Democracy and development in Nepal: prospects and challenges.

people who have joined the parties became influenced directly or indirectly in the late 1960s by the ideology of Mao's cultural revolution. The majority of them became communists because of their anti-Nepali Congress and anti-India stand while others were encouraged by the supporters of the panchayati workers as a counterweight against the Nepali Congress party. Family connection or influence is another factor that influenced some of the members and supporters of the communist movement. What is noticeable is that most of young and middle aged communist supporters cherish freedom, strive for western life styles, and have high paying jobs. Those who live in the rural areas or whose families are living INTRODUCTION

A number of Third World countries have moved either from military dictatorships or one-party authoritarianism to pluralistic democracy in recent years. Nepal, which has a variegated history with respect to democracy, is one of the countries which changed from an absolute to a constitutional monarchy. Nepal achieved democracy and restored the position of the monarchy after the overthrow of the Rana oligarchy in 1951. In 1959, Nepal held its first parliamentary elections which gave the Nepali Congress party a landslide victory. However, Nepal's experiment with parliamentary democracy ended in December 1960 when King Mahendra, the father of the present king, abruptly dismissed the cabinet and dissolved the parliament. The king also banned political parties and imposed restrictions on the most fundamental human rights. After a brief period of direct rule, the king introduced a monolithic one-party authoritarian system of government called "partyless panchayat" in 1962. Nepal's main political parties, the Nepali Congress and the Nepal Communist party, had been organizing a resistance movement since the royal takeover in 1960. In February 1990, Nepal's major opposition political parties led by the Nepali Congress and supported by the United Left Front launched a popular movement for restoring democracy (MRD). Incipient with a series of demonstrations and protest marches initially concentrated in the Kathmandu Valley and a few Terai cities, the movement was intensified throughout the country by early April 1990. Capitulating to popular demand, King Birendra abolished the panchayat system and restored a multiparty system by lifting a ban on political parties on April 8, 1990.

Managing democratic change in developing countries has not been easy. If power-hungry politicians and party workers have been trying to unseat elected governments, leaders of elected governments have sought more authority and power. Lack of effective democratic institutions, experience, training and political skills, and resources are some of the problems which must be faced in building "a strong cultural and civic infrastructure of democracy."(1) A number of new democracies are struggling to establish a framework for viable legal and economic systems in the midst of growing economic hardship and rising expectations of their populations. Nepal's newly acquired democracy faces all these challenges. Peoples' expectations are turning into frustration because the government, despite promises, has not been able to provide economic relief measures such as reductions in prices and increases in supplies of the most essential commodities. It is the objective of this paper to analyze the prospects for development under Nepal's newly acquired democracy. The paper is organized into three parts: the first part provides a short introduction on the transition from absolute to constitutional monarchy; the second part analyzes the prospects for development in a democratic framework; and the last part discusses the challenges facing this new democracy and offers several conclusions.

THE DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION

From December 1960 to April 1990, Nepal was ruled by absolute monarchy and its system of government was called partyless panchayat democracy. The king ruled under the partyless panchayat system both as a head of the state and the government, advised by two centres of political power, the Council of Ministers and his Palace Secretariat. The partyless system was originally based on a four-tier system where representation and power ascended from a village to district, district to zone and zone to the national legislatures. Until 1980, elections were held indirectly on a strictly nonpartisan basis. The constitutional reforms announced in December 1980 allowed direct voting and an accountable executive, but imposed a ban on political parties until the overthrow of the system in April 1990. Under the old constitution, the sovereignty of the country was vested in the king. While limited fundamental rights were allowed, all powers -- executive, legislative, and judicial -- emanated from the king.

A number of factors, both internal and external, contributed to the restoration of a multiparty democracy in Nepal in early 1990. Four major internal factors could be attributed to the downfall of the panchayat system. First there was the relentless and uninterrupted struggle by the banned Nepali Congress and various Communist factions to restore democracy since the early 1960s, despite the fact that until 1989, the Nepali Congress and the United Marxist-Leninist parties vehemently opposed each other. This was the most influential internal factor for restoring democracy. The second factor was the growth in the size of the urban educated middle class, including the student force which was the most organized and vociferous oppositional force in the country. The third factor was the systemic crisis in the panchayat system caused by democratic reforms introduced in 1980. This led to group formations and interest alliances. The weakening unity of the panchayat workers and their declining loyalty to the system were evident from their disagreement and disharmony of interests revealed during the MRD. In January 1990, the opposition group within the National Panchayat denounced the MRD but at the same time criticized the government for its divisive and confrontational stance and its failure to correct systemic distortions. On April 1, 1990, the king dismissed nine of the twenty-nine ministers for their criticism of the crackdown against the banned political parties. The fourth factor was the economic situation which included rising urban unemployment and prices, growing inequalities, and worsening poverty. The failure of the panchayat system to fulfill the most basic needs of the majority of the population contributed to its downfall. The absence of effective political participation, and the lack of political accountability and sense of commitment, were factors that were responsible for the worsening poverty and inequality during the panchayat period. The partyless panchayat system bore some of the characteristics of state corporatism. As defined by Phillipe Schmitter, state corporatism "tends to be associated with political systems in which territorial subunits are tightly subordinated to central bureaucratic power; elections are nonexistent or plebiscitary, party systems are dominated or monopolized by a weak single party; executive authorities are ideologically exclusive and narrowly recruited and political subcultures based on class, ethnicity, language or regionalism are repressed." The main flaw of the panchayat system was such that most of the members who became political shareholders of the state-corporate worked to maximize profits and dividends for themselves rather than for the state corporation.(2)

Two major external factors could be attributed to the success of the MRD; the international movement for freedom and democracy of the late 1980s, and the impact of Nepal's trade and transit disputes with India. King Birendra, who succumbed to the demands of the popular movement for democracy in April 1990, acknowledged in an interview that "unforeseen economic factors and the question of political change within Nepalese society coincided with changes in the international arena which were unprecedented in recent history and monumental in scope and magnitude."(3) The crisis in Nepal-India relations(4) after the lapse of the trade and transit treaty in March 1989 "contributed heavily to inflation, and slow economic growth"(5) and consequently to lower per capita income. The trade and transit dispute between the two countries was resolved by the interim government in June 1990.

Nepal's transformation from an absolute to a constitutional monarchy came relatively quickly as compared with violent struggles elsewhere. A historic announcement was made by King Birendra on April 8, 1990 within seven weeks of the launching of the MRD. The king removed the word "partyless" from the preamble of the constitution and scrapped an act that banned political parties. Within a week, the National Panchayat, the Panchayat Policy and Evaluation Committee, the class organizations, and the new Council of Ministers (that was formed on April 6, 1990) were dissolved. Then the king on April 19, 1990 formed an interim government headed by Mr. K.P. Bhattarai, the acting president of the Nepali Congress party. As stated repeatedly by the members of the interim government, its main tasks were to frame a new constitution and to hold general elections. The members of the Constitution Reforms Recommendation Commissions (formed on May 11, 1990) were grumbling over the amount of representation and the contents of the draft constitution. Due to the concerns raised by this group, a new constitution was announced by King Birendra on November 9, 1990. This constitution transferred the untrammeled power of the monarch to the people. According to the new constitution (2047), sovereignty is vested in the people. As described by the prime minister of the interim government, "the people have received the Constitution as a certificate of people's sovereignty."(6) Fundamental rights, protection of liberty and the due process of law are guaranteed in the preamble to the constitution. The Crown has been declared the symbol of Nepalese nationality and the unity of the people. The constitution also laid down that "all acts performed by the crown, except those exclusively within the king's domain, will be performed only with the advice and consent of the council of ministers." Under the new constitution, the king's assent will be required for legislation to become law. However, the king will not be entitled to veto legislation. The army will be controlled by the elected government under a National Defense Council. Only on the advice of the government can the king exercise emergency powers. But within ninety days, both houses of parliament can choose to endorse this action.

The new constitution was the first major step in the process of institutionalizing democracy in Nepal. The new constitution declared Nepal "a multi-ethnic, multi-linguistic, democratic, independent, sovereign, Hindu constitutional monarchy." The constitution provides for a bicameral legislature, a House of Representatives of 205 members elected directly, and a 60-member Upper House elected on a proportional representation system.(7) One-third of the Upper House will retire every two years. The constitution is a product of political and legal speculations and anticipations between the two major and diametrically opposite political parties. It was also a compromise between them and the monarchy. It thus reflects many of the elements of checks and balances, and may also sometimes lead to a constitutional deadlock or impasse.(8)

On May 12, 1991, Nepal had its first general election in thirty-two years for a competitive pluralistic democratic system of government. The Nepali Congress won 110 seats in a 205-member House of Representatives. This party obtained 37 percent of the total votes cast. The Communist Party of Nepal (UML) won 69 seats, obtaining about 28 percent of the total votes cast, and became the main opposition party. Three other variants of Communist parties won some seats in this election. These are the Sanyukta Jan Morcha (United Peoples Front), the Communist Party of Nepal (democratic) and the Nepal Workers and Peasants Party (a local variant of a radical Communist party). The party in power also faced opposition from the Terai-based party, called the Nepal Sadbhavana Party (Nepal Goodwill Party) which won six seats. Ironically, two political parties, the National Democratic Party (Chand) and National Democratic Party (Thapa), comprised of the former members of the dissolved panchayat system, were able to win three and one seats respectively. However, by comparison, the former party (Chand) was able to secure 6 percent of the total votes cast and secured the third largest vote. According to the Election Commission's final results, some twenty parties were in the final race, some of which were guided by ethnic considerations. However, the Nepalese people by and large stood up above ethnicism, regionalism and cultural parochialism.

The general elections, the formation of a Nepali Congress government, and successfully conducting the local elections for village and municipal development committees (in May 1992) completed the transition from absolute to constitutional monarchy. The full-fledged democratic era that began in Nepal in 1990 poses the question: Will Nepal be able to institutionalize pluralistic democracy and foster just and equitable development in the country? In the following section we examine this issue.

DEMOCRACY AND DEVELOPMENT: THE PROSPECT

There is no conclusive evidence of a positive correlation between democracy and economic development. Some political scientists(9) found that modernization theory, measured in terms of socioeconomic indicators, showed a positive relationship with democracy. But some other recent studies(10) found that civil liberties and per capita GNP showed inconsequential or no positive evidence of this relationship. It is also observed that democracy is not incompatible with development. Development in this paper is perceived in a broader context. In more specific terms, development is considered as a multidimensional change. The main objective of development is to bring about desirable holistic change encompassing economic, social and political aspects. The goal of economic development and change can be attained through acceleration of growth, alleviation of poverty, and reduction of inequalities. The goal of social development and change can be achieved through positive societal change in attitudes, beliefs, traditions and values. And the goal of political development and change can be achieved through guarantee of civil liberties, popular participation, representative and accountable administrative and political structures, formalization of institutions and party organizations, and effective and higher decentralization. It is hypothesized that the democratic exercise in Nepal will create positive awareness about the socioeconomic and political development among the poorest but the largest sections of the society. Over time, this will enlarge the base of the middle class "which has long been associated in political theory with modernization, tolerance and democracy."(11) It is the belief that in poor countries like Nepal, development will be lopsided, dualistic and unequal as well as politically unstable in the absence of a representative democratic system.

Nepal's recent democratic experiment indicates a high degree of political mobilization through the formation of groups and parties. Immediately after the dissolution of the partyless panchayat system in April 1990, several pressure groups and political parties were formed. Within days of the formation of the interim government, most of the pressure groups started to ventilate their bottled-up grievances which made it difficult for the transitional government to restore order and peace. On a positive note, these groups also articulated group interests and represented the reactions and expectations of various classes and sections of the Nepalese society.

The entry of forty different political parties in the May 1991 general election not only enhanced political competition, but also brought various domestic and international issues before the general public. A study of the election manifestos of various political parties, however, indicates that Nepal does have very limited choices when it comes to public policy. Where the parties differed in their ideologies was in their methods of implementation. Except for the Communist parties, who promoted radical slogans such as the redistribution of land and house property by confiscation from the richer sections of the society, most political parties differed very little in their approaches. Nevertheless, some 1,345 candidates were in the election fray for a 205-seat house. All those candidates represented people from all over the country. The proposed programs and plans these candidates put to the electorate were an opportunity to educate the people and encourage their participation. This was the first time in thirty-two years that the people had such an opportunity. From the point of view of political assimilation and integration, it is important to note the election victory of the pahadis (the hill men) from the madhesiya (Terai) constituencies, and a non-Newar candidate from the predominantly Newar community. The election results defy the assumption of the supporters of the panchayat system that democracy divides peoples rather than uniting them.

Freedom and democracy create political conditions for development. As stated earlier, a peoples' mandate to a certain political party means a majority approval of that party's policies and programs. For example, people gave their mandate to the democratic socialist orientation of the Nepali Congress for its development policies and programs. The Nepali Congress, which is now the ruling party in the country, is obliged to fulfill its electoral promises, not only by improving the socioeconomic conditions of the people, but also by its interest in returning to power in the future. According to the Nepali Congress's manifesto, the party is committed to enable the majority of the poorer section of the society to earn an income adequate for meeting fundamental needs such as food and clothing, education, housing, medicine and entertainment. Guided by these fundamental objectives, the Nepali Congress candidates, like those of other parties, made several commitments to their respective constituencies. In general, these promises included provision for the construction of roads, the delivery of safe drinking water, health clinics, education and inputs for the establishment of cottage industries. No such electoral promises were politically possible in the dissolved partyless system, because those who contested elections were not allowed to form any group alliance, let alone a political party.

In consonance with the spirit of electoral promises, certain radical announcements were made by the prime minister of the Nepali Congress government. One of these announcements was a promise to bring the dual ownership of land to an end -- "a problem left over by the panchayat regime."(12) Similar announcements were made regarding environment, industrial policy and privatization.

Since 95 percent of Nepal's population lives in rural areas, Nepal's development means the development of the rural areas. This is clearly the objective of development in Nepal as spelled out by the government in its budgets and plans. The government expressed its commitment to "strive to take the fruits of economic development to the poor and destitute rural population with a development strategy based on people's participation. To achieve this objective, the government gives priority to primary education, primary health care, potable water supply, rural transportation, environmental conservation as well as income and employment generating activities in agriculture and small cottage industry sector."(13) The government has planned to invest 70 percent of its total expenditure for rural development.

It is emphasized here that the political mechanisms for presenting development policy and programs to the public and getting their approval or rejection through democratic elections were missing in the previous system. Even more important than the political mechanisms was the lack of unity in both policies and their implementation in the partyless system. Under the multiparty system, policy and programs of the ruling party should be endorsed and supported by the party's members of the parliament. For example, the Nepali Congress, the ruling party, passed an "economic resolution" in its eighth convention held in February 1992. The members of the Nepali Congress party are morally as well as politically obliged to work towards attainment of the goals.

The Nepali Congress, the ruling party, gained comfortable majorities in local political bodies. Theoretically, local political bodies will be exercising more political and economic powers under multi-party democracy as compared with the partyless system. This is ensured by the Decentralization Act passed by the government. The local elections for 4,000 villages and 36 towns held in May 1992 will contribute to empowering local self-government. This will be necessary to maintain Nepal's multiethnic mosaic and to mobilize human and financial resources for development. Very comparable to the Pakistani scenario, as described by Rose, are the rural elites of Nepal, who will control about 90 percent of the seats in the parliament. The rural elites will be more supportive of the democratic system than the urban elites, "who use the rhetoric of democracy enthusiastically but have reservations about any system based upon the power-to-the people concept, given the rural-urban population ratios."(14) In addition, there is also a whole network of party workers who should in principle be working to accomplish the government's objectives. This kind of political mechanism was totally absent in the partyless system. Ironically, the only uniting factor in the partyless system was personal interest, which has been replaced by party interests in a multi-party system.

The presence of a strong opposition force, represented by the Communist and radical parties from the moderate and extreme left, and by the vanguards of the old shambles from the far right, have led to a situation of a political equilibrium. The Nepali Congress party, which represents centre-left viewpoints, is forced to eke out a policy that may not be optimum but may be politically acceptable to its opposition. Every issue, vital or trivial, has the possibility of being scrutinized politically by the opposition. This may lead to negotiations. Similarly, any issue that is vital for political interests of various political forces will be opposed to the point whereby all the political forces find a compromise solution. Depending on the strengths and weakness of various parties, and political equilibrium and its consequences, opposition and negotiations will prevent the ruling party from being undemocratic or authoritarian. This inherent check and balance will impose vigilance and careful consideration on the party of the government. There are high political costs for lack of progress, inefficiency, corruption and delays in delivering the goods to the electorate. These political risks have enhanced prospects for democratic development in the country which were absent for nearly three decades.

Another factor that imposes political costs on the ruling party is the media. Since the restoration of democracy, there has been a considerable growth of news media. For example, the number of newspapers increased from 476 in 1988-89 to about 509 in 1989-90 (about a 7 percent increase in a single year). The largest increase was found in the central development region (which includes the capital region). The number of newspapers in this region increased from 343 to 367 during this period. More than the quantity of newspapers, it is the freedom of publication that matters. Political interest groups, lobbyists and political forces who are disposed to discredit the government are many. Journalism becomes vulnerable in their hands and governmental activities are a priority. One could be equivocal about the authenticity and the reliability of the press in democratic Nepal. However, the press can sensationalize issues that demand public attention. This was not the situation during the panchayat regime. Newspapers were censored and only those who subscribed to the government policy could survive. The implication is that the growth of public media has a significant role to play in enhancing government's efficiency.

During the partyless panchayat periods, the main political debates were over the system of government. The debate as to what system of government is best has in fact absorbed the energy and resources during the last three decades. Even the Communists and the supporters of the partyless system have participated in the on-going democratic process which should create conditions for strong opposition and check and balances. This not only marks the end of the struggle over the system but should contribute to reaching the people through democratic opposition. The wide support for constitutional monarchy throughout the country by various political groups (except for a few so-called republicanists) and the king, should contribute to political stability which is a necessary condition for development.

The Nepali Congress government has been encouraging serious political challenges since its formation, both from within and outside the parliament. Unlike in many fledgling democracies, Nepal's politics is controlled by two ideologically hostile parties, the Nepali Congress, and the United Marxist-Leninist (which includes various other Communist factions). These parties have fundamentally different approaches to a number of domestic policy issues. However, the most important factor that distinguishes them is their perceptions about Nepal's relations with India. In the following section, we discuss some of the challenges the government has been facing in its efforts to institutionalize democracy and promote development.

THE CHALLENGES

Democracy, as stated by Larry Diamond, "is the most widely admired type of political system but also perhaps the most difficult to maintain."(15) Nepal's transformation from an authoritarian to a pluralistic multiparty democracy has been difficult as the country has experienced every imaginable kind of political ferment. The unity between the two opposite political parties, the Nepali Congress and the United Leftist, which worked together to restore democracy and facilitate transition to the elected government, turned into open hostility and competition for power during the elections and thereafter. Ever since the formation of the Nepali Congress government, it has been encountering serious political challenges.

I. The Role of the Opposition

Unhealthy democratic trends began to surface with the inaugural session of the country's first parliamentary session. Considering that democracy was absent in the country for thirty-two years, the exchange of heated debates over various issues was not unexpected. As the July 1991 and February 1992 sessions of the parliament have shown, creating healthy parliamentary precedents in the country has remained one of the major problems. The use of different regional languages by some parliamentary members, rather than the national language as specifically prescribed in the house regulations, created procedural impasses in the parliament. The parliament ruled that members could speak in their native language if they wished (there are about forty languages spoken by fifty ethnic groups). However, a ruling was made that the Nepali language, which is the lingua franca and is spoken by 58 percent of the total population, would continue to be used for official and Parliamentary business.

In a multiethnic and multilingual country, democracy should be a means to maintain cultural and linguistic identity. Insofar as the policy of allowing multilingualism at the national government level is concerned, such a policy may lead to conflict and controversy. First, Nepal is not a federal state.(16) Second, even if Nepal is a multilinguistic society, there is no dominance of one particular language in a particular region or territory. Third, a large number of the languages and dialects are extinct and have been absorbed by the Nepali language. Finally, the wrangles over the use of some of the languages in the parliament are deeply entrenched in nationalistic and socioeconomic fabrics. The UML members of parliament opposed members representing the Terai constituency speaking in Hindi (which is one of the official languages of India), instead of in Maithili or Bhojpuri. This action was taken to stop the influence of India in Nepali politics. The Maithili and Bhojpuri languages are predominant Terai languages which are spoken by 11 and 7 percent of the total population respectively. Similarly, members from the Terai and the mountain regions opposed the use of Newari language by some members representing the Kathmandu Valley, the Newari language being spoken by 3 percent of the population. This language is considered as the language of the privileged and economically dominant class of the Kathmandu Valley. Official unilingualism at the national level and freedom of choice of language at the regional or local level could best assure political comity in Nepal.

Incidentally, the United Marxist Leninist Party considered the Nepali Congress to be its arch enemy from the time of its formation until its joining the MRD. Mr. K.P. Bhattarai, the interim prime minister, was somehow able to win over their friendship and cooperation because of his saintly and unblemished image. But soon the Communists turned to bitter rivalry against the Nepali Congress during the May 1991 elections and thereafter. In fact, some of the Communists(17) are believed to have infiltrated the panchayat system with the goal of supporting the banned Communist parties in their efforts to overthrow the system. Some of the members of the dissolved panchayat system were so concerned about the growing influence of the Communist faction that they "established a Democratic Panchayat Forum" to "counter the growing influence of the communist faction" in the Rastriya Panchayat (the national legislature). Mr. G. P. Koirala, the prime minister, is considered to be the most outspoken anti-Communist leader of the Nepali Congress. He, however, preferred to be a pragmatist and took an accommodative posture towards Communists immediately after becoming prime minister. He hoped that "the opposition would accept the harsh realities of the country and provide active support to the government in the day-to-day administration of the country, in institutionalizing the development of democracy and in eliminating poverty from the country." But the UML and other Communist parties are bent upon ousting Mr. Koirala from power as early as possible. Mr. Madan Bhandari, the general secretary of the UML Party -- a man who rose from obscurity to popularity because of his election victory over Mr. K.P. Bhattarai -- has stated repeatedly that his party will do everything to oust the Nepali Congress government as soon as possible. The UML party's opinion is divided on the extent of the opposition, but a large section of the young and radical members are determined to dislodge the government and replace it with a Communist regime.(18)

Another staunch opposition party is led by Sayunkta Jana Morcha (United Peoples Front, also called the Maoist revolutionary party). The leaders of this party advocate that parliamentary democracy only perpetuates the interests of feudalism and the bourgeoisie. Ideologically, the United Peoples' Front believes neither in elections nor in democracy. But according to the party leaders, the reason the party contested the election was merely to work to tear it down from the root and establish the so-called Naulo Janabad (new democracy). In addition, two Communist-oriented parties (insignificant though if seen individually), the Nepal Workers and Peasants Party, and the Communist Party of Nepal (Democratic), have been supporting the UML's move to oppose the Koirala government. Another Communist party known as Mashal (lighted torch), which did not participate in the election and is believed to represent a Naxalite variant of Maoism, considers the Nepali Congress as its main enemy. Then there is the Unity Centre, another radical faction of the Communist party, which organized a violent agitation in early February 1992 in which seven people were killed. The centre blamed the government for price increases, corruption, smuggling and blackmarketeering and failure to solve the problem of squatters and landless people.

The future direction of the Communist parties of Nepal with regard to its India policy will depend on the nature of the Sino-Indian relations. Although the UML is vague on the definition of Nepal's balanced and equitable relations with India and China, the role of the Communist parties is vital for a number of important issues of national interest. The main reason for this is Nepal's constitution. Article 126 of the constitution requires a two-thirds majority of the house for ratification of an international treaty or agreement on specific issues related to friendship and cooperation, security and strategic matters, boundary, utilization and distribution of benefits of natural resources. The Nepali Congress does not have a two-third majority in the house and therefore has to rely for both consensus and cooperation on the UML.

For much of the country's travails, the Communists raised the Indian bogey during the election campaign. Most of the Communist parties see India as viscerally hegemonistic and expansionist, and treat anti-Indianism as a synonym for Nepali nationalism. The various Communist parties have been opposing the trade and transit treaties and the memorandum of understanding on sharing water resources signed by the Nepali prime minister in December 1991. The members of the main opposition along with members of other oppositional parties boycotted some of the early sessions of the winter session of the parliament which began on February 21, 1992. The opposition parties demanded that the government table the relevant documents on the understanding concerning water resources with India. The opposition led by the UML has challenged the constitutionality of some accords. It has also challenged both the constitutionality and the advantages for Nepal as claimed by the government of some other accords signed with India. Indeed, utilization and benefit sharing of water resources between Nepal and India has been a serious bone of contention since the 1950s. Viewed from the criticisms levelled by the Communist forces on Gandak and Koshi river projects in the past, it is no wonder that the Tanakpur barrage project (one of the projects signed between India and Nepal in 1991) has received by far the most serious attacks from the opposition.(19) The opposition has been criticizing the government for implementing accords related to issues included in the constitution without their ratification by a two-thirds majority in the house. From outside the parliament, a lawyer filed a writ petition at the Supreme Court on December 17, 1991 demanding that the new treaties and agreements signed with India in December 1991 not be implemented until they were approved by the parliament. The petition has serious political implications for Nepal. The prime minister will be under pressure to resign if the Supreme Court hearing goes against the government, the defendant.

The non-Communist opposition in the parliament accounts for little more than 6 percent of the votes. Most of these members are apt in creating their identity as well as credibility by means of criticism of the government. For this reason, they even align with the Communist factions. For example, in the winter session of the parliament, the non-Communist members, other than those of the Goodwill party, supported the Communists on the sensitive issue concerning the understanding reached between Nepal and India on water resources. The non-Communist opposition parties are either regional or ethnocentric in orientation. Legally, the constitution (1990) bars the Election Commission from recognizing political parties based on religion, caste, community, tribe, or region or parties founded for the purpose of disturbing the national unity. In practice, it is hard to control these premises as none of the parties describes its goals as those which are forbidden by the constitution. But if one looks into the membership or the issues promoted, their political orientation becomes self-evident. In their search for a regional identity and political viability, these parties' opposition is limited to their goal orientations. For example, the Goodwill party has been opposing the government for its failure to solve the grievances of the Terai region. The people of the lowland commonly known as the "Terai" feel that they have been discriminated against in matters concerning citizenship, employment, and representation in civil and military service. Issues such as citizenship were critical even during the last period of the previous system, and the Sadbhavana party (the Goodwill party), was successful in capitalizing on these issues. Both the Nepali Congress and the various Communist factions also have a sizeable representation among the Terai population.

Some other parties like the Nepal National People's Liberation Front, which did not win a single seat in the general elections, demanded a "federal state, provincial autonomy, and political representation to |sic~ ethnic groups in proportion to their population."(20) However, serious ethnic and regional problems could emerge if the government fails to ensure equity and fairness in its public policy decisions. Another risk is that in odd times, such political parties may become gullible to both internal and external forces and be subject to manipulation and coercion.

The vanguards of the old regime masquerading under the veil of democratic parties were routed at the polls. All the former prime ministers of the partyless regime were defeated and their parties fared so poorly in the election that their parliamentary opposition is almost insignificant. But it is certain that the supporters of the old system could become a force to be reckoned with in the near future. As the parties of the former supporters of the panchayat system are vying for being an alternative to the Nepali Congress, the two parties, the National Democratic party (Chand) and National Democratic party (Thapa) have merged and formed the United National Democratic party in February 1992. Another group of the former panchayat supporters has formed the National Party Alliance in February 1992 with the objective of becoming an alternative to the Nepali Congress.

II. The Fear of a Royal Backlash

Constitutional monarchy can be a positive factor in institutionalizing democracy in Nepal. Unfortunately there still exist some clouds of mistrust and misunderstanding between the political parties and the monarchy. Two major events in the early transitional phase contributed to further the misunderstanding between the major political parties and the monarchy. The first was the formation of the seven-member Constitution Reforms Recommendation Commission by the king on May 11, 1990 "without consulting" the prime minister about its membership. Mr. G.P. Koirala, the then general secretary of the Nepali Congress, alleged that some of the members of the commission were "undesirable" and that the people wanted not a reformed constitution, but "a new, and separate constitution." The king on May 15, 1990, however, dissolved the commission and constituted a new commission on the recommendation of the prime minister. The second event was the release of a draft of the constitution on October 21, 1990 which it claimed to have been "prepared in consultation with the Prime Minister." Mr. Bhattarai denied that the "royal palace draft had been prepared in consultation with him." The king's counter draft of the constitution, if transpired, would have left his "executive, legislative and judiciary powers intact, as under the Panchayat system. The draft empowered the King to dismiss the prime minister, dissolve the House of Representatives under emergency powers and appoint a new one. It deleted all references to the historic democracy movement contained in the draft prepared by the Constitution Commission endorsed by the (interim) Cabinet."(21)

The royal action created confusion and uncertainty and consequently sparked off a wave of protest across the nation. A new constitution, which fulfilled people's aspirations, was finally promulgated on November 9, 1990. Some political circles were critical of the royal appointment of ambassadors made during the interim government without consulting the prime minister. All these events created distrust and misunderstanding about the role of the king. But the king seems to be well reconciled with this reality and has been staying within constitutional limits. He has clearly stated that the institution of monarchy in Nepal "always abided by the value and norms prevailing at any time. In more recent time, it is the Constitution in existence which has guided the monarchy. In this context I have abided by the spirit and provisions of the 1990 Constitution, which institutionalizes multi-party democracy in a constitutional monarchy."(22) The king also told me that he would like to see that constitutional monarchy become well embedded in Nepali politics.

One of the problems in fragile democracies is that political events change very fast and tend to become unpredictable. The speculation that the palace might be forced to take over if the democratic government fails to maintain law and order in the country has created some degree of political uncertainty in Nepal. Moreover, the Nepali Congress government has not been able to buy the loyalty and commitment of the military and police force. The thirty-five-thousand-strong military force is still very loyal to the palace. This is obvious from the circular sent on June 23, 1991 by the Military Operation and Staff Duties Unit of the G Branch of the Royal Army Headquarters to all army units. It directed them to submit a suggestion to the Constitution Recommendation Commission stating that the king should remain the supreme commander-in-chief and field marshall of the Royal Nepal Army. It also directed them to suggest that "sovereignty must be vested in His Majesty, who should control the army." Fortunately, the aborted coup attempt and the victory for democracy and freedom in the Soviet Union in August 1991 highlights the fact that democracy cannot always be taken back from the people. So long as the monarchy remains within the constitutional limits, it will be in the best interest of the country to preserve monarchy which is the oldest political institution in the country. In a geopolitically sensitive country like Nepal, the retention of the constitutional monarchy will help maintain balance between different communities and political forces. If both the king and the political forces are guided by the constitution, monarchy can make positive contributions towards institutionalizing democracy in the country by way of resolving any parliamentary crises that may occur from time to time.

III. Fulfillment of Peoples' Expectation

Another serious challenge before the democratic government is the rising expectations of the people. It is correctly stated that "democracy will not be valued by the people unless it deals effectively with social and economic problems and achieves a modicum of order and justice."(23) Nepal's poverty is too obvious when one examines socioeconomic indicators such as literacy, health and sanitation, drinking water facilities, average calorie intake, etc. Poverty is rampant in rural areas where the majority of the population live. About 60 percent of the population in rural areas are estimated to have income below the poverty line.

The government so far has failed to make a dent on Nepal's economic problems. The economy grew moderately (by about 3 percent) in 1991-92 but agricultural growth was reduced to 1.5 percent which intensified hardships for the majority of the population. Although 70 percent of the development budget was allocated for rural development, the government could not spend more than half of the resources. The poor performance of the government led the Nepali Congress president to state that "the people are dissatisfied because the pace of development has been slow."(24) The prices of essential commodities have been rising rapidly since the impasse in Nepali-Indian relations and especially due to lifting subsidies and raising administered prices under the economic reform program the government embarked on in 1991-92. The devaluation measure taken by the Koirala government in early July 1991 and the partial convertibility of the rupee announced in March 1992 contributed to further price increases. The prices of essential goods and services increased over 20 percent in the last quarter of 1991 compared with an average annual inflation rate of 10 percent in previous years.

In an attempt to bring about structural adjustment in the economy, the government embarked upon price reform measures in public utilities such as electricity and telecommunication, and public goods such as education and water. The decision to increase prices has been a condition for increased external loans and grants. Such reform measures which were introduced with the goal of reducing the government deficit contributed to hyperinflation. The hyperinflationary pressure provoked civil servants and the unionized industrial

labour to demand wage increases which have been partially met, thus setting off a rapid inflationary spiral. The fact that a large number of people supported the protest demonstrations organized by one of the radical factions of the Communist parties in February 1992 indicates growing public discontent. Much of the failure is attributed to the three decades of economic mismanagement by the panchayat system. Indeed, whatever little economic change took place in the past was confined to the urban areas and their periphery which served the interest of only the vested interest groups, the elites, and the merchants. But part of the failure to improve the economy is attributable to the political stalemate type situation created on the one hand by a strong opposition, and on the other by the growing rift between the Nepali Congress party and its government.

The government is facing numerous problems as stated above. But the government is also muddled about economic policy; its policy goals are developmentalist but its approaches are neoliberalist. There are two distinct groups within the party, one believing in "democratic socialism" and the other in a free market approach. This is obvious if one compares the eighth five year plan (1992-97) and the budget for 1992-93. The former follows a democratic socialist path while the latter subscribes to liberalization and privatization. There are also differences in approach. The eighth five year plan emphasizes the alleviation of poverty using a multisectoral approach while the budget, which deviates from the first budget (1991-92), concentrates on the modern sector, and the government's strategy to privatize state-owned industries including the traditional sector has received wide criticism.

IV. Politicization of the Bureaucracy

It would be wrong to assume that Nepal's bureaucracy is a Weberian type ideal bureaucracy. On the contrary, bureaucracy in Nepal has emerged as a potential threat to its fragile democracy. Indeed, since the early 1950s, the bureaucracy absorbed the tradition of being a political instrument. The agitation by the Nepali Congress party in the fall of 1953 "which went so far that in September 1953 B.P. Koirala was arrested and confined to the Kathmandu Valley" was supported by the civil servants. B.P. Koirala himself was accused of "trying to disaffect the civil servants by writing a letter to them." The Supreme Court declared in November 1953 that the arrest was illegal and as a consequence of B.P. Koirala's action "the civil servants were required to turn over all correspondence which they received from political parties and were forbidden to engage in political activity." The civil service of Nepal worked as an invisible political opposition to the partyless regime. It was a well-known fact even among the rank and file of the panchayat system that the majority of the middle class civil servants, who were university graduates, subscribed to either the Nepali Congress or to the Communist ideology. Since the civil service was banned from unionization, these two diametrically opposite groups did not fight with each other. Instead, they indirectly and passively lent moral and political support to political parties or groups. Interestingly, one of the most organized voices against the first democratic government came from the civil servants who began their political agitation when a coalition interim government was in place, agitation which was withdrawn after the government constituted a pay recommendation commission. However, immediately after the formation of the Nepali Congress government, the civil servants renewed political agitation, which is claimed by the members of the ruling party as a move to discredit the government.(25)

The Nepal Civil Servants Organization had its first national conference in mid-September 1990 which demanded that its entity be officially recognized. The unrest by the 150,000 civil servants in the summer of 1991 demanding increases in salaries and housing and health allowances definitely disturbed the process of institutionalizing democracy. Within days of the formation of the Koirala government maintenance of law and order became again a major problem. In defiance of the prime minister's commitment to maintaining law and order and his appeal to the civil servants to be patient for at least a year, the country's bureaucracy became partially paralyzed as the pro-leftist faction of the lower ranks of the civil servants went on strike. The possible threat to democracy is obvious from Mr. Koirala's warning that "at a time when the reactionary forces were looking for the opportunity to inflict a blow to the new born democracy, any trouble originating from the demands can pose a danger to democracy." But surprisingly the striking civil servants called off the strikes on 24 August without any gains in hand. It seems that the failure of the aborted coup attempt in the Soviet Union and the return of Mr. Gorbachev to power created psychological effects on both striking civil servants and their political mentors. In order to reduce politicization and thereby enhance efficiency of the bureaucracy, the government has embarked upon a two-front strategy. It has offered monetary incentives by raising salaries of the civil servants in April 1992, but has also decided to retire about one-third of the total government employees within the next three years. However, so long as political parties do not make commitment not to use civil servants as an instrument of their politics, depoliticization of the Nepalese bureaucracy will remain a fundamental challenge to the government.(26)

V. The Amorphous Political Parties

In democracy, political parties work as foundations on which governments are formed. Political parties not only organize voters into majorities behind leaders and ideology, but they also try to mobilize the diffuse electorate as a means of bringing dominant issues into focus. Parties also work as platforms that are institutions for rational tests of leadership and statesmanship. Political parties can be studied in many ways: by their ideological orientation, by their objectives, by their national and international perspectives, etc. Ideologically, political parties can generally be grouped into three major groups: the conservatives, the progressives (with a Communist connotation) and the centrists. With specific objects in mind the political parties can be divided into two types: goals-oriented, and power-oriented. Power-oriented parties can also at the same time be goal-oriented because gaining power is invariably associated with attainment of other political goals. Downs' hypothesis that "parties formulate policies in order to win election, rather than win election in order to formulate policies"(27) is applicable to the power-oriented parties. By implication, political parties appear and disappear or reappear in relation to political power. The members of predominantly power oriented parties are not bound by ideological or any sound political philosophy.

Most of the political parties that were born in the aftermath of the restoration of democracy in 1990 in Nepal are power oriented. For example, the two national democratic parties, the Communist party of Nepal (democratic), and a host of others are guided by the sole objective of gaining power through election. By contrast, the Nepali Congress and the Nepal Communist (UML) parties are goal oriented in the sense that they have had certain goals which they have been pursuing partially in some cases, and wholly in other cases. Some factions of the Communist parties are also goal oriented because their main goal in the past was to overthrow the panchayat system.

The Nepali Congress party, which was formed in 1947, is the oldest and the largest party in the country. The Nepal Communist party was formed in 1950 and if all the factions are put together, it becomes the second largest party. Both these political parties have not been able to emerge as fully institutionalized parties. There are a number of problems. These problems are discussed first in the context of the Nepali Congress and thence in the context of the Communist parties. First, the Nepali Congress from its very inception suffered from an internal crisis that arose due to competition for leadership and power. Second, the party faced the problem of what can be called the Weberian syndrome. The party was virtually overwhelmed by Mr. B.P. Koirala's charismatic personality which remained conspicuous until his death in 1982. The leadership void left by his death is the greatest loss for the Nepali Congress. And third, the long and arduous struggle by the party to restore democracy for nearly three decades has obstructed the process of institutionalizing and exercising democratic norms and values within the party. However, the party was able to survive despite internal crisis brought about by circumstances that occasionally led to serious party divisions and factionalism.

The success of the democratic movement has definitely enhanced the Nepali Congress party's position and strength as the results of the general election have made evident. However, the party has three major interrelated challenges insofar as its institutional development is concerned. The first one is that the party lacks a clear and well-identified common national as well as international vision for the 1990s and beyond. Discussion with the party leaders and the members of the rank and file gives one the impression that the party is divided by its economic ideology. Some are strongly in favour of democratic socialism (developmentalists) whereas others favour a strong free enterprise system (neoliberalists). Theoretically, the party has endorsed democratic socialist principles but in reality, this was neither discussed democratically nor applied wholeheartedly. The second challenge is the problem of consolidating and strengthening the party as a modern democratic organization with established rules, procedures, norms and elections. Up until now, the party, which was a loose body of members with divided affinity and loyalty, was operating in a policy vacuum. Besides, the party is also facing the problem of how to channel the different but disparate members scattered all over the country who feel alienated from the party leadership and the party's government. The party members are also labelled as "old" and "new," "pure" and "panchayatized," meaning those who had joined the panchayat system.

As politics is central to power and social status in Third World countries, perhaps even more so in Nepal, many of the old vanguards of the Nepali Congress party feel humiliated to see that some of the junior and unknown entities are appointed by Mr. Koirala to his cabinet and other key positions. This implies that the neglect of those who are influential and have been honest all along will only hamper the institutional development of the party.

The third challenge, which is related to the second, is to effect coordination between the party and its government. This has been a peculiar problem since the early 1950s. Apparently it seems that there is a triangular distribution of political power among Mr. G.M. Singh who is the supreme leader, Mr. K.P. Bhattarai, the party president, and Mr. G.P. Koirala, the prime minister. The implication of such a triangular distribution of responsibility and leadership is that those members who have no patron-client nexus with any of these leaders will have very little chance of benefitting from political patronage, let alone exercising real powers. The "discretionary nomination" to the Upper House in July 1991 aroused controversy and anger among the senior and dedicated workers of the party as the leaders nominated people according to their personal judgement and their assessment of loyalty and proximity. Some of the Nepali Congress members of the parliament as well as its party organization felt humiliated by G.P. Koirala's nomination of one of his relatives relatively unknown either politically or intellectually in the political circle around the member of the cabinet.(28) Some of the senior party members mentioned that "if it is up to Mr. Koirala to judge competence, qualification and expertise, it will be no wonder that he will pick some of his mediocre people around him."(29)

The politics of patronage transpired into a real crisis in mid-September 1991 when Mr. G.M. Singh, the supreme leader of the Nepali Congress party, asked for Mr. Koirala's resignation or else he would quit politics. Mr. Singh alleged that Prime Minister Koirala favoured an extreme form of nepotism and some form of "brahamanism" in making certain key appointments, including the position of minister of finance.(30) The issue was resolved through some compromise and active persuasion from party president, Bhattarai. Unfortunately, the conflict of interests between the prime minister and the supreme leader increased due to the sudden dismissal of some cabinet ministers in late December 1991. The supreme leader of the Nepali Congress accused the prime minister of his party of being a "dictator."(31) The conflict of interest became a crisis at the time of the party's eighth convention held in mid-February 1992.(32) The party supremo had given a three month grace period, which would expire in May, to set things right.(33) The party's outstanding victory in the local elections made Mr. Singh less critical of the prime minister's performance, and the prime minister also pursued a policy of appeasement by appointing some of Mr. Singh's family members and community friends to high level positions. However, such a policy only heightened the frustrations and anger of some of the senior party members who believe that the government is bogged down in sharing powers and privileges between the families of the prime minister and the supreme leader. After the death of one of the three leaders, there will undoubtedly by a split in the party. But considering the current level of conflict, it is quite probable that the party will break up in the near future into two major groups, one led by Mr. Koirala, and the other led by the party president and the supreme leader.

The conflict of interests also aggravated the discontent of the party workers who did not happen to be as close to any of the leaders as others are, due to their family relations or affinity. Simmering discontent might grow into some kind of a canker in the party, which will make the goal of achieving political stability difficult. The politics of patron-client relations will not disappear in Nepal's multiparty democracy. In fact one of the reasons for the importance of the studies of patronage and patron-client relations is social scientists' growing awareness that the "patron-client relations were not destined to remain on the margins of society nor to disappear with the development and establishment of democracies with well-functioning political and economic systems marked by economic development and modernization, or with the growth of class consciousness among the lower strata."(34) But unless political justice is done by leaders commanding powers and resources, it is very unlikely that a party system could be well institutionalized.

The Communist party, the party that is now in the opposition, is more amorphous than the Nepali Congress party. The Communist movement in general in Nepal has a very distorted history. The first Communist party was founded in 1950 under the leadership of Pushpa Lal. The Communist party of Nepal, "to its everlasting regret, had not taken part in the revolt"(35) against the autocratic Rana regime. According to Levi, "the vast majority of Nepali living in India and all political groups pledged cooperation with the movement" against the Rana regime. "The Communists were the exception. They demanded commitment to an anti-Indian policy as their price, a price never paid by the Nepali Congress."(36)

Factionalism has been an inherent feature of the Communist movement in Nepal especially since the Third Convention of the party held in 1965. Prior to the Third Convention, the Communist movement was split into two disparate groups, one group supporting the Soviet line adopting a moderate attitude towards the panchayat system and monarchy. The other group, that is, the pro-Chinese group, adopted a revolutionary strategy against the panchayat system and the monarchy. The pro-Chinese Communists in opposition to the pro-Soviet group convened the Third Convention in 1965. However, it soon became divided along ideological and strategic grounds. Those supporting the Soviet policy split into four main camps in the immediate aftermath of the national referendum. The pro-Chinese faction was divided into more than twenty different variants during 1965-1989. Seen in this perspective, many of the Communist parties operating under different suffixes(37) are fairly new. The United Left Front, a loose unity of seven Communist parties, was created in January 1990 to launch a movement for the restoration of democracy. In December 1990 four of the seven Communist parties (not represented in the interim government) broke away from the United Left Front. In January 1991 the two major factions of the Communist parties, the CPN (Marxist) and the CPN (Marxist-Leninist) merged to form the United Marxist-Leninist party.

The Communists of Nepal are divided on various issues. In the 1960s, the main issue was the Sino-Soviet conflict. By the late 1960s, other issues divided the Communists of Nepal sharply. Those issues were Mao's propaganda for cultural revolution; the Nepali Congress and its strategy; the Indo-Soviet alliance and the creation of Bangladesh; the debate whether to use revolutionary means or to infiltrate the panchayat system; the role of monarchy in Nepal; and the question of Naxalite-type strategy for exterminating the rural landlords. There were differences in both ideology and strategy between various local and regional Communist groups, especially whether or not to stage an anti-zamindar movement.

Added to the changing face of communism in the international arena and to the crisis in the Communist movement in Nepal is its lack of a leader of national stature and vision. The Communist movement has suffered from a lack of consensus on politico-economic issues since its inception. Some talk about "new democracy" in which "peasants, workers, and national capitalists will be supreme, and exploitation by feudal, merchants and capitalist, and other privileged groups will be abolished."(38) Another group represented by the United Marxist-Leninist party seems to be utterly confused. According to the general secretary of the United Marxist-Leninist Party (UML) "the new democracy" envisioned by the group is not socialist, nor Communist. It is entirely a new kind of capitalist system which encourages national capitalism and creates conditions for the transition to socialism. The theoretical link of "new democracy" is "with both socialism and communism."(39) Such a division of opinion is an apparent reason for factionalism, but the implication is that such confusing views hamper growth of political parties.

The most demoralizing psychological effect has been caused by the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe in the late 1980s. The Hoenecker-Ceausescu example of the misuse and corruption of power for building family fortunes amidst mass suffering and discontent gave a serious blow to the Communists of Nepal. The pro-democracy movement in China in the summer of 1989, the economic catastrophes faced by the Soviet Union, and the historic transformation of the Soviet Union into a commonwealth of republics that took place in late December 1991 came as a moral crisis for the Communists of Nepal. The choking of the middle class by the provincial Communist government of West Bengal on the one hand, and the failure to improve the conditions of the working class on the other, further demoralized the Communists of Nepal. These are the recent international events that contributed to the sharp division of the Communists along both ideological and methodological lines. One of the consequences of this situation is that some factions of the Communist party left their party and joined the Nepali Congress.(40)

Insofar as Communists believe in constitutional monarchy and democracy, such cleavages and schisms weaken Communists as political parties. However, the most serious problem with communism in Nepal is the lack of conviction and commitment of the majority of the members of the parties. A great number of the party workers come from middle and higher middle class families, that is, from the land owning class. Most of the