Demands on weapons systems of the RF AF long-range aviation.

Long-range and strategic aircraft systems of the long-range aviation (LRA) will be one of the most important weapons systems in the RF Armed Forces (RF AF) both under the present conditions and prospectively. Until recently, they only formed the air component of the national strategic nuclear forces, the air strategic nuclear forces (ASNF). At the same time, as the threat of a total or large-scale nuclear war diminished, there emerged a tendency to expand the list of missions tackled by long-range (strategic) bombers. In particular, modernization programs were adopted to give the aircraft a conventional capability for addressing the missions.

In order to formulate operational and tactical requirements a prospective aircraft system of the long-range aviation (PAS LRA) of Russia's Air Force should meet, it makes sense, as the present writers see it, to analyze the views of the U.S. Air Force command on the employment of their own strategic aviation in wars of the first half of the 21st century.

The main trends in the development of the U.S. strategic bomber aviation in the forecasted period are as follows: modernizing B-52H and B-1B aircraft; launching the production of new Stealth-based B-2A bombers; supplying all types of bombers with non-nuclear precision weapons. In this context, the dominant tendency in efforts to improve the U.S. strategic bombers which, as before, form the basis of the ASNF, is expanding their capabilities in using conventional-tipped precision weapons (PW) and giving them the status of "double purpose" weapons.

B-52H bombers are assigned a special role, because prospectively they will be the Air Force's only delivery vehicle for air-based strategic cruise missiles (ABCM) with a nuclear warhead (AGM-86B, AGM-129A) and for their conventional-tipped counterparts (AGM-86C); for middle-range guided missiles (GM) (AGM-142, AGM-158), and for anti-ship Harpoon missiles. In addition, the B-52H fleet will be modernized to use new PW systems, including aircraft guided bombs (AGB) of the JDAM type (GBU-31, GBU-32, GBU-33), WCMD cluster bomb units, and guided missiles JSOW and JASSM. The intention is to keep the B-52H in the army till 2025-2030.

PW programs are being implemented to enhance combat capabilities of the B-1B fleet. Their weapons include JDAM-type AGB (GBU-31, GBU-32, GBU-33), WCMD cluster bomb units, JSOW and JASSM guided missiles, and unguided missiles with self-homing antitank submunitions. In addition, it is intended to modernize navigation and communications systems, to install a streamlined automatic combat mission planning system, and to modernize the EW system to enable mid- and high-altitude penetration of enemy air defenses.

While batch-produced, the B-2A bombers will be modernized to employ conventional PW, and all earlier aircraft will be streamlined to use JDAM-type AGB (GBU-31, GBU-32, GBU-33) and GAM-type AGB; JASSM GM; GBU-87, GBU-89, and GBU-97 cluster bomb units; and sea mines. They will also be equipped with Navstar satellite weapon guidance systems, airborne combat mission planning systems, and modernized EW systems.

As far as the Russian PAS LRA is concerned, its tasking designation in future wars can be formulated as follows, proceeding from an analysis of the employment of U.S. and Soviet long-range aviation in armed conflicts and local wars in the last few decades. (1) First, strategic containment and pursuance of combat operations as an element of the RF strategic nuclear forces; second, containment (non-strategic, non-nuclear) and combat operations in local conflicts and regional wars as an element of troop (force) groupings in continental and sea (oceanic) TO.

Strategic containment is connected with the threat of an effective engagement, in the course of military operations, of important administrative centers, as well as economic and military facilities of the countries that determine the strategic balance in the world. Proceeding from this task, the main requirements PAS LRA should meet, in our view, may be the following: intercontinental range of the "aircraft-missile weapons" system; high assured probability of weapons being employed against strategic targets, which is primarily secured by the high survivability of the "aircraft--missile weapons" system as it penetrates air defenses (AD) and by the use of long-range precision weapons; high survivability of aircraft on the ground.

Intercontinental range of RF aircraft strategic systems is assured owing to the use of the "bomber-air-based strategic cruise missile" system. The demand on the tactical range of the prospective long-range bomber will be determined by the range of the prospective air-based cruise missile (ABCM).

The high assured probability of weapons being employed against strategic targets may be achieved by carrier aircraft launching missiles off the zone of fire of enemy ground AD weapons (in the long run, global-range ABCM is likely to be developed). Cruise missiles have an advantage over bombers in that they demonstrate a greater efficiency in penetrating ground air defenses due to their lesser (by an order of magnitude) signature and the capacity to move at extremely low altitudes in terrain-hugging mode.

In addition, high survivability of the "aircraft-ABCM" system (in a situation where shorter- and middle-range missile weapons are employed) may be ensured by the development of a low-signature bomber of the B-2A type, characterized by much greater maximum range. For Russia this possibility is hardly acceptable though, being too costly. For example, 16 billion dollars was spent on the B-2A program, and the cost of one aircraft is in the environs of 800 million dollars.

Thus, considering the prospects for the development of strategic ABCM, the high likelihood of their employment against strategic targets in a nuclear attack will be ensured, in our view, by the use of PAS LRA without it entering the zone of effective engagement with fires by the enemy ground AD weapons.

High survivability of PAS LRA on the ground may be ensured by their dispersal to numerous airfields (civil included). To implement this requirement, PAS LRA should possess basing and self-sustained ground alert capability on no higher than first-class dispersal airfields, and also be little conspicuous to enemy space reconnaissance assets (or possess no distinguishing signs by comparison with surrounding civil aircraft).

In a situation where the adversary achieves strategic surprise effect, the long-range bomber is the only strategic weapon system which, in principle, is able to survive when in ground alert status, because it can withdraw to avoid attack if alerted in time by the early warning system. As is quite clear, this is possible under certain conditions, such as a high level of combat training of the crew, combat readiness of the aircraft system as a whole, comparatively short time needed for an urgent takeoff, as well as a sufficient resistance of the aircraft and its systems to the kill mechanism of a nuclear blast.

Enemy submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) (especially when launched at low-angle trajectory), whose approach time may be about ten minutes, will pose the main threat to long-range bombers based in coastal sectors. So, their basing and dispersal airfields must be outside of the range of these missiles.

Operations in local conflicts and regional wars in continental TO's are likely to involve first precision missile and air strikes at crucial facilities across the whole depth of enemy territory (TO) against the background of a strong AD system and non-strategic antimissile defenses (AMD). They may also involve air strikes, in the course of combat operations, by comparatively cheap and effective conventional precision weapons at crucial targets across the whole depth of enemy territory (TO) against the background of a weak, pocket or suppressed AD system.

One of the main military factors in non-nuclear containment of possible aggression against Russia is precisely the capability (potential threat) to deliver effective missile and air strikes by conventional precision weapons at crucial facilities across the whole depth of enemy territory (TO).

In terms of cost efficiency, PAS LRA is the optimal weapon system for air strikes. What makes it this kind of system are its high combat payload, long range, and high accuracy of munitions deliveries to targets (including delivery of precision aircraft bombs and short-range guided missiles); comparative cheapness of prospective guided (self-homing) aircraft bombs; it being possible to address a number of diverse fire missions during one sortie; high reliability of PAS LRA.

Russia's geopolitical position, as we believe, is such as to confine its long-range aviation, in a conventional war, to the Eurasian continent (it hardly makes sense to consider the North American continent as a territory of combat operations for conventional strategic systems in view of the threat of a retaliatory nuclear strike). Launching long-range missiles from the territory of Russia will ensure that they reach targets in the Eurasian continent even in the face of unsuppressed air defenses. But to employ the "cheap" PW (guided aircraft bombs), the bomber tactical range should be anywhere between 6,000 and 7,000 km, with bombers based outside of the zone where they can be destroyed by potential enemy's conventional precision weapons.

Long-range aviation operations in sea (oceanic) TO's may involve: in peacetime, creation of security zones along Russia's maritime borders and presence in sea (oceanic) zones of its national interests; in wartime, annihilation, in the course of combat operations, of naval striking forces, aircraft forces and other forces, major enemy landing forces in concentration areas, during sealift, and in landing areas; demolition of naval bases and ports; the sealing off of straits zones and, in necessity, assistance to the disembarkation of operational landing forces.

Creating security zones along Russia's maritime borders is necessary in order to make Russian atomic ballistic-missile submarines (SSBN) capable of resisting the enemy in combat patrol areas and preventing massed missile and air strikes from sea and oceanic sectors. What deserves attention and an in-depth study in this connection is equipping the prospective long-range bomber with air-craft-based AD-AMD system so as to destroy aircraft carrying strategic ABCM before missile launch point and enemy submarine-borne ballistic missiles in launch zones at initial trajectory.

Effective engagement of surface targets in a multipurpose carrier group (MCG) has always been the most difficult task for the long-range aviation in combat operations in sea and oceanic TO's. The reason is the powerful zone-facility AD system, which is currently 800 km deep at the MCG center. In addition, using airborne anti-ship weapons is in two stages: target acquisition and designation, and an aircraft's approach to missile launch zone (or one where other weapons can be used). Target acquisition and designation ranges of the equipment on board the attack aircraft are restricted by its specifications and altitude-dependent radar horizon range. Simple calculations show that target designation on board a missile-carrying aircraft takes place as it enters the MCG AD zone, something that places exceptional demands on aircraft survivability in flight.

A likely promising method in dealing with this problem is using the reconnaissance and target designation system of space-based naval facilities, which will be able to secure continuous reconnaissance, acquisition of naval targets, and their classification in the face of enemy electronic countermeasures; generation and issue of target data to consumers, including attacking anti-ship missiles. If in receipt of information from space reconnaissance systems, PAS LRA will be able to fire long-range anti-ship missiles (including over-the-horizon models) without entering MCG AD zone.

PAS LRA range requires a separate consideration where peacetime tasks in security zones along Russia's maritime borders and in sea (oceanic) zones of its national interests are concerned. The same applies to wartime tasks in oceanic (sea) theaters of operations.

The present writers do not aspire to their point of view being the only correct one. At the same time, they think that it is in conformity with trends in the world military-political situation and to a certain extent outlines possibilities of neutralizing some forecasted military threats to Russia.

NOTE:

1. Voennaia mysl', 2003, No. 7, pp. 58-62, 65-70; No. 8, pp. 68-72; No. 9, pp. 75-76.

Maj. Gen. A.G. TSYMBALOV (Res.)

Candidate of Military Sciences

Maj. Gen. S. Ya. RAZIN