suitable spaces available behind the pipemains, manifolds and instruments were packed with boxes, jars and sacks filled with food products.

There were no regulation uniforms for autonomous cruises, either. At first, seamen were issued with soldiers' ordinary wear garment. But the lengthy cruises in the southerly latitudes showed that such garment is unfit for cruises in hot climates, therefore in the second half of the 60s of the previous century, submarine crews were issued with disposable underwear and tropical uniform, which significantly improved the crew's habitable enivironment during combat duty.

The sumarine's combat torpedo load consisted of 22 torpedoes, including two torpedoes with special warheads. The diesel subs with such torpedoes spelled awesome power.

Several words about submarine crew manning. The rigid requirement envisaged the drafting for submarine crews of the conscripts having secondary education certificates. The sailors with seven-year school education were allowed to be drafted only for steersmen and signalmen. The seamen-submariners' length of active service (four years) was distributed as follows: the first year--service in the traning detachment; the second year--service on the submarine to study the equipment, to learn one's own functions, and traineeship for the assimilation of duties in the order of battle and in the daily routine; the third year--full-fledged combat service on the submarine; the fourth year--relief training. The education and training of seamen and of Petty Officers were allotted, besides Crew Officers, to Crew Captains, who, as a rule, were extended servicemen with wide submarine experience. From the reveille to the sound-off, the Crew Captains worked with their subordinates, educating, instructing them and sharing their life and service experience. We had no idea of any relationships, which would not be regulated by the Code.

After the Commander reported about the submarine readiness for the cruise, the submarine checking sea voyage was made under the guidance of the Submarine Brigade Commander or of the Submarine Brigade Staff with the participation practically of all the Staff Officers. During this voyage, the Staff examined the readiness of the submarine and of its crew to implement the forthcoming tasks. After the return, the identified deficiencies were resolved, fresh food rations were laded, and the Squadron Staff was informed about submarine preparedness for the cruise. Where the Commander was making the autonomous cruise for the first time, the Submarine Brigade Commander, or his Deputy, or the Chief of Staff was attached to the submarine as the Cruise Superior Officer, who kept the watch on the par with the Submarine Commander.

The route of the cruise was taking course from the Sea of Japan, via the Korea Strait to the East China Sea. In the daytime, the submarine moved in the submerged position, at night--in the surface trim, with the charging of the storage battery. At the early nightfall, the submarine approached the Korea Strait and traversed it in the surface trim. In the region of the Korea Strait, there were a lot of fishing vessels that facilitated the submarine's surface ship masking at nighttime. The darkness hours were enough for traversing the Strait and for gaining the East China Sea, where the deep waters allowed the submarine to submerge. From the East China Sea, the route went through one of the water lanes between the Ryukyu Islands in the Phillipine Sea. Just in the northern and central sectors of the Phillipine Sea were the designated areas to search for U.S. fleet BM submarines, nuclear propulsion. Monitoring and battery-charge subzones were also traced in the search area. Search duty mode was planned for 72 hours: three-days-and-three-nights patroling in the submergred position in the designated subzone, then surfacing at night-time, battery charging, then at the first light, diving and covert passage to the next search subzones. Notice that diesel submarine sound level was substantively lower than that of U.S. fleet BM submarines, nuclear propulsion that heightened the chances for detecting the latter. Besides, each submarine making the autonomous cruise had the special operations detachment group detailed, which performed the monitoring of the U.S. Navy and other countries' combat control networks, and also the interception and interpretation of radio signals and radio communications.

As is well known, one of the critical features of submarine successful activity is its operational security. Therefore, much attention was given to the operational security both at the preparatory stage, during the passage and patroling. Main threat for the submarines moving in the surface trim in the open sea emanated from U.S. Navy anti-submarine land-based aviation, from which even the night-time was no shelter, because the aircraft searched by Radio Detection and Ranging equipment.

The submarine's warning radars enabled the finding of the radar-carrier (aircraft or ship), the approximate direction to the operating radar, and carrier distance measuring by signal power. The scanty information, as it is, given its expert utilization, often saved submarines from detection.

Notice that the "crash diving" maneuvre was paid special attention to by the Pacific Fleet Diesel Submarine Brigades in the workout of the combat training tasks. For instance, the Submarine Brigade deployed in the Bay of Vladimir worked out the following method established by the Formation Commander: the submarine crew, after the fulfillment of the first (organizational) task was denied exit to the sea until it conducted 100 crash dives in the Bay (all the more so, the depths allowed it). With this end in view, the submarine moved to the middle of the Bay and dived and resurfaced, like a float, first without propulsion, then on the move, untill the high-pressure air resource was used up. Then, the air compressors were activated untill the high-pressure air resource was fully replenished, and the workout continued untill the sub made 100 crash divings. Such kind of training helped work out the automatic performance of the sophisticated and most important maneuvre both by the entire crew, and by each separate combat shift that allowed the submarine, in combat duty, to elude successfully the detection by enemy aircraft.

After solo submarines accumulated autonomous cruise experience, the task for the submarine group deployment was assigned. This implied the autonomous actions of several submarines in adjacent patrol areas. Thereby, the considerable surface area of the potential occurrence of fleet BM submarines, nuclear propulsion was blocked by search actions. In this case, the submarines made the passage till the Korea Strait independently. The rendezvous point was assigned before the Korea Strait. The submarines traversed the Strait jointly and also jointly moved on until they reached the points for each submarine to dive in. From the dive points, each submarine moved alone to the designated area. This deployment procedure imposed heavy responsibilities on the controlling Staff for ensuring submarines mutual security. There were cases, when the Fleet Staff, having obtained information about the passage of the U.S. Navy Aircraft Carrier Battle Group, reconfigured the submarines into the screening force in the area of the probable passage of the Aircraft Carrier Battle Group. This combat formation of the Submarine Group is most complicated both from the security viewpoint, and from the viewpoint of submarine control. The point is that the submarines, reconfigured into the screening force, must move in alignment, maintaining the assigned intervals betwen them, the assigned course, speed and the submerged depth. In spite of the challenges, this method of operation was used with success.

Later, several submarines underwent renovation, following which their autonomous endurance was expanded to 45 days and nights. In the course of the renovation, the new hydroacoustic station was installed and a number of other improvements were made. But the renovation did not affect the crew's habitable environment--it became even more complicated.

In 1965, the U.S. unleashed the war against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. To make reconnaissance and to monitor the activity of the U.S. Navy, the C-145 submarine was sent for combat duty to the South China Sea in August 1965. This was the unique cruise both for the remoteness of the combat area from the naval base (over 2,000 miles), and for the time of its realization (August and September are the hottest months, when typhoons are in the making). Inspite of the unbearable conditions: the temperature in the compartments of up to 60[degrees]C, fearful humidity, limited fresh water supplies (one litre per person for 24 hours), the crew successfully fulfilled the assigned mission. The cruise of this submarine under command of Capt. 2nd Rank V.I. Shchekotov was the demonstartion of the high quality naval school training of the Soviet diesel submariners and of the Soviet diesel submarine shipbuilding.

The diesel-powered submarines became the officer training school for the nuclear-powered submarine fleet, and also served as the test base for the proving trials and practical implementation of the most audacious ideas of our scientists and designers. It was on diesel submarines that our first cruise and ballistic missile systems, new hydroacoustic systems and other equipment were optimized. But by the end of the 60s of the previous century, the era of the medium diesel-powered submarines ended. In the Pacific Fleet, they began to be replaced by the large diesel-powered torpedo submarines and missile-firing submarines

The U.S.S.R.'s Navy was entering the ocean gaining epoch in view of the new emerging tasks, but the role of diesel submarines in their implementation was significamt, too.

In April-May 1970, the combat-ready forces of all our fleets were deployed in the ocean and sea zones under the uniform idea and plan of the Training Exercises code-named "Ocean" headed by the Naval Forces Commander-in-Chief. The Pacific Fleet diesel submarines directly participated in these exercises, too. The medium diesel submarines, which remained in the tactical composition by this time, were deployed in the Sea of Japan on-station near the Tsugaru Strait and the Korea Strait with the task of detecting and monitoring U.S. Navy Aircraft Carrier Battle Groups entering the Sea of Japan. In the central part of the Sea of Japan, the S-62 radar picket submarine, fitted with the powerful Radio Detection and Ranging equipment, was placed on combat duty. This submarine made the reconnaissance of the surface and underwater picture over the vast area. Several diesel submarines as part of the mixed anti-submarine forces conducted the anti-submarine search operation in the Peter the Great Bay for detecting and expulsing the U.S. subs, which constatntly made reconnaissance on the approaches to the Fleet's main naval base.

The Project 641 large diesel submarines conducted massive search for U.S. fleet BM subs, nuclear propulsion in the Philippine Sea.

Apart from participation in such large-scale exercises, the diesel submarines were fulfilling various, it would seem, routine tasks, which were none the less challenging and critical. For instance, one of the Submarine Brigades was encharged by the Command with the task of preparing the submarines to perfom the gravimetrical surveys in the Pacific and Indian Oceans. The cruise duration was nine months. The reserve submarine crew was detailed for the purpose, as well as the motorship and the tanker were provided for off-duty crew rest, for fresh food, fuel and fresh water supplies. The choice fell on the B-833 large diesel submarine (Commander Capt. 2nd Rank A.I. Petrov, who was the Cruise Senior Officer). The submarine was fitted with the equipment for the gravimetric field survey, and had specialists attached to operate this equipment and to conduct the surveys. The task, it would seem, was non-combat and extrinsic to submarines, nevertheless, it was of nationwide importance, being implemented, among other things, also for defense purposes, because this data was needed for the computation of the flight trajectories of artificial earth satellites, cruise and ballistic missiles and for other applied aims. This challenging task was successfully fulfilled, too, thanks to the submarine crew enormous efforts. In fact, the survey itinerary was traced off the intensive navigation lines and in the areas, where our submarines had never operated before, where fresh gales and hurricanes were not infrequent coupled with tropical heat. All this caused high temperature in the submarine compartments.

In the 70s of the previous century, the U.S.S.R. intensively expanded its interests in the World Ocean by concluding agreements with friendly countries for the setting-up, on their territories, of the ships' logistical support centers. For instance, thanks to our logistical support center in the Vietnamese Kampan naval base, the materiel and technical support for the ships, operating in far-off regions, improved considerably, by reducing the timeframes for maintenance work and emergency repairs between cruises and by increasing the time for the fulfillment of tasks in combat deployment areas.

After the deployment in the Indian Ocean, on the permanent basis, of the Pacific Fleet 8th Operational Squadron (informally code-named "Indian"), it included two or three large diesel submarines (Project 641), operating on the permanent basis, which sustained 9-18 month combat duty (while the autonomous submarine endurance lasted 90 days and nights), with single crew rotation during the entire combat duty period. This did not mean that the submarines were constantly present on the battle positions. The submarine combat duty period included the time spent in anchor hold points to refuel, to get food and water supplies and to make other reserves, the anchorage time in the naval base for regular overhaul, for crew wash and rest, and the time for calls at foreign ports as part of naval detachments. For all that, the combat duty of submarines (and of other Pacific Fleet ships) was the critical strength check of our Navy's readiness, the submariners' moral qualities, their stamina, endurance and training. The diesel submarines forming part of the Pacific Fleet 8th Operational Squadron participated in all the missions conducted by the Squadron: provided the security of our ships in the Persian Gulf during the military conflict between Iran and Iraq, supported the operational regime in the northern regions of the Indian Ocean during the complicated situations in connection with Iraq's incursion in Kuwait, monitored U.S. aircraft carrier battle groups, searched for U.S. nuclear-powered subs.

The Pacific Fleet diesel submarines became the trailblazers of the depths in the vastness of the ocean with all the complexities, difficulties and misfortunes appropriate of the trailblazers. The Pacific Fleet nuclear-powered submarines continued the development of the oceans using the trails blazed by them.

The importance of diesel submarines in fulfilling the tasks of the Naval Forces have not dwindled in modern conditions. The construction of the more sophisticated submarines of this type is going on, although not with the rates of the past. The nuclear-powered fleet has not ousted diesel submarines from the high seas. Today, after 100 years have passed since the birth of first diesel submarines, they continue firmly maintaining their important place in the structure of Russia's Naval Forces.

Rear Admiral V.S. PROZOROV (Ret.)

Viktor Sergeyevich PROZOROV was born on 28 April 1937 in Ukraine. He graduated from the Lenin Komsomol Higher Naval School (1959), the Navy's Higher Officer Courses (1968), the Naval Academy (1974). He served on the Pacific Fleet diesel submarines (1959-1968). In the ensuing years, the Master Navigation Officer of the Submarine Brigade (1968-1972), Special Center Senior Research Officer (1974-1978), Senior Officer, Deputy Section Head, Section Head, Naval General Staff Operations Department (1985-1992)